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PREFACE

After an interlude in which interest seemed to have shifted to later periods,
there are signs that T'ang studies are once more attracting the attention of a
number of younger western sinologists. Without depreciating the importance of
studying other parts of the seamless web that makes up the history of Chinese
civilization, one can only welcome this renewed attention to the seventh, eighth
and ninth centuries. T'ang was, after all, a great formative period in which
the political institutions of the Chinese imperial system were renewed after
the decline and division that followed the end of Han and in which new begin*
nings in economic and cultural life came to rapid fruition in what was ever
afterwards looked back on as a golden age. Celebrating past glories should not,
of course, be the main aim of historical scholarship, but to investigate the^
interplay of forces which led to the triumphs and disasters of an age like T ang,
so full of both lasting achievements and creative innovations with fateful long
term consequences, must be of perennial interest.
Dr. Guisso's study of the Empress Wu takes a subject which has not lacked
attention of a kind in the past even in English. The sensational aspects of
female rule, exaggerated and distorted by popular legend, and Confucian moraliz
ing, in a society where male dominance was as deeply entrenched as it was in
traditional China have, however, often been the main focus of such interest.
The more serious historical questions raised by her reign have been little ex
plored. Dr. Guisso has opened the debate on several issues, as well as con
tributing to the discussion of problems concerning the role of the Empress Wu
in major societal and political changes of the T'ang period that have been
raised by other scholars in the past.
One of the themes that Dr. Guisso has chosen to discuss is that of legitimacy.
How could a woman establish a claim to supreme authority in the Chinese state
in her own name? Other women before and after Wu Tse-t'ien exercised power as
empresses dowager, ruling in the name of child emperors, but she was the only
one in the whole recorded length of Chinese history who went beyond this and
openly assumed the style and prerogatives of the imperial dignity for herself.
In spite of the affront to Confucian political theory and tradition, this claim
was accepted de facto by her contemporaries and by historians of the T'ang peri
od.
It was left to the Sung historians, especially the Confucian theorist Chu
Hsi, to undertake the "rectification of names."
Dr. Guisso attributes the empress's success in holding the allegiance of her
subjects mainly to "personal and instrumental claims." This seems correct.
Having shared power with her husband for nearly three decades, she still had
the reins of authority firmly in her grasp when he died and was unwilling to
give them up. At the same time her proved competence in government made her
acceptable to the majority of her subjects, whose support enabled her to dis
pose of such challenges as did arise. Where the issue becomes more debatable
is in regard to her ultimate aims. Dr. Guisso goes so far as to suggest that
her primary loyalty was to the T'ang house and that her refusal to relinquish
Vi i
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power was motivated by a desire to consolidate the achievements of the three
previous T'ang reigns in freeing the monarchy from "the constraints of selfseeking aristocrats and . . . factious bureaucrats," seeing in the untrammeled
power of the monarchy the source of the peace and prosperity which had come to
China since the accession of T'ang.
Such a conclusion will hardly go unchallenged, as Dr. Guisso himself suggests.
It seems to credit the Empress Wu with altogether too much altruism and long-^
term political vision. The opposite view, which treats her as simply an unprin
cipled usurper, is as difficult to maintain, however. One of the remarkable
things about the picture we get of her from contemporary sources is the respect
in which she was held by Confucian ministers who served under her, even when
they disapproved in principle of her unorthodox occupancy of a position reserved
for a member of the male sex.
At the heart of the problem is her intention in changing the dynastic name
from T'ang to Chou in 69O.
In the light of earlier precedents this should have
meant a transfer of the Mandate of Heaven from the Li family to the Wu family,
and this is clearly what her Wu relatives expected. There is no clear evidence,
however, that this was ever her intention.
Instead of making the titular em
peror, her son Jui-tsung, go through a ritual abdication and so leaving the way
clear for a change of dynastic line, she merely demoted him to Imperial Successor
{huang-ssu) , making him in addition change his surname from Li to Wu. Was this,
as Dr. Guisso suggests, merely an audacious way of testing her success in con
solidating the strength of the imperial institution, while subtly indicating to
T'ang loyalists that she really had no intention of changing the succession?
Or was it just a first cautious step that was never followed up because she per
ceived that the opposition to a permanent change of dynasty was too great?
A factor that should not be overlooked is Wu Tse-t'ien's feminism, perhaps
not consciously articulated but obvious enough in some of her actions. Her
reign was unprecedented not only in the position which she herself occupied but
also in the roles played by her female advisers and daughters, particularly the
youngest, the T'ai-p'ing Princess, of whom she was particularly fond. Dr. Guisso
has little to say about this but it is surely not without significance when we
try to understand her vacillating indecision with regard to the succession.
It
is evident that she had as poor an opinion of the male members of her own clan
as she had of her sons and the thought of handing over the continuation of her
work to the former rather than the latter, who were after all the offspring of
her own body, held no attraction for her. What she wanted, one may guess, was
to find a way of perpetuating her own line as a dynastic founder; but the Chi
nese patriarchal political and family system provided no means of achieving such
a goal. To make her son reign as her successor, using her surname rather than
her husband's, would have been a partial victory. Even better would have been
to pass the succession to a daughter. Though there is no evidence that the Em
press Wu herself ever contemplated such a step, her granddaughter, the An-lo
Princess, did actually ask her father, Chung-tsung, to make her heir to the
throne. To Confucian minds female succession was unthinkable but in the atmos
phere of female advancement started by the Empress Wu there were women who were
beginning to think the unthinkable.
If this suggests that in offering these prefatory remarks to Dr. Gulsso's
book I do not think he has said the last word on the subject, I hope he will
forgive me. What his book has done is to stimulate me to think again about
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these and other questions relating to an important epoch in T'ang history.
I
trust that it will do the same for others and provide a basis for further stud
ies in the same depth by himself and others in future.

E. G. Pulleyblank

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Tse-t’ien and the Politics of Legitimation in T'ang China is an attempt
to examine and to describe the career of China's only female "emperor" and an
attempt also, by using a particular frame of reference, to place in perspective
her very controversial regime.
I have not set out consciously to write a biog~
raphy but could not avoid, of course, the inclusion of a good deal of biographi
cal detail.
In general, the life of the Empress Wu has been subordinated to
larger themes, and it is for this reason that we can see her remarkable force
of character and virtuosity of mind only through the darkest of glasses.
This study has three emphases. The first is the question of legitimation,
the nature of the Empress Wu's position and power. How did she win recognition
as the legitimate sovereign of a state and a culture which had never before per
mitted a woman to be Son of Heaven? And why, after this unique achievement, did
she fail to preserve her position until her death? What influence did her un
orthodox rise and her anomalous position have upon her times, and what does her
career tell us of the process of legitimation in T'ang China?
These considerations lead to the second emphasis, that of the tension between
Confucian state theory and the contradiction of a female ruler.
In the result
ing clash I attempt to show that the tradition proved to be of greater flexibil
ity than is generally recognized but at the same time proved to be so durable
and resilient that in the Chou, the empress found herself increasingly frustrated
and finally defeated by it. This study suggests that while husband or son occu
pied the throne she was able to borrow their legitimacy and make genuine strides
toward the accomplishment of her chief goals, namely the creation of a viable
centralization and of an imperial institution which would be free, secure and
supreme in its relationship with a new bureaucracy.
In the Chou, when the em
press ruled alone, the contemporary power structure came increasingly to resist
innovation and with growing success. As a result, I suggest, the dynasty is
best regarded as it was at Chung-tsung's restoration, as a caretaker regime, a
period of consolidation and of the continuation of policies -initiated in the
preceding quarter century.
In all probability Empress Wu seized the throne to
preserve rather than to innovate.
This is not to suggest, however, that the Confucian tradition and the value
system it represented survived unchanged. Certain of its components were less
durable than its whole. The traditional hierarchy, for instance, was forced
into a process of gradual change, with the aloof and self-sufficient aristocracy
whose political and societal role had shaped the character of the age of dis
union, beginning its transformation into a quite different sort of ruling class
in response to creation of state status registers and the growth of the examina
tion system. Thus the centralizing and absolutistic thrusts of the empress'
regime helped to modify the customary stratification of early T'ang society and
the perception of status it supported. Certain institutions, such as the fuying system, were forced into decline because the empress saw the state, its
environment and its priorities in rather different terms than did the first
X
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T'ang rulers.
In a positive vein, other institutions were fostered. The Bud
dhist church and the examination system are the most prominent of these, and
their rapid development is to be seen partly in terms in the empress need for
support, but also in terms of her inclinations and temperament and in the close
identification she developed with her people and their aspirations. The tension
between orthodoxy and the rule of a usurping woman was, therefore, an important
force for change and it is to be hoped that I have given it due stress.
The third emphasis is historiographical. Few figures in the history of Chi
na's middle period have been the object of so much discussion, and one result
of this has been the creation of durable stereotypes and recurrent misconcep
tions. Many of these are referred to and examined in the following study, and^
largely through the introduction of new evidence such as the P'an-tung-t'a'i
the commentary on the Gveat Cloud Swbva, and the Saunguk Sagi- account of the
Korean war.
I paint rather a different picture of the empress and her policies
than that which emerges in traditional historiography.
Finally, we may do well to note that the scope of the study is a wide one.
Because it seeks to portray the spectrum of change over a large area both in
temporal and geographical terms, depth has sometimes been sacrificed to breadth
of treatment. The balance between biography and history, description and anal
ysis has been difficult to strike, and some aspects of the period, such as eco
nomic policy, have been treated too lightly.
In choosing what to omit, selection
has been based on the quality of other secondary literature available and, whereever possible, an attempt has been made to identify this literature.
The effort of producing a full study of the reign of the Empress Wu Tse-t'ien
has been a worthwhile one.
It is to be hoped that this study will weaken the
tenacity of outworn paradigms like that of the political rivalry between the
Northwest and the Northeast and the "lewdness" of Empress Wu, and that it will
provide insights into new ones such as the force of Buddhist legitimation.
Its
deficiencies will perhaps identify those many areas in which additional research
would be fruitful.

R. W. L. Guisso

TERMINOLOGY AND ABBREVIATIONS

The roman Ization of terms in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean follows the recom
mendations of the Journal of Asian Studies Style Sheet, while Sanskrit trans
literations are based upon the Dictionary of Chinese Buddh%st Terms by
E*
Soothill and L. Hodous. T'ang place names are hyphenated, while the familiar,
unhyphenated form is used for names describing present locations. Dates con
taining the name of a month have been converted to the Western calendar on the
basis of Todai no koyomi by Hiraoka Takeo. A distinction is made between the
regime and the reign of the Empress Wu, the latter used only to refer to the
period from 690 to 705The following abbreviations have been used in this work:
BSOAS
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CTS
CTShih
CTW
cm
EJAS
HTS
JAOS
JAS
MSOS
PSTS
SKSC
SPPI
SS
TCTC
TD
TFIK
THY
TLSI
TEST
TT
TTCLC
TTLT
WETK
WIIE

Chiu T'ang Shu
Ch’uan T'ang-shih
Ch'uan T'ang-wen
_..............
Kuo-li chung-yang yen-chiu yuan li-shih yu-yen
yen-chiu-so chi-k'an
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
Esin T'ang-shu
Journal of the American Oriental Society
Journal of Asian Studies
d
•
Mitteilungen des Seminars fur Orientalische Sprachen zu BerLin
Chi sha-men pu-ying pai-su teng-shih
Sung kao-seng-chuan
Ssu-pu pei-yao
Samguk sagi
Tzu-chih t'ung-chien
Taisho daizo kyo
Ts 'e-fu yuan-kuei
T 'ang hui-yao
T'ang-lu shu-i
Toryo shui
T'ung-tien
T'ang ta chao-ling chi
Ta-T'ang liu-tien
Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao
Wen-yuan ying-hua
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

In the history of imperial China, the T'ang empress Wu Tse-t'ien occupies a
unique place. For almost half a century she enjoyed supreme power: first in
partnership with T'ang Kao-tsung, a ruler usually considered weak and ineffec
tual, later as de facto regent for her youngest son and finally, from 69O to
705 A.D., as China's sole female emperor.^ Her rise from the obscurity of
T'ai-tsung's harem was dramatic and her pursuit of power ruthless. Her polit
ical policies were controversial and her lifestyle flamboyant. For these
reasons novelists and playwrights have found in her career a frequent source of
i nspiration
For historians, too, she has been a popular subject, and few figures of her
era have been so often or so passionately discussed. Judgments of her place
in history, both by traditional and modern historians, have been diverse, and
to the present day scholars in China continue to debate her merits.3 It is
somewhat surprising, in view of their volume, that traditional studies of the
empress debate a rather narrow range of issues and, reduced to their basics,
restrict themselves generally to two questions. Was the Empress Wu a legit
imate emperor and, i-n personal terms, was she a good or a bad ruler? The con
troversy is framed in this manner, of course, because of the moralistic and
didactic bias of Confucian historiography,^ and before turning to my own ex
amination of her career, I might offer a short survey of the earlier views to
isolate the grounds of controversy and identify some of the problems with which
I shall deal later.
Turning first to the question of the empress' legitimacy, we should note
that theoretical analyses of the nature of legitimate authority are of rela
tively recent vintage, and that while social scientists like David Easton have
made useful contributions to our conceptual understanding, the original formu
lations of Max Weber have stood up remarkably well.5 Weber's suggestion that
there exist three pure types of legitimate authority—the traditional, legalrational, and charismatic^-- is one I shall discuss later in some detail, and
I shall remark here only that it was the first type which constituted the great
barrier to the empress' legitimation. Second, we must bear in mind the dis
tinction between claims to legitimacy and their acceptance--the belief of sub
jects that a particular individual or social order is legitimate.7 For the
historian this distinction is never an easy one, since sources are seldom of
such psychological depth that he can pass judgment on something so elusive as
the reality of belief, and for the seventh century when the vast majority of
the Empress Wu's constituency was wholly inarticulate, definitive statements
are best avoided. What we can say with some certainty, however, is that in her
lifetime the articulate among her subjects acted as if her legitimation were
valid and that after her death, attempts made to deprive her of that status in
official historiography met with only limited success.

1

2

Chapter 1

For both these statements evidence is so full that only a few examples need
to be raised. From the very beginning of the Chou, for instance, officials at
all levels accorded the empress the proper forms of address and homage and, in
contrast to their counterparts under Wang Mang, seem to have carried out her
orders without question. There was no protest, as far as we can tell, when she
performed such hallowed imperial ceremonies as the feng-sharij and even those
anxious for a T'ang restoration seem to have recognized the present legitimacy
of the empress.
In 702, for instance, we find a scholar of this persuasion
memorializing: “I have heard that the empire is the empire of [T angj Kao tsu
and T'ai-tsung. Although Your Majesty (pi-hsia) occupies [the position otj
rightful ruler {aheng-t'ung), certainly you depend on the old foundations ot
the T'ang clan."9
In view of the coercive power at the empress' command, we might be inclined
to suggest an element of dissimulation in this choice of terminology, but argu
ing against it is the attitude of her successor, her son Chung-tsung. At the
T'ang restoration in early 705, he not only accorded her the honorific emperor
[Tse-t'ien ta-sheng huang-ti)^
but in his edict of access ion sa i d: ^
The emperor Tse-t'ien ta-sheng is of real intelligence, perfect virtue
and deep wisdom.
In response to the needs of the time, her excellent
plans of October 16, 690H initiated the grand design of perfect unUy.
Moving the jade seal, she destroyed the avaricious and conferring the
golden halberd, she killed the immoderate. She received the Sign ot the
Lo River [on which was] written she must [follow] the calendar of Hao
Hsi.l2 She cared tenderly for those of virtue among the people and to
gether they obtained humanity and long life.
Finally, she embraced
closely the search for the Tao and fixed her thoughts on wu-we%, endur
ing a life of toil for the sake of the Imperial throne [ta-pao).
'hen
she "restored it respectfully to the intelligent prince." . . .She made
offering at the ancestral temple of Kao-tsu and respected the altars of
T'ai-tsung, not disregarding the old things.13
In this way Chung-tsung set the "official line" on the usurpation, not only
justifying his mother's legitimation but offering imperial recognition of the
fact that a woman had been de facto and de jure emperor. His description of
her legitimation process is most instructive, and we would do well to bear it
in mind in the course of our own analysis.
At the restoration, of course, an element of coercion remained in that Wu
Tse-t'ien was still alive and political control was vested firmly "
of her nephew San-ssu and the Empress Wei. Similarly, the next ru^er,
son Jui-tsung, was much under the influence of his sister T ai-p mg,
J
the attitude of Hsuan-tsung is therefore a much better indicator of how histo y
would view the legitimation of his grandmother. While
no statement on the matter, the fact that in 716 he accepted her VerrtableRec
ords (shih-lu) along with those of Chung-tsung and Jui-tsung'^ suggests that
he was willing to see her as emperor even though she
title on her deathbed.15 Because the Veritable Records formed the principal
source for the Rational History (kuo-shih), it seemed her legitimacy was secure.
In 780, however, the first voice to
off'cial1y the quest ion of Tse
t'ien's usurpation was heard when Shen Chi-ch 1, an official of the Histo y
Office, complained In a lengthy memorial that the account of Wu Chin^^s era had
been cast in the form of an annal {pen-chi) in the Nat^onal H^story.
9

Introduction

3

his argument on the Confucian principle of the rectification of names {ahengmCng), he contended that she was a usurper and her position false {chiait}.)
rather than legal {cheng). Since the Mandate of Heaven had not changed [t'ienming wei-kai) with the deposition of Chung-tsung in 684, the acts of the em
press dowager should be placed in his annals, and even though he did not him
self participate in government, his whereabouts should head each yearly entry.
Te-tsung rejected his advice but, according to the T'ang hui-yao, historians
of the time praised it.^7
This seems to have ended the debate in the T'ang and when the official dy
nastic history was completed in 945, the Empress Wu was duly given annals and
in them referred to as shang or emperor.^® There exists a certain ambiguity,
however, in that the annals are still called those of an empress {huang-hou),
a phenomenon duly noted by the compilers of the New T'ang History (HTS) in
1060.^9 Their attitude is one we can judge with certainty not only in the fin
ished work but also in a separate volume by L'u Hsia-ch'ing, the T'ang-shu ahihpi,^^ which outlines the principles on which the revision of the old T'ang His
tory (CTS) was based.
in it we find direct criticism of the practice of accord
ing annals to empresses and even of including their actions in those of husbands
or sons.21 The Chih-pi does not list Tse-t'ien among the twenty T'ang emperors,
but in the very next passage, which lists the number of chief ministers in each
reign, we find that the empress had sixty-eight tsai-hsiang.^^ The Chih-pi was
impaled upon a dilemma:
if Tse-t'ien were not a legitimate ruler, how could
the events of her period of actual power be recounted consistently in the chron
icle style of history which was the set form of official historiography? Ouyang Hsiu in the New T'ang History^ makes the uneasy compromise of according
her both annals and a biography {lieh-ohuan), remarking in the latter that she
"styled herself" emperor.^3 Only with Ssu-ma Kuang's Comprehensive Mirror for
Aid in Government (TCTC) and the several influential if less "official" works
based upon it do we find a clear position. To Ssu-ma, Wu Tse-t'ien was never
emperor but empress-dowager (t'ai-hou) from 683 until her death.24
In the general perception it was ultimately this latter view which prevailed,
and particularly as Chu Hsi's Tzu-ahih t'ung-ohien kang-mu because the most wide
ly used of historical textbooks, Wu Tse-t'ien became simply a usurping empress
presiding over an illegitimate regime.25 By this time historians were also
turning their attention to other facets of the empress and her rule, and once
again because of the didactic function of history, the central question was
that of "praise-and-blame." The striking feature of the Chou usurpation, and
what made it wholly unprecedented, was of course the fact that it had been
effected by a woman, and in order to understand better the common tendency of
Confucian scholarship to darken the empress' reputation, we shall survey brief
ly the evolution of the traditional prohibition of female influence in govern
ment.
The origins of China's unwritten Salic principle are obscure but of great
age.
In spite of the impressive body of evidence which suggests that China's
earliest society was matrilinear and perhaps matrilocal, and in spite of the
fact that in its mythological tradition one of the Three Rulers isan-huang) was
female,26 the bias against women being active outside the home appears in the
earliest works of what was to become the canonical tradition. "The hen does
not announce the morning," says the Book of History (Shu-ohing)j "the crowing
of a hen in the morning indicates the subversion of the family."27 The Book of
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Odes (Shih-ohdng) contains several songs, suggestive of similar attitudes, like
the following:
A clever man builds strong ramparts,
A clever woman overthrows them.
Beautiful is the clever wife.
But her heart as cruel as that of the owl.
Women with long tongues
Are harbingers of evil.
Disasters are not sent down from Heaven—
They originate in wives.
These two can neither be taught nor led.
Wives and eunuchs.
When they start slandering people.
At first the ruler does not hide them.
He even says? "They can go nowhere.
What evil could they do?"
But they are like merchants selling at triple profit.
All those wiles are known to the wise.
They do not let wives meddle in public affairs.
And keep them to their spinning and weaving.28
It was, of course, because these writings were associated with Confucius,
who himself declined to associate with "women and inferior persons,"29 that the
bias gained increasing strength, and until the early Han informal prohibition
seemed sufficient to keep women out of politics. The virtual usurpation of the
Empress Lu from about 187 B.C., therefore, confronted commentators with an un
precedented situation, and the Han historians had to invent the phrase "appear
in court and pronounce decrees" {l-Ln-ah'ao ah'eng-ehi-h) to deal with it.30 The
phrase was to be used of at least eight dowagers in the Han,31 and so pronounced
and deplorable was female influence in the period that later commentators found
it a principal cause of the dynasty's fall.32 |n 222 A.D. Wei Wen-ti issued a
formal decree that women were forbidden to involve themselves in politics.33
The subsequent period of disunion saw no repetition of formal prohibitions,
but the growth rather of customary recognition that in certain closely defined
"emergency" situations, empresses or empress dowagers might exercise a tempo
rary regency, though in all cases they were duty-bound to "restore the throne
to the intelligent prince" [fu-tHen yu ming-p'i)
Both in North and South,
however, we find instances of women who exceeded the definition of their role,
and from the Sui-T'ang reunification we can trace a determination that such
breaches of Confucian tradition not recur. The T'ang attitude is well expressed
by Wei Cheng and his colleagues in a Sui-shu passage which also comments on the
disharmony in the family lives of the Sui rulers:
In the Chin and Sung, a great number [of women] all gained their position
by [imperial] favor and their rise was not due to virtue. Soon after,
[their] conduct became corrupt and none observed Zi and i. By [women who
were like] birds which devour their parents, [dynasties] were destroyed
and did not return. Later examples are numerous. . . . Thus, we record
the biographies of empresses to hand down a warning to the future.35
Even from this briefest of surveys it should be apparent that by the T'ang
the conviction that female non-interference in politics as a desirable feature
of the natural order was a well-established one. The first T'ang empresses.
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although of "barbarian" extraction and therefore accustomed to a relatively ac
tive life,36 were models of compliance and restraint, and in the context of Confucian historiography, Wu Tse-t'ien was bound to suffer in comparison. The old
T'ang History therefore praises the virtues of T'ai-tsung's empress while com
paring the evil of Wu to that of a viper,37 and the New T'ang History though^
admitting that Wu was far superior to her successor, the Empress Wei, still in
sists that both women serve as a warning to future rulers.38
It is difficult to say, as we read the traditional commentators, whether
their hostility to Wu Tse-t'ien derives more from the fact that she was a usurp
er or a woman, and perhaps the question is too academic to merit discussion.
What we must realize is that her sins were seen as offenses against a tradition,
an order, an entire way of life, to which her critics remained loyal. Even dur
ing the lifetime of the empress, the first condemnation, an eloquent indictment
written as a manifesto for the rebellion of 684, took this line.
In it Lo Pinwang39 charges:
The woman Wu, who has falsely usurped the throne, is by nature obdurate
and unyielding, by origin truly obscure.
Formerly, she was among the
lower ranks of T'ai-tsung's servants and served him by changing his
clothes. When she reached maturity, she brought disorder to the palace
of the crown prince . . . she usurped the pheasant regalia of empress
and entrapped our ruler in incest.
Then, with a heart like a serpent and a nature like that of a wolf,
she favored evil sycophants and destroyed good and loyal officials. She
killed her sister, butchered her elder brothers, murdered the ruler,
poisoned her mother. She is hated by gods and men alike. ®
As we shall see, some of these allegations were to find their way into later
accounts, but what should be noted here is the reaction of the Confucian mind
against a woman who had not only betrayed such cardinal virtues as humanity and
wifely submission, but in so doing had challenged an ancient tradition which
guaranteed wordly harmony and gave both livelihood and self-respect to the Con
fucian scholar-official. This class, with its monopoly on the writing of his
tory, was almost bound to emphasize the ruthless and unconventional aspects of
the empress' success, her "heart like a serpent and nature like a wolf," in or
der to defend the integrity of the state system.
This is the most basic explanation for the form taken by historical criticism,
and it is consistently applicable down to the present century.
In many works, of
course, the "blame" is balanced by some degree of praise, and in the two T'ang
Histories and the Comprehensive Mirror we find the historian looking favorably
upon the empress for her decisiveness and ability to accept remonstrance, her
veneration of upright men, her final settlement of the succession on the Li clan,
and the control she exercised over her family, her favorites, and her "evil" of
ficials.^^ The overall judgment, however, remains negative and many scholars
representative of their age--Yuan Shu and Chu Hsi, Wang Fu-chih and Fang Hsiaoju, as well as such prolific and perceptive Ch'ing essayists as Chao I and Wang
Ming-sheng--have ensured that unfavorable opinion prevailed. ^ The rise of the
Empress Dowager Tz'u Hsi in the latter part of the nineteenth century brought
inevitable comparison with Wu Tse-t'ien, and the latter's inability to arrest
dynastic decline must have validated in some minds, at least, the old strictures
against women in power.
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Prior to 1911 the Empress Wu thus found few admirers, and although we can identlfy among them at least one scholar of stature in most periods,^3 Jt was not
until the new intellectual climate of the twentieth century that revisionist
views began to appear. Marxist historians have been most active in her rehabili
tation, but well before 19^9 the notable studies of Ch'en Yin-k'o were finding
new social significance in the regime of the Empress Wu.
In one article, in par
ticular, he attacked several of the old stereotypes, including that of her lewd
ness by suggesting that as a female emperor she was perfectly entitled to a male
harem!^^
For Marxist historians, at least prior to the Cultural Revolution, the Em
press Wu was a heroine, champion of the masses in the historic class struggle
against the aristocracy and great landlords. Two important authors, Ts'en Chung
mien and Lu Ssu-mien, are not persuaded that her achievements outweigh her bru
tality and other "feudal" characteristics,but theirs is the minority view.
The authors of three of the most important textbook surveys of Chinese history
all portray her in a favorable light, seeing her as being ahead of her time in
attacking the privileged classes, elevating the position of women, and foster
ing the examination system and the culture of her people.Other academic and
cultural leaders in China have echoed these views, and because names like Kuo
Mo-jo, Yang Chih-chiu and Wu Han were found among them,the rehabilitation of
Wu Tse-t'ien was rapid.
At the end of the 1950s, however, a wide-ranging debate on the empress broke
out. Arising principally out of an article by Wu Tse,^^ it was to last for sev
eral years and was to develop the interpretation considered standard until the
Cultural Revolution. Professor Wu's basic point at the time was that several
previous works had failed to stress adequately the class struggle of their peri
od, and to show that the masses, not the ruling classes, are the driving force
of history. At the same time, there was failure to recognize that the influence
of an individual is not incompatible with historical materialism, and the Em
press Wu is a case in point. The Vii-ting system of the Sui and T'ang, he goes
on to suggest, was essentially a control mechanism designed to ensure the con
tinuing power of members of the aristocratic-landlord class. T'ai-tsung began
to weaken their power, but it was only with the advent of the Empress Wu, whose
background had made her more class-conscious than her predecessor, that an al
liance was effected among merchant, small landlord and bureaucrat to challenge
them. By fostering their rise and simultaneously attacking the old ruling class
in other ways, she broke their power even before the declaration of the Chou at
which time conflict became internalized within the ruling class. During Chou
the empress remained representative of the class she had fostered, but as the
dynasty became increasingly corrupt, the remnants of the T'ang family were able
to ally themselves with small and middle landlords to bring about a restoration.
Throughout the process the Empress Wu carried out many policies to benefit the
peasant, but did so not out of altruism but because of the exigencies of class
struggle. She was a great ruler but, nonetheless, a "feudal" emperor.
This very interesting analysis was the last detailed study of the empress
prior to the Cultural Revolution, and in the present climate of ideological un
certainty, the debate has yet to be resumed.
It is interesting to note that
only in the present century have historians begun to transcend the questions
raised in Confucian historiography, and as the reevaluation progresses, espe
cially in social history, the regime of the Empress Wu is coming to be seen as
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a period of rather marked transition. The process of reappraisal, however, is
a lengthy one, and as three fairly recent non-Marxist book-length studies^9 of
her period show, the old stereotypes of the empress are durable, and her life
is by itself so fascinating that historical change is still rather poorly docu
mented in comparison.
I hope that my study does not neglect the old questions
but also sheds some light on the position of the Empress Wu, on how she gained
it and how she used it.
In addition, I hope to examine her policies, particu
larly those which relate to social change, politics and the examination system.
Buddhism, and China's external affairs In the seventh century. Finally, I shall
attempt to show more clearly the origins of the Empress Wu's historical reputa
tion and, in so doing, draw a more accurate picture of one of China's most con
troversial rulers.

Chapter 2
SOURCES FOR THE LIFE AND CAREER OF WU TSE-T'IEN

The chief primary sources for the life of the Empress Wu are her annals in
the two dynastic histories of the T'ang, her biography in the New T'ang History,
and the numerous references to her in Ssu-ma Kuang's Comprehensive Mirror.^
In
some of the large official compilations of later ages, like the Ts'e-fu yuankuei,^ there are to be found several allusions and fragments of documents not
elsewhere preserved, and
material of this sort is also to be found in some of
the private essays and anecdotes of the T'ang.3 The sizable corpus of writings
attributed to the empress herself consists mainly of edicts and other official
documents, but some of her poetry and ceremonial verses are extant, and even
though commentators are reluctant to acknowledge her direct authorship, some
seem fairly personal in tone.^ In addition, the biographical sections of the
dynastic histories record many incidents concerning her and conversations with
her, so that we are able
to assemble a fuller sketch of her character and her
life than is possible in
the case of most of her contemporaries.
If the sources are relatively extensive, there are compensating drawbacks.
Wu did not become empress until she reached her late twenties and records of her
life to that time are extremely scarce. More importantly in the present con
text, the sources which tell of her rise and outline her subsequent career are
"official" in nature, and thus their reliability is open to question. This
problem arises from two causes, one of which I mentioned earlier. The Confucian literatus, even in his role as objective historian, was bound by his duty
to provide lessons for the future, and his treatment of a woman ruler who was
also a usurper inevitably reflected a certain disapproval. A second cause is
the fact that the Empress Wu shared with other rulers, like her predecessor
T'ai-tsung, a concern with historical reputation and, like him, was not above
deliberate falsification of the record.5 In her case, we might point to the
dubious assertions of the edict which raised her to the rank of Kao-tsung's em
press® and later to the appointment of "tame" historians to oversee the writing
of history in her own time.7
In order to understand the degree to which these influences occur in our ma
jor sources, the dynastic histories and the Corrprehensive Mirror, we might begin
by trying to discover the origin of their information. Appendix A, which fol
lows a methodology developed by E. G. Pulleyblank,® compares their accounts of
five incidents and reveals not only their consistent, if small, difference of
attitude toward the empress, but also establishes that the few incidents re
corded about her early life can be traced in most cases to the Veritable Records
of herself and her husband.
The question of the circumstances of the composition of these records during
early T'ang is a complicated one because of the disagreements in bibliographic
sources,9 and although we are certain that Ssu-ma Kuang used the thirty-e?zuan
version of the Veritable Records of Nu Tse-t'ien presented to the throne by Liu
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Chih-chi and Wu Ching in 716,'° we find two earlier versions mentioned in other
sources. The first of these was by Tsung Ch'in-k'o who, as a relative of the
empress and a supporter of her usurpation,'' might be expected to produce a work
favorable to her. Of course, we know nothing of the scope and content of Tsung's
work and whether or not it treated the controversial events of 681t-690, but we
might reasonably assume that it formed the basis of the slightly expanded ver
sion presented to the throne in 706.'
The supervisor of this compilation was
Wu San-ssu, cadet nephew of the empress. Although the position of supervisor
was often a nominal one, he seems to have taken an active part in the work since
Liu Chih-chi and Wu Ching, who worked under him on an earlier national history,
both had occasion to complain of his interference.'^ In the production of his
aunt's records he may well have exercised a good deal of editorial discretion,
and it was perhaps for this reason that Hsuan-tsung had them revised. Neither
Liu Chih-chi nor Wu Ching were admirers of the empress but, judging from the
fragments of their VeritahZe Records preserved in Ssu-ma Kuang's k'ao-'L, they
treated her with objectivity.'^
In 716 the Veritable Records of Wu Tse-t'ien were presented together with
those of Jui-tsung and Chung-tsung and it is clear, therefore, that Liu and Wu
were responsible for the final version of the Veritable Records for the period
from 68A to 713. The role of Empress Wu in government during that period was,
of course, an overt one, but prior to 684 contemporaries were less certain of
her role and the degree of actual influence she had over her husband. Moreover,
as we shall see, there were certain aspects of her background and rise that she
might logically wish to conceal, among them her relatively obscure lineage, her
concubinage to T'al-tsung, the beginnings of her liaison with Kao-tsung, and the
machinations by which she helped ruin her rival, the Empress Wang.
Information
on these matters would be found in the Veritable Records of T'ai-tsung and Kaotsung, and it is natural that she would attempt to exercise some control over
their content, just as she tried to influence the historiography of the later
period.
Indications are that she was successful.
There is some disagreement about the compilation of T'al-tsung's Veritable
Records, but an impressive body of evidence suggests that Hsu Ching-tsung'^ was
a major, if not the principal contributor to them.
Ssu-ma Kuang, for instance,
refers to the version he used as the Hsu Ching-tsung T'ai-tsung shih-lu.'i Hsil's
name appears again in 659 ss the compiler of a tvi&nty-chwxn Veritable Record cov
ering the period from T'al-tsung's death to 658, and he may have supplemented
this before his death in 672 since the old T'ang History mentions a Veritable
Record in thirty chuan.^^ It seems unusual that a young emperor like Kao-tsung
would have his own Veritable Record begun so early in his reign without some
special reason, and the conjecture that the Empress Wu was the instigator is
strengthened by two facts. Her open concern with how history would treat her
rise and her role in her husband's reign was shown in the fact that the final
version of Kao-tsung's Veritable Record, in a hundred cKiian, was issued under her
name.'9 Besides, Hsu Ching-tsung was the most important of her close supporters.
Hsu, born in 592, was of southern origins, the son of a high Sui official
killed by Yu-wen Hua-chi. He was a precocious scholar, one of the handful of
men who passed the difficult hsiu-ts’ai examination in the Sui, under which he
first held office. After serving the rebel Li Mi, he switched his allegiance
to the T'ang and joined the staff of T'ai-tsung who seems to have heard of his
literary abilities. His career thenceforth was a distinguished one. After a
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succession of promotions which ended in the presidency of the Board of Rites,
he began to work in 63^ on the compilation of the national history and then on
the Veritable Records. He twice suffered mild disgrace, once for a breach of
propriety and once for his avarice when he married his daughter to a "barbarian"
chieftain.
It was just as he emerged from the second demotion that the issue
arose of Wu's elevation to empress and by immediately espousing her cause, he
won the gratitude of Kao-tsung and assured himself of a successful future. His
relationship to the new empress was a close one, and it was he who undertook for
her such delicate tasks as persuading Kao-tsung to elevate her son to crown
prince and to exile or execute the chief ministers who had opposed her rise.
After their fill he became the paramount civil official of the realm, a status
he did not relinquish until his retirement, and at his death in 672 Kao-tsung
paid him the great honor of himself donning mourning clothes. Needless to say,
his reputation in Confucian historiography is an infamous one.
As an historian he was an entrepreneur, and the opportunism and lack of scru
ple suggested by other aspects of his career are confirmed by reliable sources
which accuse him of falsifying the record on more than one occasion.in 673
Kao-tsung found several blatant falsehoods in his account of T'ai-tsung and oi—
dered them corrected,
but how far these corrections went we can only guess.
It
is interesting to note that Ssu-ma Kuang is unable to date Wu's entrance into
T'ai-tsung's harem since the event goes unrecorded in any source he considers
reliable.22 por the same reason confusion has long existed in such matters as
the date of her birth, her supposed entry into a convent on T'ai-tsung's death,
and the birthdates of her two eldest sons, one of whom may have been born to her
elder sister. The existence of rumors about these things even in her own life
time suggests how carefully they were obscured.
Later historians, from Liu Chih-chi onward, have expressed scorn or puzzle
ment on the reliability of the primary sources for the early T'ang,23 and there
is little doubt that their attitude is justified. Particularly in the case of
the Empress Wu, and because of her relationship with Hsu Ching-tsung, later of
ficial historians, like the authors of the old T'ang History found it necessary
to openly reject certain details of her father's career because of their con
viction that Hsu exaggerated or falsified his achievements.2^
The task of the modern historian is, therefore, not an easy one, and he must
attempt to distinguish the truth which lies between the operation of two oppos
ing principles. The following chapter, which deals with the most controversial
period of the empress' life, seeks to identify the specific areas of historical
uncertainty and to offer at least some conjecture on what the truth might have
been in these matters.

Chapter 3
THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF WU TSE-T'IEN

The first problem to confront a biographer of the Empress Wu is the difficulty
of determining the details of her family background and her early life.
I have
earlier alluded to the unreliability of the Veritable Records for the reigns of
T'ai-tsung and Kao-tsung, and have suggested that the national historians of the
T'ang as well as the later dynastic historians were suspicious of their sources
and so tended to omit from their accounts any detail they regarded as flatter
ing to the empress and her family. As a result, primary source references are
fewer than might otherwise be the case.
I have also admitted the justice of these historians' scepticism in view of
the likelihood of falsification, but we should be aware at the same time of the
possibility of overcompensation on their part.
For example, it is generally
acknowledged that in order to bolster her legitimacy in the aristocratic cli
mate of the early T'ang, Tse-t'ien took the not unusual step of falsifying her
genealogy.^ Several of her contemporaries succeeded in having their dubious
lineages incorporated into the dynastic histories, but in her case the biography
of her father Shih-huo mentions not a single one of his ancestors even though,
as will be shown, his father's official career in the Sui is attested by reli
able sources.
The biography of Wu Shih-huo is, of course, our standard account of the Em
press Wu's background and is also an instructive example of the historiographi
cal processes we have been discussing. This is particularly clear when we com
pare it with a little-known source called the P'an-Zung-t'a’i 'pe'l, a commemora
tive inscription the empress commissioned for her father in 699*^
The biography reads:
Wu Shih-huo was a man from Wen-shui in Ping-chou.3 His household was a
wealthy one and he was rather fond of social intercourse. When Kao-tsu
first brought troops to Fen-chin, he stopped at his home and [Shih-huo]
was thus privileged to make his acquaintance.^ When Kao-tsu became T’a-tyuan li-u-shou, he recruited [Shih-huo] as hsing-ahun ssu-h'aiAt the
time, bandits and rebels rose as [numerous as] hornets and Shih-huo would
secretly urge Kao-tsu to raise troops [and rebel against the Sui]. He
[also] presented him with a book [of his own composition?] on military
matters, together with a fu-gui.^ Kao-tsu said to him, "Please say no
more. Military books are forbidden articles, yet you still give one to
me, [so] I well understand your meaning. Together we must certainly pros
per."
When he was about to raise his righteous rebellion, Kao-tsu levied
troops and sent Liu Hung-chi and Ch'ang-sun Shun-te7 to share the lead
ership [in this task]. Wang Wei and Kao Chun-ya^ spoke secretly to Shihhuo saying, "Hung-chi and his men are all traitors to the Imperial Guard.
This is a capital crime, [so] how can they lead troops? We want to
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imprison and investigate them." Shih-huo replied, "They are all repre
sentatives (fe'o) of the Duke of T'ang.
If you do so, great confusion
will follow." Wei and his group therefore hesitated and did not act.
The tiu-shou ssu-ping T'ien Te-p'ing9 also wanted to encourage Wei and
the others to make a judicial inquiry into the situation of the levy.
Shih-hou said to him, "The troops they are recruiting will all be at
tached to the Duke of T'ang. Wang Wei, Kao Ch‘un-ya and their group have
no power of their own, [so] how can they do this?" Thus Te-p'ing de
sisted.
When the [T'ang] uprising began, Shih-huo was made ta-ohiang-oh^ fuk'ai-ts'aa.^^ He participated in taking the capital and for his merit
[was rewarded with the titles] kuang-lu ta-fu and T'ai-yuan ahun-kung.^^
Previously, when the rebellion was about to begin, Shih-huo was unable
to predict the outcome. When the capital was taken, he claimed he had
dreamed that Kao-tsu had entered the Western capital and [then] risen to
be emperor. Kao-tsu [on hearing this] smiled at him saying, "You were
connected with Wang Wei and [still] were able to remonstrate and prevent
[him from seizing] Hung-chi and the others. Your sincerity is worthy of
record and so I rewarded your devotion. Now you see that the matter is
concluded and so say this absurd thing to flatter me."
In the Wu-te period, [Shih-huo] was promoted successively to the post
of kung-pu shang-shuj and his enfiefment was raised to Duke of Yingkuo.^^ He also served as tu-tu of Li-chou and Ching-chou.^3 In the
ninth year of ohen-kuan [635], he died in office and was posthumously en
titled ti-pu shang-shu^^ with the temple name of Ting^ Constant."^5
To the casual reader this account appears straightforward and relatively un
biased. The Empress Wu came from a wealthy clan and was the daughter of a man
who rose to prominence by early supporting Kao-tsu in his rebellion against the
Sui. Seen within the context of T'ang biographical writing, however, the nar
rative is characterized by a certain implicit deprecation. Not a single one of
Shih-huo's ancestors is mentioned, so that his lineage, it is implied, \/jas un
distinguished. He was wealthy. Was the source of his wealth the despised pro
fession of commerce or is mention of the fact made because his clan had no other
claim to renown? He participated in the events connected with the fall of the
Sui capital. Did he play no more substantial part than this in the T'ang founda
tion? He held posts up to the level of president of the Board of Works {kungpu shang-shu), but did he do nothing worthy of record in them? Was he really
the rather timid opportunist who seems to emerge from the anecdotes chosen to
give flesh to the details of his career progress?
These are but some of the questions which might occur to one familiar with
the official biographies of the period, and if their answers indicate an implied
hostility, the reasons are not hard to understand. T'ang beliefs about heredity
were such that by distorting the origins and minimizing the achievements of Wu
Shih-huo, the historian could indirectly cast aspersions on the character and
career of his daughter, the Empress Wu.*°
This seems indeed to have been the case when we compare the above account
with that given in the T'an-tung-t’a-t pet.
In doing so we must bear in mind
that the inscription, too, is not a wholly reliable source for it is typical of
its genre in the hagiography of its tone and in the dubious nature of some de
tails.
Its author, Li Chiao, was a noted official and litterateur of the Chou,
and though not strictly speaking a sycophant, he was closely identified with
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The Pei is clearly tendentious, if only because the em

press commissioned it, but by using it carefully and referring frequently to
other sources for verification, we can find in it the most comprehensive ac
count of the empress' immediate background. At over six hundred lines, it is
too lengthy for complete citation, but in the following discussion, I hope to
cover the salient details.
The Pei begins with an outline of the Wu clan's genealogy, a subject to
which I shall later return, but in speaking of Shih-huo's parentage it differs
from the official accounts by omitting all reference to his family's wealth.
The omission may well be an attempt to dispel the persistent rumor that Shihhuo's background was mercantile, a response to the frequent charge by contem
porary enemies that Wu Tse-t'ien was of low or "unsuitable" birth.The
truth of this matter is difficult to ascertain, but most relatively recent
scholarship reproduces the view that Shih-huo's family dealt in timber, a de
tail recorded in a ninth-century local history and repeated in the T'ai-p'ing
kuang-ahi.^^ The relevant passage, "in his youth [Shih-huo] dealt in timber
together with a man called Hsu Wen-pao of the [same] city," is not conclusive
and seems rather to suggest that Shih-huo's business was personal, not famil
ial.
It would not be unusual for a younger son, even of landholding or offi
cial family, to engage in a pursuit of this sort, and Lo Pin-wang's charge
that the empress' origins were "truly obscure" might thus be greatly exagger
ated. The point is raised here to illustrate the manner in which the Pei di
verges from the official accounts and encourages an alternate explanation.
We will pass on now to the concrete facts it relates.
According to the Pei, Shih-huo was born in 577, the fourth son of Wu Hua
who held the position of oheng of Loyang in the reign of Sui Wen-ti.^O The
distinguished lineage provided for him goes back to the Chou, and while the
earliest ancestors mentioned are probably spurious, there is good reason to
believe that the genealogy from the T'o-pa Wei onward is genuine.If so,
the Wu clan was closely connected with the T'aiyijan area for several genera
tions, and if it was not numbered in the national aristocracy as the empress
tried to pretend,^2 it was almost certainly a clan of local prominence with
some renown based upon past nobility and upon present membership in the minor
official and perhaps military class.^3
The next point in the Pei, that it was Shih-huo who raised his clan to
empire-wide prominence, is in agreement with official accounts. The manner in
which this was achieved, however, is described differently. According to the
Pei, Shih-huo was no mere opportunist who rose through a fortuitous connection
with Kao-tsu, but rather was a man who gained fame for his filial actions on
his parents' death and so received several p'i-ohao summons to office from Sui
Wen-ti.2^ On the advice of a yin-yang diviner, and because he had no confi
dence in the Sui, Shih-huo initially refused, accepting only on the interven
tion of the governor of T'aiyuan.25 There is, however, no confirmation in Sui
records that Shih-huo ever held office in the period, much less that he aroused
the jealousy of the powerful Yang Su whom the Pei has remarking, "I have no
ticed that Wu's talents and appearance {feng-ku) are certainly of heroic degree.
Now we enjoy an era of peace, so why use this man?"26
Whatever the truth of the matter, the Pei goes on to relate that when Wenti died, Shih-huo feared this jealousy and so retired to private life. He
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then devoted himself to a study of military matters. He was able to predict
to his brothers the failure of Yang-ti's Korean expedition of 611 and also to
produce a thirty-e?ziian work on strategy and tactics, called the Ku-chin pingyao.^^ This is probably the work he is said later to have presented to Kaotsu.
In 613 he had an opportunity to test his knowledge, for he happened to
be in Loyang when the city was besieged by the rebel Yang Hsiian-kan. Accord
ing to the Petj it was his advice which prevented surrender.28 Again we find
no confirmation of the incident, but the Pei offers an explanation, saying that
Shih-huo feared the envy of Yang-ti and so insisted that his participation go
unreported!29
When Yang-ti fled to the South in 6l6, Shih-huo is reported to have told
his brothers, "This is a journey from which he will not return!" but when they
encouraged him to rebel himself, he refused.30 Similarly, he realized that the
prominent rebel Li Mi would not succeed, and he declined an invitation to join
him.31 Only when Kao-tsu came to T'aiyUan did he recognize greatness: "How
brave and heroic, yet how plain and easy [of manner?]; how intelligent, and
marvelously courageous! This is a man with whom one can devote oneself [to
founding a dynasty]!"3^ Shih-huo soon paid a courtesy call with the result
that "Kao-tsu . . . took his hand and placed his confidence in him.
[It was
like the way] Duke Wen of Chou obtained [the services of] Chiang Ya."33 The
partnership was strengthened when he accompanied the emperor-to-be in the sup
pression of brigands in Kao-yang3lt and when, afterwards, Kao-tsu became a guest
at his home.
The Pei inserts in the narrative here the dream referred to in the old T'ang
History account and, as if in anticipation of its criticism, claims that Shihhuo revealed immediately not only the dream but also some mysterious voices he
had heard predicting Kao-tsu's success.35 |n addition, the Pei account of the
dream differs from that of the old T'ang History in relating that Shih-huo also
ascended to the heavens and touched the sun and the moon--an interpolation
clearly designed to show that his offspring would also found a dynasty.
With the exception of conventional references to dreams and portents, the
Pei to this point need not strain credulity; indeed, the notion that Shih-huo
took the initiative in meeting Kao-tsu seems most reasonable. After this sec
tion, however, exaggerations about his achievements and honors become more pro
nounced. The reason lies perhaps in the general confusion of the T'ang founda
tion; falsification here would not easily be detected.
The Pei tells, for instance, of how Kao-tsu was "greatly pleased" about the
dream and the military textbook and how Shih-huo advanced rapidly to the re
ception both of high honorific rank and of a ducal title.36 On more than one
occasion his military expertise is supposed to have "saved the day" in the
course of the T'ang conquest, and when the capital fell, he is said to have
been rewarded with a mansion, promotions, 5.000 tuan of silk and 3,000,000
cash.37 This seems dubious since there is no official record that men even
more prominent than he in the campaign received rewards of such magnitude.
The subsequent honors mentioned in the Pei go similarly unrecorded elsewhere,
and we might well be suspicious of such claims, for instance, that Shih-huo
declined the two highest posts in the administration during the first year of
the new dynasty.3° Instead, says the Pei, he accepted a position without fixed
duties but with rank equal to the chief ministers {t'ung dhung-shu men-hsia sanp'in)a designation, according to the New T'ang History treatise on officials.
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Details of this sort we must reject.

The next major incident recounted, Shih-huo's appointment as president of
the Board of Works (Kung-pu) in 620, is well documented in other sources, and
we can find confirmation in the Ts'e-fu yuan-kuei that at about the same time,
Kao-tsu praised his integrity and honored his brothers with appointments as a
sign of his regard for Shih-huo.^^ Even more striking is the allegation in the
Pei that Kao-tsu himself served as broker {hun-chu) in arranging Shih-huo's
second marriage into the eminent Yang clan, to a cousin of the last Sui emper
or.Because of the inequality in clan status, historians have long been
puzzled about how this marriage was effected, but here again the Pei is con
firmed by a Ts'e-fu yuan-kuei notice which differs in detail but which shows
that the emperor himself suggested both the marriage and the bride.^3 This
union, concluded probably in
was to become the Empress Wu.

620,

produced three daughters of whom the second

It is interesting to note here the skill with which Li Chiao intersperses
these verifiable facts with assertions of a more dubious nature. We find no
confirmation, for instance, that Shih-huo's brothers were awarded the rank of
ohun-kung nor, indeed, for the statement that "afterwards, when Kao-tsu made a
trip, he often ordered Shih-huo to manage the affairs of the tribunal [of cen
sors?], to be at the same time in charge of the troops and horses of the [Pal
ace] Guard of North and South, and to judge (p'an) the presidents of the Six
Boards.Although unlikely to be true, these notices gain an air of verisi
militude by their placement among otherwise documented facts.
In* 624 Shih-huo received a temporary assignment to pacify the Yang-chou area
following the rebellion of Fu Kung-shih,^5 and after an administration so suc
cessful that he received imperial commendation,^^ he returned to the capital in
late 626 at the accession of T'ai-tsung. The following year saw the abortive
rising of Li Hsiao-ch'ang in Shan-nan,47 and the Pei reports that when T'aitsung asked his ministers for a suitable candidate to quell the remnants, "all
considered that unless Shih-huo [were put in charge], it could not be done."^^
He was duly appointed governor-general of Li-chou and seems to have remained
here until 63I when he was transferred to an equivalent post in Ching-chou.^9
Some evidence recently come to light suggests that the Empress Wu may have been
born during her father's posting in Li-chou, and if so, she is three years
younger than has traditionally been believed.50
The Pei relates little else of interest to us here, giving few details of
Shih-huo's administration inChlng-chou, but mentioning how his prayers before
a statue of Asoka at the Ch'ang-sha temple miraculously ended a long drought
in the area.51
It is also the only source to offer details on his death in 635
at age 59, attributing his final illness to sorrow at Kao-tsu's death. T'aitsung is said to have sent him capital physicians, and his funeral arrangements
were charged to Li Chi, the governor-general of his home prefecture where he
was buried.52 jhe last detail is significant since it was Li Chi's voice, two
decades later, which was decisive in the establishment of Shih-huo's daughter
as empress.
Finally, the Pei gives detai1s of Shih-huo's posthumous honors.
There are numerous aspects of the Pei upon which I might comment, such as
its relationship to the ideology of legitimation, but since my sole purpose here
is to ascertain the facts of the Empress Wu's immediate background, let me point
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out only that it provides enough reliable information to supplement and occa
sionally to revise the official account. The most important of the new per
ceptions it provides are that the Wu clan was not wholly undistinguished, and
that the empress' father was a valued friend of Kao-tsu and a man who enjoyed
the trust of T'ai-tsung.
Beyond this, it is a source which encourages certain
speculations about the early life of the empress herself. Of these we might
list the possibility that she was born outside the capital in the Szechuan area,
and probably in 627. Her earliest years were spent in the provinces, in a
wealthy family with close ties by marriage to the imperial clan and high min
isters of the T'ang. Her home was one in which Buddhism had a certain influence.
From other sources we learn of the visit of a noted fortuneteller to the Wu
home,53 so it may be that popular religion generally was strong there.
By of
fering even this much information, the Pei becomes our major, if still meager
source on the first seven or eight years of the Empress Wu's life.
There exists also a corresponding inscription for the empress' mother,5^
but it unfortunately offers no information on the movements of the family over
the next years. We are forced, therefore, to return to official sources and
to resume the narrative with the entrance of the future empress into T'aitsung 's harem at the age of fourteen. Dating of this event is problematic be
cause of source conflicts regarding her birthdate, and Ssu-ma Kuang, discussing
the matter in the k'ao-i, concludes that it was in 637 that T'ai-tsung "heard
of her beauty" and summoned her.55 There is, however, reason to question this.
First of all, T'ai-tsung had only buried his beloved Wen-te Empress in the
eleventh month of 6365° and is recorded to have mourned her "for a long time."^'
It seems unlikely he would so soon add to his harem even if Wu had been of out
standing beauty. We find no confirmation in other sources that this was the
case, and the fact that she neither advanced from her initial rank of ts'aijen^° nor bore T'ai-tsung any children might suggest he was not greatly attrac
ted to her. An alternative explanation for her summons to the harem is pro
vided in the fact that in the late 630s one of her cousins became T'ai-tsung's
favorite concubine and used her good offices to have Wu selected.59 if this
suggestion is valid and if we accept the evidence of a later birthdate, we
might place Wu's entry into the palace in 640 and attribute it to nepotism
rather than her personal qualities. She seems to have had little to do with
the emperor, for she totally escaped his notice in 648, when he acted upon a
current prophesy that a "martial prince" {wu-wang) who was female would over
turn the T'ang.
Her duties in the imperial wardrobe, however, did bring her into contact
with the future Kao-tsung who had been declared crown prince in 643. Contrary
to T'ang custom, he seems to have occupied the same palace as his father, and
in T'ai-tsung's final illness is said to have been present constantly at his
bedside.Some sources give the impression that an Incestuous liaison was
formed at this time,^^ and while we cannot be certain that this was so, it does
seem possible in light of subsequent events.
The career of the Empress Wu should have come to an end with T'ai-tsung's
death if, in fact, she retired with his other concubines to a convent. The
principal sources agree that she did so,°^ and they go on to record that she
was resummoned to the palace at the urging of Kao-tsung's childless Empress
Wang who hoped thereby to detach his affections from a rival concubine called
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Hsiao Liang-ti.
The story is a curious one, with numerous source contra
dictions and a lack of essential details, so that it may be well to reject
altogether the convent story, or to suggest that she entered under different
circumstances and for a shorter period of time than is usually assumed.d5 Kaotsung may well have planned to make her his concubine from the time of their
first meetings!
From her return to the palace, Wu Chao-i, as she was now known, is said to
have mounted a surreptitious and skillful campaign to discredit both Empress
Wang and the concubine Hsiao Liang-ti. She bribed servants to spy on them,
slandered them to the emperor, and perhaps even smothered ^er new-born daugh
ter in order to find some crime to blame upon the empress.”
The usual source
difficulties are, of course, magnified here since events of this sort, occur
ring within the palace, cannot have been made known through regular channels
to the historians. The infant's death, for example, might have been accidental,
and it is perhaps significant that the incident goes unrecorded in the old T'ang
History biographies of Wu and Wang.
In any event, Wu Chao-i came rapidly to
monopolize Kao-tsung's love, bearing him one or perhaps two sons in 653-^ and
emerging in early GSk as his open favorite.”7 Later that year Kao-tsung began
to seek ministerial approval for her elevation to empress.
This search for approval met initially with almost universal opposition among
the tsai-hsiang^ a group composed at the time of six men.”
As one of the sig
nificant political crises of the period it is well documented in primary sources
and much studied by modern historians,^9 so that its full details need not con
cern us here. Certain points of broad importance might be made, however, and
the first is that Kao-tsung showed throughout a resolution and ingenuity not
often associated with his character. We must recall that his chief opponents,
Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi and Ch'u Sui-liang, were men of great prestige and, indeed,
had been entrusted by the dying T'ai-tsung with the care of his son.'® Like
their colleagues, they assumed that all matters affecting the empire fell with
in their purview, and this attitude had been encouraged by their recent experi
ence in the collegial-style government of T'ai-tsung.7i They had in his reign
played a role in all important decisions including Kao-tsung's selection as
crown prince, and when the latter argued that the choice of an empress was a
domestic matter, their resort to this precedent was not unnatural. Kao-tsung
seems to have accepted this limited view of his prerogative at first, and so
turned to every avenue from cajolery to outright bribery and intimidation in
order to gain agreement. Only when this failed did he simply overrule them,
and in so doing he changed the balance of power and the style of rule which had
characterized the dynasty up to that time.
In the debate Itself, he stressed continually that Empress Wang had failed
to bear him a son while Wu Chao-i had done so. This was sufficient ground for
divorce under T'ang law, and nowhere is there recorded a reference in the de
bate either to the murder of Wu's daughter or to the charge of sorcery later
cited to justify the Empress Wang's depos1tion.72 Jhe arguments of his oppo
nents therefore seem the more cogent since they could speak of the blameless
ness of Empress Wang and could even point out the unfilial nature of removing
an empress personally selected for her virtue by Kao-tsung's father. Moreover,
they claimed, bonds of marriage were sacred, especially in the imperial house
hold where they were an example to all. The sincerity of this argument might
be questioned, however, since they admitted that compromise was possible.
If
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Kao-tsung were determined to change empresses, why did he not choose a lady of
distinguished lineage? Wu Chao"i was not only of relatively low birth, but as
a former concubine of T'ai-tsung the possibility of having an accusation of in
cest could only blacken the emperor's historical reputation.73^ In this sug
gested compromise we see perhaps the real basis of the tsai-hs'Lang position.
They were not opposed to a new empress provided it were not Wu Chao-i; that is,
they would agree to a change if they could guide the emperor's choice. Kaotsung was probably aware of this, for he made no effort to refute their specific
charges against Wu until the edict on the occasion of her accession in November
of 656.7^
On one level, therefore, the conflict may be regarded as a struggle over the
definition of imperial prerogative, and modern scholars have extended its scope
even more widely than this. Ch'en Yin-k'o, for instance, saw it as a regional
struggle between rival aristocratic blocs from the Northeast and_the North
west.'^ Japanese commentators like Yokota Shigeru and Matsui Shuichi view it
rather as intra-bureaucratic competition between entrenched aristocrats and
newly rising officials like Li l-fu76 who allied themselves with Kao-tsung for
opportunistic reasons or to compensate for the lack of a genealogy which would
open to them the highest state posts.77 Maoist historians, like Chang Ch'lin,
incline to the latter view, though they emphasize a different sort of class
struggle and use a different vocabulary.78 More recently, Lo Lung-chih has
taken a revisionist position which sees opportunism as the chief motive of both
camps.79 All these approaches provide a certain insight, but the nature of our
sources is such that a high degree of speculation is necessarily present in each.
Perhaps it would be best to take both emperor and tsai-hsiang at their own val
uations, for on both sides we can find such elements as genuine idealism, Confuclan loyalty, and class as well as self interest. The issue of whether or
not the Son of Heaven could choose his empress independently is the fundamental
one, and by finding a single tsai—hstang3 Li Chi, who agreed that he could, Kaotsung won an important victory. Li's view, "This is a household affair of Your
Majesty. Why [do you need to] inquire further from outsiders?" would be invoked
often in support of imperial claims in the T'ang.°® In late 656, after two
years of uncertainty, the matter was settled.
The Empress Wu seems instinctively to have grasped that the manner of her
elevation put the tsai-hstang group on the defensive, and she lost no time in
pressing her advantage. Taking the initiative and overriding Kao-tsung's re
sistance, she had newly-promoted officials like Li l-fuand HsU Ching-tsung
bring criminal charges of dubious validity against all five of her former oppo
nents so that by late 659 sil
been driven to disgrace and death.
In the
same period, she personally effected the destruction of the former Empress Wang
and Hsiao Liang-ti and with needless brutality.®2 Both of these acts appalled
the Confucian historians, but it was the first which had the greatest historical
significance. Not only was the social and regional configuration of power
changed at the highest level of government, a change of great Importance in the
context of the revision of the national clan list in 659, but the entire politi
cal climate at the same level was also altered. Ssu-ma Kuang says with only
minimal exaggeration that "from the death of Ch'u Sui-liang and Han Yuan, inside
and outside [the court, frank] speech was avoided. No one dared oppose the
[imperial] will or strongly remonstrate. For almost twenty years [it was like
this]."^3
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We might ask at this point what role Kao-tsung played in these years. The
standard sources give the impression that as his wife's vengeance unfolded, he
became more and more debilitated in spirit and morale, weeping openly, for in
stance, at the fate of his former empress and his uncle Wu-chi.°^ Though such
remarks as "My family is unlucky, and there is constant trouble with my rela
tives,"85 indicate a belief in the need for severity, the strain of the punish
ments was great and may have been related to the illness he suffered in 660 and
which resulted in the temporary delegation of his duties to the empress.°°
In this same period, on the other hand, he was proving with real achieve
ments to be a competent and even an energetic ruler. His armies, for instance,
conquered the Western Turks in 658 and incorporated into the empire the vast
area of the An-hsi protectorate-general.He showed his administrative abil
ity in measures for governing the new territory and by the institution of a
biennial census within the Wall, and he did not hesitate to send troops to res
cue the tributary state of Paekche from an aggressive KoguryS.®® |n 659» as we
shall see, he demonstrated his centralizing talents with important measures to
weaken aristocratic regionalism and to confer prestige upon the examination
system. With similar purpose he took steps to strengthen the ideology of the
state, and recognizing the force of Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist loyalties
among the various groups of his subjects, he took steps to patronize them all.
Thus he commissioned a new ritual and new versions of the dynastic histories
from Liang to Sui, creating shortly thereafter the post of oh’i-ohu she-Qen
"diarist of activity and repose" in order to facilitate the production of true
dynastic records.89 As early as 655 he showed his respect for Buddhism by pub
licly greeting the famed pilgrim Hsuan-tsang at the city gates and installing
him in the Tz'u-en Temple.90 Two years later he freed both Buddhist and Taoist
clergy from their duty of obeisance to their parents.^
In the same year, 657»
and principally for purposes of centralization and consolidation, he completed
an extensive program of building and restoration at Loyang, and he designated
it the Eastern Capital.92
This final measure presents an opportunity to raise a central question. Tra
ditionally, the explanation for the virtual shift of the court to Loyang from
this period has been the antipathy of the Empress Wu to the Ch'ang-an palaces
where she was haunted by the apparitions of her early victims.93 Did she there
fore inspire the shift, and was she similarly the moving force behind her hus
band's other actions? The evidence suggests not.
First of all, there existed
both precedents and valid economic and political considerations for the estab
lishment of a second capital, and these were enunciated at the time.9^ Second,
Kao-tsung rapidly recovered his strength after 66O, fathering two more children
and making extended tours, most notably to T'ai-shan in 665*95 Third, in late
664 he forcibly reminded the empress of her technically subordinate position
by threatening to depose her.96 This last event is subject to frequent mis
interpretation, and so we might examine it more closely.
The Empress Wu, it seems, had been seeing at this time a Taoist priest known
to be skilled in the occult (yen-sheng). These activities could easily be con
strued as sorcery, the crime to which Empress Wang's fall had been attributed,
and it was as such that a eunuch reported it to Kao-tsung.
In anger he sought
advice from one of his chief ministers, Shang-kuan 1, a man who had been closely
connected with the former Crown Prince Chung and also with the fallen elder
statesmen.97 Warned that the empress' unrestrained influence was detrimental
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to the empire, he had Shang-kuan draft a decree of deposition. What happened
next is not recorded in our earliest source, the old T'ang History, and so may
be suspect, at least in detail. The Hew T'ang History says the empress heard
what was happening, hastened to her husband to confess, and "the emperor there
fore repented. He also feared her anger and so said it was done on the advice
of Shang-kuan l."9^ Shang-kuan and his eunuch accomplice were executed on
charges of conspiracy with the former crown prince, and the Comprehensive Mirror,
following t,he Hew T’ang History, says,
from this [event], whenever the emperor attended to business, the empress
then hung a curtain [and listened] behind. There was no matter of gov
ernment, great or small, which she did not hear. The whole power of the
empire passed into her hands; reward and punishment, life and death, she
decided. The emperor folded his hands and that is all.
In court and
country, they were called the Two Sages.99
This passage, although dubious in origin and extravagant in expression, has
been extraordinarily influential in creating the quite common perception that
from 664 Kao-tsung was no more than a puppet ruler. The old T'ang History, in
the parallel section, offers a different view: "From this, the empress for
several decades aided {nei-fu) in government with power and authority no dif
ferent from that of the emperor. They were designated at that time as the Two
Sages."100
Whichever interpretation we choose to accept, it is clear that only in 664
did contemporaries begin to regard the empress even as an equal partner in
government, using a phrase, incidentally, which had been similarly applied to
Sui Wen-ti and his wife.101 Until 664 Kao-tsung was almost certainly the senior
partner, and it was possibly only when he began to lose ground after 660 that
he considered deposition. We might even speculate from the rapidity of his
"repentance" that deposition was never a serious alternative in his mind, for
he had the evidence, the power and the support necessary to do it had he been
determined to do so.
It seems more reasonable to suggest that essentially Kaotsung ruled just as his father had, co-operatively; only in his case, the Em
press Wu played the supportive role traditionally assigned to the ministerial
body. Kao-tsung apparently recognized the unusual talents of his wife and,
sharing with her a concurrence of purpose, used the events of 664 simply as a
warning, never thereafter withdrawing his trust. There is no sign that the re
lationship between the "Two Sages" became antagonistic after 664, and indeed
Kao-tsung‘s first reaction on the return of his illness in 675 was to offer his
wife the regency.
Kao-tsung was to live for another two decades, presiding with the Empress Wu
over a largely successful administration and a prosperous state. The policies
of these years are examined in subsequent chapters, but before we pass on to
them, we might outline here some of the more intimate events of court life as
they touched the empress' career and, to a degree, were determinants of her pub1 ic actions.
The year 665 was notable for the celebration of the feng-shan sacrifice, the
most important of state rituals whose function it was to announce to Heaven the
successful achievement of a ruler's tasks and to beg continued blessings.^*^9
Both Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung, feeling unworthy to perform this most solemn of
rites, had refused ministerial requests to do so, the latter on five different
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occasionsIn 665 the initiative seems to have been the rulers', and while
certainly related to domestic prosperity and the success of Chinese arms abroad,
may incidentally have been symbolic of the restored harmony of Kao-tsung's fam“
ily life. As we shall note, this represents the unique instance in Chinese his
tory of female participation in this ceremonial, and though this later came to
be considered a sacrilege, it seems at the time to have done nothing to dim the
luster of the occasion.
The aftermath of the ceremony was not, however, so happy. Because of Confucian sensitivity to her own unusually great role in politics, the Empress Wu
had always been careful to avoid the charge that her family, the wai-oh'i, bene
fited too greatly from her position. In 656 she had, therefore, presented a pub
lic "instruction" to her clan which resulted in the transfer of her half-brothers
and their families to provincial postings.Most sources suggest that the
real reason for the transfer was the empress' long-standing dislike of them oc
casioned by their disrespect for her mother.Both brothers had died at their
posts, but the sons of the elder, Wei-1 iang and Huai-yiin, were invited to the
feng-shan celebration and returned afterwards to the capital with the imperial
party. Also in the capital was the empress' niece Ho-lan Kuo-ch'u, daughter of
her elder sister and, the histories allege, recipient of Kao-tsung's favors as
her mother had been before her.1^7 Though their vocabulary here is deliberately
vague, Kao-tsung seems to have made it known that he wished the girl as a concu
bine, so that the allegations may have been true. The empress was in any case
jealous of her, and in the eighth month of 666 at a banquet in the home of her
mother, Madame Yang, the girl died in convulsions. The empress' nephews were
executed as poisoners, but suspicion was naturally directed toward the empress
herself. This is the first of a series of deaths within her family circle for
which she is implicitly blamed in the histories.
It is impossible, so long after the fact, to pass judgment on the empress'
guilt or innocence, but on the basis of what evidence we have, an alternative
explanation is possible. We know that Madame Yang greatly disliked her stepfamily and at the same time she was naturally anxious that her daughter retain
the emperor's favor. Her banquet may therefore have been given to rid herself
of the stepfamily which seemed to be regaining favor and simultaneously to de
stroy her daughter's rival. This interpretation is supported by the fact that
when Wei-1iang's execution left Wu Shih-huo without a descendant in the male
line to carry on the ancestral sacrifices, he was replaced not by a surviving
member of the Wu clan but rather by Ho-lan Min-chih, Madame Yang's real grand
son.
As her rival's brother, he is not likely to have risen to this honor
and been granted the Wu surname by the empress if she had been jealous enough
to murder his sister!
Min-chih, in the event, proved an unworthy candidate, soon discrediting him
self in various ways. Not only is he said to have seduced the palace ladies
who attended the T'ai-p'ing Princess but also to have raped the bethrothed of
the crown prince.
In 670 he callously ignored the mourning regulations for
Madame Yang, who had been his constant protector, and in punishment was exiled
to the provinces. He committed suicide on the road, thus opening the way for
the return to court of the last survivors of the Wu clan, Ch'eng-ssu and Sanssu,^09 men who would have great prominence during their aunt's usurpation.
There is perhaps little to be gained in speculating upon the guilt or
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innocence of the empress in matters like these except insofar as they relate to
her character and to the progress of her career.
Domestic tragedy seems to have
had little effect on her role in government though it may be possible that it
contributed to a weakening of her self-confidence. We see signs of this in 670,
the year of her mother's death, and also a year of calamity both in domestic and
foreign affairs. At the same time, a number of ill omens were observed,^^0 and
the empress seems to have blamed herself, for in the [intercalary] ninth month
she offered to resign her position (pi-wei). The New T'ang History suggests
that her request was a false one,^^‘ but even Ssu-ma Kuang, who is usually ready
to believe the worst of her, does not question her sincerity.^Kao-tsung, as
we might expect, declined the offer, reaffirming his confidence in her and dem
onstrating it even more clearly four years later when, at her suggestion, he
appropriated to both of them the unprecedented title "Celestial" [t ’ ien-hiiang3
t'ien-hou).^
This measure is well known and is usually attributed simply to a whim of the
empress: her desire to avoid the style of all former rulers.
As we shall
see, this motive was present but in all likelihood was not the sole one. The
titles were taken in a mood of celebration, part of a general measure to correct
and standardize the posthumous honorifics of the imperial clan, so that Kaotsung and the Empress Wu made themselves, while still alive, part of a recog
nized tradition of good government. This aspect of motivation became clearer
within a few months when the empress presented her husband with a twelve-part
memorial on the subject of governmental improvement.^^5 In it she proposed a
comprehensive program which envisaged in a state of peace and plenty, low taxes,
light corvee and only a small army so that transformation could be carried out
by virtue not force. The administration was to be more frugal, opening re
served lands to cultivation and economizing on public works and donations to
monasteries and temples. The government was also to be more open, prohibiting
all slander but welcoming free representation on any matter from all subjects.
The servants of the state were to be better rewarded, with salary raises in the
capital and promotions for those in low ranks who had no one to recommend them.
Two measures were new:
the first extended the mourning period for a dead mother
to the full three years hitherto reserved for a father, and the second encour
aged the study by all, of Lao Tzu's Tao-te ohing.
I shall comment on these
later.
Although one source says that to some degree all the suggestions were imple
mented,practical considerations would seem to have made impossible, for
instance, any large-scale demobilization of troops.At the same time, how
ever, the symbolic nature of the act was perhaps most important and its basic
principie--concern for the people's welfare generally and for the lower orders
of society and bureaucracy in particulai—must have been a popular one. Hostile
historians have tended thus to see the memorial as a transparent device to win
popular support and pave the empress' way to usurpation, but on examinination
we must reject this view. The encouragement of Taoist studies, for instance,
could only strengthen the T'ang, and of greater importance, in the years 68^-690
when the empress was preparing her usurpation and was most in need of public sup
port, her policies diverged widely from the suggestions of the memorial, encom
passing corvee-built public works, the lavish patronage of Buddhism, and the
dependence on ruthless and slanderous officials. Administration in the Chou,
conversely, was based closely enough on the principles of 67^ that we might in
stead accept the program as a sincere one.
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One of the reasons that historians see the memorial in the context of usurpa
tion is that in 674-5 the succession question was becoming central. Kao-tsung's
old illness was returning, and in the third month of 675 he suffered so serious
a relapse that he suggested his wife become regent, desisting only when Hao
Ch'u-chiin, vice-president of the Secretariat, protested that "the Son of Heaven
manages the external and the empress the internal. This is the way of Heav
en."'l8 A second reason was that less than two months later the Crown Prince
Hung died in mysterious circumstances and, as Ssu-ma Kuang puts it, "people of
the time considered that the Celestial Empress [Wu] poisoned him."''9
Evidence for the crime, as Ssu-ma admits in the k'ao-i, is of the most ten
uous sort, arising from a court rumor in the time of Su-tsung (756-62),'20 but
the accounts agree at least on the details of the story. Hung was a popular
prince, rapidly gaining reputation as a humane, filial and serious man and, as
his independence grew, he came occasionally into conflict with his mother on
policy matters. The most recent of those occasions was his persuading of Kaotsung that the two daughters of Hsiao Liang-ti, confined at the empress' wish
since 656, should be released and allowed to marry. The empress showed her re
sentment by finding them husbands of low degree. Shortly after this Hung ac
companied his parents to the Ho-pi palace near Loyang where he died.
The New T'ang History is the only one of the primary sources to suggest he
was poisoned,^21 and other evidence exists which points rather to a natural
death.
In the first place, it seems unlikely that the empress was planning a
usurpation that early, and even if she did, to poison her son in the very pres
ence of a father who loved him, seems an extreme and foolhardy tactic. Also
arguing against murder is the fact that Prince Hsien, the next in line, was pos
sibly not the Empress Wu's son at all^22 gnd, therefore, was not a man she would
have been anxious to have succeed.
Finally, there are indications that the dead
heir was not of a healthy constitution.^23
Hsien, who became crown prince in the sixth month of 675» was a man interested
in scholarship and Buddhism; he was open, lively and fond, we are told, of wine
and women24 The rumor of his illegitimate birth, so soon to surface, must
have been known in certain circles at his accession, but there is reason to be
lieve that even so, the empress was willing to see his succession to the throne.
She took a personal hand in his education, writing him letters of instruction
and reprimand, and permitting the appointment as his counsel lors (p'iw-?c o) of
four men not known to be friendly to her, among them Hao Ch'u-chiin.
Hsien
seems to have begun well, and he won praise from his father in 676, the same
year he presented to the throne his Hou Han-shu commentary.'2° Soon after that,
however, his reputation began to deteriorate. He was told that his mother had
been advised by one of her intimates, a man holding regular office and also
skilled in fortunetelling, that he had not the look of a future emperor and was
less noble than his younger brothers. His response, according to a palace serv
ant with whom he had an improper liaison, was to procure the fortuneteller's
murder,^27 and although proof of this was lacking, the empress was naturally
suspicious.
Shortly after this, when Hsien rejected the advice of one of his secretaries
to end his liaison, the empress seized the chance to have a formal inquiry made
into his affairs.
In searching his residence, the investigators found in his
stables several hundred suits of armor which they reported as evidence of treason.
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Kao-tsunq. although he had also had earlier reservations about Hsien's suita
bility,^^® was willing to pardon him, but on the empress' insistence, the ar
mor was publicly destroyed and Hsien demoted to the status of commoner.^^9 He
was soon exiled to the provinces where he committed suicide in 684, with sus
picion falling on the empress as the instigator of his death.^^0 His position
as crown prince was taken by his younger brother, the future Chung-tsung.
Was Hsien, like his elder brother, a victim of Empress Wu's ambition? Once
again, the nature of our sources makes certainty impossible. The evidence of
the armor seems damning enough for the penalty of degradation and, given the
circumstances, the empress had little to gain from the heir's removal. Two
sons remained and would always stand between her and the throne and, besides,
Chung-tsung was not only allowed to succeed but was later to comment specifi
cally on the kind treatment he received from his mother.^31
In 682 Kao-tsung,
presumably with his wife's agreement, took the unusual step of establishing
Chung-tsung's son as huang t'ai-sun "Heir Apparent Grandson,"^32 g measure
which might be regarded as an expression of his fear that Empress Wu would de
prive the Li clan of the throne. Yet this interpretation is also dubious in
view of the long partnership of the "Two Sages," and especially in view of the
great power Kao-tsung was to leave the empress in his last testament. More
likely, the measure was designed to quiet the fear and suspicions inspired at
the court by the unaccustomed influence of an empress and the disappearance of
two heirs to the throne. When Kao-tsung died at the end of 683 it seems to
have been in the belief that the succession was assured and that his heir would
benefit from the expertise of the Empress Wu.
Kao-tsung's death presents us with a suitable opportunity to summarize some
conclusions. From the discussion thus far one of the strongest impressions to
emerge is that of the weight of historical bias against the empress.
I have
cited a number of instances where unprecedented or discreditable acts are as
cribed to her without convincing evidence, and have shown that on occasion the
historian prefaces his allegation with the phrase, "people at the time believed
. . .". This is important, for the "people" to whom the historian refers were
principally the bureaucratic element at the court, a group consistently ready
to believe the worst of the empress.
I have suggested that their attitude
arose from loyalty to the Confucian tradition which was highly resistant to fe
male influence in government even if the woman exercising it was highly compe
tent .
The existence of this attitude had two principal effects. First, it helped
to delineate the empress' constituency and to define the form taken by her
search for legitimation. As I shall point out, the prejudice against female
rule was not so strong among the masses. Second, the overt presence of the em
press in her husband's administration meant that his reign was a period of ex
ceptional tension in the highest circles of government.
It was a tension which
hastened historical change, and perhaps the most notable aspect of this was the
relative decline of ministerial power. Since very powerful ministers had been
a chief cause of dynastic change in the period of disunion, it could be argued
that this development contributed to the longevity of the T'ang.
Dynastic consolidation, as I shall shortly suggest, was the central policy
of Kao-tsung's reign, and in view of her eventual usurpation, the loyalty of
the Empress Wu to this aim is striking. Historians who see her plotting to
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seize the throne in Kao-tsung's lifetime neglect to consider, for instance,
that she and her entire clan owed their rise to the T'ang. As we shall see,
policies of the period in which her hand is obvious, the celebration of the
feng~shan, the extension of Buddhist patronage, and the emphasis placed on ex
aminations, literature and the polite arts, were all elaborate and effective
means of expressing dynastic self-confidence and convincing the empire that the
T'ang was essentially different from its short-lived predecessors.
It is in this light that I have taken my position on the success ion question.
If we accept the possibility that Hung's death was accidental, then Hsien's de
gradation could hardly have advanced a putative usurpation by his mother, and
he is most plausibly viewed as simply one more example of the overambitious
crown prince seen in every reign of the T'ang up until that time.
If, indeed,
he was the son of the Empress Wu's sister, we could even construe his fall as
the result of Empress Wu's extreme concern for legitimate succession and there
by strengthen our conjecture that at Kao-tsung's death, the Empress Wu had not
yet conceived any intention of establishing a dynasty of her own.
I have devoted so much attention to the succession question not only for the
light it sheds on the empress' career but also because of its great importance
in 683. From the late 670s the prosperity of the dynasty was beginning to ap
pear Jeopardized as successive years of natural disaster and meager harvest
brought about regional scarcity and general economic uncertainty. By 68I these
conditions had brought about something of a crisis as grain prices fluctuated
wildly and the government was forced to take the unusual step of permitting the
starving households of Ho-nan and Ho-pei to change their registration by settling
farther south.'33 The next year, 683, the fu-ping units of Kuan-nei were set to
the work of cultivation in the Southwest,'3^ a good indication of the severity^
of the situation since the government was at the same time attempting to consti
tute expeditionary forces to meet the resurgent Turks. A strong ruler, there
fore, seemed to be an absolute necessity.
Before turning to the question of why Wu Tse-t'ien should have been thrust
into that role instead of her mature sons, it is necessary to raise a theoret
ical matter of central importance, how an Ideological basis for exercising sov
ereignty can be created.

Chapter 4
THE EMPRESS WU AND THE CREATION
OF STATE IDEOLOGY

Since the collapse of the Han Empire in the late second century, the reuni
fication of China had become a constant though increasingly elusive ideal.
Successive dynasties in North and South had frequently exhausted their strength
in the search for ways of conquest, control and practical administration which
might weld a pluralistic culture of strong and persistent regional loyalties
into a coherent whole.
In this process, certain military, economic and organ
izational mechanisms had been developed which constitute in some recent schol
arship the principal explanation for the restoration of the empire in the sixth
century. 1 There is much that is appealing in such analyses, but at the same
time, they have in common a tendency to ignore the role of what Arthur Wright
calls the "suasive accompaniment to the exercise of power,"2 and what I call
the state ideology, i.e., that which justifies the legitimation of the powerholder and disposes the people to accept and support his policies.
Ideology
was a basic concern of all Sui-T'ang rulers and a first priority of the Empress
Wu. Without making significant changes in its traditional form, she could not
have become emperor.
Before we proceed, some further clarification of terminology is required, for
even among social scientists there is much debate about the definition of ide
ology and its relation both to comparable terms like political theory, culture
and value structure as well as to its various components such as national myths
and the religious and intellectual life of those it seeks to Influence.3 I
shall give the term wide connotations in the following discussion, using it to
refer to the totality of words, symbols, rituals, ideas and principles used to
legitimize particular individuals, institutions and procedures. We shall also
see that it is a concept subject to redefinition, for to be successful an ide
ology must be a process not a stasis and remain responsive to the shifts of
values and constituencies. This is something seen clearly in the most success
ful ideology before the Sui-T'ang period, the so-called Han Confucianism which
during its lengthy development in the second half of the second century B.C.
came to include several of the ideas and rituals associated originally with such
schools as Taoism, Legalism and yin-yang.
In the Later Han, however, this ideology became first outmoded then impotent,
as rapid social change and the spread of Buddhism created new values and as in
creasingly weak rulers succeeded each other, each less responsive to these new
values than the last.
In spiteof this, one feature of the syncretic Han ide
ology which survived even in the "barbarization" of North China was its percep
tion of the imperial institution. The emperor continued to be seen as a "cosmic
pivot," the harmonizer of Heaven, Earth and Man, and for this reason the formula
tion of state ideology became more and more an imperial responsibility. Thus
in the Sui reunification of China, Wen-ti's greatest achievement lay perhaps in
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his ability to turn to the purposes of centralization and the consolidiation of
dynastic power, the values and symbols of Confucianism, Taoism, and especially
Buddhism, the faith of the vast majority of his subjects.^
The first rulers of the T'ang, facing a hierarchy of problems very similar
to those of the Sui, were able to adopt similar solutions and, at least in
broad outline, to espouse an ideology whose only major variation was its use of
Taoist messianism.5 The mid-dynasty usurpation of the Empress Wu, however, was
a very different case. Because of its unprecedented nature, the Chou dynasty
required different justifications for legitimation and different estimates of
societal response.
It is principally for this reason that traditional histor
iography has dwelt on the anomalies of the period, with most sources depicting
the era as one of brilliant, extravagant and vulgar ceremonials, of constant
omens and of a ceaseless attempt to influence both domestic and foreign affairs
by the manipulation of the supernatural. Seen in contrast to the more rational
istic attitude of T'ai-tsung, this emphasis has a certain justification, but we
must recall that T'ai-tsung was more firmly established in legitimate dynastic
succession than was the empress and was, in any case, of a vastly different tem
perament.
This final point is of some importance. Because the formation of state ide
ology was so intimately connected with imperial prerogative, the character,
background and training of the ruler were significant factors in its creation
and form. We have earlier seen that the background of the Empress Wu differed
in several respects from the rulers of the Sui and the early T'ang: her clan
was of a lower social stratum, northeastern rather than northwestern, and she
herself spent her formative years outside the capital where she must have been
exposed widely to what Maoist historians term the "people's culture."® And be
cause her ministerial body was so aristocratic and metropolitan, clashes with
it were bound to be frequent. Of even greater significance, the empress was
raised in a strongly religious atmosphere, and as I shall attempt to show, this
particular aspect of her background was evident in each of the several stages
which ultimately gave Buddhism a brief precedence over both Confucianism and
Taoism as components of the ideology of the Chou.
The roots of the Empress Wu's deep religious feeling can probably be traced
to the influence of her mother, Madame Yang. The Yang clan as a whole was known
in Sui times for its particular generosity toward the Buddhist T'ien-t'ai or
Lotus Sect, and both emperors had been lavish in their patronage of Buddhism in
general.7 Several scholars have commented upon Madame Yang's own piety and up
on her generous support for the work of translation and the erection of votive
images,® and one goes so far as to suggest that she placed her daughter, the
future empress, in a convent at an early age.9 Evidence for this is dubious,
but it is generally acknowledged that from the mid-650s, as mother of the reign
ing empress, she was one of the most influential patrons of Buddhism in the land.
In the Chi- sha-men pu-ying paisu teng-shih (PSTS)j' our fullest account of the
obeisance controversy of 662, she is depicted as the staunchest and most stead
fast of the church's allies at the court and is credited with a share in its
victory.
At the same time, however, Madame Yang was typical of her times in the syn
cretism of her beliefs. She had once welcomed to her home the soothsayer Yuan
T'ien-kang to prophesy about her children,'^ and it was perhaps she who introduced
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to her daughter the Taoist priest {tao-shih) whose skill in the black arts {yensheng) almost caused her deposition in 66AJ2 |t |s little wonder, therefore,
that the Empress Wu was herself inclined to belief in the mystical and the su
pernatural, and we may note the earliest manifestation of this tendency in her
attempt to exorcise from the palace the bloody apparitions of the murdered Em
press Wang and Hsiao Liang-ti. Failure to do so, according to traditional his
toriography, led her to desert Ch'ang-an for Loyang.'3
These few illustrations raise an interesting point. Prophecy, divination,
exorcism and practices of the sort were not since Han times the exclusive prop
erty of any of the three principal philosophical traditions. As I shall later
show, there were numerous contemporary examples of avowed Confucians engaging
in such activities as the interpretation of omens and dreams, and there were
many miracle workers among the Buddhists. The following discussion is, there
fore, restricted to those aspects of state ideology which were directed toward
the several definable and discrete groupings and beliefs.
It should become evi
dent that the empress propounded no novel system but rather "juggled" or re
assembled in her ideology existing elements of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism
in response to the needs of the time. We shall also see three distinct stages
of her ideological development.

Both the early Sul and the reign of T'ang T'ai-tsung are regarded in the
standard histories as eras of flourishing Confucianism,^^ and it is to be ex
pected that the empress would have seen the advantages of a continued appeal to
the educated classes, the aristocrats and officials, on the basis of Confucian
ritual and values. Especially in the period following her controversial and
unorthodox elevation, she was the very model of the humble, supportive, and
ostensibly noninterfering Confucian empress. Her relatives were not raised to
high posts, and she publicly praised the devotion to duty of those ministers
who had opposed her, remaining detached at least in the public eye from their
destruction.'5 Even the hostile Ssu-ma Kuang remarks on her initial modesty!
In this same period much attention was devoted to Confucian ethical values: a
new ritual was promulgated and the rules of filial piety extended.^7 a new col
lege, the Ch'ung-hsien-kuan, was founded,^® and an otherwise severe critic in
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praised the standard of education both in the capital and the countryside.^9
Education was, of course, a priority of Confucians, and to win the loyalty of a
still developing ruling group, both Kao-tsung and his wife consistently patron
ize the schools and more especially the examinations, a matter 1 shall later
discuss in detail.
It may have been that in this period the Empress Wu devoted
some attention also to her own studies, for she was soon to demonstrate an in
timate knowledge of Confucian symbolism, nomenclature and ritual tradition which
could be used both for state and personal purposes.
The first and most striking instance of her ability in this regard came in
when Kao-tsung decided to celebrate the most awesome of state sacrifices,
the feng-shan on Mount T'ai, reporting to Heaven the fulfillment of harmony and
acknowledging the continuing responsibilities of his mandate.20 Given that rul
ers of the caliber of Sui Wen-ti and T'ai-tsung had felt themselves unworthy to
perform the ritual, its celebration at this time was an expression of unusual
personal self-confidence and dynastic congratulations, and even more unusual was
the fact that the Empress Wu was able to persuade the officials of ritual that
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she be allowed to participate in it. Edouard Chavannes, who has made the most
thorough study of the sacrifice, translates from her request:
d'apres ce qu'expose la doctrine des livres classiques, le ceremonial
feminin et le ceremonial masculin sont done distincts:
lorsqu'il
s'agissait de constituer des associes pour 1'autel femininj on s'est conforme au sexe de al divinity de la Terre; . . . d'ailleurs, puisqu'on in
vite les augustes imp4ratrices d^funtes ^ venir en personne participer au
precieux festin, pourquoi ordonne-t-on h de hauts fonctionnaires de sexe
masculin de s' immiscer cl des sacrifices parfaits offerts & des femmes?
Si on raisonne en bonne logique, il y a quelque chose qui jette le
desordre dans une excellente ordonnance.^
With Kao-tsung's consent the empress thus became the first woman to partici
pate in the shan sacrifice, and it is noteworthy that there was no overt protest
at the time.
In 725 the great savant Chang Ylieh was to cite this sacrilege as
the cause of the T'ang overthrow and the success of the Chou usurpation,22 but
at the time of the sacrifice the whole court joined in congratulating the em
peror and accepted the lavish rewards he offered.23
It is useful to speculate here upon the motives of the empress in requesting
to participate. There is no direct evidence for the usual assumption that she
herself inspired the sacrifice, but once it was decided she undoubtedly desired
correctness of form. More than this, however, her request was an assertion of
the imperial prerogative to define that correctness, and this was probably a
more important motive than, for example, any concern she may have had to advance
the position of women. More specifically, and within the context of Confucian
ideology, she sought the best of both worlds, preserving the broad basis of the
ancient rite while making real change in the name of the spirit of the regula
tions. "Why," she asked her husband, "should you conform to outmoded rules and
not institute a perfect regulation?",2^ and with this the emperor transcended
precedent and became the interpreter of a tradition which had so often tied the
hands of former rulers. Chang Yiieh's later protest was essentially an attempt
to repudiate this view.
Lest this interpretation seem too political, I adduce a few further examples
to show the consistency with which the "Two Sages" performed resolutely Confucian
actions with a subtle originality which kept them ever from becoming imprisoned
by form. Confucius, for instance, was awarded the honorific title t'ai-shih in
666,^^ a term once used for the most honored of the Three Dukes {san-kung) of
antiquity and a title held by the Duke of Chou, but one which had never before
been awarded to Confucius. Similarly, the title "Celestial" which the monarchs
appropriated for themselves in 67^,^® had classical connotations of high antiq
uity but had never been used for living rulers. On two occasions, in 662 and in
684, new names were created for the posts and titles at every level of the bu
reaucracy.^7 Other rulers like Wang Mang, concerned ostensibly with the very
Confucian principle of the "rectification of names" (oheng-ming), had also made
similar extensive revisions,28 but there was no parallel for such thorough re
form in mid-dynasty. Perhaps of greater interest is the fact that most of the
names chosen in 662, such as those for the Three Departments and Six Boards,
were wholly new while those of 684, for reasons I shall discuss later, were
largely an echo of the Rites of Chou (Chou-li).
From the above summary we may conclude that in Kao-tsung's lifetime two aspects
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of the Confucian tradition, its social-ethical and its ritual-symbolic values,
were espoused to bolster the state.
In both areas there were well-worn ex
amples to follow and even where ritual innovations were made, protest was ab
sent, a phenomenon to be contrasted with the response to similar measures under
taken by the empress after her husband's death. The lack of protest may be at
tributed perhaps to the skillful form into which the innovations were cast, to
the simultaneous and welcome grant of patronage to schools and the examination
system, and the resulting social progress made by the lesser aristocracy, and
finally to the Intimidation of the upper levels of the bureaucracy and the great
clans. Another factor, and one to which we shall now turn, was the fact that
the developing state ideology was coming in the same period to embrace Taoism
and Buddhism, philosophies which had their supporters among the ruling group,
but which were far more important among the lower orders and so could be cru
cial components in the maintenance of social order.
Taoism had occupied a special position in the T'ang since T'ai-tsung's dec
laration in 637 that Lao Tzu was the direct ancestor of the imperial family.^9
Such a claim was not unusual in the aristocratic climate of the times and was
made chiefly for the purposes of dynastic consolidation—to dissociate the T'ang
from the Sui with its highly Buddhistic ideology and to strengthen the royal
lineage against the pretensions of the great northeastern clans. The success
of Kao-tsu's rebellion against the Sui had been attributable in part to the po
tency of the "Saviour Li" myth of Taoist messianism,30 and T'ai-tsung thus hoped
to use the awe of inherited charisma to further his centralizing aims.
In the
same edict in which he declared his descent, he also decreed the precedence of
Taoist over Buddhist representatives in all court ceremonials, and though the
Empress Wu was to reverse the order in 691,^ she saw the value of the myth and
while Kao-tsung lived she encouraged and supported him in his patronage of Tao
ism. A good example of this occurred immediately after the feng-shan sacrifices
when one Taoist and one Buddhist temple were founded in every prefecture of the
empire and twenty-seven monks ordained and attached to each site, all expenses
being borne by the state.32 Returning from Mount T'ai, the imperial party also
visited the reputed birthplace of Lao Tzu in Hao-chou and there conferred upon
the sage the honorific t'ai-shang hsuan-yuan huang-tt^ a mark of great respect.33
Four years later the empress took the initiative by ordaining her only daughter,
the Princess T'ai-p'ing, as a Taoist nun (nu-kuan), and though her motive was
probably the circumvention of Tibetan requests for a marriage alliance,3A the
act retained symbolic value and must have pleased the Taoists.
These measures were calculated to win the support of religious Taoists whose
communities had grown increasingly numerous since the fall of the Han and who,
largely through a virtual monopoly of calendar-making functions at court during
the period of division, had come to wield a good deal of political influence.35
There existed also, however, a large number of educated men who might be termed
philosophical Taoists, men Interested in the wisdom or scientific writing of
that tradition.
In 675 the empress appealed directly to them when she formally
memorialized in praise of the sagacity and relevance of Lao Tzu and requested
that "all those below the rank of prince or duke, officials both inside and out
side [the capital], and all the people study the Tao-te ohtng:"'^^ As a result,
the Taoist classic became part of the examination curriculum and shortly there
after was declared the equal of the Classto of F-il-Lat Ptety (Hstao-ohing) as the
most important object of study for all scholars.37 Taoist philosophy received.
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therefore, significant patronage.
It is difficult to know whether or not the empress had any sincere attach
ment to Taoism.
As a philosophy of rule it was unlikely to hold much attrac
tion for her but, on the other hand, she must have been aware of the deleterious
effects on the Northern Chou of its proscription of Taoism and Buddhism between
57A and 578.38 On quite another level, I have noted earlier that the empress
was much attracted to the supernatural, and after the Han Lao Tzu had not only
been adopted and deified by religious Taoism, but had become associated in the
popular mind with numerous culture heroes, folk deities and, indeed, the cult
of immortality (shen-hsien)Taoist adepts were the most active practition
ers of the occult--exorcism (ohang-ohiao), amulets {fu-lu) and conjurations
(chang-fu)and had moreover produced or interpreted prognostications used both
by the Sui and the T'ang in taking power.Finally, Taoism, with its rich and
exotic pantheon, had created a realm of opulent imagination which might be ex
pected to appeal to a romantic mind like that of the empress.
In any case and
whatever its attractions, Taoism appears in the traditional sources as a prom
inent feature of court life of the Chou dynasty, even though imperial patronage
toward the organized religion was largely withdrawn; Traditional historiography,
as we shall see, remarks that the empress was "fond of auspicious omens"
and
portrays her dynasty as a time when charlatans abounded.
It points, for example,
to her support of a notorious brothel in the belief that it was a convent whose
abbess survived on a single grain of rice per day, and to the Taoist priest as
sociated with the abbess who became a tsai-hsiang because of his supposed mag
ical powers.^2 Above all, it documents her relations with the Chang brothers,
one of whom she believed to be the reincarnation of a Taoist divinity and for
whom she created a fairyland-like setting where frequent and unseemly celebra
tions became something of a scandal in her last years.^3 It seems reasonable
to conclude on the basis of evidence like this that the empress had a personal
interest in Taoism which was divorced from state purposes.
The same is true, though to an infinitely greater degree, with Buddhism.
It
is perhaps here that we encounter the core of the empress' spiritual life, and
her short dynasty was to be, in the words of a modern Buddhist historian, "a
turning point, a time of rapid advance"^^ in the fortunes of the church.
In
terestingly, the empire saw little evidence of her preference before Kao-tsung's
death, though this is not surprising in view of the T'ang commitment to the ri
val Taoist ideology. There exist several references to her private devotion in
this period--the support of votive sculpture at Lung-men and the reception of a
series of eminent monks^5--but she eschewed the adoption of any public policy on
church-state relations. Dynastic consolidation and embellishment of the imperial
lineage called for the subordination of religious to state interests, and the
clearest indication of her willingness to do this is found in the great obeisance
{pai) controversy of 662.
The issue, whether or not monks and nuns of the Taoist and Buddhist churches
should do obeisance to ruler and parents, was not a new one. From the Eastern
Chou onward, it had arisen in almost every dynasty and while the practice had
varied from one to the other, clerics in the South had been consistently free of
the obligation until Sui Yang-ti's edict of 607- ^ It represented the most basic
of clashes:
the other-worldly nature of clerical vocation against the Chinese
way of li and i. Moreover, should clerics be freed of the obligation to bow to
the ruler, they would in effect enjoy "extraterritorial" rights, and for anyone
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to refuse obeisance to parents was clearly subversive to filial piety. The
T'ang, as a dynasty of doubtful pedigree, had increasingly emphasized the hi
erarchical relationships of Confucianism and its ethic of authority and obe
dience as the center of the Chinese Way.^7
T'ai-tsung had opened the debate during T'ang by complaining that clerics
"falsely respect themselves. Seated, they accept homage from father and mother,
damaging [our] customs, perverting the Ritual {li-dhing)
If this is an
accurate depiction of the situation, it seems that Yang-ti's edict had had no
lasting effect, and as far as we can determine, T'ai-tsung had no better luck.^9
In 657 Kao-tsung was forced to decree that the clergy receive no homage from
parents and seniors,50 and either because this was ignored or because he wished
to reverse the situation, he called for a full discussion of the matter in 662.
In the edict, his own position was clear:
We wish now to order Taoist and Buddhist monks and nuns to do obeisance
before emperor, empress and crown prince, as well as their [own] parents.
[Since] sometimes we fear the loss of deeply-rooted feelings, it is prop
er to have the officials concerned discuss the matter critically and me
morial ize.51
The effect of this decreee on the Buddhist community in the capital seems to
have been electrifying. Within the week, over two hundred monks appeared at the
gates of the P'eng-lal Palace bearing a brief of opposition prepared by the emi
nent cleric Wei-hsiu of the Ta-chuang-yen Temple.52 in rapid succession similar
petitions were carried to influential patrons: to Li Hsien, second son of the
empress and still a boy, to her mother, Madame Yang, and to the several tsathstangWhen the debate began two weeks later, more than a thousand officials
were in attendance, including many from the provinces, as were more than 300
monks led by the famous Tao-hsuan who had prepared earlier briefs. Perhaps in
fear of undue pressure, the chairman ruled that of the clerics, only those with
civil rank (su-kuan) should be allowed to remain.
The meeting rapidly polarized into two groups, and several sources preserve
the positions of each, though not in a very comprehensive or systematic fash
ion.55 jhe range of debate was wide and since as a whole it constitutes a sum
mary of earlier debates on the subject, we might do well to look briefly at the
opposing positions.
Those who advocated the duty of obeisance maintained that because of the re
lationship established between Heaven, Earth and Man (san-i), homage to ruler
and parent was essential, a gauge of civilization among all peoples, and cler
ical exemption thus undermined the entire Way. The power {te) of the Son of
Heaven was, moreover, absolute and unique, spanning present and future worlds,
and both the unity of the empire and the order of the universe depended on it.
Even if clerics were removed by ordination from the secular world, they still
lived in the empire and owed to the ruler a debt of gratitude for his protec
tion and transmission of the religion.
In a slightly different vein, propo
nents of the obligation argued that Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism were at
the most basic level the same.
It was wrong, therefore, for the two churches
to withhold the sign of their respect from the Confucian relationships. They
pointed out that the Tao-te ching, for example, numbered the ruler among the
Four Greats (ssu-ta), and that no less than four Buddhist sutras also supported
the obiigation.56 Other tenets of Buddhism--humi1ity, respect and discipline—
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were cited as reasons for the pai, and several of the briefs which pursued this
line of argument contained veiled threats by referring to the arrogance of the
clergy and to the "excessive" numbers of monks and nuns.
A total of twenty-nine briefs putting this side of the case are found in the
Ch'uan T’ang-wen, and it is interesting to note that in them the question of
obeisance to parents receives a good deal less attention. Here the argument
can be distilled to the simple proposition that human life is a gift of one's
parents.
Is it not both natural and seemly that all men should wish tangibly
to show their gratitude? Because this was the first ethical objection faced by
Buddhist proselytism in China, answers to it had been developed centuries be
fore,57 and there may have been a feeling that since new arguments were unlikely
to be adduced, this aspect of the question need not be emphasized.
The fundamental position of the clerical party was that ordination consti
tuted an effective withdrawal from the world and was a casting aside of state,
society and family to enter a transcendental sphere of existence where Confucian
li had no place. As Tao-hsuan put it.
In his manner of living, the monk has no regard for wealth and sensuous
beauty. . . . Therefore, he is proclaimed as one who has left the house
hold life. One who has done so no longer embraces the rites of one who
remains in the family, one who has forsaken the world is no longer im
mersed in the practices of the world.5°
Though this premise was constantly repeated in the debate, the clerical party
had several other propositions to advance. They contended that the sangha (con
gregation of monks and nuns) was subject to its own discipline, the Vinaya, and
thus had no need to acknowledge secular authority. Several sutras specifically
forbade the practice of pai and one warned that he who accepts homage from a
monk does himself harm.59 They argued further that historical tradition freed
clerics from the obligation and, cleverly turning back upon their opponents thei
own arguments, pointed out that a ruler who reinstated the practice would be be
traying his own ancestors and committing a breach of filial piety! Still on the
attack, they reminded the emperor of his duty to respect the spirits and, since
the Buddha was a spirit, the emperor should perhaps pay homage to his representa
tives rather than vice versa. Moreover, they said, it is the emperor who per
mits a monk to leave the secular world by ordination. Was it not a denial of
his own imperial action to subject a monk once more to worldly obligations? As
effective as this point may have been in the debate, it was also a bald admis
sion that the ruler had the right to control ordination and, as such, was ul
timately destructive to the independence of the church.
In a more conciliatory view, several members of the clerical group suggested
that obeisance was simply an external sign, and that the clerical vocation was
by nature filial and respectful. They explained the merits of a monk's ordina
tion and prayerful life extended to three generations of his family, and they
further emphasized the filial piety of the funeral rites and memorial services
held after a relative's death. Finally, they objected to the manner in which
their opponents had interpreted the sutras and offered counterarguments.
On neither side was there much novelty in the arguments and it is unlikely
that many minds were changed. The final vote, however, must have been unexpec
ted in view of Kao-tsung's instructions. The clerical party under Ling-hu Tefen^O mustered 539 votes against the pai obligation while their opponents under
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Yen Li-pen
could gather only 3Sh. The emperor compromised the next month with
a decree that homage to the ruler was unnecessary but that parents were entitled
to receive it.^^ This solution seems to have been unsatisfactory to the sahgha
who continued to petition their patrons, including Madame Yang, and possibly
with success. The Confucian sources are silent on the matter, but the Sung kaoseng ehuan relates that even the pai to parents was ended.^3 When the issue next
arose in 714, Hstian-tsung is found to be ordering obeisance both to ruler and
parents.
There are numerous facets of the incident which might profitably be explored,
but what concerns us here is the position of the Empress Wu. She seems to have
made no public expression of her view, and the clerical party, perhaps in def
erence to Kao-tsung, made no direct representation to her. There is evidence,
however, that she was active behind the scenes, for of the extant briefs which
advocate the pat obligation, almost one-third were produced by her blood-relatives
or by men closely tied to her in other ways.^5 Among them was Ho-lan Min-chih,
her nephew and the future heir to her father.°° The outcome was, therefore, un
satisfactory to her and it was not characteristic that she bow to defeat. Why
did she do so?
The answer lies perhaps in her adaptability and far-sightedness.
It is sig
nificant, first of all, that she and her husband sought to settle the question
by consensus rather than by fiat, and when the outcome revealed the strength of
the church in the highest circles of government, it was clear that Buddhism must
play an important role in the ideology of the state. To antagonize its sup
porters could prejudice both present and future freedom of action. Beyond this,
we might recall that the inclinations of the empress were Buddhistic and she saw
little threat, political or economic, from a church recently weakened by the
relatively unfavorable attitude of T'ai-tsung.^7 in the debate a blow had been
struck at imperial prerogative, but at the same time the Buddhists had acknowl
edged the right of the throne to control ordination and, what is more, Taoism
with its T'ang associations had a share in the victory. The fact that South
China, the winning of the loyalty of which was a priority of centralization
policy, had traditionally rejected the pat obligation may have played a part in
the decision, as indeed may have been the perception that if Confucian piety
were weakened, so too would be its constricted view of women.
In short, the
empress seems to have reflected, then changed her position to one which was
probably more congenial to her, and certainly offered greater long-term advan
tages. Kao-tsung, who was much more friendly to Buddhism than is generally
recognized,^® was perhaps persuaded to let the matter rest.
State patronage of religion during the next two decades was, as suggested
earlier, both balanced and generous. This is best illustrated by the founda
tion of the Kuo-fen temples in 666, valuable to both churches in a symbolic as
well as an economic sense.^9 Buddhist sources offer other examples. Through
out these years the Buddhists in particular made great strides in theology,
conversion and translation so that they were well prepared for the new role to
be thrust upon them by the regime of the Empress Wu. Though in retrospect we
must acknowledge that the church was driven to unprecedented depths of syco
phancy during Chou, we must also admit that it reached heights of prosperity
unseen since Liang Wu-ti or Empress Dowager Ling of the Wei, and we must turn
our attention now to the reasons for this development.
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In the latter part of the fourth century and largely through the work of the
eminent monk Tao-an, there had developed in China a special devotion to the fu
ture Buddha, Maitreya.^® From a private, clerical spiritual exercise, it had
developed into a cult of statewide proportions whose most prominent feature was
the belief that in the last period of the Law (dharma), Maitreya would return
as a universal monarch to cleanse a corrupt and confused world and to inaugu
rate a new golden age. This belief was not the exclusive property of any single
sect and there was much variation among them in dating the apocalypse,71 but
judging from such evidence as the votive sculpture at Lungmen, Maitreya was the
most popular object of devotion by the early sixth century.72 Although the cult
was potentially subversive and by the T'ang had a history of involvement with
popular uprisings and consequent proscription,73 it was not easy to suppress,
and as late as 661* we find Hs’uan-tsang, the famed pilgrim and an imperial favor
ite, exhorting the multitudes to pray to Maitreya in his last sermon.7^
There is little evidence in subsequent years of any growth in devotion to
Maitreya, and indeed there seems to have been a decline among the societal elite,
but several events are recorded which kept alive the belief that the last stage
of the Law was at hand and the coming of the future Buddha imminent. Among
these two were of sufficient importance to find a place in official histori
ography. The first was a mysterious aura which appeared over a site in the cap
ital in 677, and when a great cache of Buddhist relics was found buried beneath
this site, the Kuang-chai Temple was founded on the spot.75 Knowledge of the
event was disseminated through the empire in 68A when the reign title was changed
to kuang-ohai. At about the same time as these relics were being discovered,
Sui-chou in Shensi was becoming a popular and lucrative center of pilgrimage be
cause of the excavation there of a buried image whose whereabouts had been re
vealed by a Buddha light above it.
In 683 the perpetrator of what the court
then regarded as a hoax declared himself the Kuang-ming sheng Emperor and rose
in rebellion, seizing two hsien before he was suppressed.76 Though his title
was more closely connected with Amitibha or Candraprabha than with Maitreya,77
his rebellion demonstrated the force of Buddhist legitimation and must have re
inforced among the people the belief that the last period of the Law was at hand.
Only a few months
after the rebellion Kao-tsung died and, aswill be sug
gested in the next chapter, the Empress Wu became almost immediately the de facto
ruler of the state. The precise timing of her decision to usurp power must re
main surmise but between 68A and 69O she turned first to the Confucian supports
for legitimation. Prominent among the symbolic measures of the period was the
renaming of all posts and offices in 68A using the Rites of Chou as the major
inspiration,78 the choice of oh’ui-kung, a phrase from the Book of History^ which
was of course one of
the Confucian classics,79 and the erection in 688 of a mingt'ang (cosmic hall),
a typical Han institution but one based on the Book of Rites
(Li-ohi) and one which former Sui and T'ang rulers had feared to emulate.®^
There are several other examples, such as the creation of new forms for several
Chinese characters,®^ but in the face of growing opposition which was kept in
check largely by a system of terrorism, it must have been apparent to the em
press that Confucian strictures against a woman ruler retained their force. She
was forced, therefore, to seek a new ideology, and to legitimize her power found
in Buddhism a source of support which would make her the sole female emperor in
Chinese history.
The man chiefly responsible for this development is known to history as Hsueh
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Huai-i, a virile, unlettered seller of sedge and other herbs who appeared at
Loyang in the mid-680s and there formed a liaison with a maid servant of the
Princess Ch'ien-chin.^2 When the princess reported to the empress that he was
a man of "unusual ability" {fei-eh’ang ts’a-i-yung) , he was summoned to an im
perial audience and before long given unrestricted entry to the palace. His
official biography scrupulously avoids the suggestion that he became the em
press' lover, and though this is broadly hinted in later Chinese sources and
generally accepted by modern historians, the evidence which exists is wholly
deductive. Perhaps one source of the belief is her refusal to have him cas
trated, and to avoid the scandal this entailed, her choice of the alternative
of Buddhist ordination. While serving with certain bhadanta like Fa-ming in
the palace chapel (ne-i-tao-oh'ang)
Huai-i became a familiar figure in the
capital—an arrogant, eccentric man and a chauvinistic Buddhist referred to by
the people as "Master Hslieh." By late 685 he had been installed as abbot of
the reconstructed White Horse Monastery west of the capital, a site tradition
ally regarded as the most ancient repository of the Law in China. Though the
official sources are reluctant to accord him either piety or learning, he may
have acquired at least the latter in subsequent years, for when omens of dy
nastic change began to appear in 688-89, he was quick to offer his services.
With Fa-ming and seven other monks, he seized upon the MaJiamegha or Great Cloud
Sutra (Ta-yun ohing), and seeking justification for female rule outside the Confucian tradition, provided a commentary to demonstrate that when Maitreya was
reborn as a woman, the long-awaited reincarnation would be the Empress Wu.®^
There is a good deal of contradiction among primary sources about the nature
of the sutra, and the most persistent belief is that it was quite simply a for
gery.®^ Japanese scholarship, however, has demonstrated the authenticity of the
work and shown that it was translated five times prior to the T'ang, and from
Tunhuang findings we know that it was the Northern Liang version of Dharmaraksa
that was most commonly used in the seventh century.®” Ironically in view of the
use to which it was put, the sutra had been a favorite of T'ai-tsung.The New
T'ang History is alone among the standard sources in suggesting that the Empress
Wu commissioned the commentary,88 and given her demonstrated piety, the assump
tion seems a dubious one. She was, in any case, gratified when the work was
presented and lost no time in promulgating the sutra and its commentary through
out the land.
In 69O, immediately after the dynastic change. Great Cloud temples
were founded as repositories in every prefecture, and over a thousand monks were
specially ordained to go forth and chant the sutra, explaining to the faithful
its real meaning. 89
The effect of these two measures was incalculable. Not only did they consti
tute an act of patronage to Buddhism staggering in scope but, as symbols of the
end of equal support for Taoism, served notice that the new regime would base
itself upon a different ideology.90 More importantly, they were part of one of
the most ambitious attempts in medieval China to mold men's minds, to use reli
gious feeling to justify the very existence of a regime and even to rationalize
its most unpopular acts.
Until the discovery of the Tunhuang manuscripts, a statement such as the pre
ceding would have been difficult to justify. Fortunately, however, some of these
valuable fragments are connected with the Great Cloud Sutra, and two of them-Stein 2658 and 6502--can almost certainly be identified as the commentary pre
sented to the throne in mid-August 69O. A fair reconstruction can be made on
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91
the basis of these documents,
and although the document is worthy of fulllength study,9^ I have chosen to translate below only the shorter of the two
manuscripts, Stein 2658, in the hope that it will be sufficient to illustrate
my view.
As noted above, the Sutra and its commentary have been surrounded by confu
sion for many centuries and it is not my intention to comment here on the debate.
I shall, however, make the following observations which emerge from the document
itself and which are relevant to the historical circumstances of the Sutra's pres
entation.
First, the commentary offers sufficient quotation from the extant version of
the Great Cloud Sutra to make clear that we are not dealing with a forgery of
the sutra or even with a version filled with interpolation. Second, the work
must have been carried out by sophisticated exegetes, monks who were perhaps un
scrupulous in their ambitions for the church but certainly more knowledgeable
than Hsueh Huai-i. The latter probably did no more than serve as a stimulus.
Third, and contrary to most scholarly opinion, the identification of Wu Tset'ien with Maitreya constitutes only a minor part of the commentary and |ts
authors seem far more interested in depicting the empress as a dakravartin and
as a Bodhisattva-savior. Moreover, the document makes abundantly clear that as
a legitimizing tradition. Buddhism was still immature.
Indigenous prognostic
texts and omenology drawn from Confucianism and Taoism play a role as great as
or greater than the prophecies of the Sutra and although synthesis of tradition
is a constant goal of the authors, the result often seems contrived and arti
ficial.
In spite of this, only the most foolhardy of historians would deny
that the device was an amazingly effective piece of propaganda.
Stein 6502, the longer of the commentary fragments, begins with about thirty
lines describing the nature of the Sutra and the meaning of its title, and then
reproduces the prophecy about a female ruler who would govern a quarter of the
realm of a dakravartin and, while eliminating heterodoxy, would bring about uto
pia.93 At this point the two versions converge.
qZ)
Corrmentojry on the Great Cloud Sutra
The Buddha then praised the goodness of [the queen] Ching-kuang who had
been ashamed, and went on to manifest the prophecy of the devi {t'ien-nu).
[He said that] she should rule over the land in the body of a woman. This
woman is she who is ca] ]ed Sheng-mu shen-huang [Empress Wu]. How do we
prove it? We prove it by the omen of the Cheng-ming ahing^^ which says:
"The Venerable One has said to Maitreya that when the Bhagavat is reborn
he shall eliminate all evil.
If there are arrogant and recalcitrant men,
I will send the young devi with rods of gold to punish them . . . East
of the river one meets the Luminous Head {ming-ahu) and the King of the
Brilliant Law {ming-fa-wang). . . . The Venerable One wanted Maitreya to
build for him a City of Transformation {hua-ch'eng) with a pillar of
white silver above and an inscription for the myriad generations below.
The devi will don heavenly robes, hang golden bells on the pillar, and
summon [Buddha's] disciples to enter all at once the City."
Thus we say that Maitreya corresponds to the empress.
and the meaning agrees.96

She must be the one

[Examining the text above, we find that] the elimination of evil and the
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dispatch of the devi to punish the recalcitrant clearly means the destruction
of violent men and the purging of the world.
[The reference to the] Luminous
Head and the King of the Brilliant Law east of the river is from the Book of
Changes (I-ohi-ng) where it says, "The emperor comes from Chen. Chen is in the
East."97 This is clear [for] the empress comes from Chen and rules the empire.
She also lives in the Sanctified Capital [Loyang] which is "east of the river."
The City of Transformation is the ming-t^ang^^ and the silver pillar is its cen
tral column. The inscription for the myriad generations is the Kuang-wu ming.SS
[The phrase about] the devi donning heavenly robes is a clear reference to the
dragon robes {kun-lung) worn by the empress [at the great ceremonial of Jan
uary 689]. The golden bells hung on the pillar refer to the sage teaching of
the four seasons at the ming-t'ang. The summoning of the disciples is the
myriad states, like rivers returning to the sea, [to make submission] at the
ming-t'ang.
[The same text] also says:
"The Luminous King and the Sage Lord will both be in the City of Trans
formation and on top of the tower will beat the golden drum to proclaim
to all disciples [this message?].
It will itranediately reach to all
those who believe this law [even if they are] ten thousand miles away,
[but] for those unconnected with this Law, they will hear nothing even
if they are in the adjoining room."
[In this passage] the golden drum is the great ceremonial {ta-i) of the mingt'angj and the "ten-thousand-mile hearing" means that those who are far away and
seek transformation and offer loyalty will see the ming-t'ang and hear the great
ceremonial. The "deafness of the adjoining room" means that if among those of
the myriad regions whom the empress rears as a mother rears her children, there
are some who cause disorder, they will surely be destroyed, and the cunning and
vicious will ruin themselves. The Ho-t'u says: "All those who are evil become
good [for] if they rebel they destroy themselves."^®®
Because the ming-t'ang was raised and sacrifice was to be offered to the
Three Sages,[the empress] summoned provincial and frontier officials'^^ as
well as the [imperial] relatives to gather at the Sanctified Capital for the
grand ceremony. Then all the members of the Hui clan^®^ rebelled and reaped de
feat and destruction. Those who survived were pardoned and exiled to distant
areas where they did not hear the grand ceremony. This is proof for [the state
ment about] the deafness of the adjoining room.

.
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[The same text] also says: "I shall send the Raksasavira King,
and on his
head shall be the K'un-lun Mountains, and from the earth shall come streams and
springs." This refers to the [new] Hsin-feng Ch'ing Mountain from which issues
the Sacred Pool.105
It also says, "To the east will be the Po-shan Palace." This is the Flying
Cloud Chamber of the great White Horse Monastery.1®° "To the west will be the
P'an-lung Court." This means the ming-t'ang"Spiritual pearls and shining
moonbeams will be above the side of the city." This means that above the mingt’ang, sun, moon and stars show in the dhen [early morning] configuration.1®°
Because of these meanings the reference is to the Empress Wu.
The {Great Cloud\ Sutra says: "[She] will obtain one quarter of the realm of
the cakravartTn."!®* Now the empress has united the empire [i.e., China] and
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This is really one-quarter of the domain of the

The Sutra [also] says: "The people will flourish, secure from desolation,
illness, worry, fear and disaster. All that is auspicious will be achieved at
a stroke. All the lands of JambudvTpa will come under her sway and there will
be no opposition in far-off places."’^® This shows that right now the great
ministers and the people are wholly loyal. They will have many sons and grand
sons; the years will be without scarcity and all will be happy without sickness
or other misfortunes. All these happy things happen at once. And because of
the great wisdom, prestige and virtuous transformation [of the empress] which
extends everywhere, the "four foreign people" will all come to submit.
If their
allegiance is wholehearted and eternal, all will receive these same blessings.
If they waver and rebel, even if they escape punishment from our state. Great
Heaven(shang-t'ien) will chastise them and they will destroy themselves. Thus
the I-t'img-shih chi says: "Wherever in the world there is sedition, it will
come to naught."^This proves it.
The Sutra [also] says: "[She] will obtain the great [sovereignty?] and be
self-existent" {te-ta tzu-tsai)[This means] the empress has brought all
states to submission and her power is without equal.
According to the Kuang-wu ming: "It is an inferior man {hsiao-jen) who will
discover this inscription" and this refers to the [unknown?] man who found it.
[But she who] reads this inscription will be the Sage Ruler." This refers to
the empress who has read it with her own eyes.
The [Kuang-wu] ming says: "[She who is] unlike the leopard or the wolf is
called Wu, and as king is in Loyang." This corresponds to the kingship of the
empress in the Sanctified Capital.
[In the phrase] "the great king, three
[plus?] two [years?], then the inscription will appear," the word "great" means
her sage virtue spreads far and encompasses all things. From the wen-ming era
[i.e. 68A] five years in all have passed since [we who] wanted to see but did
not see [were rewarded] in the wu-tzu year [i.e. 688].
[The reason the ming
says] "the superior man {ahun-tzu) in yellow robes is called 'long life'" is
that when augural gifts are given, "long life" is always written. "One with
the virtue of earth (t'u-te)'^^ will rule with the greatest prosperity," means
the empress. "None of the common folk will go mad," means that the people of
the empire will serve the state wholeheartedly and not lose their senses and
rebel.
[The phrase] "a bright cat far away shall be your guard in the four
directions" refers to the Book of Changes^'^ which says that "far away" ( ^j
li) means "bright" (
ming) and the position is in the South. Moreover,
it says "middle daughter." This refers to the empress who faces south and
rules the empire.115 And again we have a reference to the wen-ming period.
The cat is the representation {hsiang) of the Wu [surname] and Wu belongs to
the [category of?] sage clans {sheng-shih).
[In the ming, the phrase occurs] "three times six youths will sing [a ballad
called] T'ang-t'ang." Three times six is eighteen and the eighteen sons are the
Li [clan]116 of the T'ang dynasty. "Later they changed the ballad to that of
Wu Mei-niang."l17 This clearly means that the empress will rule the empire
after the Three Sages [of the T'ang].
[In the phrase] "not to travel too far
nor fly too high, remaining motionless in the center," the word "center'' means
that the Sanctified Capital is at the center of the Earth {t'u-ohung) 'and
shows that the empress rules majestically in Loyang. "The Sage Way extends far
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to those who accept the light in all directions," means that the sage transfor
mation of the empress reaches everywhere, to all and without limit.
"A Buddha transformed, come down from on high, will stroke her head [as when
preaching] and prophesy [to her]." This corresponds to the Great Cloud Sutra.
"She will enlighten and reside (kuang-ohai) in the four continents and [her pow
er] will reach the eight extremities all at once." [In this phrase], "enlighten
and reside" means the empress rules and enlightens the world and favors wholly
the myriad states. "Four continents" means all within the four seas and "eight
extremities all at once" means the states of the eight farthest corners will re
ceive together the sage transformation and will come [to court] to submit. "The
people are all peaceful and happy; civil and military officers will develop,"
means that civil and military officials will grow [in number?].^^9 "For a thou
sand years the ancestral temple remains unmoved," means that the time of the
sage will last forever.120 [The phrase] "eighteen forms the emperor" means the
reigning emperor [Jui-tsung].
A ballad says: "not old, not new." This means that the empress is not [too]
old to rulel^l and that she had already nourished [people] as a mother.
Thus
she is not new [i.e., inexperienced in rule], and these words are used.
"Crossed
sevens become a body" means the word for "woman" (nii),122 gnd [the phrase] "along
the base of a mountain, invert the exit, appears a Sage" means that the charac
ters for "mountain," "exit" and "sage" make up that of "woman" (fu). Twice,
therefore, is the sage virtue of the empress in evidence.
The Sutra says: "Relics [sariras] cannot be obtained.
If the leg of a mos
quito could be used to make a bridge [strong enough for] all beings to cross at
once, relics could be obtained.
If leeches in the water could grow white teeth
the size of an elephant's tusk, relics could be obtained.
If rabbits could grow
horns which could be used as ladders to the sky, relics could be obtained.
If
a small boat could carry the Hsu-rni Mountain across the great sea, relics could
be obtained."^23
These metaphors are very numerous and show that the relics of the tathagata
{du-lat) cannot be obtained.
In the Sutra, however, we are told that the ruler
of JambudvTpa would become the Guardian of the True Law and would obtain many
relics, [and also that she] would desire to venerate them and [so would] build
stupas of the Seven Treasures everywhere.^24 [i^ also says that she] will ven
erate and respect [the Law] and when she sees those who keep to the Law and ob
serve their pure rules, she will venerate and respect them. When she sees those
who break the Law and disregard their rule, she will rebuke and destroy them.125
Now the empress rules the empire and has obtained more and more relics. First
of all, omens began to appear in the kuang-ohai era [684]1^6 and now appear
[again] in the tsai-oh’u era [689]. Thus [the passage in] the Kuang-wu mingj
"kuang-ohai . . . i-shih ohih^" makes clear that the empress has vowed to build
840,000 stupas for the relics127 and to distribute them throughout the world.
They are distributed not by the power of mere men but by the spiritual achieve
ments of all the eight cords {pa-piao) [which bring order to the eight extrem
ities]. This is proof that [the empress] protects the True Law and has obtained
many relics.
The Sutra says: "[She] will teach and convert all the places she rules, and
men and women, young and old will observe the Paficaveramani ."128 yg believe
that because the empress embraces the precepts of the bodhisattva {p’u-sa).
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transforms the people and keeps them from crime, good spirits protect their
persons.'This proves that she teaches and converts mankind and has accepted
and embraced the Pancaveramani.
The Sutra says: "[She] will destroy the heterodox and the various perverse
doctrines." The Holy Mother Empress teaches and transforms all beings. Thus
she makes Deva Maral30 sigh and look up in respect and makes heretics return to
the truth. This is the conversion of the yeliow-capped [Taoists] by the White
Horse [of Buddhism].
The Sutra says: "In another kalpa she will truly be a bodhisattva and will
receive a female body to transform all beings."'31 According to the K'ung-tzu
oh'an:^'^^ "[When] Heaven gives birth to a Sage, [the Sage] emerges from the
grass." It does not refer to a male and in this cryptic saying is a prophecy
that the empress will rule the empire. Also, as the Yuan-sung e/z'anl33 says:
"A unicorn is born with two horns and for generations the people {shihrrtin) 134 do not know it. When it is grown, full in majesty, its sponsors
receive offices and posts. Virtuous and loyal ministers are found at
court and the unworthy expelled from the ruler's sight.
[This ruier] is
capable and able to discriminate, bringing everlasting prosperity {yungZung’)'35 and security to the state."
Now the family of the empress' mother is called Yang
and the sheep [yang
%
) has two horns. "Shih-min" is the given name of T'ai-tsung.
[the pas
sage about] the reception of posts when the unicorn is grown in majesty means
that during the years of the empress great majesty is achieved and that those
of wholehearted loyalty have received offices and enjoy honor and emoluments.
This corresponds.
[The phrase] "virtuous and loyal ministers are found at
court" means that right now all at court are wise and good. "The unworthy are
expelled" means that the empress in her sagehood examines good and bad, sends^
away the evil [persons] and purifies the conduct of the court. Thus it is said,
"the unworthy are expelled." [The phrase beginning] "is capable and well able
to discriminate" [refers to] the rebellion of the commoner [and former Crown
Prince] Hslen at the beginning of the yung-lung era [68o]. The empress in gov
erning for the greatest public good did not show partiality [even] to her own
son. Able to discriminate, she exiled him to Pa-chou. Thus we say that she
brought everlasting prosperity and security to the land.
The parahita of the bodhisattva is without set form and varies [to aid human
beings] according to circumstances. This is why the present form is female.
[There may be] a question: "The prophecy of the Buddha'^^ is unclear and
does not explain [the details of] family and clan. On examination, there are
several rulers who were female so how do we know that she who presently rules
is the right one?" The answer lies in the fact that in the prophecy, the king
of the country is in the fifth place of the six [in the hexagram].13/ From the
Han period to that of the Empress [Wu] there have been various female rulers
who were served and accepted, but they were called empress dowagers [t’ai-hou)
and did not conform to the Sutra's prophecy. Our Holy Mother Empress fits the
prophecy exactly and this is why the Sutra says that the female ruler of JambudvTpa will erect precious stupas everywhere and will benefit the work of the
Buddha.
We also find it said in the T'ien-shou sheng-t'u'^^^ that "a Holy Mother shall
rule mankind and her imperium shall bring eternal prosperity." This means that
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the empress governs the world and makes prosper forever the foundations laid by
the [first] three [T'ang] emperors.^39
An auspicious stone (jui-shth) says: "stop, one woman, everywhere, blessings.
[In this augury] "stop" means "end war,"^^® and the "one woman" is the empress.
It also says, "one person, sage, eighteen thousand," and "woman ruler, thousands
and thousands," and "one woman, one person, thousands of years." In these
[phrases] Heaven-on-high has given signs that the years of the empress will be
long.
The Diagram of the Dragon's DtsoZoswre (Limg-t'u t'u)^^^ says: "In the wutzu year [688] a mother-sage emperor will lay thousand-year foundations and
make bright the T'ang, Uniting the minds of Heaven and Earth, she, the one,
will maintain the Li [clan], and will endure long."^^2
believe that the
[building of a] ming t'ang has been neglected for a thousand years. The em
press began the Yang-kuan (i.e., ming t'ang) in the ch’ui-kung era [685"89] and
completed it in wu-tzu.
[Thus] when it says "mother-sage emperor . . .," it
means that she knows the True Way in her rule, and this is why it is said that
she "will lay thousand-year foundations . . . ." [The phrase], "uniting the
minds of Heaven and Earth, she is the one . . ." means that Heaven needs the
one to be pure. Earth needs the one for tranquillity, the spirits for holiness,
the valleys to be filled, all beings to be born, and the nobility to rectify
the empire. This shows clearly that the empress, reaching the highest Tao,
transforms men and unites [them with] the minds of Heaven and Earth.
[The
phrase] "maintain the Li and endure long" means that the Li are the imperial
clan and that the empress will restore peace to the land and cause the dynasty
to endure long. Thus the manifest and the obscure come together and the omens,
ancient and modern, agree. This makes clear that the sage rule of the empress
is without limit and her years will long endure.
The Sutra says:
"The Bodhisattva Ta-ylin-mi-tsang asked the Buddha:
'I simply beg the
jathagata to tell mankind about the future [coming] of this devi.' The
Buddha replied:
'From the time I have shown the way to instrumental
nirvana, after 700 years there will be a small state in southern India
called Without-Thought (Wu-hsiang).
In this state is the Black River
and on its banks is the city called Bountiful Harvest.
In the city is
a king called Teng-ch'eng and his wife will give birth to a daughter
called Seng-ch'ang."^^’
[There may be] a question [on this passage]: "If we draw our evidence from
the Sutra, [we do not know whether] this country Is the same as ours or not."
The answer is that the teachings of the jathagata are of both clear and obscure
[types]. The fourth chapter [of the Sutra] is clear, and [this] of the sixth
is obscure.
If we calculate the time from the Buddha's nirvSna to the present,
it is 1,700 years. The fact that the Sutra says 700, not mentioning the thou
sand, is obscure [teaching]. Other sutras and ^astras tell us that after the
Buddha's nirvana the periods of the True Law and the Semblance Law last each a
thousand years.
In the period of the True Law many men will be pure and faith
ful and in the Semblance Law, the work of [the evil] Mara will gradually spread
and a sage ruler of power and majesty must appear to protect and spread [the
Law]. Now the {Great Cloud] Sutra speaks only of the 700 years of Semblance
Law, not of the 1,000 of True Law.
It is like the [words of the] Nirvana Sutra:
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"Seven hundred years hence will come the time of demons and Mara will destroy
and confuse my True Law."^^^ We know, in fact, that evil gradually arises in
the era of the Semblance Law.
[The phrase in the Sutra] ''southern India" means
that since our land [China] lies within JambudvTpa which is the southern [con
tinent], it is referred to as "southern." Also to explain, [we say that] in
the Mahavibhdsa-sastra^ the Four Noble Truths correspond to the four direc
tions. '45 The South is the truth of the Way [to extinction]. The Way is the
eightfold path which destroys the eightfold perversities, and it is thus shown
that the empress is a ruler of the Way and converts the South.
[The passage]
only mentions "South" and nothing else.
[The word] "India" is Sanskrit and
means "moon." When the moon comes out it has two powers--one to cool and one
to warm. Since the empress' rule of the empire can show equally these powers,
the word "India" is used.
[The Sutra] says: "There will be a small country," and earlier, "she shall
obtain one-quarter of the domain of the dakravartTn." [Now] the dakravartin^
guides and transforms [all] the four worlds and the empire of Great T'ang which
rules JambudvTpa is small in comparison.
[The Sutra] says, "called Wu-hsiang,"
and earlier had spoken of the devi Ching-kuang who had practiced the samadhi
of Wu-hsiang [i.e., the meditation of no-thought or no-form]. This is why the
country is called Wu-hsiang. Now the empress in her activities cultivates no
thought that is selfish, thinking [of the welfare?] of all beings and the name
of the country is [thus] Wu-hsiang.
The Sutra says: "In the state will be a river called the Black River." Gen
erally, we see birth and death as a river and passions and worries as black.
Thus the empress is born by metairorphosis of the goodness and mercy of a bodhisattva, and she transforms all life in the great river, banishing passions
and cares. Moreover, we know that Wu is one of the YU surnames found in the
North and that the color of the North is black. YU is also used for water.
Thus it says "Black River." And the surname formed from "black water" {heishui) indicates the black robe {hei-i) which corresponds to the black river {heiho) of the K’ung-tzu oh’an. We know that the empress already wore black robes
as a child^^^ and this is certainly the meaning of the term.
Also, in Ping-chou by the tomb of her ancestor {t' ai-huang) ^there was of
old a well called by the people the Well of Wu. At first there was water but
afterwards it dried up. From the end of the Sui, water began to reappear, and
[the well] filled with the T'ang foundation. Now it overflows, forming a wide
stream which flows into the Fen River. Thus in'the Sui there was a popular bal
lad which ran: "The river of
dries up but the well of Wu fills. From
it a Sage must emerge." Thus it means that the flowing water refers to the em
press who is not of Kuan[-chung] nor of the Liu surname. Liu Wu-chou heard the
popular saying: "If it overflows, the^water will flow (Ziu)[and Liu will suc
ceed], but if it fills to the top (Zi^) [the Li will succeed]." Wu-chou was not
perceptive and did not understand the saying. Thinking it meant the Liu sur
name, he rose in rebellion, was killed and his line destroyed. What a mistake!
But how could he know that the Black River meant the Well of Wu?"
[When] the Sutra speaks of the City of Bountiful Harvests on the south bank
and later says that because of the birth of the king's daughter, there will be
limitless joy, it is for this reason that the city is called Bountiful Harvests.
The explanation is that our Yellow River corresponds to the Black River and the
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city on the south bank is the Sanctified Capital.
ful .

Here the harvests are bounti

]ZlQ

According to the T'ui-pei t'u, ^ "great accumulation in the eighth month,
wisdom and brilliance reach everywhere, stop war, prosperity. Female ruler,
stand straight, raise high the T'ang. Evil men, driven from court, a dragon
comes as guard, purify [all within] four seas, standardize eight directions."
[In this text], "great accumulation in the eighth month" means that in the
eighth {yu) month, the empress' regency will be completed [and she should be
emperor]. Both "spread of wisdom" and "stopping of war" refer to Wu. "Pros
perity" is a proof that the throne will flourish. The "female ruler standing
straight and raising the T'ang" refers to the name of the state and shows that
the empress establishes the straight and revitalizes the task of the imperial
clan. "Evil men driven from court and a dragon as guard" shows that the em
press expels flatterers and K'uei and Lung [the legendary good ministers of
Shun] stand guard. This is another proof that divine dragons {shen-lung) ^
protect the sage-body [of the empress]. "Purify [all within] the four seas and
standardize the eight directions" makes clear that even now the sage transfor
mation is extending throughout the universe, purifying the eight directions and
putting in order and bringing harmony to the people.
[Another] prophecy says: "In this year, on k'ue'i-yu day, the powerful ban
dits are all thwarted. The empire is at peace and no one sad or anxious. Every
where the five grains flourish with carts and oxen for sowing." Accordingly [we
point out] that the first day of the first {oheng) month of the coming year is
k'ne-i-yu, 5 and this coincides. The rebels P'el Chien, Li Ch'ang and others
planned to rebel and seize the Western Capital.^52 fjow they have incriminated
each other and have suffered the penalty.
In court and countryside there is
perfect peace. That is why it is said that the strong bandits are all thwarted.
in this year the harvest is an especially rich one. From ancient times when
ever harvests were abundant, they were regional. There was famine in the East
and plenty in the West, or a meager harvest in the North and a rich one in the
South. Never was it like this! There is now a surplus everywhere and under the
heavens, all the grains ripen. How can it fail to show that next year, k'ueiyu, will accord exactly with the omen? All that is evil will disappear and it
is for this reason that it is said that the world will find peace. . . .153
Within the context of state ideology of the seventh century, the commentary
on the Great Cloud Sutra holds a unique place.
It was, first of all, the basic
justification for the Chou usurpation and the principal source of legitimation
for China's only woman emperor.
It is unquestionably the strongest of several
appeals to Buddhist legitimation made in the middle period of Chinese history,1^^
and marks the beginning of a brief primacy of Buddhism over all other doctrines
in the formulation of state ideology.
The commentary is noteworthy for this reason alone, but its implications go
far beyond a simple assertion of the transformation of Maitreya and his incarna
tion in the person of the Empress Wu.
Invocation of the myth of the mo-fa, the
last period of the Law, enabled her to stigmatize her enemies, foremost among
them the imperial Li clan, as devadatta or demons who had to be destroyed to
purify the world. On similar grounds, specific unpopular acts like the murders
of P'ei Yen and of former Crown Prince Hsien were rationalized and, by extension.
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other acts of bloodshed, past and future, could find justification. Even the
infamy of the terror was made more comprehensible.
It is somewhat Ironic that
the cult of Maitreya, so long a subversive movement, should thus be turned in
to a bolster for the exercise of secular power, and doubly ironic when we con
sider that the commentary makes clear the wish of Maitreya incarnate that the
Buddhist church confine itself to spiritual matters. The parable of the king
of Jambudvipa who destroyed the errant clergy was a clear warning that the state
would regulate the church. And this final point illustrates a feature of the
commentary we must not ignore. Widely disseminated through the empire, it was
virtually a blueprint for rule.
Its omens and prophecies referred not only to
past and present but also to the future. Forming a network of mutual reinforce
ment, they served initially to strengthen the position of the empress but later
locked her into a pattern of economic and foreign policy decisions whose results
were not always beneficial to the state.
The center of this problem lies in the resumption in the commentary of the
Sutra's chi liastic vision:
Harvests will be bountiful, joy without limit. The people will flourish,
free of desolation and illness, of worry, fear, and disaster. . . . The
rulers of neighboring lands will all come to offer submission. ... At
that time all her subjects will give allegiance to this woman as the suc
cessor to the imperial throne. Once she has taken the Right Way, the
world will be awed into submission.^55
With these words the empress promised that her dynasty would be one of material
prosperity, of domestic peace, and of domination of foreign lands.
The vision itself, to return to the question of Buddhism in state ideology,
had an additional significance.
It constituted the first dynastic espousal of
an alternative to the Confucian utopia described in the Book of Bitesas well
as a transformation of the Chinese world view. No longer was China to be the
center of a hierarchical, familial universe but rather one part of a universal
Buddhist empire presided over by "Maitreya the Peerless, Golden Wheel, Sage and
Holy Emperor," titles the empress appropriated in stages over the next few
years.^
The title was itself a unique one and, to a degree, anomalous, since it com
bined the realms of Maitreya and Cakravartin who in classical Buddhist doctrine
do not appear in the same kalpa.^^° Not until the k'ai-yuan period (713“7^2),
however, is there any recorded protest. Although at that time the claims of
the empress to be Maitreya reborn were classified by Chih-sheng as one of the
"three evil treasures {hsieh-san-pao) of the t'ien-shou period,"^59 the church
seems generally to have acquiesced in the use to which its teachings were put
in the Chou dynasty. And this marks an important stage in its development, for
with the reversal of the Taoist precedence over Buddhism in 69I ® and with the
attachment of the church to the tz'u-pu in 6Sk,
it was embraced by the secu
lar power as a virtual state religion and thrust, therefore, into an unexpected
and unsuitable role. The rewards of this collusion started the church upon the
road to the persecutions of 84l-i»5, and of greater importance, the Buddhist Idea
was twisted, expanded, and intensified to the point of exhaustion.
It seems no
coincidence that with the Hua-yen systematization of the Chou period, the doc
trinal creativity of philosophical Buddhism in China came to an end. Once
Buddhism was espoused as a state doctrine by a dynasty which ruled the entire
empire, its earlier spirit of evangelism and proselytism disappeared.^
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This development, however, was hardly apparent at the time, for in an atmo
sphere of lavish patronage, both official and private, the church must have
seemed more prosperous than ever before. There is as yet no detailed account
ing of state expenditure on Buddhism in the Chou dynasty but it must have been
enormous. The continuous expense of maintaining the Great Cloud temples was of
course great, and the sources speak in some awe of the numerous new foundations
at the time, of the erection of images at Lungmen and in the capital and, above
all, of the m-ing-fang complex which was soon characterized by gold and jewels,
by the "Seven Treasures" and by a gilded statue so large that several tens of
men could stand on its outstretched finger. ^^3 The classical ming-fang was to
have been a simple thatched hut, but we must recall that the commentary on the
Great Cloud Sutra saw it as the City of Transformation or of Temporary Nirvana^®^ and, as time went on, it was modified to accord with the omens.
It was
also here that Hsueh Hual-i staged his "no-barrier" rites {wu-ahe-hui), a form
of ritual dating back to Liang Wu-ti and deriving its name probably from the
free mingling of social classes.^^5 Each of these rites, according to one source,
"cost 10,000 strings of cash {rri'in
). Men and women gathered like clouds
and ten cartloads of money were scattered [to them], causing them to fight to
gather it, with some [trampled to] death in the scramble."^Orthodox officials
made frequent protest about these expenditures, and though the empress occasion
ally enjoined others to religious frugality,^®' she only belatedly became aware
of the financial drain on state resources caused by her own generosity. The
first example is not found until the year 700 when she proposed a special tax
on monks and nuns for a great statue, and dropped the entire plan when the most
trusted of all her ministers memorialized on the parasitical nature of the church
and pointed out that "the temples and monasteries of today [already] surpass [in
splendor] the imperial palaces.
There were other ways, however, in which the empress could demonstrate her
love for Buddhism. She is, for Instance, unique in history for the frequency
and duration of her bans on the butchery of animals and the taking of fish.
From the time of Liang Wu-ti, various dynasties had recognized this first com
mandment of the PancaveramanT, usually with three-day prohibitions.
Incredible
though it may seem, the Empress Wu forbade her subjects to take life to eat for
the entire period between 692 and 7001^^9 As another sign of favor, the penal
ties for crimes against temples and monasteries were in 69^ made equivalent to
those for crimes against state property.^70 Measures of this sort aptly illus
trate the expanding and mutually beneficial relationship between church and
state in the period. The frequent signs of imperial favor could not but "bring
benefit to the shrines of the Buddha," but each one had also its ideological
content and, for example, used the religion for centralizing purposes, as a ve
hicle to carry civil enactments everywhere.
In brief, the relationship was be
coming symbiotic, and its chief symbol was the existence in every prefecture of
the empire of the Great Cloud monks, many of whom wore the insignia of hstenkung, a civil position of the fourth rank.^71
The relationship, however, was not an equal one, and those scholars who char
acterize the Chou as a "golden age" or a "high point" of Buddhism^72 gj-g only
partly correct. As mentioned earlier, Buddhist affairs
the Bureau of National Sacrifice {tz'u-pu), and if this
state sanction, it also rationalized state control.
In
period this organ came to exercise wide functions: the

were attached in 69^ to
measure gave the religion
the k'ai-yuan (713"^2)
preparation of a clerical
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registry, the limitation and review of the legality of ordination, the appoint
ment of monastery leaders (san-kang), and the determination of prayers and serv
ices for state occasions.^it is extremely doubtful, however, that the first
three functions were exercised with any consistency during the Chou, and we know,
for example, that clerical registration was not regularized until 729 and that
in 71^ private ordination was still a matter of concern.^7^ In these matters,
Lhe empress was content, it seems, with the symbol of control and while she did
reassert the throne's right to "ordain by grace" {en-tu) in 701,^75 she relied
largely upon the morale and responsibility of the church to prevent abuse.
The same may be said about clerical discipline, a vexing question since the
church had long resisted the application of secular law in the belief that the
Vinaya was sufficient. The T'ang had failed to accept this argument, issuing
in about 637 a code of governance called the Tao-seng /co,^76 and incorporating
into the Code presented in 653 numerous provisions to deal with secular offenses
by clerics.^77 Civil officials had also for some time had a duty to "admonish
publicly and privately" misbehaving clergy, but since the ipai controversy in
662, it seems reasonable to assume a certain reluctance to do so. Except where
a specific secular offense was committed, the scope of discipline was ill-defined.
In the Chou the difficulties of those ministers who wished to subject Huai-i and
his followers to secular law is a good case in point. The Empress Wu, as far as
we can tell, issued only three disciplinary edicts in the period — two designed
to reduce friction between Buddhists and Taoists and the third forbidding monks
to burv relics and show improper emotion at the death of one of their commu
nity.^^® Because these edicts threaten the penalty of laicization and empower
civil officials to enforce them, they may be seen as a continuation of the ero
sion of the sahgha's independent status, but the fact remains that the empress
resorted only rarely to state intervention.
In sum, we might conclude that while she insisted on state supremacy and en
couraged integration of the religious communities into the body politic, her
relations with the church were singularly harmonious because she never lost
sight of the mutual advantages of their cooperation. The worst that can be said
of her patronage of Buddhism is that she created the climate which fostered the
selling of ordinations, false registration of clerics and large-scale land deal
ings which blighted the next two reigns.^79 In the Chou orthodox officials were
quick to attack any Buddhist abuse, but it is significant that beyond the standard
complaints against the wealth and non-productivity of the church, the only charge
leveled prior to 705 was that it neglected its obligation of charity to the
poor.'80
These remarks seem to suggest that the Buddhism of the Empress Wu was cynical,
insincere, and subordinate to state interests, but there is much evidence to the
contrary. The biographies of eminent monks of her period, collected principally
in the Sung kao-seng ohuan,^^^ are filled with references to her support for
their translation projects and to the lectures they gave before her. There can
be no doubt that her relations with the church were good primarily because her
piety and doctrinal understanding won lively clerical respect for her. Prior to
the Chou dynasty, she had already shown a desire for knowledge and probably lis
tened to Hsuan-tsang and Tzu-en explain the tenets of the Fa-hsiang school.
Perhaps because this school was in the process of eclipsing the T'ien-t'ai which
was so closely associated with her maternal clan, she seems to have shown it no
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particular favor, but in 670 she took a great interest in Fa-tsang, the bril
liant young disciple of Chih-yen and the systematizer and real founder of the
Hua-yen sect.^”^ What first attracted her to this most recondite and sophis
ticated of Chinese sects is difficult to say, but when Fa-tsang was summoned
to the capital and placed at the head of the T'ai-ytian Temple founded to com
memorate the empress' mother,he was only twenty-seven and was to retain a
close association with her until her death.
It was the empress who in 67^
gave him the name "Sage Head" {hsi-en-shou) by which he is best known, and who
had ten of the most honored of capital bhadanta confer on him the holiest form
of ordination {man-fen-ohieh) in 680.185 In the same year she installed the
famed translator Divikaral86 in the T'ai-yuan Temple with him, and together
they decided upon the need for a new translation of the huge Hua-yen (Avatamsakaj
Gandavyuha) Sutra. The empress cooperated by summoning from Khotan an even more
eminent scholar, Siksinanda, who brought his own copy of the work to Loyang
and, taking charge of the project, completed a new translation in eighty fasci
cles in 699-^°^ The empress herself is said to have participated in the work,
editing and assisting at lectures; and she wrote a preface for the final ver
sion taking note, as might be expected, of the Great Cloud omens.Another
well-known participant in the project was the pilgrim and prolific translator
l-ching who also received from the empress support for his work and respect as
a master.189
While there can be no doubt that the Empress Wu reserved her highest interest
for the Hua-yen sect, and her inspiration of one of its most fatrous texts, the
Treattse on the Golden L-ion (Chin-shih-tzu ahang) , is a good example, she was
not exclusivistic in her desire for instruction. Among the famous monks she
received are names like Chih-hsien of the Pure Land sect, Heng-ching of T'ient'ai and many others.190 She was especially interested also in Ch'an or Zen,
and if Hui-neng, the patriarch of the southern school refused her summons to
the capital,19* the northern Ch'an patriarch, Shen-hsiu, was one of her favor
ites. His biography relates that on his arrival at the palace, the empress
knelt before him and by the admiration she showed, made him an object of 1 ion
ization in the capital.192 This is undoubtedly one of the reasons Buddhist
sources serve as
the empress in a
compiled in 695>
versal Ruler who

a counterweight to Confucian works, almost invariably seeing
favorable light.
In the new catalog of the Tripitaka she had
the editor Ming-ch'iian speaks of her as the long-awaited Uni
would bring salvation to all.193

The preponderance of Buddhism in the state ideology of the Chou seems, on
the basis of the foregoing discussion, to have served well the empress' pur
poses. Before we look more closely at this question, however, we might briefly
raise another matter, the effect upon Buddhist doctrine and sectarian balance
of imperial patronage. Historians in recent years have begun to take note of
social and political influences in the sixth and seventh centuries as determi
nants of the doctrinal form of the eight schools which arose at that time. What
seems to emerge from this research is the notion that imperial patronage of a
leading monk was based first of all on the needs of a particular ruler and this,
in turn, not oniy determined which sect would be paramount in his reign but also
played a role in shaping the sect's characteristics.19^ In this way the Sui dy
nasty, as unifier, supported Chih-i and T'ien-t'ai the genius of which lay in
the synthesis and unification of doctrine and scripture from preceding exegetical traditions.^95 The T'ang rejected T'ien-t'ai because of its Sui associa
tions and turned to Hsuan-tsang and the Fa-hsiang school, a regressive Indian
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form of Buddhism which accorded with the dynasty's cosmopolitanism.
I might
^add that it was also a school less congenial to the Chinese mind and so less
likely to challenge the Taoist bias of the dynasty.
If the above argument holds, the Empress Wu chose Hua-yen to set off her dy
nasty from the T'ang, and because the central concept of the school, the doc
trine of totality or the complete and harmonious interfusion of the worlds of
phenomena and ultimate principle converging on the single point of the Buddha,
served her centralizing, totalitarian ends. The paradigm is a persuasive one,
but in the case of the empress, can constitute only a partial explanation.
Her favoring of Hua-yen, we must recall, was demonstrated as early as 670 when
she could have had a T'ien-t'ai foundation commemorate her mother and when she
was probably considering abdication rather than usurpation. Her patronage,
moreover, was not exclusive and, as we have noted, Ch'an was not far behind
Hua-yen as a recipient of her patronage. Though the basic doctrines of this
school ranked high in Fa-hsiang's fivefold hierarchy of Buddhist doctrine,
its basic and profound egoism can hardly be considered useful to centralizing,
totalitarian ends.
It is perhaps more accurate to see the empress' special fondness for Hua-yen
as the product of sincere faith and of a metaphysical sophistication which found
few parallels among T'ang rulers. Hua-yen is quite simply the most demanding
in intellectual terms of all the sects, and is even today regarded by many as
the "perfect teaching" of the Buddha.^97 |t is also a school with a strongly
altruistic bias: the bodhisattva reaches enlightenment in ten stages and along
the way gains the power to perform miracles, to unite the universe and to de
liver sentient beings from pain and desire.^98 Since the commentary on the
Great Cloud Sutra had also cast the empress into the role of a bodhisattva, she
could only find this a most congenial doctrine.
In assessing the relationship of the Empress Wu to state ideology over th&
half century in which she played a role in its formulation, I would like to
make the following suggestions.
In the first place, her ideology was developed
in stages and was characterized by an acute perception of the needs of each pe
riod and an ability to respond to them. For this reason, Taoism and Confucian
ism were given precedence during her husband's lifetime and continued to rank
above Buddhism, though not necessarily in the same order, prior to the composi
tion of the commentary on the Great Cloud Sutra. For the usurpation itself,^
legitimation was sought principally in the symbols of Buddhism and Confucianism,
but Taoism was permitted to retain its court precedence over Buddhism and the
Tao-te ohing remained a part of the examination curriculum. The Chou dynasty
saw Buddhism paramount but, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, there was
occasional resort to Confucian symbolism and, more importantly, the constant
presence of a substantive Confucianism in the attitudes of the empress toward
the bureaucracy, education, examinations, literature and music, and war. Taoism,
because of its special significance to the T'ang, necessarily lost ground, but
with the coming of the Chang brothers to court, its symbols began once more to
appear, and by the end of the Chou the three traditions were more in balance
than had been the case at the beginning of the dynasty. The grand compilation
of 1,300 volumes called the San-dhiao ohu-ying, produced early in the eighth
century by the institute of which the Chang brothers had charge, 99 symbolized
as well as anything else the awareness of the empress that balance was the key
to a successful ideology.
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To the question of whether or not her Ideology was successful, my answer Is
a qualified yes.
In the largest sense, I base this conclusion upon the suc
cesses of the regime based on this ideology: the domestic peace, briefly In
terrupted only twice during her period of activity, upon the trend to cohesion
and consolidation which permitted both usurpation and restoration to be effected
with relative peace, and upon the factious but brilliant galaxy of ministers
who consistently emerged to offer their services to the state. A second measure
of success is the simple fact that her ideological manipulation, supplemented
of course by intimidation and the exercise of raw power, overturned centuries
of tradition and enabled a woman to ascend the throne. The fifteen years of
power she enjoyed were characterized by the gradual relaxation of force and co
ercion, and by the growth of confidence and affection on the part of her sub
jects. The palace coup which deposed her was the reluctant work of a small
minority of her ministers.
We shall never know whether the Empress Wu ever overcame wholly, even for a
short time, the Confucian prejudice against female rule. The fact of her depo
sition argues against it, and the judgment of traditional historiography, as we
have seen, would indicate that the effect of her reign was to strengthen this
very prejudice. For this reason, her ideology was but a qualified success—
qualified because in the Chou, at least, it was so highly personal that there
was never any real chance that her dynasty would survive her. The people of
China would support her but not her nephews and not any other woman, as the
cases of the Princesses An-lo and T'ai-p'ing would show in the next reigns.
But in these remarks we anticipate ourselves too greatly.
It is time now to
return to our narrative from which we departed on the occasion of Kao-tsung's
death.

Chapter 5
THE ROAD TO USURPATION

Little is known of the Emperor Chung-tsung who came to the throne in January
of 684. As the seventh son of Kao-tsung, the second or third born to Empress
Wu, his chances of succession had seemed remote, and quite naturally his early
education and training had been designed less to prepare him as future emperor
than to prepare him as one who would constitute no threat to the ruler.
His
career was to be an unfortunate one, and the sources depict his character as an
unhappy combination of qualities: a weak will and sensuous nature but stubborn
and quick to anger. He had been crown prince for only three years prior to his
succession, and Kao~tsung may have had some reservations about his experience
and general fitness, for his last testament provided for the continuation of
his widow's influence in government: "When important matters of defense and
administration {ohun-kuo ta-shih) cannot be decided, the course of action [de~
cided by] the Celestial Empress shall be adopted in both [types of problem]."
This kind of provision was not unprecedented3 but, strictly speaking, it dif
fered from earlier female regencies in that the power of the Empress Wu was sub
ject to specifically defined limitations. Her interpretation of the clause,
however, seems to have been free, and she immediately contravened another pro
vision of the will, that Chung-tsung should succeed "before the coffin," by de
laying his coronation a full week.^ We are given no explanation for the delay
and might regard it, therefore, as a symbolic gesture. The Empress Dowager Wu
did not yet seek the usual honored but impotent retirement and was making clear
to her son that his actions would not go unobserved.
If warning it was, Chung-tsung paid little attention, and he had ruled less
than a month when he committed the act which was to cost him his throne. Like
his father, he was married to a formidable woman, but one very different from
Empress Wu. The possessor of a proud lineage and a woman lacking in political
sensitivity,5 the new empress persuaded her husband to elevate her father, Wei
Hsiian-chen, to the post of president of the Chancellery, a violation of the cus
tomary limitation on posts granted to the consort family.®
The appointment created a crisis.
It was unwelcome to the Empress Wu, who
had been extremely careful to exclude her family from any meaningful political
role and who clearly resented the rivalry of her daughter-in-law.
In the higher
circles of the bureaucracy, where a revival of ministerial power had been antic
ipated, it met an even more hostile reception. The spokesman for this group
was P'ei Yen, an ambitious man who had risen through the examination system from
the minor gentry of Shansi and was now paramount among the chief ministers as
president of the Department of State Affairs.7 He had been closely associated
with Chung-tsung before his elevation, and when his own prestige was enhanced
still further by becoming the sole receptor of Kao-tsung's testament, he had
immediately asserted his leadership over the tsai-hsiang members by transferring
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their meeting place from the Chancellery to his own department. n To him the
entrance into politics of another empress and especially one who represented
an extensive and powerful Kuan-chung clan was an unhappy development and he
lodged a forceful protest. Chung-tsung replied with ill-considered temper,
"What is to stop me from handing over the empire to Wei Hsuan-chen? So why
should I be sparing with the post of Chancellery president?"^ Yen was angered
and astounded at so strong a rebuke and reported it at once to the Empress Wu.
Choosing, to take her son's statement as one of literal intent, she summoned the
full court, charged her son with treasonable intent, and had him forcibly re
moved from the throne by members of the YU-1 in Guard (z/ii-Zin ohun) , a group
which played a key role in virtually all the coups of the early T'ang.’*^ De
moted to princely rank Chung-tsung was soon exiled with his pregnant wife to
Fang-chou in Hu-pei and was not to return to the capital until 698.^^
He was succeeded by his twenty-two-year-old brother Jui-tsung who was wholly
unprepared for his new role, and if we may judge from his actions after the res
toration, he was a reluctant ruler even at this time.^^ Wu Tse-t'ien, claiming
he had a speech impediment and could not talk,^3 "appeared in court and pro
nounced decrees." There is no record of Jui-tsung ever asserting his preroga
tives, and as the Comprehensive Mirror puts it: "Political affairs were decided
by the empress dowager.
She installed Jui-tsung in a detached palace and he
had no chance to participate."^^
The legality of these acts, as we have seen, was disputed even in the T'ang,
with one school of thought maintaining that Chung-tsung never lost the Mandate,
and we must ask whence derived the power of an empress dowager to depose a ma
ture emperor. Although there was at least one Han precedent for the replacement
of an emperor on a dowager's authority,^5 this does not seem to have been a
normative act and went unmentioned in 684. Of greater importance, therefore,
was the ability of the Empress Wu to draw on the authority of Kao-tsung's will
and define the situation as an emergency, one in which the dynasty faced the
familiar threat of an ambitious consort family. By convincing P'ei Yen and
other high officials that this was the case, or perhaps by playing on their am
bition, she in effect borrowed the legitimacy of their position to supplement
her own and so win the support of the Yu-1 in Guard who added a second essential
element, that of coercion. The presence of force makes it difficult to know
how sincerely to take the claim of the empress to legitimate authority was ac
cepted, but perhaps by examining briefly the nature of legitimacy we can offer
some explanation.
Since Roman times historians, theologians and politicians have speculated on
the sources and nature of legitimate authority, and even in very modern times
the debate continues.Present-day social scientists usually take as their
starting point the formulations of Max Weber,and several convincing advances
have been made by such scholars as Easton and Etzioni.^° Empirical evidence,
however, which provided the basis of many of these studies, is unavailable to
us. We must instead examine the Empress Wu's claims to legitimacy and, in the
absence of contrary evidence, assume that their validity was accepted at least
by her politically active contemporaries.
A recent manuscript 19 posits the existence of five types of claim which we
might use for analytical purposes:
the cultural, ideological, structural, per
sonal and instrumental. A claim to cultural legitimacy, corresponding to Weber's
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"traditional" legitimation, posits a congruence between societal values and the
operative form of government and political elite within it.
In the context of
seventh-century China, this claim would encompass such concepts as the Mandate
of Heaven, the traditional role of the Son of Heaven and his bureaucracy, and
the relationship of this elite to the commoners, especially as it was defined
by the theorists of Han Confucianism. Wu Tse-t'ien, as a woman, could never
claim complete cultural legitimacy. Her later ideological claims, on the other
hand, suggest that an alternative to the existing system might derive its au
thority from the fact that new procedures and power holders are better than the
old.
In 684 the empress might well be seen as "better" than Chung-tsung or his
brother, but not until the usurpation did she posit a new set of principles.
As suggested in the preceding chapter, the new regime drew more force from the
Buddhist world view than the Confucian.
Structural claims argue that particular power holders ought to be considered
legitimate because they legally occupy positions within a structure atneady con
sidered legitimate on cultural or ideological grounds.
Because an empress dowager
had no formal, legally defined prerogatives in traditional China, Wu was forced
to rely on tsai-hsiang support to depose Chung-tsung and immediately to assume
the position of regent.
In no source do we find the regency formally conferred,
and she seems, therefore, to have taken advantage of the lack of defined legal
procedure to assume the position on her own authority.^® Undoubtedly Jui-tsung
gave tacit consent, and from 684 to 690 the empress possessed the structural le
gitimacy of a regent's status.
Finally the empress won acceptance in 684 through personal and instrumental
claims, categories closely related to Weber's "charismatic" legitimacy and the
real key to her successful usurpation in 69O. Personal legitimation is that
type derived from superior qualities and capabilities, and is closely related
to the instrumental type in that these particular qualities are seen by subjects
to be necessary for or beneficial to the attainment of specific values or bene
fits. The special feature of these types of legitimation is that power holders
who possess them can usually defy at least some of the cultural-traditional requisities of legitimacy, thus presenting their constituents with a choice of le
gitimized objects: either the integrity of a traditional system or the benefits
which might accrue from the rule of superior or charismatic personalities.
This dichotomy presents us with an interesting perspective on the period prior
to the usurpation.
It may be recalled that my discussion of state ideology sug
gested that while the Confucian tradition was extensively patronized by Kao-tsung
and Wu Tse-t'ien, it was also the tradition upon which they most often imposed
their innovations. The form of the feng-shan sacrifices, the new titles appro
priated by the rulers and bestowed on official posts, new mourning regulations
for mothers, and the innovations in the examination system are examples of this
process.
I suggested that one of the reasons behind it was the unwillingness of
the "Two Sages" to become prisoners of tradition and, in the context of legiti
mation, I might posit that Confucianism was singled out for attack because of
its prohibition on female influence in government.
If this was the case, we are
witnessing a dual process. Confucianism was patronized sufficiently to enable
it to remain primary among the three philosophies as a legitimizing ideology,
but at the same time it was subtly weakened by acquiescence in innovation or
modification, and the net result was that by 69O personality overshadowed tra
dition and a woman could become huang-ti.

5^

Chapter 5

It is difficult to know whether or not the Empress Wu was consciously seek
ing personal legitimation in this manner prior to 684, but her actions as re
gent suggest that she was. Within the first month of the new regime she began
to cast aside the former conventions of female rule, for instance appearing in
imperial regalia and disdaining to "hang the curtain" in the audience hall.21
She ignored the protests of her elder statesmen, P'ei Yen and Liu Jen-kuei,
who suggested that she was beginning to conduct herself like the Han Empress
Lu,22 and uncharacteristically not only appointed her senior nephew to tsathstang rank but created for him the new title huang-ssu which seems to have had
the sense of "emperor-expectant."23 This was an ominous sign since Jui-tsung
had produced an heir five years earlier, and it must have appeared even more
suspicious when word reached the capital that the former Crown Prince Hsien
had committed suicide in exile on the arrival of an envoy from his mother.2^
The possibility of usurpation seems now for the first time to have occurred
to the empress and shortly after, she sent up two trial baloons. The first of
these was an Act of Grace {ta-she) in the ninth month of 684, and the second
the decision to establish at Loyang seven ancestral temples {mtao) for the Wu
clan, a number customarily reserved for the imperial family.25 Both these de
cisions met with protest, the temples causing P'ei Yen to compare her once more
with Empress Lu,2o and the Act sparking the armed rebellion of Li Ching-yeh.
Before passing on to the rebellion, we might pause here to examine some fea
tures of this Act not only because of its particular historical role, but be
cause it was typical of many in the T'ang. The original purpose of the Act of
Grace was the reward of merit and the pardon of convicted felons on auspicious
occasions, but at the same time, they were often used to promulgate important
administrative measures. While only a small number have survived in their en
tirety,27 those which have are of wide scope and are useful sources for the
general policy lines of their period.
The first portion of the Act^® of 684 was the one which confirmed suspicions
of approaching usurpation by transforming the external symbolism of the regime.
Banners henceforth would be gold with violet trim, and certain officials would
wear different robes and insignia. Loyang was to be renamed "Sanctified Capital"
ishen-tu) and its palaces called the "Great Beginning" {t'ai-oh'u). The deep
concern of the empress with symbolism and nomenclature and their relation to
state ideology were reflected in her claim that official titles and posts were
defective, and for the second time since she came to power, all were to be re
named. This time most of the new names harked back to the first Chou dynasty-a demonstration of Confucian reverence bearing a close resemblance to the use
of Chou-li symbolism by other successful usurpers like Wang Mang.29 Some of the
new names were also drawn from a mythology principally Taoist, and several of
these, like Phoenix Court {feng-ko) and Luan Terrace {luan-t'ai) have remained
unique in Chinese history.30 Since the Act of Grace was itself issued to com
memorate the discovery of Buddhist relics, 31 we might see in the symbolic
manipulation here the balance common to the empress' entire ideological policy.
Finally, she pointed out that her mother's posthumous title was not of sufficient
dignity and so raised it to empress dowager {hsien-t’ien t'ai-hou), a measure
whose clear implication was that she was herself of imperial birth.
Though many in the empire were convinced that these measures were open indi
cations of an intention to seize the throne, there is in the Act of Grace no
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mention of the signs of heavenly approval necessary for a successful transfer
of the Mandate, and when we examine the rest of the document an alternative
explanation becomes possible. Chung~tsung in 705 was to remark on the desper
ate situation in 68^t,32 and while he probably had in mind the rebellion itself,
we can see from the Act that the problems of the early 680s required a strong
and experienced ruler.
In the next section of the Act of Grace, and in measures reminiscent of her
lengthy memorial a decade earlier, the empress demonstrated by her concern for
the people's welfare that this is precisely what she was. Here were expressed
her benevolence, humanity and frugality as she pardoned criminals, made gifts
to the aged and filial, offered relief to the poor and sick, and went on to
restore lost ranks, grant temporary tax holidays to some areas, seek improve
ment in the distribution of military rewards and release a number of serving
women from the palace.33 None of these measures were unique to the empress'
Acts of Grace, and though some contemporaries regarded her as overgenerous in
her awards,3^ there is little evidence that she differed in any appreciable
degree from her predecessors. These were not tactics to "win the hearts of the
people," as some historians allege, but rather were representative of the spii
it of the Acts and were designed to maintain rather than to enhance her posi
tion.
The final section of the Act of Grace deals with current problems, and here
the empress began with the most basic of these, namely the rapid expansion of
population, with a consequential decline in the standards of provincial admin
istration. This was revealed in false registration, tax evasion and other forms
of corruption. To combat it, a new branch of the Censorate was to be formed to
closely supervise the provinces and make frequent inspection tours, while at
the same time counties and prefectures were to be standardized to contain popu
lations of 10,000 and 30,000 households respectively. New ones were to be
created where necessary.35 Because the census was closely related to the tax,
equal-field and military systems,36 household registration was a continuing and
thorny problem for the government. The empress was later to approve a rather
radical suggestion from Li Chiao to divide the empire into twenty provinces for
the purposes of closer supervision, but was thwarted in this by hostile bureau
cratic opinion.37
Another problem of the period was the growth of military abuses, principally
the decline of morale which resulted from careless and excessive conferral of
rewards {hsUn) and their purchase by wealthy persons who had never served.38
Because of the nature of the fu-pina militia (which will be discussed later)
this was extremely serious, particularly since it dated at least from the Korean
expeditions of the 660s. The Act of Grace called for investigation and punish
ment of offenses but had no new solutions to offer and, judging from later ob
servations, the deterioration was not arrested. Some scholars during the T'ang
and later were to blame the empress for the destruction of the fu-ping.^^
If this was the case, there is no sign that it was intentional, for the em
press was genuinely concerned with administrative improvement and in the Act
put forward again the Confucian panacea for all governmental problems, the re
cruitment of "men of virtue" (hsien). On this occasion she decreed that vir
tually each high official was to recommend for office one man of either civil
or military ability.^® While it is difficult to know whether she used this
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form of recruitment more than earlier rulers, there is doubt she used it often,
and under her almost every form of recommendation was used at least once.^1
Historians often tend to comment on the growth of the bureaucracy which was
partly a result of this. They seldom notice, however, that the empress also
thereby created a highly qualified bureaucracy, largely loyal to her, which in
turn would have the heavy responsibility of recommendation. Penalty for errors
in this duty could be heavy and, as will be shown later, officials were often
intimidated and, therefore, anxious to conform to the ruler's definition of
"virtue."
In summary, it might be remarked that the Act of Grace of 684 provides a use
ful starting point for any assessment of the Empress Wu's political concerns
over the next two decades and, in addition, reveals her priorities in the con
text of the restless political climate of Chung-tsung's deposition.
It shows
that she was concerned first with the viability of the T'ang and secondly with
her own place in it.
It was only within this framework that usurpation could
be considered.
As already mentioned, by 684 the institutions of the early T'ang were show
ing signs of strain. The long internal peace and the acquisition of empire
had spurred population increase, commercial development and demographic mobility.
In turn, these placed pressure on the mechanism for registration of population
and the various systems of taxation, equal-field distribution and fu-ping serv
ice which depended upon it. The rapid expansion of civil and military bureau
cracy found some justification in this but, at the same time, the emoluments
of officialdom and the costs of defense were becoming the largest items of state
expenditure.
Furthermore, the widening opportunities for bureaucratic employ
ment, principally by means other than the examination system, were creating
something akin to a "revolution of expectations" among men whose lack of a suit
able genealogy had prevented their advancement to high office earlier in the
dynasty. All these developments are explored in detail in later chapters.
The point here, however, is that in 684 a turning point, albeit an artificial
one, arrived with the deposition of Chung-tsung. Officials were beginning to
call for reform, and some, like the important critic Ch'en Tzu-ang, wanted it
to be thorough: "Those who would rectify the end must first correct the begin
ning, and those who purify a stream must first cleanse its source. . . . The
abuses in the empire have existed already for a long time."^2
As we shall see, however, there is little evidence of thorough reform by the
empress during the next few years, and the reason for this is the basic concern
of this chapter. We must remember, first of all, that the administrative prob
lems we have been discussing were the result of policies initiated by the first
T'ang emperors and brought to fruition by those the empress and Kao-tsung had
pursued. Together the Two Sages had not hesitated to innovate in areas like
state ideology and in their treatment of the upper bureaucracy and the old aris
tocracy, but they had been wholly loyal to the I’u-t'Lng system of codified law
upon which the dynasty was based. A clear sign of this was their regular issue
of regulations {ko) which amended and supplemented the penal code (Z-ii) and ad
ministrative statutes {ling). The last set of regulations had been issued in
677 and the empress was to promulgate a shorter one in 685, but from that time
until the restoration there were to be no more.^^ Institutional reform seems
therefore to have had low priority. Now in some cases like that of the fu-ping.
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rejuvenation may have been impracticable, while in others, like the tsu-yvngtiao taxation system, the problem was not yet serious. For still other prob
lems, like registration and vagrant households, solutions were sought but only
in a piecemeal and ineffective fashion.
I suggest, therefore, that the nature
of the problem may have determined the approach to its solution. A second pos
sibility is that the empress never really intended to deprive the T'ang perma
nently of the empire, and so eschewed radical change lest it be identified with
her usurpation and nullified at the restoration.
In this view she saw her role
as that of a caretaker.
A further possibility, and the most likely of the three, lies in the evolu
tion of the imperial institution or, at least, in the empress' perception of it.
During the preceding thirty years, she and Kao-tsung had progressively dimin
ished the prerogatives of the upper bureaucracy with the result that both the
spectrum of opinion and the scope for administrative innovation had narrowed.
Increasingly rule by flat had been replacing cooperative decision-making and
the ruler became, therefore, more and more the pivot of statecraft. We need not
make too much of this, for the empress was following some well-worn precedents,
and her political style marked a turning point only within the context of her
examination policy and her success in putting the great aristocracy on the de
fensive.
My point here is different. The empress truly saw herself as the pivot or,
to switch metaphors, as the mortar which held together the state structure.
It
was, therefore, her greatest priority to win for the imperial institution the
confidence and support of the people, rather than to undertake reforms which
would inevitably alienate certain segments of the population.
If she could win
this type of support for the ruler, she could afford to leave the task of insti
tutional and economic reform to a strong emperor in the restored T'ang who would
know how to use the new bureaucracy she would continue to build.
If so, it is
in the legislation of the reign of Hsuan-tsung that we must measure her success.
I have made this lengthy digression in the hope of providing an alternative
to the usual view that the empress' policies in the years 684-690 were basically
little more than preparatory steps on the road to usurpation.
I am suggesting
instead that she perceived a dynastic crisis with which legitimate succession
could not cope, a challenge from the new emperor's consort family and from pow
erful ministers like P'ei Yen, and she took extreme steps to meet it. Her usur
pation must then be viewed as the result of necessity and not ambition.
These steps, however, compounded the crisis in the short run, for it was
largely in response to the Act of Grace of 684 that the rebellion of Li Chingyeh broke out. Ching-yeh was the grandson of Li Chi, conqueror of Korea and
one of the early supporters of the Empress Wu.^^ When he died in 669, report
edly foreseeing his grandson's disgrace,^5 his accumulated honors had assured
his descendants of privileged entry {yin) into the civil service and Ching-yeh
had begun a career in the bureaucracy. Dismissed from his post for a misdemean
or, he had taken up residence in Yang-chou at the Junction of the Yangtze and
the Grand Canal.In the brash yet indolent atmosphere of this commercial cen
ter, his closest companions were disgraced officials of good family, ' anxious
to restore their lost fortunes. By the end of 684 the empress' actions had
created what seemed an ideal climate for rebellion, and in November the insur
rection broke out.
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Its aims were ambiguous. Although the rebels claimed to be partisans of the
deposed Chung-tsung, they soon placed nominally at their head a "look-alike" of
Prince Hsien who had committed suicide earlier in the year.^® In view of this
duplicity on the part of Ching-yeh, we might be justified in thinking he planned
no restoration but rather had dynastic ambitions of his own. This conjecture
gains force when we examine the rebel manifesto, a brilliant polemic by Lo Pinwang,^° which stridently blackens the reputation of Empress Wu while remaining
noncommittal about Ching-yeh's ultimate aims.
It runs as follows:
The woman Wu, who has falsely usurped the throne, is by nature obdurate
and unyielding, by origin truly obscure. Formerly, she was among the
lower ranks of T'ai-tsung's servants and served him by changing his
clothes.50 When she reached mature age, she brought disorder to the pal
ace of the crown prince, concealing her private [relationship] with the
former emperor. She then plotted covertly to gain favor in the Inner
Chambers . . . and concealing her mouth behind her sleeve, she skillfully
slandered the other women. With cunning flattery and perverse artfulness
she deluded the ruler. She then usurped the pheasant regalia of empress
and entrapped our ruler in incest.
Then, with a heart like a serpent and a nature like a wolf, she fa
vored evil flatterers while destroying her good and loyal officials. She
has killed her elder sister, butchered her elder brothers, murdered the
ruler, poisoned her motherl51 She is hated by gods and men alike; nei
ther heaven nor earth can bear her. Still, she harbors calamitous inten
tions and plans [to steal] the sacred regalia [of the ruler]. The belov
ed son of the ruler she keeps in a separate palace, and she has given the
most important offices [of state] to her own group of bandits.
The statement continues with a series of historical allusions to the evil ef
fects of female political dominance in earlier times and concludes:
I, Ching-yeh, am a former minister of the great T'ang, the eldest son of
a noble family.
I received the testament of our former emperor and I owe
gratitude for the liberal graciousness of our ruling house.53 ... My
spirit rises in anger like the wind and the clouds; my will is determined
to restore tranquility to the altars of soil and grain. The whole world
has lost hope and the people of the empire have placed their trust in me.
I therefore raise the standard of righteous rebellion in order to purify
the empire of the baleful omens of disaster. . . .
You my lords! . . . Some of you have been entrusted by weighty charges by
the words [of the late emperor], and others have received his dying com
mands in the audience chamber. His words are still in your ears. How
can loyalty have gone from your hearts? The earth on his tomb is not yet
dry and where are his young orphan princes? We may yet change bad fortune
to good, show homage to the dead emperor and serve his living successor.5^
May you one and all arise and devote yourself to the cause of the ruler.
Do not permit our former emperor's orders to be brought to nothing. . . .
I ask you to look at the world today. Which house possesses the empire?55
Though many of the allegations made against the empress are false, they must
at least reflect some contemporary beliefs, and as the tract became more and
more familiar as a model of T'ang literary style, various of its details were
adopted by hostile historians. We cannot fail to notice, however, the absence
from the list of murders that of the empress' infant daughter and of her son
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Hung, the very crimes to which historians most frequently allude. We might,
therefore, conjecture either that she was innocent or that she had successfully
concealed these events in her own time. She herself showed a sardonic apprecia*
tion of the polemic when a copy came into her hands, blaming her tsai-hsiang for
their incompetence in leaving a man of such literary talent as its author to lan
guish in provincial obscurity.56
in retrospect, the rebellion of Li Ching-yeh seems hardly to have constituted
a serious threat to the empress, lasting only three months and affecting only
three prefectures. Part of the reason for its failure undoubtedly lay in the
rapidity and skill of imperial response,57 but Ching-yeh's failings as a com
mander may have been even more important.
In the first days of the rising 100,000
men are said to have joined him, and perhaps encouraged by this, he refused to
move from his Kiangsu base in spite of the advice of lieutenants who urged a
march north into Hopei where, they claimed, were to be found the finest fighting
men and the greatest resentment and disappointment at the empress' "dictatorship"
{oh'uan-ohih)Some recent scholarship has tended to confirm the soundness of
this strategy,59 and in rejecting it, Ching-yeh revealed once more his own am
bitions.
Instead he sent a part of his forces to take Nanking (Chin-ling), the
old southern capital, which he believed still to have an "imperial air" {wangah’i).
This seems to have been a serious error, for a month of siege warfare
yielded only the eastern garrison town of the city, and by that time imperial
forces comprising over 300,000 men were advancing in a pincer movement. Despite
the ineptitude of the T'ang prince who led the northern army, the issue was not
long in doubt, and in the eleventh month of 684 the rebels were destroyed and
their leaders slain.61
Had this been the extent of the rebellion, it seems likely that its conse
quences would have been less serious. From the empress' point of view, however,
a greater danger was present in rebel connections at the court, and shortly after
the rising began the capital was shocked to learn that P'ei Yen had been arrest
ed and charged with treason.
This was the event which led directly to a virtual reign of terror during the
next few years, and for that reason the guilt or innocence of P'ei Yen has been
the subject of much debate. Only in his biography in the Rew T’ang History do
we find the direct charge that he was planning to seize the empress during a
projected journey to the Cave Buddhas of Lungmen and was thwarted when rain can
celed the trip,5^ but at the same time we must recall his earlier signs of am
bition and the presence of his nephew as a prominent rebel.We are told,
moreover, that he early advised the empress that her retirement would end the
rebellion without fighting,64 and at that time a number of ministers seem to
have regarded his motives as suspect. To his several defenders the empress
claimed to have proof of guilt,5? but since we have no record of its presenta
tion, we might assume that her consistent fear of the growth of ministerial pow
er played at least some part in her decision to bring the matter to trial. She
seems to have acted, after all, only when a censor pointed out that "P'ei Yen
served in the court of the late emperor for over twenty years. He received the
testament of guardianship [of the state] and [already] enjoys great power.
If
he had no disloyal design {i-t’u), why would he ask you to return political con
trol [to Jui-tsung]?"66 After a tribunal found P'ei guilty, he suffered the deg
radation of public execution, and the most prominent of his defenders. General
Ch'eng Wu-t'ing, met a similar fate in the very midst of his unprotesting
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troops.
The empress, therefore, had found herself betrayed not only by the
scion of an eminent clan but also by men in highest of civil and military posi
tions and, according to one source, she assembled her entire court to confront
them with this fact. Raising in turn the example of her three slain enemies,
she warned:
These three men were looked up to [with respect, but] they were harmful to
me and I was able to destroy them.
If [any of] you have abilities [which]
surpass these three men, then you must act accordingly.
If not, you should
change your hearts and serve me, not making [of yourselves an object of]
ridicule for the empire.^^
Ssu-ma Kuang, who relates this anecdote, doubts that the empress would speak
in such a fashion to her ministers,^9 but perhaps only because he fails to per
ceive the depth of her anger and shock. The rebellion itself, and what she seems
clearly to have seen as a betrayal by ungrateful and overambitious officials,
came as a profound disillusionment. Convinced of her own indispensability and
regarding herself as the legitimate representative of the throne, she determined
never again to be threatened in such a way. To this end she initiated what is
termed, not inappropriately, a reign of terror which was to claim thousands of
victims over the next six years and become a feature of her reign which is al
most universally condemned.
In some respects this system of delation was simply an extension of the em
press' earlier policies: the frequent demotions and shifting of posts through
which she had long attempted to ensure that loyal men surrounded the throne./O
Ssu-ma Kuang, however, sees its origins in an incident of 684 when a privately
expressed protest at Chung-tsung's deposition brought summary execution to the
protester and generous reward to the informant.71 There is justification in
this view but, at the same time, we have no indication that it would have been
repeated had the rebellion not occurred.
It was not until early 685 that there
began to appear in the Censorate and the Board of Punishments the agents of the
terroi
men of obscure origin whose biographies are grouped in the old T'ang
History under the special category "cruel" {k'u)Most prominent among them
were Chou Hsing and Lai Chun-ch'en who soon set in operation a network of spies
and informers, ostensibly to eliminate the remnants of the rebellion. Before
long, however, their victims included the patently innocent.
In a new prison
they extracted "confessions" by forgery, torture and other methods later de
scribed by Lai in a handbook called the Ctassio of Entrapment (Lo-ohih ching)^'^^
and the empress seems to have been convinced of the existence of plots every
where.
In early 686 she established a great bronze urn (kuei) which in modified
form was to endure as an institution until the end of the dynasty.74 At the be
ginning the urn was constructed of four compartments, each for the reception of
a particular sort of report: self-recommendation, criticism of the government,
grievances and wrongs, and finally, omens, calamities and secret plans. Soon it
was little more than a repository for a growing number of denunciations and,
ironically, claimed its inventor among the first of its victims.75
Because the terror stretched on until the usurpation was secure, the climate
it created in court and countryside may well be imagined. Protests poured in,
and in frankness and eloquence that of Ch'en Tzu-ang in 689 is representative:
From [the start of] this year, your servant has seen secret denunciations
in every corner [of the empire]. We imprison hundreds and thousands of
men, and the majority are [still] denounced in connection with [the]
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Yang-chou [rebellion].

When we examine carefuly [the charges], not one in

a hundred is true.
Your Majesty is humane and merciful . . . [but] you have appointed a
deceitful and evil group [of officials], reckless and in rivalry with
each other. With angry looks of suspicion, they then report the exist"
ence of secret [plots]. One man is accused and a hundred fill the
prisons. . . . Some say that for every man Your Majesty loves, there s'*®,
a hundred you harm. The empire gasps and no one knows a place of rest.
Seen in these terms, the terror is indefensible. On the other hand, however,
centuries of Confucian historiography may have gone too far in unremitting con
demnation, so that a more balanced view might be appropriate here. The terror
was born of well-grounded feai—the response of a woman ruler to a tradition
which did not accept her because of the biological accident of her sex. She per
mitted the terror to continue even after seeing its evils, because she saw in it
values beyond the elimination of disloyalty, and because she also knew that the
phenomenon Itself enhanced her power and hence her ability to control its ex
cesses .
This view seems the more tenable when we isolate certain ramifications of the
terror. The most obvious, as suggested earlier, was the further transformation
of the political climate. Almost all of the victims were officials above the
fifth rank, a pattern consistently maintained both before and after the usurpa
tion.77 The result of this was fear and uncertainty in the upper bureaucracy,
and no minister could gain over the empress the degree of influence which min
isters like Wei Cheng had exercised over T'ai-tsung.
In 630 Tai-tsung had even
gone so far as to encourage officials not to follow his edicts blindly and on
several occasions withdrew them in deference to ministerial opinion.7° In 687
when the paramount minister, Liu Wei-chih, refused an edict not ratified by his
own department of the Secretariat, the empress was so angered by the ingratitude
of one "to whom We have given employment" that she ordered his Immediate sui
cide.79 Traditional historians have found here a vivid contrast to the "good
government of chen-kuan," but we might note instead the consistency of the em
press' determination to reduce the power of high officials relative to that of
the throne.
A second set of implications seldom noticed concerns the social effects of
the terror. As will be shortly pointed out, several steps were taken early in
the T'ang to put on the defensive the great aristocratic clans which had domi
nated political life in the period of disunion. Since mid-century these clans
had been increasingly bureaucratized and, profiting from cohesion among them
selves, their court connections, their wealth and education, they had become the
predominant element in the upper bureaucracy. Less suited by temperament and
training than officials of lower social origin for coexistence with a female
ruler, they became easy targets for the trumped-up allegations of Lai Chun-ch'en.
Since the charges brought against them were usually those of treason, the penal
ties extended to their families who were exiled or enslaved, and to their prop
erty which was confiscated by the state.A good illustration is the final
purge, that of 697, which followed the conspiracy of Liu Ssu-li. Of its thirtysix chief victims, the Comprehensive Mirror says that "all of them were renowned
[members of the] shih
of the land," and goes on to say that over a thousand
of their relatives and friends suffered the secondary punishment of exile.
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As far as we can judge, this incident was not atypical, and particularly be~
cause the Ling-nan exiles were more than once massacred by self-seeking inspec
tors from the capital,vve cannot estimate how many families were wholly extin
guished, Those who survived were able only gradually to regain Hang or free
status with its attendant rights of examination and officeholding, so that in
spite of amnesties before and after the restoration they were weakened in the
competition for office and often took generations to recover. The roots of some
of the factional strife under Hsiian-tsung can be traced to this time.
Less tangible but no less important were a series of decrees in 686 which em
powered informers of any social class to travel at public expense to the capital
to make denunciations and to receive the provisions of fifth-rank officials along
the way.°J In 628 T'ai-tsung had decreed death for any slave attempting to bring
charges against his master,®^ but now incidents of this sort became frequent,
and there were several examples of illiterate commoners rewarded with high of
ficial posts for informing.The Corrtprehens'Lve Mirror speaks of a wave of fear
so great that "people all marked time and held their breath,"®^ and there was a
stream of protest against excessive punishments throughout the 680s. These
critics were undoubtedly also aware of the social disruption which accompanied
the imperial commissioners who combed the provinces in search of disloyal ele
ments and the sad processions of once-mighty families plodding the long road to
exile in Ling-nan.
For most of her reign, even in the 690s when from our perspective her position
seemed relatively secure, the empress ignored the protests.
In this there may
have been a certain paranoia but, at the same time, she couid hardly have been
unaware that whatever its drawbacks, the terror always served as a tangible,
nationwide reminder of the power of the central government and of its head, her
self.
Finally, we must acknowledge that in the terror the T'ang judicial system
survived a most severe test.
Injustice was too often the rule, but a review of
the trials of the period shows that it was found mainly where the secret police
acted upon confessions extracted by torture or by promises of clemency toward
the family of the victim.87 When these were presented to the empress she had
little alternative but punishment. Often, however, she presided personally at
important proceedings, and several sources offer evidence that when courageous
censors like Hsli Yu-kung pointed out miscarriages of justice, she acted im
mediately to rectify them.88 After 697 when she destroyed the last of her evil
officials and was puzzled that denunciations ceased, she replied to an explana
tion by Yao Yuan-ch'ung by saying, "Recently the tsai-hsiang followed their own
interests and deceived me into acting as a ruler [too fond] of excessive punish
ments." 9 This avoidance of responsibility somehow lacks the ring of sincerity,
but it is a fact that from this time the executions stopped and prominent vic
tims of the terror like Wei Yuan-chung were rapidly restored to office.
The initiation of the terror is often taken as the definitive sign that Wu
had made up her mind to usurp sovereignty.
Indications are equally strong, how
ever, that she made no firm decision to do so until the discovery of the Fao-t'u
in 688. One sign that she was becoming less single-minded in her political pui—
suits was the intimate relationship she formed in 685 with Hs'ueh Huai-i, whose
origins and early career were discussed above. We have noted the ambiguous sug
gestion of a sexual relationship, but whatever the truth of the matter, the
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empress seems to heve fsllen into a state of unaccustomed infatuation. His
visits to the palace were frequent, and despite his arrogance and impropriety
which she had to excuse to irate ministers,90 she refused to dissociate herself
from him. She began the year 686 with a decree restoring power to Jui-tsung
but, says the Comprehensive Mirror, he "knew the empress dowager was not truehearted"91 and so refused. The offer was perhaps insincere, but it is at least
possible that the empress was considering for herself a less exhausting role in
government since she was about sixty at the time. Her association with^Huai i
continued for the next decade, and he was to serve her in several capacities,
unsuccessfully as a general against the Turks, and more notably in 688 as chief
architect of the mtng-t'angThe years immediately prior to the usurpation are depicted in the Confucian^
sources as years dominated by the terror, by the rise of such favorites^as Huai^
i and the Wu nephews, and by the advancement of the empress' usurping aims. This
last perception is certainly a valid one, but it could also be suggested that the
end of the policies she pursued at this time was not necessarily the overthrow
of the T'ang. Jui-tsung had just indicated his unwillingness to assume power,
and if we bear in mind that legitimaation is not a static but a continuing proc
ess, the repairs the empress now made in the administrative structure become not
simply devices to win support but rather the continued application of the politi
cal expertise she had demonstrated for so long.
The new regulations were promulgated in 685 and that same year special censors
were set up to oversee the activities of Buddhist monks in the capital. Migration
to the South continued throughout the post-684 period, and new administrative
units were set up each year in Chiang-nan to accommodate the shift.
In response
to the increasing number of border raids by Turks and Tibetans, several large
expeditions were dispatched and the An-pei protectorate reorganized
though
without lasting success.
Informed officials, appalled by the state of tu-hu-fu
administration, were beginning to predict the loss of the entire Ho-hsi region
unless decisive steps were taken but, as we shall see, this was not a priority
of the empress and the garrisons were not augmented.
Emphasis during these years was clearly on domestic affaris, and symptomatic
was the rapid growth of the bureaucracy. Though statistical evidence is lackirg, the trend to expansion is seen in such developments as the encouragement of
self-recommendation, already extensive since the foundation of the Urn, the in
crease of ahin-shih degrees, especially at Loyang,93 and the creation of new
posts like market commissioners {shih-ling), registrars {lu-shih), and correc
tors of the imperial oversights (shih-i^ pu-Qh'ueh^.
Commissloners made
frequent tours of the provinces, and among their duties was the recruitment of
personnel for the new positions.95 Appointment of auxiliary {yuan-wai) officials
became more frequent, and especially in the Six Boards the number of such posi
tions was increased.96 In some cases, like that of the Board of Civil Office,
the increase was probably justified by the simple need to classify and place new
officials.
In others, for instance at the level of provincial administration,
the proportion of bureaucrats to the general population had typically been very
low. Here the increase might well have brought about a tighter administration
and a government of improved quality.
It is, of course, impossible to know whether administrative improvement was
as important to the empress as her more obvious need for bureaucratic support
but, as mentioned earlier, she knew the importance of performance in overcoming
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prejudice against female rule.
It was probably for this reason that, even as
she expanded the bureaucracy, she began to turn her attention to the economic
problems which had surfaced in the last years of her husband's reign.
As early as 666 and especially with the failure of the new hsten-feng coin
age, counterfeiting and inflation were beginning to receive official notice,
and by the death of Kao-tsung the cost of rice was said to be a hundred times
that of the prosperous 630s.97 Sumptuary regulations were issued, but with lit
tle effect, and the problems were exacerbated by a series of bad harvests and
the growing costs of defense.
In the early 680s the first instances occurred of
tax evasion by households fleeing their registration, and while the problem was
still very much localized in the border areas,98 it increased the financial strain
on the government.
None of these problems were unprecedented, and solutions were
proposed by several ministers, though invariably they fell into the time-worn
categories of reduction of military activity and bureaucratic recruitment and
the end of the building schemes and religious patronage which were so costly in
man-hours and money.
This would rejuvenate agriculture and strengthen the
state's revenue base.
Unfortunately, political expediency seems to have precluded any sustained
effort in these directions.
If the empress were to maintain confidence in the
dynasty and in herself, the borders must remain secure and the bureaucracy ac
tive, smooth-running and receptive to new recruits.
If she were to increase
confidence, the "sanctified capital" of Loyang must be a worthy center for the
dynasty.
Economic reform consisted, therefore, of palliatives, extra slaves
instead of a raise in salary for the lower bureaucracy and rapid suppression of
the rare instances of resistance to taxation,99 but no coherent reform program.
In fairness we must also acknowledge that measures like these seem to have been
considered sufficient by the majority of the empress' constituency as they were
soon to make clear in the so-called Princes' Rebellion.
In this sense also, the economic measures of the period were closely related
to the question of legitimation.
Since out-of-work officials had been the
guiding force of Li Ching-yeh's rebellion, the cost of bureaucratic expansion
might be justified.
Similarly, since the very existence of female rule was a
source of opposition to the existing regime, the temples, palaces and monuments
which made Loyang as brilliant a city as Ch'ang-an were expressions of imperial
self-confidence and, moreover, the buildings themselves were often designed to
win Heaven's sanction.
The same was true of the court itself, as ceremonials
became more frequent and more magnificent and more often evoked the ritual of
the first Chou dynasty.
This last tactic is a most interesting one, for ever since Wang Mang the Rites
Why this was the case is
not altogether clear, but it seems to be related to recognition of the excellence
of the institutions begun by the Duke of Chou and Confucius' admiration of
them.^^ The Chou, moreover, had held the Mandate longer than any other of the

of Chou had had a particular attraction for usurpers.

historical dynasties and so must have been exceptionally pleasing to Heaven.
Finally, for a usurper the greatest source of opposition was the Confucian loy
alty of existing officialdom, and thus if a new dynasty could clothe itself in
the purest and most exalted form of this tradition, it could dilute some of this
natural hosti1ity.
Though it was not until the summer of 688 that the empress decided
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on usurpation,
the event which occasioned her decision was one closely related
to the omen tradition of Han Confucianism and one which exactly paralleled a
portent of Wang Hang's usurpation,*®^ the discovery in the Lo River of what came
to be called the Rao-t’u.
The Pao-t'u was a white stone bearing the eight-character legend, "A Sage
Mother shall come to [rule] mankind and eternally prosperous shall be her imperium" {sheng-mu tin-gen yung-ch'ang ti-yeh)Beyond this we know little
of the omen,103 but all sources agree that it was fabricated by Wu Ch'eng-ssu
who still held the title of huang-ssu and whose motives are, therefore, obvious.
No source implies collusion on the part of the empress and it seems certain
that she was convinced of its validity, for in the next two months she made
the prophecy known everywhere.
An Act of Grace was issued and a public ceremony
held to give thanks.
The Lo River was made sacred and fishing banned there, and
the empress took a new title, "Sage Mother, Sovereign Divine" {sheng-mu shenhuang)At the same time she announced a magnificent festival to formally
venerate the omen and to change the reign title to yung-oh'ang to accord with
it.
The festival would also celebrate the opening of the ming-t'ang, an achieve
ment of note since, although T'ai-tsung had proposed its construction as early
as 631, the dynasty had thus far failed to act on it.l®5
It was decreed that
every single notable in the empire should assemble for the celebration--prefects,
governors-general, and of course the numerous princes of the T'ang clan most of
whom held provincial posts at the time.
For them the invitation was not a welcome one.
Since 684 when two scions of
the clan,
sons of Kao-tsu, had fallen under suspicion as potentially subver
sive,*®^ they had been progressively excluded from any meaningful role in poli
tics or ceremonial, "orphaned outside [the capital] without a place to lodge
their feet."*®^ The empress, of course, had consistently claimed that Jui-tsung's
interests demanded such exclusion, and Li Ching-yeh's claim that he would restore
Chung-tsung by rebellion gave it some validity, but from the perspective of the
princes it must have seemed she was now committed to usurpation.
opening of
a ming-t'ang, so often used in the past as a legitimizing device,
added to
their suspicions, and the princes began to fear they were being assembled in the
capital to be massacred.*®9 At the same time they realized that refusal en masse
to attend would also condemn them and, faced with this dilemma, they chose to re
bel in the cause of "saving the state" {k'uang-fu).
The moving spirit in their rising was Li Chuan, an uncle of Jui-tsung and at
that time prefect of T'ung-chou
in Shan-nan.
Forging edicts and sending
out messengers to his relatives in every direction, he worked against time and
poor communications to coordinate the insurrection.
His plans were ruined, how
ever, and the secrecy of the enterprise destroyed by a premature levy of troops
in Po-chou, Ho-pei, where the prefect was Li Ch'ung, a grandson of T'ai-tsung.
This area, where there was a strong militarist tradition as well as separatist
tendencies, would seem to have been fertile ground for rebellion, yet Li Ch'ung
could raise no more than 5»000 men.
Even these were not enthusiastic and melted
away before engaging the imperial troops, killing their lea^r^^to avoid punish
ment.
In Yu-chou near Loyang, Li Ch'ung's father, Li Chen
, was prefect.
He, realizing that his son's actions had doomed him, rebelled in turn.
His
small force also fled as imperial troops approached and with his defeat and sui
cide, the so-oalled Princes' Rebellion came to an end.'*®
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Though this rebellion, lasting only a few weeks, scarcely constituted a threat
to the empress' position, she permitted her judicial officers to implicate in it
the entire Li clan so that horrifyingly disproportionate punishment fell on in
nocent and guilty alike.
In this she far exceeded earlier usurpers like Wang
Mang, and it seems fair to conclude that after the initial reprisals the execu
tions wre carried out chiefly to facilitate the usurpation.
By mid-690 several
hundred households had probably been extirpated, and only a few children survived
as exiles in the remote South.^'^
This particular aspect of the rising, of course, receives a good deal of at
tention in traditional historiography but, at the present time, the historians ad
mit that neither the prestige of the T'ang name nor the (forged) edicts bearing
the seal of Jui-tsung used by the rebels had evoked any significant support.
The
Comprehensive Mirror, while attributing the princes' failure to their lack of
coordinated action and daring, admits that of the 500 members of Li Chen's group
who bore official rank, all but one had been coerced into joining!^The em
press' legitimacy seems, therefore, to have been accorded recognition at least
by the provincial bureaucracy.
No force now stood between the empress and the throne, but still she was re
luctant to move without further ideological legitimation.
Signaling the end of
the T'ang by divesting Lao Tzu of the honorific bestowed In 666,she presided
over her delayed ceremonials in early 689.
At the Lo River, what the sources
call the most magnificent ceremonial since the T'ang began gave publicity to the
omen of Heaven's favor, and at the ming-t’ang the empress preceded Jui-tsung in
the offering, while sacrifices to her father followed those to the T'ang emperors
She herself carried the regalia {ta-kuei^ ahen-kuei) of the ancient Chou and
later that year decreed the implementation of Its calendar.
In the same act which proclaimed the new calendar^she promulgated an un
usual piece of propaganda, one which not only reflected the common concern of
usurpers for the rectification of names but showed the same flair for subtle mod
ification which had characterized her earlier measures of ideological patronage
of Confucianism.
Suggesting that in the development of the writing system anom
alies and corruptions which made understanding difficult had crept in, she
created a dozen new characters for such common words as "day" and "month" as well
as a new name for herself, using forms which would illustrate the foundation of
the words and still preserve their meaning.In this measure she may have in
tended an Implicit comparison of herself with the legendary Inventor of Chinese
script,^17 but from another perspective It suggests a certain desperation. As
the foundation of the palace examination a month later^^° shows, she was still
uncertain of the support of officialdom at the capital and so must have been
particularly gratified when, in the seventh month of 69O, Hsueh Hual-i presented
his commentary on the Great Cloud Sutra.
Recalling the strength of Buddhist loy
alty within the bureaucracy from the pai controversy of 662, she must have known
that the commentary could be as effective among them as among the Buddhist com
moners .
In the preceding chapter 1 alluded to the key role played by the Buddhist
tradition in facilitating the usurpation, and it is time not to place this Judg
ment in context.
First, we must recognize that the use of Buddhist legitimation
was not new in medieval China and had, for Instance, played an important role in
the ideology of the Sui.^^9 Nor was it unknown for rulers to adopt Buddhist
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titles, though usually in an informal fashion.
Liang Wu-ti had been called Huang
ti p'u-sa and P'u-sa t'ien-tzu and certain of the T'o-pa Wei rulers were refer
red to by the sangha as tathagata
Conversely, the persecution or
proscription of Buddhism seems to have been detrimental to dynastic survival.^21
Antagonistic Confucians always maintained that excessive Buddhist patronage
weakened a dynasty, but the point is that by the T'ang there was wide recognition
that Buddhism could not be neglected in the formation of a state ideology. The
case of the Empress Wu was distinctive in that, unlike earlier rulers, she was
not^simply a model of Buddhist kingly behavior but insisted upon the titles both
of CakravartTn and Maitreya.
Her claim to be the Buddha incarnate was an attempt
not only to disarm a potentially subversive cult, but also to inaugurate a new
era in Buddhistic world history.
Second, we must ask whether the Great Cloud Sutra and its commentary were of
equal or greater importance than the various symbols of the Confucian tradition
used in legitimizing Wu Tse-t'ien as emperor.
To answer this question, we might
first note that the Sutra itself was not by its nature an effective legitimizing
device.
T'ai-tsung had seen nothing subversive in it and, aside from its chiliastic vision, it did no more than tell that when Maitreya was reborn it would
be in female form.
The commentary is therefore crucial, for it not only identi
fies the empress as the tathagata of the Sutra but supports the identification
with all the weight of native prognostic tradition, both Confucian and Taoist.
I commented previously on the ideological value of the commentary as a legitimiz
ing force and here might expand these observations to clarify its relationship
with other aspects of legitimation.
The invocation of the mo-fa is extremely important, for it permitted the
stigmatization of all the empress' enemies, including the T'ang princes, as
devadatta whose purge was righteous and necessary for the purification of the
world.
On similar grounds, acts like the murders of Li Ching-yeh and the former
Crown Prince Hsien were specifically rationalized and by extension, other acts
of punishment, past and future, could be justified.
The infamy of the terror
became more comprehensible and legitimation, once obtained, could be preserved
by force.
It is significant that immediately prior to her usurpation, the em
press substantially augmented the Y'u-lin Guard.
At least half the commentary deals with the omens of dynastic change proper
to the tradition of Han Confucianism, and so is just as interested in depicting
Wu Tse-t'ien as a culturally legitimate secular ruler as in showing her as a
parahita.
These signs of Heaven's favor seem to have been of more interest to
the Chinese than claims of divinity, and it is interesting to note that when a
skilled diviner enumerated for Chung-tsung the signs of usurpation and restora
tion, he made no mention at all of the Sutra.In some senses, moreover, the
Buddhist prognostications of the commentary were the least convincing of all
and in 693> when Huai-i presented a new translation of the Preoious Rain Sutra
(Pao-yu dhing), the interpolations attempted to clarify the time sequence of
Maitreya's rebirth, to portray the empress even more strongly as a cakravartTn,
and also to supplement the conventional omens of the commentary with others,
like the appearance of a five-colored cloud.
What seems to emerge here is that Buddhism alone was deficient as a legiti
mizing force.
Stated in positive terms, it might be suggested that although
the commentary provides a classic example of charismatic legitimation, it
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emphasizes traditional or cultural legitimation to an equal degree,
This is
clear not only in its frequent resort to Confucian tradition, but in the very
nature of the Sutra's prophecy:
"You must know, therefore, that this is an in
strumental [fang-pien) body and not a real woman's body.|f Chinese tradi
tion outlawed female rule, a male deity in "instrumental" female form might win
acceptance.
The transformation, therefore, gave Wu what I have called structur
al legitimation.
Finally, to show that Buddhism played a subordinate role in the success of
the usurpation, we must recall that the Sutra appeared only two months prior to
the Chou foundation and at a time when the symbolism of the first Chou was al
ready well established.
Knowledge of its contents and their meaning could not
have been widespread until at least a month after the usurpation when the temples
were founded and the interpreters of the Sutra ordained.
We see, moreover, no
signs of Maitreya symbolism in the early days of the new regime:
the color
white was never used, and the empress did not assume the first of her Buddhist
titles, "Golden Wheel," until the autumn of 693*
She added "Maitreya" only in
early 695 and divested herself of it less than a year later, after the mingt'ang was burned.Finally, I cannot overemphasize the fact that the Sutra
was itself interpreted within the context of the native legitimizing tradition—
classical works like the Book of Changes and the Rites of Chou, oracular texts
like the Eo-t'u, and "Taoistic" devices like popular songs.
The influence of Buddhism in Wu's legitimation was, therefore, not negligible
but neither was it predominant.
Two months after the presentation of the Sutra,
in September of 690, petitions which requested the empress to found the Chou
dynasty began to appear.^^7 One of them bore 60,000 names, representing of
ficials, monks of both churches, commoners and foreigners.
At the same time
Jui-tsung requested that he be granted the Wu surname.
The empress followed
the custom of modest demurral until she was informed of the sighting of a phoe
nix, a sign since ancient times of the impending appearance of a sage-king.'28
A second omen, a flock of red birds in the audience hall, reminiscent of the red
bird of the first Chou,'29 made it clear that Heaven could no longer be denied.
Jui-tsung abdicated, becoming "emperor-expectant," and Wu Tse-t'ien ascended
the throne as "holy and divine emperor" {shen-sheng huang-ti), choosing as her
first reign title "Heaven-bestowed" {t'ien-shou), a reference to the omen of
the Lo River whose confirmation she seemd to consider to be the key element in
her successful usurpation.'30
In summation, it might be argued that the legitimation of Wu Tse-t'ien was
the result of a long and, on her part, a partially unconscious process.
Her
outstanding administrative ability, her lengthy devotion to the aims of the
T'ang, and her instinctive concern for the people made her in the course of thir
ty years a familiar, respected, and almost indispensable part of T'ang govern
ment.
In the context of her achievements, the fact of her sex diminished in
Importance and to the vast majority of her subjects, those who supported her
against the princes and against the rebels of 68A, narrow and legalistic con
siderations of legitimacy became largely irrelevant.
To the guardians of tra
dition, who were found mostly in the upper bureaucracy and whose opposition
might have been directed as much against a forceful and absolutist temperament
as against a woman ruler, she remained unacceptable well into the 680s.
In the
years immediately prior to the usurpation her dual policy of delation and man
ipulation of Confucian and Buddhist legitimation rendered them amenable to her
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dynasty, but because of the central role of coercion, we cannot judge how sin
cerely they accepted her claim.
I shall return in later chapters to this
question.
Events in the Chou, particularly the manipulation of the succession, would
demonstrate the need constantly to renew her legitimation, and this was to be
a principal motif of the next fifteen years.
As we will see, it was princi
pally through the continuation of T'ang policies that the empress maintained
her position, and it is time now to examine those policies in order to establish
the lines of continuity.

Chapter 6
IMPERIAL POWER AND THE RULING CLASS

The single most Intriguing theme discernible in the Empress Wu's regime,
at least by modern historians, has been that of social change.
Though the de
bate continues, Maoist historians seem to have reached a broad consensus that
her opposition to the aristocracy and to the large-landlord class intensified
class struggle both inside and outside the ruling group, and so constituted an
important stage in the dialectical process.^
Western scholars who are inter
ested in the problem have usually taken as their starting point the work of two
major scholars.
From Naito Torajiro has come the idea that the late T'ang saw
social changes which made it the transitional period between medieval-aristocratic
and modern-bureaucratic China,2 and from Ch'en Yin-k'o the perception of T'ang
history prior to the An Lu-shan rebellion as a struggle between two blocs--an
entrenched aristocracy and a newly-rising group of examination bureaucrats.3
Professor Ch'en elaborated his thesis by the division of the aristocracy into
contending northeastern and northwestern groups, and by suggesting that the
Empress Wu was responsible for the most significant change:
From the establishment of the T'ang by Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung until just
prior to the accession of Kao-tsung, those who held the most important
civil and military posts in the state were mostly the successors of the
Sui, Northern Chou, and Western Wei.
This is to say that they were the
descendants of the bloc assembled under the banner of Yii-wen T'ai's
"Kuan-chung first" policy.
From the time the Empress Wu seized power,
she destroyed this traditional policy step by step and, because of her
ambition to found her own dynasty, she began the destruction of the fuping system which was the traditional prop of the Kuan-chung bloc.
[So]
in this period social classes were in a state of flux, rising and falling.
As for the ohin-shih and other examinations, although established in
the Sui, they were unnecessary for the attainment of civil office.
Under
the Empress Wu, great emphasis was placed upon selecting officials for
their literary abilities, and [because] she broke the old rules of selec
tion, the oh-in-shih degree became the object of great competition every
where.
At that time there existed many persons in Shan-tung and Chiangtso who had devoted themselves to literary pursuits, but lack of member
ship in the Kuan-chung bloc had disqualified them from rising to official
positions.
The political revolution of the Empress Wu brought them to
court.
After this the high positions formerly monopolized by the old
[elite] of Wei, Chou, and Sui were necessarily taken and occupied by this
newly rising class.
The replacement of Li-T'ang by Wu-Chou was thus not
merely a political change.
It was a social revolution and, seen in this
light, was a irore significant change than the dynastic succession from
Sui to T'ang.^ . . .
Both these hypotheses are persuasive ones, though the former has proven to be
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somewhat more durable than the latter.
I nCh'en ‘ s work certain weaknesses in
premise and definition, as well as internal contradictions, have led to the
successful challenge of some of his conclusions,5 but several of his insights
remain vaiuable, and the emphasis he places upon regionalism, examinations,
and imperial policy as a determinant of change seem still to be warranted.
Moreover his work raises some questions which might profitably be examined in
the present context.
Did the Empress Wu, for instance, consciously foment a
"social revolution" even in the narrow sense in which Professor Ch'en uses the
term? Did her reign see the rise of any new "class"? What role was played by
the examination system and the decline of the fu-ping in societal change? And
finally, what was the nature of the T'ang ruling class and, within it, the re
lationship between status and office? While the nature of our sources for the
early T'ang is such that all statements regarding social mobility contain a
certain degree of speculation,^ partial or interim answers to all these questions
are possible.
Of the several contemporary observations on the subject ot the T'ang ruling
class and its development, that of the genealogist-historian Liu Fang is per
haps the most comprehensive.7
In his Discussion of Surnames and Lineages
(Hsing-hsi lun)dating from about 719> he wrote that clans and lineages had
been a state concern from the most ancient times:
There existed a work called the Shih-pen which recorded the names, ti
tles, and lineages of the feudal lords and great officers from the [time
of the] Yellow Emperor down to the Spring and Autumn period. . . . After
the Han arose Ssu-ma Ch'ien and his father edited the Shih-pen [for In
clusion in] their work, the Shih-ohi.
They clarified the [origins of
the] hereditary houses, following the Chou genealogies, and so came to
know the origins of their surnames and clan names. . . .
[Now] when Han Kao-ti had risen and, on foot, had gained control of
the empire, he appointed his officials because of their wisdom, and con
ferred noble rank for merit. ... He employed [only] those descendants
of former princes, dukes and great ministers who were talented, and he
rejected those without ability.
He made no distinction between shih and
shu,^ and so for the first time office [rather than lineage] was much
esteemed.
Still, however, the northeastern hao-ohieh^^ were transported
to fill the capital city.
At this time the Chu and T'ien of Ch'i and
the Ch'ii and Ching of Ch'u were all [considered to be] the preeminent
surnames {yu-hsing). . .
The Wei [dynasty] set up the 'nine rank' system and established
[officials called] the 'impartial and upright' {ohung-oheng) to recom
mend [potential officials], and they esteemed men of noble descent {shihohou) and looked down upon those scholars of low birth (han-shih).
Power
reverted again to the preeminent surnames. . . .
The Chin and Sung followed this method and so for the first time, sur
names {hsing) reached the pinnacle of importanc^.
Therefore, the shih
and the shu, the noble (kuei) and base {ahien
)'^ were clearly sep
arated once and for all.
At that time when officials came to select men
for promotion, they were certain to examine their genealogy (p'u) and
registration {chi) and check to see that there was no fraud. Thus every
official possessed his genealogical table {shih-ohou p'u) and it listed
the offices [of family members] for generations. . . .
South of the Yangtse [the greatest clans] were [called] the
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oh’iao-hsing and the greatest were the Wang, Hsieh, Yuan and Hsiao.
In
the Southeast were the wu-hsing, and the greatest were the Chu, Chang,
Ku and Lu.
East of the mountains (s/ion-tung') were the oKim-hsing, and the
greatest were the Wang, Ts'ui, Lu, Li and Cheng.
In Kuan-chung, they
were also [called] the ohun-hs'ing, and the greatest were Wei, P'ei, Liu,
Hs’ueh, Yang and Tu.
In northern Shansi (Tai-pei) were the lo-hsing, and
the greatest were the Yuan, Ch'ang-sun, Yu-wen, Yu, Lu, Yuan and Tou.
These lo-hsing were the 'eight clans and ten surnames' and the 'eightysix lineages and ninety-two surnames'of the time when [the Northern] Wei
[emperor] Hsiao Wen-ti moved his capital to Loyang [in ^9^]. • • . and
[Liu goes on
they called themselves men of Loyang in Ho-nan. . . .^3
here at some length to explain how the ohun-hsing were ranked according
to the offices held by family members into four groups, and how this was
the true origin of the term 'four surnames' {ssu-hsing) later appropri
ated by the northeastern clans alone.
He points out that the Northern
Ch'i restricted office to those numbered in the ssu-hsing.]
Formerly [during] the Southern Dynasties (Chiang-tso), their system
of status for clans and lineages was to consider the first of the ranking
surnames in each commandery the 'preeminent surnames.'
During the t’aiho period [477-500] of the Wei, all the 'four surnames' of each command
ery were considered 'preeminent surnames.'
The same term ['preeminent
surnames'] was used for those classified as ohia-men in the Lei-ti of
the monk T'an-kang^^ of the Northern Ch'i; for the 'clans respected by
all' {ssu-hai t’ung-wang) in the ohien-te [572-78]
compilation of the
Northern Chou;^5 for t^ose called the mao-hsing in the Sui compilation of

k'ai-huang [581-601];' and [finally] when the Shih-tsu ohih was compiled
in the ohen-kuan period of the T'ang, the same term was used for those
there classified as the first-rank families.
Those whom Lu [Ching-ch'un]
calls the sheng-men in his Chu-hsing Vueh^^ were also considered as 'pre
eminent surnames.'
Any [classification] which fails to accord with these practices of
successive dynasties should not be called 'genealogy' with them.
The
present-day custom of referring to the Ts'ui, Lu, Li and Cheng as the
'four surnames' . . . certainly does not follow this standard rule.
When culture {wen) is in decay, honor is given to false [genealogies].
The Sui was heir to this sort of decay but did not understand why there
was corruption and so went against the way of antiquity.
[The Sui] abol
ished the way of local recommendation {hsiang-ohu) and did not consider
persons [for selection] in reference to their place of origin {ti-ohu).
It valued officials only for their administration.
The shih thus had no
locality or village of their own; villages had no officials, and the
people lost integrity and their sense of shame.
The shih lineages were
thrown into disarray and the shu-gen went beyond their appointed station. . . .
When the people have nothing left to preserve, the shih lineages will
be destroyed.
And when the shih lineages are destroyed, the state perishes as a result.^®
Llu Fang's analysis, impressive in its detail and in its familiarity with a
full range of status terminology, is important in several respects.
In the
first place, it identifies a stratum of local shih, a minor aristocracy which
was recognized by the state to exist "in every commandery" during post-Han
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times and which was, in Liu's view, a crucial factor in the maintenance of so
cial order at a local level.
Without them the state would perish and, as a
result, they had been an object of concern to the throne since Han times.
He
points out that although rulers like Han Kao-tsu had successfully asserted
their right to define the criteria of status, the practice of respect for lin
eages distinguished either by nobility or by a tradition of state service was
a very ancient one and that as time went on, the growing contiguity between
title and office produced a class with a virtually hereditary charisma which
was highly Impervious to imperial control.
The gradual establishment of the
ethic of Han Confucianism made such qualities as superior humanity and refine
ment, scholarship and service to inferiors the hallmark of prestige,^and the
means of distinction between shih and shu.
There is ample evidence in the peri
od of division that conferral of shih status stood beyond the imperial preroga
tive, and that heredity was an essential element in its attainment, ° When a
high minister of the Sung (420-^*77) remarked that "between shih and shu there
is a gulf ordained by Heaven,"20 he was affirming not only the validity and ne
cessity of distinction, but also an hereditary source of charisma beyond defi
nition by man.
Liu Fang refers secondly to state recognition of shih status, most notably
through the bureaucratic and legal privileges it granted in the nine-rank ohungcheng system. Although much could be said about this system and the aristocrat
ic monopoly of power it produced, the important result for present purposes is
that it helped to make distinctions within the aristocracy:
Liu's elite of
"preeminent surnames" and the "blocs" identified by Ch'en Yin-k'o,
Genealogica^^
compilation became common practice both for individual clans and for the state,
but the motives were different and, as Liu suggests, there arose a parallel di
vergence between the public and private criteria of status.
To him this was a
serious, matter and, as we shall see, the first T'ang emperors shared his concern.
in specific terms, Liu saw the ideal state as one characterized by wen, a
word of wide connotation referring both to civil virtue and high culture.
Honor,
both from above and below, should be bestowed on the basis of wen, and its twin
foundations were officeholding (kuan) and lineage [hsing].
Moreover, as he sug
gests in the same essay, the clans of certain areas preserved through the gen
erations, different types of virtue;
The people cast of the mountains are unsophisticated and honest {ahih
%
), and so they esteem marriage connections. Their sincerity {hsin)
is%orthy of praise.
Those of Chiang-tso Ithe Yangtze valley] are highly
cultured {wen) and so esteem individual worth.
Their wisdom {ahih ^
)
is admirable,
in Kuan-chung, the people are brave and manly {hsiun^ and
so esteem officeholding.
Their perception {ta) is admirable.
The people
of Tai-pei Inorthern Shensi] are martial {wu) and so esteem noble relation
ships {kuei-dh'i).
Their breadth [of mind] {t'ai) is admirable.22
In this statement lies the problem.
While great clans could base their claim
to status on regional values, genuine centralization was illusory.
In other
words, a dynasty seeking to consolidate its rule had first to unify the defini
tion of wen since this was the acknowledged basis of respect.
Ideally, it should
itself personify the highest wen and enforce conformity upon rival claimants.
It seems clear from Liu's statement, however, that intangible and long-standing
clan tradition was relatively immune from imperial control, and that the succes
sive attempts by ambitious dynasties to compile state genealogical lists had
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failed to achieve their aims.
Only by revising this triadic relationship, by
emphasizing kuan over Using as a component of wen and as a claim to the status
and perquisites of the shih class could a dynasty triumph over regionalism and
Incipient rivalry.
And for the T'ang, the political history of post-Han China
and the disintegration which accompanied the fall of the Sui made priorities
clear.
The following discussion is largely the story of how the dynasty sought
to deal with the centrifugal tendencies of the aristocratic elite, and how under
Kao-tsung and the Empress Wu a solution was found which ultimately effected a
change in the nature of the ruling class in China and so hastened the end of
the aristocratic government which had been perhaps the outstanding feature of
"medieval" China.
The climate of the court in the early days of the T'ang was highly aristo
cratic and was seen in that light by others than Liu Fang.
Su Mien, in his im
portant encyclopedia (Hui-yao) of 803 wrote:
Of the great officials who were founders of the present dynasty, all were
of aristocratic clan {kuei-tsu).
Since the Three Dynasties of antiquity,
has there ever been a dynasty [so aristocratic] as ours?^3
The imperial house, of course, was aware of this phenomenon, but between the
first two emperors, Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung, there was a great difference in at
titude.
The former, judging by remarks attributed to him, was both confident
and proud in his lineage.
Speaking once to the scion of a great northwestern
clan, he said;
Our clan, the Li, was in antiquity wealthy and Influential in Lung-hsi
and in my grandfather's time [even] married into the imperial family.
When I raised my righteous troops, the whole empire joined me and in a
few days, I rose to become Son of Heaven.
Looking at the rulers of for
mer times, many rose from humble origins, toiling in the ranks and scarce
ly able to sustain their lives.
You, sir, are also from an eminent clan
{shih-ohou ming-ahia) which has successively held pure and illustrious
{dh'ing-hsien) [posts]. . . . After a thousand years, only the descendants
of you and me will he unashamed of their antecedents!^^
Kao-tsu in this speech makes clear the degree to which a proud genealogy had
become the source of pride, satisfaction and even self-respect by the seventh
century.
In his claim of relationship to the Lung-hsi Li clan—a claim almost
certainly false^5-^he also betrays a certain anxiety.
For although the wealth,
the regional influence, and the status of a former consort clan with its implied
concomitant of title and office which he claimed would seem an impressive enough
background even for an imperial house, in the early T'ang it was not.
The rea
son for this is the existence of a regional aristocracy whose prestige and pride
was much greater.
In 632, only a dozen years after his father's boast, T'aitsung defined the rivalry as follows:
At the time, the court discussed how the shih of the Northeast liked to
boast of themselves.
Although in successive generations they had de
clined, they still relied upon their former status (ti) and when their
daughters married into other clans, they had [to be paid] a bride gift
{p'in-’ts'ai).'^^ T'^ai-tsung disliked this, considering it very detrimen
tal tQ the teachings of rectitude ichiao-i).
As a result, he decreed that [KaoJ Shih-lien, . . , Wei T'ing, . , .
Ts'en Wen-pen . . . and Ling-hu Te-fen27 should revise and correct the
[state list of] clans.
Thereupon the genealogies {p'u-^tieh) of the whole
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empire were investigated and checked against historical records to veri
fy their truth.
The loyal and virtuous were commended and advanced,
while the disloyal and recalcitrant were censured and demoted.
The com
pilation was called the Shih-tsu chih and Shih-lien then grouped the
clans in ranks and categories (teng-ti) and submitted [the work].
T'ai-tsung said, 'For a long time, I have borne no resentment against
the Ts'ui, Lu, Li and Cheng [clans] of the Northeast.
I consider that
over the generations they have declined to insignificance and have wholly
failed to produce officials.
Yet still they call themselves shih-ta-fu^
and in their marriages they demand huge sums in money and silk.
In abil
ity and knowlege they are deficient, but [still] they esteem themselves.
They [are forced to] sell the trees from ancestral graves and rely upon
[marriage to] the rich and noble.
I cannot understand why the people
respect them [so greatly].
Previously, the Ch'i dynasty was restricted only to Ho-pei while the
Liang and Ch'en possessed no more than Chiang-nan.
At that time, though
they had talented men, they were minor Insignificant states and not wor
thy of respect.
Yet today the Ts'ui and the Lu, the Wang and the Hsieh
are admired.28
j have pacified the [entire] empire and made one family
of all the world.
The shih of my court are all renowned for their achievements and the loyalty and piety of some Is praiseworthy while the
learning and talent of others is wide.
[For this] they were chosen and
employed.
[Yet even] those who occupy positions above the third rank
seek to become the relatives [by marriage] of those decayed, ancient
families, sending them lavish [gifts of] money and silk, paying them hom
age. 29
Now when I specially decreed the settlement of clan [rankings], 1 de
sired to honor the officials of this court.
Why then has Ts'ui [Min-]
Kan still been placed in the first rank? . . .30 Do you gentlemen not
respect the offices and titles of my court? You were not instructed to
discuss former generations but simply to choose present offices and
titles for your ranking.
Subsequently Ts'ui [Min-] Kan was placed in the third rank.
The [re
vised] work [completed in 638] was made up of one hundred oTman and was
promulgated by decree to the empire.31
This important incident, which permits great insight into T'ai-tsung's vision
of a united China, has wide implications.
He and his father had indeed united
the empire into a single family, and he was determined that status should de
rive from himself as head of that family and should be earned in service to the
T'ang.
As emperor he could hardly have been unaware of the existence of the
four regional super-elites identified by Liu Fang, but he directed his attack
only against the clans of the Northeast.
His ostensible reasons were their pre
tensions, their exclusivistic posture which failed to produce central officials,
and marriage customs he regarded as detrimental to established morality.
It
seems unlikely, however, that these exhaust his reasons and, his disclaimer not
withstanding, he was probably aware of the northeastern clans' source of pres
tige and felt both inferior and insecure before it.
In the seventh century the northeastern ssu-hsing quite simply represented
the longest, purest, and most uncompromsing strain of the Confucian trad^ion.
Centered around the historical birthplace of the sage, they had made lif^ ,
a respect for the Way, the core of their pride, and when North China fell
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foreign hands they had refused both to flee south and leave their ancestral
graves untended and, in most cases, to sully their bloodlines by marrying with
the conquerors.32 When Hsiao Wen-ti, for instance, accepted a consort from the
Lung-hsi Li clan in 496, he had to compel the same four clans mentioned by
T'ai-tsung to provide inmates for his harem and wives for his sons.33
For reasons like these, the elite of the Northeast had distinguished them
selves from their counterparts in other regions of North China and had added
to their prestige by the traditional severity of their clan rules and the value
they placed on the maintenance of morality and ceremonial within their families.3^
Their
their
which
ality

prestige arose, therefore, more from social than bureaucratic causes, and
general unwillingness to enter state service under the foreign regimes
preceded the Sui provided them with the appearance and sometimes the actu
of martyrdom.35 Reluctance to hold offices in the capital accentuated

their regional characteristics, intensified their cohesiveness and exclusivity,
and dissociated them both from the exploitative nature of the foreign regimes
and from the parasitical character of the collaborating Chinese elite.36
We might note, finally, that it was in the Northeast that the T'ang had found
the greatest resistance to its dynastic foundation and, as we will see, had
reason to suspect the area of separatist tendencies for many years to come.37
Although Liu Fang had associated the military arts with the clans of Tai-pei,
there is ample contemporary evidence to suggest that, as a whole, the Northeast
possessed the finest fighting men and that the term hao-dhi-eh or hao-tsu, which
seems to have been a wide generic classification for the great clans in Han
times, came to connote such characteristics as self-sufficiency and martial
skill, and was reserved Increasingly for the people of the Northeast.38 Both
in economic and strategic terms, the area was a key one in the survival of the
dynasty and so could not be permitted to remain aloof from the centralizing
policies which T'ai-tsung considered so important.
His special treatment of the area sprang therefore from two causes.
The
greatest clans of the Northeast enjoyed a status in the popular view which was
beyond Imperial control, and with their superior prestige, marriage revenues
and court connections as well as their traditional military power, could threaten
not only national unity but the very life of the dynasty.
Status fixing by the
state was an old solution but, in the newly united T'ang Empire, one with a new
importance.
The rev ised vers ions of the. Shih-tsu oh-ih, according to the old T'ang Htstoryj
was greeted with general approval,89 but there are indications that in its stated
aim of equating status with present success in the service of the central gov
ernment, its effects were minimal.
There was no rush of northeastern aristo
crats to the capital, and in 642 the emperor was forced once more to attack the
same clans, charging that they had abandoned the profession of official.
He
struck at a key source of their economic viability with a decree forbidding the
sale of marriages {mat-hun)In the same edict he again commented on the pre
tensions of the group, and complained that new officials and wealthy families
still contended to marry with them, a custom which was now well-established.
Perhaps in order to justify what must have seemed a harsh order, he claimed
that marriages of this sort degraded the great clans, led to friction among in
laws because of status differences and even caused the "buyers" of marriage to
adopt the pretensions of the northeasterners.
His deeper motives were perhaps
punitive, reflecting both his frustration that the northeastern clans still
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remained aloof, and his determination to force them into acquiescence.
If this
is the case, his tactics were wrong, for as Ssu-ma Kuang remarks of a later ban.
Since [these] great clans {tsu-wang) were the object of contemporary
respect, in the end the prohibition could not succeed.
Some [of the
clans] secretly sent their daughters to the [intended] groom's house, and
others [permitted their] daughters to grow old as spinsters.
In short, these two measures of T'ai-tsung must have struck the northeastern
elite as expressions of regional discrimination on the part of a dynasty whose
own origins were northwestern and, as a result, can hardly have persuaded them
to contribute their services to it for reasons other than economic necessity.
Secure in their social prestige and realizing that if status were dependent on
office, the northwestern clans already had a thirty-year head start over them,
they seem for the most part to have continued their policy of non-cooperation.
Of the northeastern representatives among T'ai-tsung's chief ministers not a
single one was of the group of families he identified as objects of his central
izing concern.^2
I mentioned earlier that Kao-tsung inherited his father's bureaucracy and that
the preponderance of northwestern influence in its highest levels has led some
scholars to interpret the political struggle over Empress Wu's evaluation as a
conflict between regional aristocracies. While I have attempted to show the de
ficiencies of this view, I must also concede that it contains some measure of
validity.
The fact that it has been so widely discussed indicates at least that
the problem of regional jealousy within the ruling class had not wholly been
solved.
The events following Wu's elevation, most particularly her destruction
of the principal northwestern tsai-hsiang and the declaration of Loyang as the
eastern capital, created a favorable climate for another attempt to conciliate
the northeastern elite, and in 659, with a new clan list and marriage ban, the
attempt was made.
The immediate inspiration for the revision of the national clan list in 659
was, we are told, the fact that Empress Wu's clan was unranked or "not clearly"
ranked in the Shih-tsu chih.^^ While this may be true, it seems from such facts
as the comparatively low rank of the compilers of the new list^^ and from the
extant descriptions of the completed work that the motives for the revision pai
alleled those of T'ai-tsung two decades earlier.
The chief differences between
the two works is to be found in their size and scope, in the exact correlation
of official and treatise rank in 659 3nd in the omission in the later work of
all but the immediate family of the individual ranked.
These differences are
presented in tabular form as follows:^5

Shih-tsu chih

Title of
Work

(final form

638)

Hsing-shih lu
(completed 659)

No. of

oKuan
Contents

100
293 surnames

1,651
Features

1ineages

(a) Arranged by rank
(b) Imperial clan placed
first, followed by the con
sort families.
The Ts'ui

200

245 surnames
2,287 1ineages
(a) Same.
(b) Ranking reputedly decided by the
emperor, who also wrote a preface.
[The imperial clan probably occupied
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Shi-h-tsu ohih
(final form

Hsing-shih lu

638)

clan, which had originally
ranked first, was placed
third.

(completed 659)
a special rank at the top.]
In the
first rank were placed the four con
sort families (Tu-ku, Tou, Ch'ang-sun,
and Wu),' the imperial clans of Sui
and Chou (Yang, yu-wen),2 the clans of
those who had [in the T'ang] held the
posts of san-kungj,^ of t’ai-ssu,^ of

t'ai-tzu san-shih,^ of k'ai-fu-i-t'ung
san-ssu,^ of p'u-sheJ
Civil and military officials of the
second grade (—\jo) and [active] civil
officials of the third grade {ohihoheng-shih ahe san-p'tn) were placed
in the second rank.
Every [other] of
ficial was ranked according to his
grade.
(c) A total of 9 ranks.

(c)

(d) Aim to distinguish shih'^
from shu
’

(d) Inclusion of all who had reached
at least the fifth grade in the T'ang
period.
No relatives of the man
ranked, except his brothers, his sons
and grandsons, were included.

(e) Greeted generally with
approval.

(e) Since all who had achieved the
fifth grade were elevated to shih'Jr
status, even soldiers, the gentlefolk
{ahin-shen shih ta-fu) were all
ashamed to be ranked.
They called the
work the Rule of Meritorious Service

Same.

to the State (Hsun-ko).
Notes

(1) An observation found
in the Comprehensive Mirror,
and in the old T’ang History,

189, 3578:1, biography of
Liu Ch'ung.

(1) The respective empresses of Li
Ping, Kao-tsu, T'ai-tsung, and Kaotsung.
(2) Referred to as hsi-kung and ohieh-

kung.
(3) The posts of t’ai-wei,
In addition to
clan, members of the P'ei,
Fang and Li clans had held

ssu-k’ung.

ssu-t’u and
the Imperial
Ch'ang-sun,
one of the

posts.
{h) The heads of the Chancellery,
Secretariat and Department of State
which were second and third grade posts.
(5) The Three Preceptors of the Crown
Prince, who were all first-grade of
ficials.
Four men had held the post.
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Title of
Work

Shih-tsu ohih
(final form

638)

Hsing-shih lu
(completed 659
(6) An honorary official title of the
first class.
(7) The two vice-presidents of the
Department of State Affairs.
Six men
not included elsewhere in the first
rank would be found here.

The substantive differences between the Shih-tsu ohih and the Hsing-shih lu
reflect as much as anything else a different tactical approach to an identical
problem.
As we have seen, the first work is said to have been greeted with aris
tocratic approval and, moreover, to have had as one aim the separation of shih
and shu.
Both of these attest to its traditional character, and the necessity^
for a marriage ban four years later suggests that perceptions of status were lit
tle changed by it.
T'ai-tsung clearly was not anti-aristocratic, nor did he seek
by the treatise to weaken or destroy the northeastern clans.
He sought rather
to woo them into direct service to the T'ang, but his openly indiscreet and hos
tile attitude and his arbitrary reduction of the Ts'ui clan's ranking could only
have had the effect of polarizing the two sides.
Moreover, since he decreed that
the list was to be a permanent ordinance {yung-shih)the proud clans of the
Northeast would be forever inferior in the eyes of the state to those whom they
regarded as the upstart clans of the Northwest.
The Hsing-shih lu was at once more conciliatory and more firm.
Like its pred
ecessor, it emphasized state service over family as a determinant of status but
even more greatly stressed the individual over the clan.
The truly important
change lay in the fact, therefore, that heredity was no longer a factor in obtain
ing shih status and that any individual who reached fifth-rank officialdom needed
no other qualification to be accounted a shih.
At a stroke officeholding became
more desirable and more necessary, and marriage into one of the great north
eastern clans no longer held the same attraction for those who sought rapidly to
raise their status.
At the same time, however, the olive branch of conciliation was held out to
the Northeast with the collection and burning of all available copies of the Shihtsu ohih^l and the elimination thereby of the clan superiority of the Northwest.
Probably for the same reasons, the new work recognized the validity of marriage
as status in the high ranking of consort families and removed the imperial clan
from competition with the Northeast by creating a special rank for it.
The North
east, moreover, had produced its share of regional officials above the fifth rank
and, by providing most of the manpower for T'ai-tsung's Korean campaigns, had prob
ably come to hold most honorific ranks.
On these two grounds, its representation
in the second work was, in relative terms, likely to have been better than in the
first.
Although the new list took even less account of genealogy than the old,
on balance it was probably more palatable to the northeastern clans.
The same was true of the marriage ban issued four months later.
This docu
ment forbade the intermarriage of seven surnames {hsing) and specified limita
tions on the bride

gift.Pragmatic

and free of moralizing,

it listed first
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the Lung-hsi Li clan, thereby implicitly bonding the imperial family to the six
greatest clans of the Northeast who made up the remainder of the list.
It tied
the bride gift to present official rank, thus providing additional incentive for
the aloof clans to seek high capital office.
In this way the ban was directed
not so much against their economic base as against their exclusive marriage cir
cle and the cohesion which fostered their sense of regional independence.
If this is the correct interpretation of the ban's purpose, and if it suc
ceeded in drawing more of the northeastern elite to the capital, it would seem
logical to conclude that there was no real need for enforcement of its specific
prohibitions.
As we have seen, traditional historians record that the response
of the great clans was to marry secretly or to keep their daughters unwed, and
recent scholarship has empirically demonstrated that this was indeed the case.^^
In spite of this, there is no evidence until after the Chou dynasty that the
throne insisted on enforcement,51 and the principal reason seems to have been
that there was no need to do so.
From all we can gather, the two status measures of 659 seem to have succeeded
in wiping clean the slate.
By permitting a limited bride gift rather than out
lawing the practice as T'ai-tsung had done, Kao-tsung and the Empress Wu were
recognizing that the northeastern clans had at least a social claim to superior
status.
The Esi-ng-sh-ih tu at the same time served notice that status would
henceforth be tied principally and definitively to office in the T'ang.
In com
parison to the Shih-tsu ohih, it was more in the nature of a Who's Who than an
Almanach de Gotha and so acted as an invitation to the northeastern clans to
diversify their claims and compete for status on the same terms as the other re
gional elites.
The fact that the empress, considered by contemporaries to be an
easterner and known to favor Loyang over Ch'ang-an,52 was by 659 being seen al
most as an equal partner in Kao-tsung's government, must have served as an addi
tional attraction to the Northeast.
It seems more than coincidence, therefore,
that before Kao-tsung's death, all but one of the lineages specified in the mar
riage ban of 659 had provided the T'ang with a chief minister; and in the Chou
dynasty the high proportion of these same surnames in tsai-hsiang ranks further
attests to the success of her reconci1iation.53
Finally, we might note in this regard the form of what seems to have been the
last major attempt by the T'ang at status fixing on a nationwide scale, the Hsing
tsu-hsi tu of 71^.5^ Though details of the work are scarce, it was altogether a
more "professional" compilation than its predecessors55 and, as much as anything
else, reflects a general acknowledgment that the state had won the right to set
the criteria of status.
The proposal for its composition in 707 remarked, first
of all, that "official families {kuan-mien ohih ohia) have changed, rising and
falling. . . . Judgments of former times can hardly be used as a rule for the
present."55 Chung-tsung concurred, decreeing that a treatise of eminent clans

iyu-hsing) be compiled to include "men of high repute and great virtue, of pure
occupation and good breeding; [men] whose titles are inherited, of the standard
of well-known scholars, whose bravery has been often demonstrated, who have re
ceived honorific rank, who are of supreme distinction at this court, and who are
honored in court and countryside, their fame united with general admiration. . .
Barbarian chieftains of notable official service should be placed in a separate
category."57 The work was to be based on the Shih-tsu ohih which seems, there
fore, to have escaped total destruction and was completed in 200 ohuan.^^
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Although it is sometimes suggested that this compilation reflects the "aristo
cratic revival" said to follow the deposition of Empress Wu, these surviving de
tails seem to indicate that it resembed the Hsing-shih lu rather more than the
Shih-tsu ahih.
Once again, for instance, the emphasis was placed on the individ
ual rather than the clan, and once again it listed recipients of honorific rank
and foreign chieftains--the groups whose inclusion in the compilation of 659
had led to widespread criticism.
On this occasion we hear of no such protest
and, as a result, might be justified in assuming that in the intervening seventy
years, a principle had been successfully established.
The Hsing-tsu-hsi lu was
designed not so much to create as to identify present membership in the shih
class.
In 71^ success and reputation in the service of the T'ang were accepted as the
sole criteria of eminence, and scholars, soldiers and "barbarians" were all eli
gible seemingly without reference to their antecedents.
The fact that during the
two generations which had passed since the Shih-tsu ohih, status had come to de
pend more on office than on clan, on achievement rather than birth, represents a
social change of truly grand significance.
It is perhaps the most important historical change for which Kao-tsung and the
Empress Wu were responsible.
They had done no less than redefine the ruling
group, the shih class, changing its principal characteristic from "aristocratic"
to "bureaucratic," and winning popular acceptance for the new view of societal
stratification.
One of Kao-tsung's chief ministers summed up the change when he
retired from office in 683, reportedly remarking on the three disappointments he
had suffered in his life:
his failure to win the ohin-shih degree, to marry a
daughter of the northeastern wu-hsing, and to be a compiler of the National His
tory. 59 The fact that he was the scion of one of the preeminent clans makes his
preferences the more meaningful.
The means by which the change was wrought, most particularly the growth of the
examination system, belong properly to the next chapter, but two other aspects of
it should be noted here.
In the first place, the changes which occurred in the
ruling class were as much qualitative as quantitative.
Second, and in a directly
related process, the new, more highly bureaucratized shih began to show signs of
melding with its former antithesis, the shu, to form a single class of subject
in a more "modern" societal configuration.
Under Hsuan-tsung the change was em
bodied formally in law.
To understand these two developments, it is necessary to return to the state
registers of status.
From the descriptions provided of the two works of the
seventh century, it seems abundantly clear that the clans counted in the nation
wide elite comprised only a miniscule proportion of the population and indeed as
early as the Sung, traditional scholars had pointed out that they were really the
elite of an elite, existing above a generalized, locally prominent shih class who
were also exclusive in their marriages and able to claim both social and bureeaucratic preferment.^0 As I already suggested, this situation is reflected only
slightly in the state registers, with the clans listed in the Shih-tsu c^ih, for
instance, comprising no more than .05 percent of the entire population.
Al
though the Hsing-shih lu increased its coverage to 245 clans and 2,287 lineages,
the proportion was probably not much greater, and since status ranking was to
correspond to official rank and there were over 16,000 liu-nei officials at the
time,52 this seems a situation difficult to explain.
Even considering the nepotistic nature of the early T'ang bureaucracy, the majority of officials must have
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gone unlisted, and from this indirect evidence, it seems reasonable to assume the
existence of a much larger shih stratum whose lineage made them desirable as pro
spective officials, but whose social standing was still too low for the national
standard of registration.
Until the discovery of the Tunhuang manuscripts, further development of this
hypothesis was difficult.
Several documents in various collections, however,
have recently thrown light on the problem, though there remains a certain con
troversy over their exact interpretation.°3 These conflicts aside, they consti
tute an extremely valuable source.
The documents in question, four or possibly five in number,date from the
middle of the eighth century and offer detailed information on those clans con
sidered to possess social prominence in the various ohou and ohun of the empire.
Collation of them with later geographies and rhyme dictionaries^5 reveals the
existence of a second level of shih lineages which was perhaps five times the
size of the super elite of the Shih-tsu ohih.° This configuration is the chief
explanation for the form taken by social development in the second half of the
seventh century.
Let me explain further.
In the early T'ang, prestige, influence, and the per
quisites of rule belonged to the sh-ih class, but an inordinate share of social
status was monopolized by a tiny, nationally renowned super elite concentrated
east of the T'ai-hang Mountains.
The following map, based on manuscript wei 79
in the Peking National Library, illustrates the regional disparity and shows the
distribution of the aristocratic groupings identified by Liu Fang. As I sug
gested earlier, the northeastern clans were exclusivistic, proud and, largely
through marriage practices, self-sufficient.
Their concern with genealogy, clan
solidarity and Confucian ritual was at least partly an attempt to remain distinct
not only from the other regional super elites, but also from a wider stratum of
local shih which aspired to the same heights.
Provided the criteria of status
remained unchanged, their security was assured.
The attempt begun by T'ai-tsung to equate status with present office, es
sentially a measure designed to balance rather than weaken the great clans,
changed the situation.
Whatever the failings of his policy, the emperor had at
least recognized the use to which the local shih could be put, recognized their
aspirations and their adaptability and thus, it will be recalled, had canvassed
the genealogies of the entire empire rather than simply concentrating on the
areas where the super elites were concentrated.
Kao-tsung and Empress Wu had
extended this principle in 659» attempting further to blur distinctions within
the aristocracy while at the same time conciliating the alienated Northeast.
For them the second part of the policy was of greater immediate importance, and
until the 670s it reflected the need for unity, for acceptance on the part of an
upstart dynasty, and for a cooperative Northeast to support the Korean campaigns.
Imperial success in these aims was not total, but a good deal of evidence can be
adduced to show that by Kao-tsung's death representation of the national elites
was more balanced in the chief ministerial ranks than had been the case in the
650s and, as will be shown later, that they came to dominate such governmental
organs as the Chancellery and the Board of Civil Off ice.^7
During this same period, however, the bureaucracy was expanding rapidly,^®
and if the regional distinctions within the super elite were being diluted by
their common bureaucratization, the group as a whole found itself pressured from
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Locations of ohou with one or more great clans from Peking wei 79;
locations in parentheses from Ikeda On's reconstruction from T’ai-

p'ing huan-yu ahi.
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below by the inferior layer of shih lineages who were rising in the bureaucracy
through examination and the decreasing imperial emphasis on genealogy.
Having
committed themselves to court politics and become vulnerable to their vicissi
tudes, the great clans found themselves on the defensive in the maintenance of
the prestige they had so long monopolized.
To compensate for their surrender to
one form of definition of status in terms of state service, they seem to have
responded by intensifying what they still monopolized, the purity of their Confucian tradition.^9
When Kao-tsung died and the Empress Wu seized control of the government, they
found themselves, therefore, in an impossible position.
As representatives of
the Confucian opposition to a woman ruler and as possessor of great political in
fluence, they became the primary objects of the terror, and over the next decade
hundreds of families suffered extinction or eclipse, in many cases taking gen
erations to recover.70 Though monographic studies on the subject are lacking,
it seems safe to assume that the great aristocracy suffered a severe blow under
the empress' regime and that had they clung more tenaciously to their regional
bases, they might have attained a much higher rate of survival.
This, of course, lies in the realm of speculation and, in any case, it is dif
ficult to see continued aloofness as a viable alternative for them.
The message
of the state registers and marriage bans was difficult to ignore and, as we will
shortly see, from about the time of the examination reforms of 669, imperial re
cruitment policies were directed largely toward the provincial elite whose selfinterest, traditions, and competence made them natural alternatives to the great
aristocrats in the highest ranks of officialdom.
Lest this group displace them
by default, the latter were forced to respond to bureaucratization and, judging
from extant lists of high officials, this was as true of the other regional super
elites as of the northeastern wu-hsing.
As we shall see, even the scions of
great clans applied with increasing frequency for the state examinations.
These developments served, therefore, not only to initiate change within the
aristocracy but also within the bureaucracy.
By the Chou and thereafter, official
dom was not only growing but, in the lower ranks at least, its highly aristocratic
character was becoming progressively diluted.
The super elites, still well en
trenched in high office, found themselves pressured from below by the lesser shth
and at the same time subject to the systematic policies by which the empress at
tacked the upper ranks of the bureaucracy.
There was no need for status registers
and marriage bans between 659 and the end of the Chou principally because the
great clans had been enticed into a larger and more "egalitarian" bureaucracy and
so had ceased to threaten the state from a position of independence.
Representa
tive of the emerging pattern is Li Ching-hsiian who was a member of the eminent
Chao-chun Li clan, entered the bureaucracy through recommendation, recruited
"myriads" each year, mostly from the Northeast, as president of the Board of Civil
Office married three times into the northeastern aristocracy, and was disgraced
in 680.
His whole family was later exterminated.71
The second major social change which occurred in the last half of the seventh
century, the blurring of the distinction between shih and shu^ was closely re
lated to the policies discussed above and was equally the result of conscious im
perial aim.
Although the change was not completed until the k'ai-yiuxn period
(713“^2) and, although it is difficult to say whether T'ang policy generally or
the special situation of the Empress Wu was a more important factor in the change,
the end of the distinction may be viewed as an event which truly marked the end
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to the "aristocratic" epoch.
Until the Sui dynasty it seems clear that the shih-shu division had had at
least a quasi“legal basis^^ and, as we noticed earlier, T'ai~tsung's Shih-tsu
ohih had as one of its aims the preservation of the distinction. The Hsing-shih
lu, however, embodied a major departure from this principle and had included in
its rankings such groups as the recipients of honorific rank and foreign chief
tains who were, in most cases, not of the shih class.
And from 659 the policy
of the throne seems to have sought further to erode the distinction.
The prin
cipal tactic, as we shall shortly see, was the extension of the examination prin
ciple and the wooing of liu-wai officials, but after 684 we find a much wider
range of specific measures designed to achieve the same end.
Several edicts, for
instance, called specifically for the recommendation of virtuous men, "whether
shih or shu" to fill official positions, and in 685 talented commoners {pai-hsing)
were given the right to recommend themselves for posts.73 During the terror serv
ants and even slaves were given the right to denounce their masters and to travel
at state expense to the capital to make their reports, while in the great Khitan
rebellion, slaves and convicts were permitted for the first time to enlist in the
army and to be eligible, therefore, for the various military rewards.'
These
measures were of the sort responsible for what Professor Ch'en has termed the
"social flux" of the empress' period but, generally, were measures of expediency
and need not be seen as any more than the most striking examples of an evolving
new perception of status dating at least from 659.
A systematic analysis of the
edicts of the Chou period shows that the term shih is almost invariably used in
its bureaucratic sense, the connotation shifting from social class to official
function.75 Conversely, the term shu, which appears in edicts much less fre
quently than such terms as min or pai~hsing, is used for any person who held no
rank in the official hierarchy.
The effect of this practice, which included the substitution of a distinction
between "free" {kuei or Hang) and "unfree" {ohien^%-), was soon to be recognized
in law and embodied in the Code of the T'ang (T'ang-lu shu-i) by IflIt seems
fair to say, therefore, that the regime of Wu Tse-t'ien marks a definite stage in
the evolution of status perceptions in medieval China.
In specific terms, it was
the state status register she inspired, and her own edicts {ling) which were
largely responsible for the creation of the simplified, two-level model of strat
ification upon which the lu-ling system of the T'ang was thenceforth to be based.
In summarizing the role of the Empress Wu in the social change which occurred
in her era, we must take care not to give her too much credit for acting con
sciously to achieve this end.
While her unorthodox governmental role was clearly a
catalyst, she remained in many respects typical of her times.
In her regime we
find the customary sumptuary regulations directed against merchants and artisans
and at least one measure designed to limit the official advancement of such groups
as astronomers, musicians, physicians and diviners.7° v/e have seen how in 683
she took great pains to embellish her own genealogy, and on other occasions she
was not above crude snobbery.
Objecting once to the family into which her daugh
ter planned to marry, she asked. "How can my daughter become the sister-in-law
to farm girls {t'ien-she nii) ?"7^ On several occasions she affirmed her belief in
the hereditary nature of good and evil character and the effect of geography upon
it.^^ Nonetheless she was a pragmatist before all else and because of her back
ground, her Buddhism and her evolving dynastic aims, she was less inflexible than
her predecessors in promoting the rise of worthy and talented men.
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Finally, the direction of social change and status perception must be related
to the most basic of the empress' aims, her attempt to establish first the T'ang,
then the Chou in an age when regional and clan-centered traditions were paramount
and when dynasties originated in the great clans. This meant that the status
claims and the prestige of the super elites not only in the Northeast but every
where had to be subordinated to those of the state.
She and Kao-tsung together
took the first step, following T'ai-tsung's lead, but the development of the pol
icy, particularly the patronage of the examination system and the lower stratum
of shih whose rise it fostered, seems to have been more her own policy than her
husband's. This theme we shall discuss in the following chapter.
Once officeholding had become the sine qua non for achieved status and the road
to high office had been opened more widely, the greatest clans found themselves
on the defensive. They possessed, after all, no monopoly on talent. When they
finally acknowledged state control of status by their rush to gain office, their
invulnerability was ended. As already mentioned, from 68^ onward so many suf
fered execution or the penalty of "eradication of name" {dh’u-ming) that entire
clans were suddenly plunged into economic hardship and social obscurity.
In spite of this, the empress' policies were not intrinsically anti-aristocratic.
She was opposed only to those characteristics of the great clans which she saw as
detrimental to state unity and to the full achievement of imperial power and ad
ministrative efficiency.
In this opposition, however, lay the seeds of the con
flict within the ruling class which would be so pronounced a feature of her own
dynasty, and which would help to cement the changing perceptions of status which
had evolved in the preceding decades.
There is little evidence that her regime
fostered the rise of any new class, but it did facilitate the advancement of an
already defined secondary shih class and, perhaps of greater importance, it has
tened the decline of the proud oligarchy whose monopoly of political power was
the outstanding characteristic of post-Han China.

Chapter 7
THE EXAMINATION SYSTEM AND THE BUREAUCRACY

Political developments in the seventh century, although far more richly docu
mented than their social equivalents, present the historian with numerous prob
lems.
The first of these, the bias of traditional historiography, has earlier
been discussed in some detail but it is in the political realm that it takes on
its greatest significance.
In the Confucian mind, questions of rule were upper
most, and by the seventh century the values of the historian were set.
A good
ruler was one who conformed to traditionalism and decorum, who achieved harmony
in the hierarchical relationships of Heaven, Earth and Man, as well as between
ruler and subject, and who brought peace and prosperity to the empire.
Motiva
tion and causation, objective assessment of success and failure except in the
moral realm, are largely absent from the traditional accounts.
There is a same
ness in all their appraisals of the Empress Wu in her political role.
She was
unorthodox and undignified, ruthless and pragmatic, cruel and skillfully un
scrupulous.
The description of her which terms her "licentious but orderly [in
administration]" {yin evh pu-luan) in juxtaposition to the Han Empress L'u has be
come proverbial.
A second difficulty lies in the fact that extant sources are concerned almost
exclusively with the events and conflicts at court and usually deal only with
the ruler and the highest echelons of the bureaucracy.
The lower levels of of
ficialdom, provincial administration and the extremely important class of office
holders termed those "outside the current" {liu-wai) are dealt with only in
directly, and the historian must rely on surmise, later sources, and occasionally
the evidence of Tunhuang.
On the other hand, the high degree of centralization
in the early T'ang makes the problem less severe than is the case after An Lushan's rebellion; moreover, the first century or so of the dynasty was character
ized by a phenomenon known as "value the center and esteem lightly the prov-^
inces" {ahung-nei ah'ing-wai)This meant that most ambitious men were active
at the capital, and it was there that important political events occurred.
Let
us now turn to some of them.
Within the governing class of pre-modern China the conventional conflict per
ceived by historians has been that between the "inner" (nei) and the "outer"
(wai):
that is, between the imperial and consort clans, their eunuchs and fav
orites on the one hand, and the bureaucracy on the other.
Throughout hi story
the ascendancy of a woman had almost always been accompanied by the rise^of her
family, the wai-dh’i, and by eunuch power.
But under the Empress Wu, this type
of analysis is of little use, for she succeeded in breaking the pattern.
Never
did a eunuch exercise any discernible political influence, and never did any mem
ber of the Wu clan advance much beyond the status of a tool in carrying out^such
specific policies as the suppression of the upper bureaucracy or the confusion^
of the succession.^ Even the military power held by male clan members was mini
mal,^ especially in comparison with the Han Empress Lii who had set the pattern,
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and with the early eighth-century Empress Wei who prepared for her attempted coup
by first placing as much military force as possible in wai-ch’i hands.
it is, therefore, one of the most remarkable aspects of Empress Wu's career
that what she did, she did with only minimal aid from her family.
There are a
number of reasons for this, some of which we have looked at in our discussion of
her legitimation.
Even more basic than those we have already discussed, however,
is the dislike she conceived for her half-brothers after her father's death with
the result that she had them disgraced or destroyed between 666 and 670.
Of the
survivors, her nephews Wu Ch'eng-ssu and Wu San-ssu, the sons of Wu Yuan-shuang
and Wu Yuan-ch'ing respectively, were summoned to the capital in 67k but were
kept out of politics until after Chung-tsung's deposition.
As we shall see, both
of them eventually reached tsai-hsiang status but held it for a relatively short
period of time and principally as a counterweight to such competent and assertive
ministers as Ti Jen-chieh.5 Even the fiefs of maintenance {shih-shi-h feng) award
ed to the Wu clan during Chou, although a source of criticism by historians, were
not excessive in the context of the times, and the real abuse of the privilege
belongs to the next reigns.® The empress is said once to have remarked that she
desired to have one member of her clan as chief minister at all times,7 but it is
significant that she was speaking at the time to a maternal relative, and that
the Yangs and other relatives-by-marriage were as prominent in her period of pow
er as were the Wus.
Neither, however, became dominant either in the political or
military spheres, and of no male ruler in the T'ang prior to An Lu-shan's rebel
lion could the same be said. Her predecessor T'ai-tsung had had his Ch'ang-sun
Wu-chi, and her successor Hsuan-tsung would have his Li Lin-fu.
To Wu Tse-t'ien
a
her servants, including her own family, were equal beneath the throne.
The Empress Wu did, however, have a series of favorites whom she used for spe
cific purposes.
The best known of these were Chou Hsing and Lai Chun-ch'en who
presided over the terror, Hsueh Huai-i who was responsible not only for the archi
tecture of the ming-t'ang and the commentary on the Great Cloud Sutra but served
also as a general, and finally the Chang brothers whose role seems to have been
that of the empress' friends and confidants and whose political interventions
were the immediate cause of her deposition.®
In each case these men were given
enormous power, but intrinsically it was chiefly the power of invulnerability,
to be answerable to the empress alone, and not the power to venture into the
realm of administrative policy-making.
Their effects were felt chiefly in the
determined absolutism of the empress as she used them to counterbalance and di
lute the influence of more talented officials.
As a result, they shared in the
empress' political success.
Was the empress a success? As mentioned earlier, most traditional historians
have said "no" and have cited her massacres along with the decline of Confucian
"virtue," the demoralization of a bureaucracy marked by excessive appointments
and poor quality, and China's weakness against its neighbors during Chou, as
indexes of her failure.
The fact remains, however, that she became emperor in a
China where it was impossible for a woman to do so, and even traditional histo
riography praises her ability as ruler "to accept remonstrance and know men."®
Moreover, the internal peace and prosperity which marked her reign, and her con
tribution to the bureaucratization of the great clans, to the development of
Buddhism and, as we shall see, to the examination system, are matters of histor
ical record.
For the modern scholar, however, these facts are not enough and
must be seen in the context of teleological questions.
What precisely were the
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motivations and the political aims of the empress, and to what extent and why
were they achieved?
The tasks she set for herself were, I suggest, simple yet visionary.
First of
all, I suggest that she wanted to see her husband's dynasty consolidated and, in
a more general sense, to make a harmonious state, permanently united under a
strong central power whose sole, free, and acknowledged head was the emperor.
Second, and closely related to this, she sought to change the relationship be
tween ruler and minister or, perhaps more accurately, to create a new type of
official who would interact in a specific way with an imperial institution for
which she already had a clear definition.
If not unique to her, it was at least
contrastable with that of T'ai-tsung, and making it a reality was the goal of
much of her political policy.
Without the support of Kao-tsung, who seems early
to have been persuaded to her view, she could have achieved little, and the policy
of reducing the tsai-hsiang prerogatives perhaps owes as much to him as to her.
Judging from the form taken both by the curriculum and the examination process
itself the empress' hand is more easily discernible than that of her husband in
the development of the examination system.
I shall, therefore, speak of the ex
amination policies as hers, bearing in mind, of course, that Kao-tsung offered
both his acquiescence in and the legitimation for enforcement of her policies,
if not the initiative in creating them.
The preceding chapter attempted to show the success of Kao-tsung's early pol
icies to make status dependent on service to the T'ang, and to bureaucratize the
great clans, especially the exclusivistic northeastern aristocracy.
It further
suggested the new problem which arose partially from the solution to the old.
This is to say that the new bureaucracy, especially in its highest echelons, was
infused with ambition, competence and the kind of self-confidence which arose
from knowledge that its members possessed not only high birth but talent demon
strated either by examination or service.
These officials had demands to make
on the ruler and ways to abridge his prerogatives, and the representatives of
their claims were the tsai-hsiang^ officisls above the third rank and of desig
nated status.^® Since the reign of T'ai-tsung, this group had been growing in
strength until by the 650s its members could justify the ancient claim that "no
matter of state lay beyond their scope.It had, of course, been the tsaihsiang acting as a group who had almost succeeded in blocking the elevation of
the Empress Wu, and we have seen how, with her husband's collusion, she rapidly
succeeded in destroying the men involved.
This had resulted in the intimidation
of the group and the replacement of its members with more amenable officials like
Hsu Ching-tsung and Li l-fu, but the early opposition of the tsai-hsiang and the
attempt in 664 by another of them, Shang-kuan I, to bring about her deposition
were things the rulers seem never to have forgotten.
In politics a major concern, therefore, became the definition of relations be
tween emperor and minister, and with her customary thoroughness the empress
turned first to the examination system.
For the next few decades, the Imperial
view of the institution seems to have been that it was more a tool to achieve cer
tain political and social ends than a method of choosing the best men to govern
the state.
The first indication of concern with selection appeared in 657In that year
the vice-president of the
Chancellery, Liu Hsiang-tao, submitted a comprehen
sive, seven-part critique of the appointment process,perhaps inspired by the

90

Chapter 7

fact that the notoriously corrupt Li l-fu had recently been given charge of the
Board of Civil Office 3 and was already selling posts on a large scale.
At the
same time, Liu identified some more general faults in the system, and because
his criticisms were to be echoed throughout the next decades, it is useful to
present them here in a fairly full way.
His first concern was a dual one:
that too many appointments were being made
and that too many men were insufficiently qualified.
Elaborating on this, he
pointed out that less than a third of present appointees were examination grad”
uates while the rest were recruited from among minor governmental servants,
clerical employees or guards, whom he referred to as the tsa-se-gen or hsu-t’u^^
There was no reason, he thought, to assume that these men were of virtuous chai—
acter, and one of the reasons that punishments still existed in the state was
that they were so numerous in the administration.
His solution was the division
of the qualified tsase-jen into four groups on the basis of their talents and
character, with the best being attached to the Board of Civil Office, the next
to the Board of War, and so on.
Those who had once committed either a private
or public crime should be reexamined and, unless amnestied, should receive no
appointment.^^ These measures, he believed, would purify the bureaucracy and in
spire the hsu-t'u to a realization that competence and character were the criteria
for appointment.
His second point was closely related to the first.
Suggesting that the former
practice whereby men "entered the current" of regular bureaucratic appointment
only when vacant positions occurred was now disregarded, he pointed out that
there existed at the time 13*^65 officials "within the current."^5 Considering
that the average bureaucratic career was about thirty years in length, he cal
culated that the appointment of 500 persons per year would be more than suffi
cient to keep the bureaucracy at a constant level.
Yet the Board of Civil Office
at the time was making over 1,400 new appointments a year, and as officials re
turned from the frontier to find positions in the capital, the numbers were fur
ther swollen.
This policy, he believed, was short-sighted and dangerous.
Liu s next three points concerned education and examination.
Requesting first
of all that two-thirds of all appointments within the current be allotted to
holders of the ming-ehing or ohin-shih degrees, he asked also that greater con
sideration in appointment and promotion be given to students in the three state
schools.
His point here seems to have been that while the great expansion of
Confucian education was highly beneficial to the state, students should have at
least equal opportunities for advancement with lower-ranking officials who cur
rently received promotion even beyond the statutory limitations as a reward for
such relatively small achievements as the suggestion of administrative improve
ments.
He recommended further that the hsiu-ts'ai examination be reinstated.
Finally, Liu criticized the k'ao system of promotion, suggesting that officials
rose too rapidly, with the result that many of them kept one eye constantly on
their promotions instead of their present duties and that the common people were
less inclined to obey them, knowing that their tenure was likely to be short.
He concluded by returning in more specific terms to his first point, criticiz
ing the three departments and the twenty-four offices for selecting and promot
ing their personnel from "outside the current." Officials of demonstrated
classical and literary abilities found it shameful to serve in the same office
with these Inferior men, and the obvious result was that administrative efficiency
was decreased.
Liu requested that Kao-tsung have these matters fully discussed
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and issue a decree to clarify the situation.
According to one source, the em
peror was willing to act, but "the great ministers {ta-oh’en) shrank from re

form,"^7

so that nothing was done.

As we shall see, Liu's views came increasingly to characterize the upper bur
eaucracy, particularly from the 680s when the sole ascendancy of the Empress Wu
and her search for support in the lower bureaucracy brought her to attack the
exclusivism and Confucian virtue which Liu so strongly advocated as necessary
attributes of officialdom.
Bureaucratic opposition in 657 is more difficult to
account for, though the fact that only a small proportion of existing ministers
possessed an examination degree may have been a factor in their reluctance to
see the implementation of Liu's proposals.Rapid promotions were popular at
all levels of officialdom except the very top, and an even more important factor
working against change was the existence in the present system of opportunities
for influential ministers to build a clientele by appointing friends and relatives
from "outside the current." For rulers who aspired to a greater absolutism this
privilege was a dangerous one, and its possible abuse was undoubtedly one of the
reasons Kao-tsung and the empress turned increasingly to examination as a means
of bureaucratic appointment.
To understand this development we must realize, first of all, that the T'ang
offered technically five means of entry into the nine ranks of the regular bui
eaucracy.
Of these, the three which accounted for the overwhelming majority of
officeholders were promotion from "outside the current," possession of hereditary
privilege {yin), and success in one of the examinations.19 Although examination
graduates probably accounted for no more than a tenth of T'ang officialdom, they
became increasingly prominent in the highest ranks of government, and we find
that by the Chou dynasty, for Instance, almost forty percent of the tsai-hsiang
were graduates of the system, compared with only one of Kao-tsu's fourteen chief
ministers and four of T'ai-tsung's twenty-one.It is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that in the period under discussion examination was becoming an in
creasingly favored path to high office.21
Because I wish to demonstrate that
this was the result of imperial encouragement and that examination was the single
method of recruitment which claimed the special attention of the Empress Wu, I
shall now explore in detail the changes introduced into the system during early
T'ang.
The mechanics of T'ang examinations are already well-known through the transla
tions of Robert des Rotours22 but, unfortunately, the primary source of his re
search, the examination treatise of the New T'ang Histopy, omits many of the
empress' contributions to the development of the system.23 As it existed from
622,2^ the T'ang system consisted of examinations held only at the capital and
divided into three stages.
The first of these was the ohu^^ which by 657 had
come to consist of two main examinations, the literary ahin-shih and the classi
cal ming-ohing, as well as more specialized and less highly esteemed examinations
in mathematics, law, history and calligraphy.
These were held on a regular basis
and were supplemented by irregular "decree examinations" {ahih-ohu) on specific
themes set by the ruler.26 Success in the chu gave the candidate an eighth or
ninth rank "within the current," with no post nor salary but the right to apply
for the second stage, the hsuan.
The hsuan or selection for a specific post was mandatory for those whose bas
ic rank {san-kuan) was lower than five27 and consisted of examination by the
Three Selectors {san-ah'uan), usually the president and two vice-presidents of
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the Board of Civil Office.
Under the procedure completed in 669, the candi
date f^esented a curriculum (hsuan-ahieh) and was then tested on his calligraphy
{shu ^ ), his judgment of a hypothetical case (p'an), his physical appearance

(shen), and his manner of speech (yen).29
If he was successful, there were
three further criteria (san-lei):
virtuous conduct (te-hsing), [administrative]
ability (ts'ai), and diligence (lao).
In this process it might be noted that
the selectors enjoyed wide powers of discretion.
A provisional nomination
ich'ang) was then posted with the candidate having the option of up to three re
fusals, and a final list [ah-ia^ ) was then submitted to the Chancellery for
verification, approval and submission to the emperor.
When the appointments
were announced, the new official received a tally {fu) and a patent of appoint
ment (kao-shen).30
The third stage of the system,

the k’ao,^^ was an evaluation of performance

for the purposes of promotion.
Details of its workings are scarce, but it seems
that a report on the administration of each official was submitted annually to
the Board of Civil Office which in turn distributed it to the office concerned.
All officials were ranked in one of nine categories, and the rankings technically
were to be discussed and revised by a committee with representatives from the
three departments before they were recorded, conveyed to the emperor, and made
public.
The ranking was made on a complicated system of "good qualities" (shan)
and "perfections" {tsui), and a high score meant an increase of rank or salary
or both.
A low score meant fine or demotion.
It was a complicated and timeconsuming process, and since the major responsibility rested with a handful of
men within the Board of Civil Off ice,32 it could never have been too effectively
administered.
Two of the few extant descriptions of actual cases in the period
suggest laxity of enforcement.33
From the preceding summary two points of great importance emerge.
First, the
The ahu at its most basic level may be
seen as an expression of the pristine purpose of the examinations, the recruit
ment of the ablest men into the ruling group.
The hsuan, which only appeared in
628,3^ served as a control, increasingly becoming a means to ensure that unsuit
able or socially undesirable men did not hold high posts.
Second, as office
came more and more to be the determinant of status, the desirability of a degree
made the examinations an ideal mechanism through which to exercise state control.
The curriculum of the ohik, for instance, could determine the values and attitudes
of much of the bureaucracy while the criteria for success in the hsuan could con
trol its size and composition and predict its internal tensions.

ahu and hsuan vjere different in nature.

As we have seen, the Empress Wu came to power when the system was still in a
formative stage.
No major modification had occurred since 628, and neither hsuan
nor ohu would take their final forms until the years 669 and 68I respectively.
Several issues, some of them raised by Liu Hsiang-tao, remained unresolved.
How could ability best be measured, and should it take precedence over "suit
ability"?
If the hsuan in particular were to be seen as a means of state con
trol, who represented the state, the ruler or his ministers? And who defined
suitability? The empress had answers to these questions and though she unfolded
them in stages, they might have been inferred from her opening move.
In 659 a
ceremony was held at the palace to honor 900 men successful in the ohu and, after
a quiz on current affairs, the top five were assigned to prestigious special po
sitions.35 The examination system thus became, at a stroke, the approved form
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of entry into the civil

service.

The year 659, it will be recalled, was also the year of the Hsing-shih lu and
the second of the T'ang marriage bans.
Bureaucratization of the great clans,
especially those in the Northeast, was the political priority, and it is to this
end that initial recruitment policies were directed.
Thus in the same month as
the ceremony held for examination graduates, control of the Board of Civil Office
was taken from the hands of Kuan-chung aristocrats like T'ang Lin and Liu Hsiangtao,^6 and the presidency was granted to Li l-fu who claimed membership in the
northeastern aristocracy. For the next three years, he exercised control over the
hsuan, and his extraordinarily close identification with the empress is addition
al confirmation that she was more concerned with bureaucratic appointment than
was her husband.
Although Li l-fu was more noted for corruption than for competence, his ap
pointment was necessary from the rulers' point of view since the Board of Civil
Office had been in the hands of northwestern aristocrats since the beginning of
the dynasty.
Of the five holders of the top offices under Kao-tsu, for instance,
all were from this group.37 From the beginning their influence was great since
at the time there were too few officials to fill the posts, and appointments were
made on the basis of tallies (/u) sent directly to the prefectures designating
those who should come to the capital for appointment.3° With the creation of the
/zsiian in 628, this practice ended but by that time entrenchment had occurred with
in the Board.
Under T'al-tsung the only important officeholder not born into
the group was Ma Chou, and his appointment came in 645 after he had formed a
close relationship with it both through his career and his marriage.39 The other
incumbents of the Board during the period included representatives of such cel
ebrated clans as the Ch'ang-sun, Liu, Tai, and Wei whose surnames were all pre
eminent in the Northwest.Their monopoly, as we have seen, continued into
Kao-tsung's reign.
As a group they had more in common than their regional and social origins.
In the years prior to 659, 3nd counting only the twenty-five men who served as
president or vice-president, more than half were related to each other either by
blood or by marriage.They seem, moreover, to have shared a certain exclusIvist consciousness, with Wei T'ing, for example, scornfully incredulous that
Ma Chou had reached such high posts in spite of his mean birth.interest
or expertise in status and genealogy may also have been common since the two men
chosen by T'ai-tsung to head the compilation of the Shih-tsu ahih were plucked
directly from their positions in the Board of Civil Office.^3 The collective
influence of Board members on the government must also have been great since
over forty percent enjoyed tsai-hsiang status concurrent with their selection
duties, and of these most were connected with the Chancellery whose role in the
selection process was greater than that of the other Departments.^^ Their bi
ographies suggest that some were responsible for the recruitment of thousands
to the civil service and that the opportunities for the building of personal
bases of support were not neglected.
It was probably these men who aborted the
reforms suggested by Liu Hsiang-tao in 657*
It is worth noting, finally, that
only three men who held the top positions in the Board prior to 659 had them
selves taken examinations.^5
When Li l-fu became president in 659, he was already notorious for the selling
of posts and, although his tenure seems to have served the purpose of bringing
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more northeasterners to the capital,his conduct in office did not change.

In

663

he was tried for gross peculation with many members of his family and sen
tenced to distant exile {ch'ang-t-iu) from which he never returned.^7 Liu Hsiangtao, who had been Li

l-fu's judge, replaced him as president of the Board, and

of the six presidents and vice-presidents between that time and 669, three were
from the Northeast, two of them representatives of the great aristocracy.
In the decade following 659> it seems likely that the empress believed she had
succeeded in achieving the social and regional balance which had been her first
priority in the reform of the recruitment system, because in 669 she moved to
the second stage.
This consisted of systematizing the hsuan, and the man placed
in charge was P'ei Hsing-chien.^9 A scion of one of the eminent Shansi clans,
P'ei had qualified by yin to enter the state university, had passed the mingohing examination, and had seemed assured of a brilliant career until his op
position to the elevation of Empress Wu sent him to the borders in disfavor.
His administration in the An-hsi Protectorate had shown that he was a man of un
usual talent, and he was recalled to the capital where he became vice-president
of the Board of Civil Office, probably in 669.
Only one source gives a reason
for the reform, suggesting that "since tung-shuo [66I-66A] a great number of un
worthy officials had been appointed,"50 and the reference is probably to the
difficulty of stemming the corruption begun by Li l-fu.
Since the number of candidates was increasing each year, even with honest officials in charge of the
hsuan, methods of deception were being found, and the New T’ang History tells of
forged tallies, false identities, and various sorts of cheating during the exam
inations.51
Since, however, similar criticisms were to continue for some time,
a more basic purpose of the reform of 669 was probably to mold officials to the
empress' purpose.
Certainly it is this aim which is reflected in the new reg
ulations .
P'ei and his colleague in the reform, Li Ching-hsiian,
proposed not only the
form of the hsuan as outlined earlier but were also responsible for the "long
list" {ah'ang-ming pang or oh'ang-ming hsing-li pang)The nature of the list
has long been a puzzle to scholars who generally conclude that it was simply a
list of the candidates eligible for posts and was designed to combat fraud and
bias.5A jhe earliest sources, however, invariably use the term hsing-li in re
ferring to it, and this coupled with other evidence suggests that the list was
related to the bureaucratic career of other members of the candidate's clan.55
It was also an admission that anonymity was undesirable, and when it was sup
pressed in 683» the reason given was that it had become an instrument of pre
selection and bias:
"When the long list was posted, all knew who would be
chosen."5o Family background was, therefore, almost certainly a formal consider
ation in the hsuan, and this is wholly consistent with the evolution of the in
stitution and with the spirit of the other provisions of the reform.
The reorganization of 669 was in many respects an affirmation of the status
quo, in no sense designed to open the road to advancement to the lower orders.
It seems designed rather to bar from office all but those with some prior bur
eaucratic connection, and it is important to note that the early prohibition
against the candidacy of merchants, artisans, and other despised professions as
well as relatives of felons, remained in force.57 The existing elite, consist
ing of relatives of the imperial clan, possessors of the yin privilege, some
holders of honorific rank {hsun-kuan) and members of their immediate family, as
well as graduates of the state universities remained eligible for the hsuan
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without prior examination. r O At the same time, all candidates needed an intro
duction from a local official and the signatures of five capital officials as
guarantors {pao).
One of these was to have personal knowledge of the candidate.
In the interview only those "tall and handsome" and whose speech was "judicious
and precise" were to be chosen,so that a man of rustic background would have
little chance.
And finally, the categories of "virtuous conduct," "talent," and
"diligence" were nebulous enough to give the Three Selectors virtual veto power.
The Board of Civil Office thus retained control of appointment to officialdom.
The Empress Wu must have approved of these measures, for not only did Kaotsung ratify them, but he left their authors in command of the Board for the
next seven years.This is an inconvenient fact for those many scholars who
wish to see the empress fostering a "new class" through the examination system..
Their view, of course, gains validity from the 680s onward, but the provisions
of 669 should be seen in the context of their time and as measures consistent
with her aims and methods.
As noted earlier, she worked in stages, and the im
mediate task was to confer prestige upon bureaucratic service and examination
as a means of entry into it.
After the ad hoc recruitment methods by which the
early T'ang had tried to cope with the shortage of officials and which by 657
had produced a bureaucracy of very mixed origins, this was crucial.
There is
ample evidence throughout the century to show that those with social pretensions
were reluctant to serve in office with their inferiors.^2 jhe empress was con
scious of this.
As pointed out earlier, she held no enlightened egalitarian
views and, what is even more important, she had at her disposal a large pool of
prospective officials with respectable shih lineages.
Only one source mentions
a decree from the end of 669 which also facilitated the entry to regular official
dom of clerks and minor functionaries in certain Boards.^3
The immediate effect of the reform, according to the New T'ang History, was
that "from that time those who sought official posts became extremely numerous."
The immediate addition of a second vice-president charged specifically with the
examination function is one reflection of this and the board membership was to
be repeatedly increased through the rest of the century.^5 The settling of the

669 her
efforts were devoted to fastening the examination habit on the country.
In the
next few years, for instance, the centers and opportunities for examination were
extended even to the most distant prefectures of the South, special honors like

hsuan also enabled the empress to turn her attention to the ohu, and from

the ta-ah'eng were granted to top graduates, and in 67O a decree was issued to
restore the schools and Confucian temples in the countryside.66 Decree examina
tions began to occur with greater frequency than before.67
Literary evidence will shortly be introduced to show the rapid response to the
growing imperial patronage of the ohu, but it is useful here to Introduce the
sole source of statistical Information on successful examination candidates in
the T'ang.
This is Hsu Sung's Teng-k'o chi k'ao, a Ch'ing work based upon a
listing in the Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao.^^
It has been shown to be unreliable in
some respects, but there seems to be general agreement that the figures given
for chin-shih graduates are accurate.69
If so, the year 669 appears to have
been something of a dividing line.
From 66A to 668 an average of nine men passed
each year.
In the years 670-67^, when the examinations were held only three
times, the average was thirty-eight!
Likewise, if Kao-tsung's reign is divided
at 669, we find that prior to that year, the average annual number of successful
candidates was fourteen, while after 669 the corresponding figure was forty-eight.70
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From these figures It seems safe to conclude that during the 670s examination
was gradually becoming the preferred form of entrance into the civil service, at
least for those who aspired to the highest ranks.
Needless to say, there was
resistance.
In 67^ a memorial complained of the increasing reliance upon literary
ability in selection and the frequency of cheating among candidates, going on to
say:
When the Board of Rites [sic] chooses officials, it relies solely upon
literary ability in ranking [the candidates], and thus the shih of the em
pire all disregard virtuous conduct and hasten to [practice] the literary
arts.
There are those who pass an examination in the morning and at night
face criminal charges.
Although they recite 10,000 words in a [single]
day, what relation does this have to governing the state?71
In 678 Wei Yuan-chung, a student at one of the state universities, commented
on the reasons for recent defeats by the Tibetans, suggesting that
the Important [things] in governing a state are both civil and military.
Now those who speak of civil [virtue] consider elegant expression to be
first [In Importance] and do not attain to moral principles {ohi-ng-Zun) .
Those who speak of the military emphasize horsemanship and archery, not
strategy and tactics.72
Even within the Board of Civil Office there seems to have been some dissatis
faction and, two years later, an auxiliary secretary, Liu Ssu-li,73 submitted an
extremely important memorial which provided the immediate impulse for change.
In it he stated that
most [examination candidates] in the rn'ing-ohing do no more than copy
out fragments on the general meaning [of the classics], and ohin-shih can
didates only^^produce by rote former dissertations in answer to the ques
tions
).
They are without real talent, and the officials con
cerned [with marking them] accept them without taking into account anything
but the number [of candidates] to accept.7^
These different perspectives of the critics must have represented a wider spec
trum of discontent, for the New T'ang History speaks in graphic terms of numerous
other abuses current both in ohu and hsuan during the period--forgery of fu and
kao-shen, impersonation, and rustic unknowns finding guarantors at the capital.
It tells how on the examination day some candidates were aided by others inside
or outside the halls, and how they often paid someone else to write the examin
ation for them.75 Partly as a result of corruption, men became qualified for
positions which simply were not available and sometimes waited months or even
years for an assignment.76
To what extent this situation reflects any conscious policy on the part of
the empress is difficult to say.
P'ei Hsing-chien and Li Ching-hsuan, who were
in charge of recruitment through most of the period, were both noted for their
enthusiasm in recruitlng.77 The empress herself, ever since Kao-tsung had at
tempted to abdicate in her favor in 675» was bearing an ever greater burden with
in government, beginning what was virtually a regency in 675 under the cloud of
whispered accusations that she had poisoned Crown Prince Hung.
The failure of
the oh'ien-feng coinage was obvious by the 670s, and to the embryonic economic
difficulties this caused were added the foreign policy reverses which, as we
shall see, began late in the decade.
For these reasons the examination system
could not claim her whole attention.
On the other hand, since she was anxious
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to promote the desirability of examinations, she may have seen laxity of selec
tion as an advantage and so permitted its continuation.
By 68l, however, it
appears that the effects of corruption were destroying respect for the system,
and this she could not permit.
Thus in that year, and principally in response
to Liu Ssu-li's memorial, the form of the major examinations was settled, and
there was to be no substantial change until 737.
Since there is some contradiction among the sources, I present the facts de
scribing the reform in tabular form, with the new features of 68l underlined.

TTCLC 106:
l8ab (dated 68l,
eighth month)

HTS kh:
3737:2.

Chin-shih

Ming-ohing

Source

(a)
Successfully respond to
6 out of 10 citations or t'ieh
from the classics.

(a)
[Answer citations on
one major classic and perhaps others.]

(b)
[Respond orally to 10
questions on the general meaning of the prepared classics.
Probably two classics were
chosen.]

(b)
Write two compositions
of different literary forms
or tsa-wen.
[These could
be, for instance, remonstrances, inscriptions,
memorials or, later, po
etry. ]

(c)
Afterwards, give [3]
dissertations in answer to
questions on current affairs.
TTLT 4:4b indicates that this
may have been oral.

(c)
Afterwards, write [8]
dissertations in answer to
questions on current affairs and on the Tao-te-

(a)

Same.

(a)

Same.
Same.

ahing.

(b)

Same.

(b)

[des Rotours,
Examens, pp.
152 and 167-]

(c)

Same.

(c)
Only those showing
thorough knowledge of lit
erary principles {wen-lu)
would advance to this stage

THY 75,

(a)

Same.

(a)

Same.

(b)

Same.

(b)

Same.

(c)

Same.

(c)
Must have knowledge of
literary principles before
proceeding.

(a)

Same.

(a)

Same.

(b)

Same.

(b)

Same.

(c)

Same.

(c)

Same as in THY.

(a)

Unmentioned.

(a)
Reform incorrectly
dated and Liu Ssu-li in
correctly identified.

pp. 1375-6.

TT 15, p.
83a.

T’ang Chih-yen
1, p. 9.
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Ming ohing

Source

Chin-shih
(b)
Those of great literary
talent should proceed.
Sug
gests that the candidate
needed to write only one
dissertation until 685,
when three were required.

CTS 190
ohung: 3582:
2.
Notes:

(i)

(ii)

(a)

Reports that Liu Ssu-11

was responsible for adding
to the number of citations.

(a)

Reports that Liu's

request added tsa-wen to
the ohin-shih examination.

For the classics on the curriculum for each examination and the
categories into which they were divided, see des Rotours, Examens,
pp. 136-38; 142, n. 3; and 147, n. 1.
The exact number of citations and dissertations varies widely in
the different texts, and none of the above are specific as to the
number in 68I.
The number of citations differed as to the number
and length of the classics chosen for presentation by the candi
date, and in the chtn-shih no source offers a clue to the number
at this time.
After 737 it was necessary to answer 4 out of 10.
In the matter of dissertations, the ohin-shih had 5 at the begin
ning of the dynasty, and in 675, 3 more were added on Lao Tzu.
In 737 the Tao-te ohing was moved to the t’ieh section.
TTLT 4:
4b-5b, is the most complete description of this aspect of the
system prior to 737 for both ming-oh-Lng and oh-in-shih.
reproduction of it is faulty.

(Hi)

The ETS

In 634 the ohin-shi^ also required a memorized oral recitation
(or reading?) {tu'%'^ ) from the classics or histories and, judg
ing by Liu Hsiao's memorial of 674 (note
been in force.

80),

this may still have

The reforms of 68I are best regarded as a response both to the growing popu
larity of and confusion about the ohiu and to the ease with which a degree was
won.
They are, moreover, not entirely a response to criticism for, if anything,
literary ability became even more necessary.
Rather they express what seems to
be an Imperial awareness that the time was now ripe to use the examinations to
create a particular type of official.
The addition of the Tao-te ehing to the
curriculum in 675, a measure noted earlier, was an obvious first step, and the
form given the two major examinations in 68I was the second.
Specifically, the ohi-n-shih now became the most prestigious and desirable of
degrees.
Hu San-hsing, remarking on the situation in the ninth century, was to
say:
"In the T'ang the ohin-shih was highly valued while the ming-ohing was
scorned.
A proverb said that while the fragrance of incense celebrated the
ohin-shih, a screen was erected for the ming-ohing
His view is borne out by numerous anecdotes and contemporary observations
after the 680s,79 and it must, therefore, be understood that the renown which
the ohin-shih came to enjoy was the creation of the Empress Wu.
In the early
part of the dynasty it was the hsiu-ts'ai whose difficulty led to its abolition
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in 651,®® and after 658 the "decree" examination, which seem to have monopolized
prestige, and even the ming-ohing was considered by the throne to be a more for
midable achievement.®^
Judging by the number of tsai-hsiang who had chosen the

ming-ahing over the chin-shih prior to 705, the former seems early to have been
as important a qualification for high office as the latter.®
By the reign of
Hsuan-tsung, however, only three of his twenty-six tsai-hsiang had opted for the
ming-ohing, and since almost all of them made their choice of examination after
681, the change in preference was a rapid one.®3
Several factors account for the comparative popularity of the ahin-shih, most
of them stemming from the reform of 68I.
The examination was now the more dif
ficult of the two, requiring both classical knowledge and literary skill, and
we are told that the success rate was soon only one-tenth of that in the mingohing,^^ The difficulty of the ohin-shih was certainly real, but it was a par
ticular sort of difficulty.
Although it placed less reliance on pure memory,
it also required a less rigorous, lengthy and costly training in the classics.
It tended to appeal, therefore, to the most intelligent members of a somewhat
lower stratum of the shih class than did the ming-ohing, and its popularity in
this stratum was enhanced by the fact that in it the scope for corruption and
favoritism was narrower.
As we have seen, the Board of Civil Office was largely
the preserve of the great aristocracy, and in the second or oral stage of the
ming-ohing subjective judgments were al1 - important.®5 Finally, the role of im
perial patronage was crucial.
The Empress Wu, as we know, was deeply and sincerely devoted to literature.
From the appearance of the North Gate Scholars around 666, her closest asso
ciates
if not particularly distinguished for political talent, all had literary
ability, and in the course of her career she was to turn her hand to most lit
erary genres.®® Many of her extant edicts reflect the contemporary belief that
"the ancient dynasties chose officials for their literary ability (wen), since
the origin of [good] literature is conduct {hsing
), and conduct is known
through words."®7 Thus in the tsa-wen section of the ohin-shih, she held out
the promise of due and lavish reward for those of literary talent, and since the

ming-ohing required only a "rough command of literary principles" {ts'u yu wenti)it became much less attractive in comparison.
A more cynical interpretation of the empress' motivation is also possible
given the fact that the two examinations produced different types of officials.
Since both her present role and that which she was destined to play shattered
precedent, the deemphasis of the Confucian classics in the ohin-shih could only
be of advantage to her.
For a would-be absolute ruler any division within the
upper bureaucracy was to be exploited, and increasingly the prestige of the ohinshih relative to other degrees could be useful for that end.®9
Finally, we might note that in 68I the ohin-shih examination became preemi
nently a test of literary ability^® and, as many contempories noted, it produced
an official who was articulate and facile, elegant and competent in language,
versatile but somehow superficial and lacking in the self-confidence which might
arise from a sense of personal worthiness.
The old values of virtue. Integrity
and right conduct, which theoretically gave the ohun-tzu the right to participate
in the process of rule, were passing or rather were being surrendered, thereby a
tacit admission was being made that it was the ruler who set the standards by
which he would judge his aides.
Under the Empress Wu office, status, and
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self-image came to depend upon an institution which existed through imperial
patronage and sufferance and as a result, the relationship between ruler and
minister began a transformation which would end in what some scholars term the
"Sung despotism." When the empress wrote her two-volume "Model for a Minister"
{Ch'en-kuei) and in 693 made it part of the examination curriculum,9^ she was
only making explicit the ruler's new power to set the standards for judging
aides.
There were, as I have said, some officials who recognized what was happening
and had the courage to speak up against it.
Among them was Wei Hsuan-t'ung, a
dhin-shih graduate and in 685 vice-president of the Board of Civil Office.92
His memorial that year was basically a criticism of the Board of Civil Office
and its selection practices, and in providing documentary evidence of the results
of recent examination policy, he also isolated the root causes of what he saw as
the problems.
His critique began with a short history of the recruitment poli
cies of early dynasties, recognizing the novelty of the examinations and char
acterizing their literary emphasis as "the modern way of power [politics]" {ahintai ohih eh'uan-tao).
He then turned to the inadequacies of the Board of Civil
Office, pointing particularly to the small number of officials who had sole
charge of a task of great magnitude and importance, and to the ease with which
the Board was intimidated by men of influence to appoint their proteges so that,
in effect, the state was "buying stolen goods from thieves." He went on to
speak of the desirability of holding office and the plethora of candidates so
that even though 1,000 ohu-se "entered the current" each year, the shortage of
vacancies meant that only one in ten actually received an appointment.
So con
fused was the system that "stones were not divided from Jewels," meaning that
those who did gain office were not always chosen for the right reasons.
His solution to the problem was to return to some degree to earlier practices
whereby the task of selection was shared widely among high-ranking officials who
knew the characters and talents of their subordinates, while only the top of
ficials were appointed by imperial order {wang-ming).
Although Wei avoided the
use of the term, he was actually advocating the restoration of the pH-ohao sys
tem referred to earlier.93
Broadening his argument, he spoke of the necessity of learning {hsueh) for one
who would be an official.
The ancient practice whereby young men were schooled
in the "six proprieties" and "seven teachings"9^ before entering officialdom was
superior to the present way whereby the sons of the wealthy and influential re
ceived posts even before reaching the age of twenty and in most cases were un
prepared by education or character training for their responsibilities.
The
whole system of education suffered from the fact that these appointments were so
lightly made.
Moreover, said Wei, appointments from "outside the current," and
particularly from the holders of honorific rank {hsun-kuan) and the Guards {sanwei), were not made by their local superiors but by a test of their calligraphy
and judgments {shu-p'an)Again this meant that virtue and conduct were den
igrated.
Even the process of recommendation was badly handled since it was not
only officials above the third rank who were so frequently given the privilege
but all officials "within the current," and since the ruler showed little con
cern with the process, the recommendations were made randomly and excessively.
Wei concluded by calling for a division of the selection powers of the Board of
Civil Office and a return to the recruitment system of the Chou and the Han.9°
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This memorial, whose sentiments were soon to be echoed by those of other crit
ics like Ch'en Tzu-ang,97 is interesting on several grounds.
We find, for in
stance, that several of the problems isolated thirty years earlier by Liu Hsiangtao had remained unsolved and, at the same time, that the reforms of 669 and 68l
had not been wholly successful in producing the ends for which they were designed.
This memorial, moreover, is one of the clearest statements we have which argues
against use of the examinations as a mechanism of social mobility for the lower
orders.
The wealthy and influential continued to manipulate the selection proc
ess for their own advantage, and birth, Wei indicates, was still of greater im
portance than talent in gaining office.
His perceptions, however, go even deeper
than this, for he makes the crucial connection between the form of the examina
tions and the "modern way of power politics."
In this statement lies a recogni
tion that when literary ability was emphasized over virtue and conduct, the
self-image and self-respect of the official were under attack, that he was re
garded as an instrument or tool of the ruler rather than as a rightful and
deserving aide in government.
His memorial, however, was not well-timed and it elicited no response.
The
Empress Wu had just deposed Chung-tsung and was ruling through the ineffectual
Jui-tsung, attempting at the same time, of course, to bolster her own legitima
tion.
She was not Interested, therefore, in placing barriers on the road to
office, and was even less desirous of producing officials of strong character
whose "virtue" might lead them to oppose her unorthodox role in government.
As we have seen, after 684 she was moving in fact to facilitate entry into and
accelerate promotion within the bureaucracy and, moreover, she continued to
patronize examination as the favored path to high office.
In 689 she demonstrated
publicly what the role of examination was to be in the dynasty she was soon to
declare when "she examined the candidates [herself] at the Loyang palace and
after [questioning them] several days, she dismissed them [since none met her
standards]."9°
In this event are to be found the origins of the famous Palace
Examinations (tien-shih) of later centuries, though for the empress it was sim
ply the logical last step in the evolution of her policy of conferring prestige
upon the system.99
The Chou dynasty was to see continued rapid rise in the popularity of examina
tion, and in 691 a memorial, which again complained of the emphasis on literary
ability in selection, graphically told of how at examination time the candidates
swarm to the [gates of the] offices [in charge].
They request to visit
the powerful and wealthy to display their poems, memorials and [other]
writings, seeking the benefits of [being able to use] fine words.
Packed
together they hope for the favor of support.
Therefore, people commonly
speak of the candidates as mi-ahu.
The term 'mi' means 'self-seeking'

itzu-ahHu)
The author went on to request a greater measure of practicality in the examina
tions, the replacement of "fancy and empty verbiage" by the discussion of prac
tical policies.
He recommended further that before permanent appointments were
made, candidates hold provisional office for a period so that the selection of
ficials would have time to assess their performance.
The empress is said specifically to have rejected these suggestions but, as
we have seen, she was then much concerned to bolster her personal support and
if, as seems to be the case, the examinations were still being manipulated by
"the powerful and wealthy," her attempts to win popularity among the lower
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stratum of the shih, who were the chief beneficiaries of her examination policy,101 would be frustrated.
It was for this reason that she made another his
toric innovation, the introduction of the principle of anonymity {hu-ming) into
the examinations.102 Although she was forced to abolish the usage in 695,
the precedent had been set for later rulers.
The Chou dynasty saw other measures designed to rationalize and extend the
examination principle, the most notable of which was the inauguration of the
military examination {wu-hsuan) in 702.10^ Criticism continued but it is of
great significance that its form now was changed.
No longer was the principle
itself questioned.
instead, men attacked the failures in administering the sys
tem, focusing most often on the various irregular forms of appointment and pro
motion which the empress used to supplement it and which resulted in the wellknown abuse of the "supernumerary officials" {tan-kuan).
Typical of this sort
of criticism was a memorial in 695 from Wei Ssu-li^05 in which he lamented the
decline of classical education caused, he believed, by the fact that appoint
ment to office had come to be based upon carelessness and corruption within the
system, upon what he termed "lucky chance" {dkiao-hsing).
It was still those
of the great houses {kuei-men) who obtained positions, and often without examina
tion or even prior study, so that officials, particularly at the local levels,
were not only becoming increasingly mediocre but harsh and self-seeking.
He
advocated a thoroughgoing reform in education along with a tightening of recruit
ment procedures.
Implicit in his memorial, of course, is a lingering feeling that character
and virtue were too little regarded in appointment, but the greater issue was
what was happening to the bureaucracy itself.
In a subsequent remonstrance,^
he made this clear, pointing out that both entry into and promotion within the
bureaucracy were carried out in a most careless fashion with the natural result
that officials and would-be officials competed against each other and curried
favor in a most unseemly fashion.
There were no longer enough posts to absorb
all appointments, and the establishment of auxiliary {yuan-waij positions which
far outnumbered the regular ones had failed to solve the problem.
Officials were
in an uproar as they waited for lengthy periods to receive their appointments,
and state revenues were being exhausted for their upkeep.
Although Wei Ssu-li
was in this case speaking of the situation in
outcome of the policies of Wu Tse-t'ien.

709,

he was also describing the

In short, the Empress Wu had in the space of only a few decades brought about
a significant change in officialdom.
On the surface, the change appears circular
rather than linear, for Wei's fears—careless selection and too many officials—
seem exactly to parallel those of Liu Hsiang-tao in 657*
There was, however, a
crucial difference.
The form taken by the empress' patronage of examinations
had now concentrated in the highest ranks men who had qualified for office both
by examination and by birth, so that in the year of Wei's first memorial, for
instance, only four of the twelve tsai-hsiang were exceptions to this rule.^07
This meant that the old division of the bureaucracy at the fifth rank^^° had in
fact hardened under the empress, and that below it was to be found what we might
term in highly qualified usage the "newly rising class"^09 of the late seventh
century.
This configuration explains the principal tensions within the Chou bureaucracy.
The upper ranks felt threatened, almost overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of those
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pressing from below, "unqualified" and "unsuitable" men eager to seize their po
sitions and emoluments.
I shall later show that the empress only belatedly
realized the existence of this fear, that her attempts to deal with it were in
effective, and that her failure was an important factor in the seeming paradox
of 705:
the fact that her deposition was the work of officials who owed their
own rise to the expanded opportunities she had offered through the examination
system.
A complete description of the composition of the lower bureaucracy in this
period is very difficult because our sources
tend either to be vague or depre
catory in character.
Liu Hsiang-tao, it will be recalled, listed a number of
posts in the departments and the courts which seemed to have become the preserve
of men appointed from "outside the current,and the critics thus far mentioned
confirm that men of tiu-wai origins consistently entered the bureaucracy in great
numbers and perhaps in increasing proportions.
Who were these men?
The liu-wai officials, who were often referred to along with an even larger
mass of minor governmental employees by such terms as H
, hsu-Zit tsa-se-Qen,
etc., outnumbered officials "inside the current" by at least four or five to one
and were employed both inside and outside the capital in fairly routine clerical
or guard positions.^11
At the local level, many of them were appointed directly
by the prefect!12 so that the central government had very little control over
their quality.
Certain categories whose responsibilities were greater, as well
as those who wished to serve in the capital or possess formal liu-wai status,
were compelled after a certain term of office to undergo an examination called
the hsiao-hsuan.^^'i This examination was administered by a superior secretary
{lang-ohung) in the Board of Civil Office and seems not to have been very de
manding.
After a successful transfer into the "current," advancement was pos
sible on the basis of annual merit assessments, though men who began their ca
reer in this way were barred specifically from the "pure" offices!!^ and so were
seldom able to reach the fifth rank without special consideration.
It is difficult to find clues to the social origins of the hsu-li, though one
source suggests that under T'ai-tsung they were often chosen from the superior
category of household {shang-hu) in each prefecture.115 Whether or not this
remained a consistent policy we cannot be sure, but it seems certain that they
were of lower status than most of the central officials in the early T'ang, and
this would account for the reluctance of the latter to be associated in office
with them.
We know also that certain offices were reserved for them and that in
the Chou an attempt was made to take away some of these posts and grant them to
examination graduates. 11^ For some posts the possession of honorific rank {hs'unkuan) seems to have been a requisite,117 and this compounded the problem since
this privilege was progressively devalued by the Empress Wu through its too
frequent bestowal.
Honorific office, which was itself considered liu-wai, had originally been
granted as a reward for outstanding military service, was limited to 900 men,
and was considered nominally equivalent to regular offices of high rank.
It
carried with it certain privileges like tax and corvee exemption, the right to
acquire land, and the right of sons to enter officialdom by hereditary privi
lege.^^®
Its recipients, at least in the early years of the system, were from
that stratum of society which entered the military, and perhaps the fact that
the Hsing-shih lu was christened the Hsun-ko by the aristocracy suggests a con
tempt for awards of this sort as early as 659.
Although it is difficult to
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document the process, evidence from the eighth century would seem to indicate
that a fairly rapid devaluation of the awards had occurred in the late seventh,
with lavish conferrals made not only as military activity accelerated, but also
for non-military merit and even in return for money payments.^^9 By the k’ai-

yuan period (713“^2) the excessive awarding of hsun-knan was a serious economic
problem for the state, but in the seventh century its significance seems to have
lain more in the additional pressures it placed upon the regular bureaucracy,
as its recipients or their sons converted the rank to substantive office.
One
scholar estimates the awards in the seventh century at over 10,000,^20 and since
the ti-u-nei bureaucracy, counting only regular appointments, numbered less than
20.000 even in the eighth century, this pressure was not negligible.
As I have attempted to show, the role of the Empress Wu was a critical one
in this particular trend.
The nature of her search for legitimation was such
that she was forced to seek additional bases of support outside the constituency
of the higher-level bureaucracy which continued to be highly aristocratic and
Confucian in tone even as examination became more common as a means of entry.
Men who began their official careers in the liu-wai bureaucracy which continued
to be highly aristocratic and Confucian in tone even as examination became more
common as a means of entry.
Men who began their official careers in the l-tu-wai
bureaucracy presumably tended to be less well-educated and less committed to Con
fucian strictures against female rule.
Particularly because the existing system
slowed down their careers,^21 these men were also natural targets in the empress'
search for popularity.
We find, therefore, that after the 680s several new liuwai positions were established^^2 and, more importantly, that promotion "within
the current" seems to have been accelerated.
According to Ssu-ma Kuang, with
the feng-shan sacrifice in 666 the empress began to advance officials rapidly
"within the current" on numerous auspicious occasions:
Prior to this, rank {ahieh) was not excessively increased but awarded
by examination of merit {k'ao).
[For] advancement to the fifth and to the
third rank, [a special procedure of] tsou-ah'u ahin-ahih [was followed].
At this time began the practice of excessive award, and in later years the
court was thronged with those wearing the purple robes [of high offi
cials] . 123
Su Mien was to comment in the early ninth century on the "excessive promotions of
[imperial] favor" {fan-ohieh ohih en)124 in this period and, as we will see, the
historian Liu Chih-chi was to remonstrate frankly about it in the middle of the
Chou.
We must bear in mind, however, that complaints of this sort were often exag
gerated and represent more accurately a fear of uppen-level bureaucrats than an
actual situation.
Of all officials who reached the fifth rank, a group of about
4.000 men, only a few could have done so through transfer from liu-wai status,
and the "pure" offices seem to have always remained untainted.125 The effects
of the process seem rather to have been, first of all, the growth of widespread
support for the empress in the lower bureaucracy and, secondly, a strengthening
of imperial prerogative as each "promotion of favor" weakened the concept of merit
and earned status within officialdom.
Within the lower bureaucracy, a good deal
of evidence can be adduced to show a certain deterioration of quality and of the
idealism of its members.126 As these men became increasingly defensive, jealous
of their perquisites and ambitious, officials in the "clear stream" struggled to
enforce obstacles to their further rise.
The case of Chou Hsing whose early
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career was hampered because his origins were not of the "clear stream" is a good
example.127
His case was not unique.
Within the bureaucracy of the Chou and succeeding
periods, intra-bureaucratic strife accelerated and began rapidly to take on
characteristics of a different nature from the factionalism of the early T'ang.
From the later part of Kao-tsung's reign onward, cohesive groupings among high
officials, especially among tsai-hsiang, were often directed against the lower
bureaucracy, and there are numerous examples of action taken against colleagues
whose origins and rise the tsai-hsiang regarded as unconventional.128 The

tsai-hsiang who had united in 65^ against Kao-tsung's choice of the Empress Wu
represented perhaps the final assertion in the seventh century by the ministers
of their right to set the limits of imperial prerogative.
When a parallel sit
uation arose in the Chou over the empress' designation of a successor, she was
able simply to declare it a household matter and to go unchallenged until 698.
Even then, the objection was raised by a single minister, and one whose position
in the empress' trust was unique.129 As Chapter 9 will show, her view of selec
tion had been determined consistently by her wider political aims, and in the
Chou her attention was to be focused upon the upper bureaucracy as the key to
her achievement of legitimacy.
Her attempts to mold it to her purposes, often
using men from the lower bureaucracy as her aides, account for much of the po
litical strife in the period.
And the fact remains that by the Chou, the posi
tion and the aspirations of the upper bureaucracy had been changed.
To understand this more fully, let us recapitulate our findings on the evolu
tion of the selection system and their political ramifications.
The political policy of the empress unfolded in stages, with the years 65^ to

660

devoted chiefly to working out the nuances of her partnership with Kao-tsung,
to the elimination of her ministerial enemies and to the weakening of the exclusivistic political control of the remnants of the Six Garrisons bloc whose dom
inance had been so marked both in the Sui and the early T'ang.
In 659 she and
Kao-tsung put into effect a series of measures designed to complete T'ai-tsung's
policy of bringing social status into line with service to the T'ang and were
more successful than he in enticing the aloof aristocracy of the Northeast to
accept office in the capital.
The fact that the Empress Wu was by that time al
most an equal partner in government and was not a member of the Kuan-chung bloc
undoubtedly facilitated the achievement of this aim, and an examination of the
backgrounds of the tsai-hsiang listed in Appendix B offers empirical evidence
that a high degree of success was in fact achieved.
The next decade was devoted to consolidation.
A genuine centralization began
to take hold, and the rulers felt confident enough of their primary goal, the
continuance of the dynasty, to celebrate the great feng—shan sacrifice, to launch
their all-out attack on Korea, and to permit the empress' emergence from behind
the screen to an active and open role in politics.
In 669 she took the important
step of reforming and rationalizing the hsuan, a measure designed not only to
fasten the "examination habit" more closely upon the country, but also to create
within the existing power structure a greater feeling of security, to reassure
its members that no flood of low-born shih would threaten their prerogatives.
This does not mean that she failed to anticipate that applications for examina
tion would Increase rapidly and would come largely from a stratum of society not
altogether acceptable to the existing elite in the upper bureaucracy.
Once that
process was under way, she undertook the reform of the ohu in

68I,

justifying
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the measure on the ground that it combated this trend.
By incorporating a great
er degree of difficulty into the examinations, it purported to bring the number
of appointments more closely in line with the number of bureaucratic vacancies.
Her real motive, however, was to turn the examinations into a bureaucratic con
trol mechanism, and the absence of serious opposition in 68l is something of a
tribute to the skill of the empress' pol ideal timing.
The death of Kao-tsung and the prospect of a weak successor precipitated a
crisis.
The empress saw her work as incomplete or at least realized that it
could easily be undone, and so launched the two most notable political events of
the 680s: the influx into the bureaucracy's lower ranks of officials whose
social status was low but whose advancement was rapid, and the terror which all
but eliminated officials above the fifth rank.
The decade was, therefore, much
more than a preparation for usurpation.
It was also the period which saw the
severe weakening of the tsai-hs-iceng and the entire one-tenth of the bureaucracy
which made up the "clear stream." Positioned squarely between two pressures,
one above and one below, they opted first to defend themselves against those
who would replace them, and so mounted no collective action against the terror.
As a consequence they were unable to protest in concert against the one female
usurpation in Chinese history.

Chapter 8
CHINESE ARMS AND FOREIGN POLICY TO 684

The middle decades of the seventh century marked the zenith of the Chinese
empire.
Never before and never again would the Son of Heaven lay claim to so
great an area outside the Wall and exact from it at least a nominal allegiance.
Seldom would the arms of a purely Chinese dynasty venture so far afield to win
the impressive if ephemeral victories that were so frequent during that period.
It was a time of confidence and expansionism, a time when uncounted "barbarians"
were incorporated into the Middle Kingdom and when tribute reached Ch'ang-an
from as far away as India and Indochina, from Persia and the oasis states of
Central Asia, from Japan and the Korean peninsula. And with the tribute came
requests for state marriages and alliances, for instruction in classical learn
ing, Confucian statecraft and Buddhist theology.
Life in Ch'ang-an and Loyang
reflected what seems to have been a more generalized cosmopolitanism.
Selfconfidence in the visual arts, in music and manners, and even in styles of cloth
ing, ^ and the vigor and richness of foreign influence was seldom to be recap
tured in later ages.
It was also a time of great generals, men like Su Tingfang, Li Chi, and P'ei Hsing-chien, whose proud armies covered distances and en
dured hardships which stagger the imagination, and whose triumphal processions
were regular events in the capital during the 660s and 670s.
It is not surpris
ing that the Empress Wu was able to boast in 684 of how Kao-tsung, and by impli
cation herself, had expanded the empire {oh'an-yu) and had brought to submission
areas beyond the reach even of the legendary Yu and T‘ang.2
These achievements did not necessarily belong to the Two Sages alone.
Ob
viously they were erected upon the foundations laid by T'ai-tsung.
There was
also a less attractive side to the picture.
From the time Empress Wu came to
power scarcely a year went by without military action in some sector of the em
pire, and for the peasantry military corvee and troop levies were an unpleasant
and unavoidable fact of life. When in the last decades of the century the state
proved unable to sustain the costs of empire, the raids of rebellious former
"subjects" took an enormous toll in lives and property, and agriculture was seriiously disrupted as more and more men were taken from the land to serve with
expeditionary or with garrison forces.
The last half of the seventh century,
therefore, represents the downward slope of a cycle, a progression from expan
sive ambition to defensive insecurity.
The Chou saw the beginnings not only of
an explicit and coherent isolationist sentiment at court, but of a more general
ized contempt for the military arts and a distaste for government service among
the people—phenomena reflected, for instance, in the establishment of military
examinations in 702 and in the growing incidence of vagrancy during the period.3
This seeming paradox is not difficult to explain and rests chiefly upon weak
nesses inherent in the T'ang system of military recruitment and colonial admin
istration.
What generally goes unrecognized, however, is that the foreign policy
of Kao-tsung and the Empress Wu was not by choice an expansionist one.
This
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chapter will attempt to show that the policy was in fact a response to both in
ternal and external challenges, and because it was carried out not to validate
any grand "imperialistic" vision, but rather on an ad hoc basis it was clumsy and
shortsighted in its execution.
T'ang imperialism was the creation of T'ai-tsung.
The reasons for several of
his policies, including the great swing to the West, still await full explanation,
but scholars tend to agree that T'ai-tsung was a ruler conscious of, if not ob
sessed by, the glories of the Han Empire, and a man who realized that one of the
surest ways to validate the T'ang possession of the Mandate after so long a period
of disunion was to replicate Han achievements.^ He thus became one of the great
conquerors of Chinese history, and from him Kao-tsung inherited not only the glo
ries but the burdens of empire.
In mid-century these latter consisted chiefly of
a tradition of intervention in a restive, tripartite Korean peninsula, and on the
northern and western frontiers the nascent threat of a dissatisfied Tibetan trib
utary and a belligerent and rebellious Turkish confederation.5 As the thirdgeneration ruler of the T'ang, Kao-tsung's principal task was that of dynastic
consolidation, the demonstration that the T'ang would endure beyond the point
where so many of its recent predecessors had fallen.
He could not afford, there
fore, to relinquish what his father had won.
A second factor in the formulation of his foreign policy was his own character.
As a child of rather delicate health and the youngest of T'ai-tsung's legitimate
sons, he had become crown prince only at the age of fifteen and in the five years
prior to his accession had received, as far as we can tell, little or no military
training.
His father's exploits, of course, were already legendary and this
seems to have produced in him a certain envy and insecurity, a need to prove
himself.
He is recorded, for instance, to have wept when refused permission to
accompany his father against Kogury^ and to have cherished thereafter the desire
to lead one of his own expeditions personally.^ He must have been aware, more
over, that he would always be subject to comparison with his father, and one of
the first communications he received from a foreign state was a warning and a
reminder from the btsccn-po of Tibet:
"If, when a Son of Heaven first comes to
the throne, there exist disloyal subjects, he must raise troops, go to that
state and punish and exterminate them."7 The commentator adds here that because
the Tibetans knew that T'ai-tsung was dead, they adopted a contemptuous attitude
toward China.^
A more tangible and more dangerous reaction to T'ai-tsung's death was the re
bellion of A-shih-na Ho-lu, who proclaimed himself Sha-po-lo khan, reunited the
Western Turks, and set out on a series of raids which soon gave him control of
the entire Tarim Basin.9 By mid-year he had crossed into China and invaded
T'ing-chou with a force of 100,000.
Faced with this external threat, Kao-tsung
had little choice but to respond and sent against him an army of 30,000, sup
plemented by 50,000 Uighur cavalry.
Fortunately it seems that even the illfated Korean expeditions of his father had not too seriously depleted China's
military resources, for he had no need to call up special levies and was able to
rely solely on fu-ping troops drawn from the Ch'ang-en region.'®
The Chinese achieved a rapid though temporary victory'' and, as far as we can
tell, made no effort to press their advantage.
Kao-tsung seems at this stage to
have had no intention of enlarging on T'ai-tsung's conquests, but it is clear
that he had no intention of abdicating from the position the T'ang had come to
enjoy in East Asia.
In late 651 he expressed this view in a reprimand sent to
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the king of Paekche in which he referred to himself as "lord of all the world"
{wan-kuo oh-ih chu) and demanded that Paekche cease fomenting trouble with its
It
neighboring states of Si 11a and Kogury^ lest it face punishment from China.
is difficult to know whether or not he could have carried out this threat, for
his father's last testament had explicitly called for the end of Korean intervent ion and his own tsai-hsiang
__ seem to have been universally opposed to any more
activity in the peninsula.
What is important, however, is that Kao-tsung had
shown himself ready to act in an area where both Sui Yang-ti and T'ai-tsung had
been unsuccessful, and he thus prepared the way for the later assaults on Paekche
and Kogury"6 which were to be the central feature of his foreign policy.
The first expedition to the Korean peninsula was dispatched in early 655> in
the very midst of the crisis which arose over the elevation of Empress Wu.^3
|t
is tempting to see her hand in the decision not only because the renewed involve
ment in Korea provided a convenient distraction from events at court and enabled
Kao-tsung to assert his will over that of his chief ministers, but also because
the empress was herself no stranger to military matters.
We have seen that the
foundation of her father's career was military and she might even have been fa
miliar with his work on strategy and tactics.
Her association with T'ai-tsung
probably made her conscious of how much his fame rested on military prowess and
how necessary it was for Kao-tsung to prove himself in this respect.
She was
later to point out that what T'ai-tsung had failed to do, she and her husband had
accomplished!^^ Finally, we might recall that certain aspects of her character
and aspirations might help to explain the upsurge of expansionist military ac
tivity which coincided with her rise.
She was determined, as we have seen, to
make her reign unique.
She possessed an exalted view of the position of Son of
Heaven and a cosmopolitan world view demonstrated, for instance, in her inclusion
of foreigners in the Hsing-shih Zu.
Above all, she was a woman whose political
role was soon to exceed the accepted norm, and as a result she could display to
her court enemies no sign of weakness, allow to them no opening for attack on the
basis of her "womanly" qualities.
By force of circumstance, the Empress Wu had
to adopt a strong policy toward those whom the Chinese regarded as "barbarians"
both while Kao-tsung lived and also during her own dynasty.
These attitudes of the two rulers are of great importance since, as we have
seen, their first two decades were marked by minimal opposition to their policies
on the part of weakened and intimidated ministers.
In contrast to T'ai-tsung
whose foreign policy was highly collegial in nature until his last years, theirs
was individual and, in fact, there is no recorded opposition to their foreign
policy decisions until the year 678115 By that time China was too deeply Involved
to withdraw with impunity from "pacified" areas, and the approaching usurpation
crisis was about to trigger a new upsurge of activity among the surrounding peo
ples which would be all the more serious since two decades of close Chinese con
tact had allowed Turks, Tibetans, and Koreans to borrow the sophisticated military
and administrative techniques, and so to constitute a greater threat than before.
The punitive expedition sent against KogurycS in 655 achieved its objective,
Kogury^'s promise to end its raids on Si 11a, even before reaching the Yalu River
and was immediately halted.18
it is unlikely that the emperor had any illusions
about the continued quiescence of Kogury^,17 but he did have a sense of priorities
and the wisdom to avoid simultaneous action on two fronts.
A last-ditch effort
to solve the problem of the Western Turks by diplomacy had just failed,1® and the
presence of Su Ting-fang,19 the leader of the Korean expedition, was required to
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deal with their mounting threat.
The sources record no specific instructions to
Su from the court, but we are told that by early 657 he had completed a reoraniza~
tion of the northwestern army and substantially augmented it with Uighurs, Sogdians and other foreign troops.20 This and the fact that the original force was
constituted partially of mu-ping, special levies or conscripts, suggest that Kaotsung was determined to settle the issue and perhaps envisaged a long campaign.21
During the year 657 Su engaged in a series of battles with the Sha-po-lo khan
and, though sometimes outnumbered ten to one, inflicted one defeat after another,
driving him back to the Hi River where the power of the Turks was finally bro
ken.
The khan barely escaped with his life to Tashkent (Shih-kuo) where he was
betrayed to the Chinese, and with his capture two decades of peace began along
China's northwestern borders.22
Some aspects of the campaign were typical of warfare of the period and illus
trate the problems such a campaign can give rise to.
After naming a field com
mander {tsung-kuan) of an expeditionary force (hsing-chun) the court left the
entire operation in his hands.
In this case the court subsequently intervened
only to thwart an attempt by some of Su's subordinates to undermine him and to
grant him permission to use surrendered Turks in his army.
A court censor was
attached to the army to report on the campaign, but with the distances and com
munication difficulties being as great as they were, he was not to interfere in
its conduct.23 The difficulty here, of course, was that the court might easily
be confronted with a fait accompli, a punitive expedition turned by an ambitious
or too successful general into an imperialist venture.
From this time on most armies seem to have been composed of a combination of

fu-pingj mu-ping or mu-shihi and i-cheng ("volunteers").2^ This combination is
a significant one since the original character of the fu-ping was defensive and,
for reasons adequately dealt with elsewhere,25 it was an institution unsuited
for long campaigns outside the Wall.
About the method of mu-ping conscription,
we have little detailed information though we do know that service was compulsory
for those conscripted by a central government official called the ping-mu, and
that these conscripts were supplied and equipped by their home prefecture.26
it
was, therefore, far more expensive than a levy of the self-supplied fu-ping and,
as Japanese scholarship has shown, conscripts came to make up an increasing pro
portion of the armies.^7 Moreover, there is at least one contemporary report
which states that as early as 664 the length of foreign campaigns and the lack
of rewards and recognition had sapped the morale both of conscripts and volun
teers and that the recruitment system had already been corrupted by the rich and
influential who bribed officials to escape service.
As will be shown, other evi
dence supports the conclusion that the quality of T'ang soldiery declined through
the second half of the century and, as a result, the acquisition of empire was
easier than its maintenance.
Finally, I might note the extensive use of foreign
ers in the expeditionary armies.
Very often even high command positions were
held by foreigners.29 There can be no doubt that foreigners played an important
role in the victories in the West and in Korea, but because their contribution
was so difficult to gauge, the effect of their participation may well have been
to give the court a false sense of the strength and range of Chinese arms.
I cannot prove that such misapprehensions existed but, judging from the ad
ministrative arrangements made following Su Ting-fang's victory, it is plausible
to surmise their presence.
The conquered territory was first organized into the
two protectorates of Meng-ch'ih and K'un-ling with native khans as protectorsgeneral {tu-hu), and the scion of one of the great northeastern clans, Lu
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Ch'eng-ch'ing,30 was sent out to rank and organize the tribes and to appoint pre
fects and other subordinate officials over them.31
In the fifth month of the next
year, the capital of the An-hsi protectorate was moved from Hsi-chou (Kao-ch'ang)
west to Kucha (Kuei-tzu) where it administered sixteen tu-tu-fu or governmentsgeneral and 106 prefectures.32 As control was extended over the various peoples
of what is today Sinkiang and Russian Turkestan, the Chinese empire reached the
very borders of Persia, controlling more of Central Asia than had ever before
been the case.33
In view of these moves, which one scholar terms the expression of “an excess
of power,“3^ it seems reasonable to conclude that in a few short years the cau
tious realism of T'ai-tsung had been replaced by unfettered ambition.
If further
proof were needed, it was provided within a month of the An-hsi foundation when
Kao-tsung sent a force against Kogury^S which had taken advantage of Chinese in
volvement in the West to escalate its raids upon Si 11a.35 For the first time
since the ohen-kuan period [627-650], Chinese troops were now active in peninsu
lar affairs and over the next year clashed with Koguryti on more than one occasion
in the Liaotung area, while Paekche took advantage of the situation to carry out
a number of largely successful raids against Si 11a to the South.
In 660, faced
with anxious Sillan calls for aid, Kao-tsung decided to settle the issues and dis
patched Su Ting-fang and a force of 100,000 by sea to attack Paekche from the
West.36
For the next two decades the Korean question formed the focal point of China's
external affairs.
Because it was either the greatest folly or the greatest tri
umph of the two rulers, and because its internal ramifications were so great, it
deserves special attention.
Since the first Chinese conquest of the peninsula in 108 B.C. a special re
lationship had been created.
For almost kOO years thereafter, most of the North
of the peninsula had been under direct Chinese administration, but with the grad
ual development of the kingdoms of Kogury^, Paekche and Si 11a, a desire for in
dependence had begun to appear.
The disastrous Sui campaigns were basically an
attempt to reassert control over an area with a long history of Chinese rule, and
Kao-tsu, on one
the T'ang seems to have regarded the territory in the same light.
occasion, refused to receive an envoy from Koguryb on the grounds that the state
had betrayed its allegiance as a subject {ah'en) of the Sui and was likely to
cause him trouble.
He relented, however, when two of his ministers pointed out
that from Chou through Han, Wei and Chin, the state had been a tributary ifengnei) and so could not now be degraded from that status {pu-k'o i ohiang)The
patents (ts'e-jjfl"
) he conferred on the rulers of all three states in 62k seemed
to confirm recognition of a special relationship.38
Although subsequent years saw a good deal of internecine strife in the area,
the T'ang refrained from intervention until 6k3 when the throne of Kogury^ was
usurped with great brutality by Y^n'gae Somun.39 Not only did this act cut off
the valuable annual tribute from all three states but threatened the basis of the
imperial system since, as T'ai-tsung declared, the act of murdering one's sover
eign to seize the throne could not be tolerated.^6 Whether or not this was simply
a convenient excuse for his costly and unfortunate expeditions against Koguryb is
difficult to know, but the fact remains that neither his failure nor his death
bed injunctions could erase the traditional Chinese view of the peninsula.
Kaotsung was to point out in 668 that “the people ipai-hsing) of Koguryli are also my
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people,and this conviction, expressed after the conquest, was unable to pre
vent the loss of the peninsula to Si 1 Ian domination before the century was out.
The attempt by Kao-tsung and the Empress Wu to achieve what Yang-ti and T'aitsung had failed to do was, therefore, a result both of tradition and of their
own particular ambitions.
In formulating their strategy, they took full advan
tage of the existing strife in the peninsula, choosing Si 11a, the least populous
and most distant of the three states, as their ally.
This choice, however, was a
natural one since Si 11a had become the most Sinicized of the states and, espe
cially after the formalization of the peace treaty of 650 with China, had rapidly
turned itself into a miniature T'ang.
The best source for the period, the Samguk
Sagi-, tells how closely the structure of both central and provincial government,
of tax and corvee systems, and even of court robes resembled the Chinese model.
Si 11a had its own national academy, and the Ode to Peace (T'ae-p'y6ng song) in
which Queen Chind^k framed her appeal for Chinese aid in 649 is said to show a
mastery of classical style.^3
Institutionally Si 11a seems to have been ahead of
its neighbors and had succeeded in combining its borrowed sophistication with
native institutions like the hwabaek and the hwarang-to^^ which, as expressions
of the national spirit, served to equip it for later hegemony in the peninsula.
The Chinese, in choosing to ally themselves with Si 11a, showed no sign that they
were aware of any ambitions Si 11a might itself have.
In retrospect. Si 1 Ian ambitions seem clear enough, becoming overt by 654 when
the new king, Muyol, seized from Paekche the entire Han River valley, an area
which had been held by Paekche for thirty years but was claimed by all three
states. 5
it is not surprising that the Chinese misread the situation, for con
flicting reports had been reaching the court for a long time, and since Yl5n'gae
Somun's usurpation, the Chinese had tended to accept the Si 1 Ian version of events.
There is even some evidence that the strategy of the expedition of 660 was plan
ned as much by King Muyol as by Kao-tsung and his advisors.In the course of
the ensuing war, the Si 1 Ians played a much greater part than Chinese sources in
dicate and, as we shall see, Chinese policies ultimately served the interests of
Si 11a better than their own.
In late 660 the great fleet of Su Ting-fang reached the mouth of the Kum River
and began to move on the Paekchean capital of Ungjin.
Even before his arrival,
however, the flower of Paekche's resistance, an army of 50,000 volunteers, had
been utterly routed by the famed Si 1 Ian general Kim Yu-sin and his hwarang van
guard.^7 Meanwhile, Su defeated another force led by King 15ija, and with "over
10,000" of his men slain, the king fled north with his eldest son.
Shortly there
after the capital was betrayed to the invaders,^® and in a campaign which lasted
only a week, the kingdom of Paekche with a history it traced back 700 years, was
extinguished.
At its fall it was a state of 200 cities and with a population of

760,000

households.

The Chinese accounts make no mention of the Si 1 Ian contribution to the victory,
and the sources of neither side record, except obliquely, the rift which must have
occurred at this juncture.
From all we can gather. Si 11a received no reward for
her efforts, and all of Paekche, including even the Han River valley which Silla
had so recently regained, was organized into five tu-tu-fu-s precise reconstruc
tion of the Han colonial administration!
The posts of governoi—general and pre
fect went to local leaders of the defeated state.50 Since this organization was
meant to be temporary, no protectorate was created and Su Ting-fang returned to
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Loyang to receive congratulations and instructions for the projected assault on
the now isolated Koguryo.
He took along most of the Paekchean royalty and over
12,000 other captives, presumably of the upper classes, in order to forestall any
nationalistic restoration movement which might arise against the relatively small
garrison of 10,000 which he left behind.51
This wholesale deportation is a strong
indication that China planned to incorporate as much of the peninsula as possible
into the empire.
By the end of 660 preparations for the expedition against Koguryo were well
underway.
Four of China's most distinguished and experienced generals were given
charge of an army of 4A,000, levied from sixty-seven prefectures in Ho-pei and
Ho-nan, the same hard-pressed areas which had supported the Korean expeditions
since the Sui.52 There is reason to assume that the campaign was not a popular
one in the Northeast,53 but its dispatch seems to have represented a calculated
risk for the rulers, who balanced the dissatisfaction of the area against their
hope for a rapid and definitive success.
By the time it set out in the fourth
month of 661, it had been supplemented by Ulghurs, Sogdians and Hsi to form an
impressive force of thirty-five armies.
The plan was to squeeze KoguryllS between
this force's advance from the North and an assault by the Si Hans and Chinese
garrison troops from the South.
Kao-tsung was dissuaded from assuming personal
command of the northern force only by the empress' last-minute intervention.5l»
From the outset, however, the two-pronged strategy went awry.
A Chinese fleet
carrying supplies and reinforcements for the Ungjin garrison was wrecked at sea
and, inspired by this piece of luck, a fierce restoration movement led by a Gen
eral Poksln broke out in Paekche.55 Before long he had rallied his whole people
and won support from Japan.
When the Si 1 Ians, already disaffected by their treat
ment a year earlier and by the high-handed actions of the garrison commander,
Liu Jen-yuan, conveniently ran out of supplies and retired, the Chinese garrison
found itself in an impossible position.56
|n the North, the two major armies of
Su Ting-fang and Ch'i-pi Ho-li were unable to effect a junction even by the fall
of 662, and Su's troops, who had already endured one winter at the walls of
Pyongyang, were restive.57 At the court Kao-tsung had suffered a relapse of what
was becoming a chronic illness, had just been forced to send more troops to put
down a Ulghur rebellion, and was so conscious of the exhaustion of the Northeast
from supplying the needs of the forces in Korea that he had to cancel the fengshan sacrifices already announced for 662.58 There seemed no alternative to re
treat, and Ch'i-pi was ordered home while Liu Jen-kuei, who had assumed charge of
the Paekche garrison, was ordered to withdraw into Si 11a and, if unwelcome there,
to embark for China.59
|t is of interest to note that the court was by now aware
of Sillan dissatisfaction but was unable to make any positive response to it and
seems to have been still unwilling to abandon its plans to rule the entire pen
insula.
In mld-661 Munmu, Silla's finest king of the century and a man with
firsthand experience of China, had come to the throne; yet in the third month of
662 China had unilaterally decreased his status by declaring him governor-general
{ta-tu-tu) of Kyerim, the old name for his state.60
Direct assumption of the conduct of the war by the poorly informed court in
the fall of 662 almost proved disastrous.
Fortunately for China, however, Liu
Jen-Kuei disregarded his instructions, broke out of the siege, regained several
lost positions and managed to coax from the reluctant court an additional 7»000
troops has.tily levied in Ho-pel.8l
But this was as far as Kao-tsung would go.
The next year he issued a remarkable decree apologizing for the hardship and
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deaths the high taxes and onerous shipbuilding corvees inflicted on Chinese by
the Korean war, and he sent commissioners to ten provinces to assess the effects
of the war, correct the administration and offer relief to the people.^2
In the meantime, however, the resistance movement of Paekche had exhausted
itself in internal strife and Liu Jen~kuei was quick to take advantage of the
situation.
Only days after Kao-tsung's decree, he won one of China's greatest
victories near the mouth of the Kum River, destroying not only the Paekchean
army but also a supporting armada from Japan under Azumi no Hirabu no Muraji.^3
As the kOO ships burned, "the heavens dark with smoke and the sea red with blood,"
Chinese arms were felt to have been vindicated.
The court rejoiced but took no
immediate steps to complete the conquest of Korea.
The major reasons for hesitation were undoubtedly the sad domestic results of
the campaign and the reception of a detailed report from Liu Jen-kuei which out
lined his deficiencies in weapons and supplies, the extremely low morale of his
troops, and their desire to return home.^^ The year 66^, moreover, was a tense
year in the capital, with Liu's report arriving in the midst of Shang-kuan I's
attempt to depose the empress and amid accusations that Liu was himself planning
to use his peninsular troops to engineer a coup.^5
|t was decided, therefore,
to hold the line in Korea.
The former crown prince of Paekche was sent back to
his state as governoi general and Silla was forced the next year to conclude with
him a pact of everlasting friendship.
This last action proved to be grossly inept.
Silla had once again been de
prived of the fruits of victory, and Munmu objected strongly to a treaty drafted
wholly by
the Chinese and to the pressure exerted by Liu Jen-kuei, a mere tu-tu,
to compel
him to sign.°7 Munmu's protest may have been responsible for the im
mediate recall of Liu Jen-kuei from the peninsula,b^t this could hardly have
satisfied
the Sillan king who nonetheless sent his representatives along with
Liu to assist at^the feng-shan sacrifices at which the only notable foreign ab
sence was Koguryo's.
Only a month after the sacrifice, Kao-tsung announced what was to prove China's
seventh and final expedition against Koguryo during the seventh century.
Its
ostensible purpose was the settlement of the disputed succession which followed
Y(6n'gae Somun's death,69 but the preparations made clear that China's aim was
much greater, and that this time it would be satisfied only with the destruction
of the troublesome state.
The experienced general Ch'i-pi Ho-li was dispatched
to Liaotung with an advance force, and the prestigious veteran Li Chi, probably
about eighty at the time, was recalled from semi-retirement as supreme commander.
He was seconded by Hsueh Jen-kuei who had yet to be defeated in battle, and the
revenues {tsu-fu) of every prefecture in Ho-pei were directed to Liaotung for
the support of the troops.70
In the autumn of 667 Li Chi crossed the Liao River and in the course of the
following year engaged in a series of bloody but inconclusive battles.
Not until
the ninth lunar month of 668, and after a month-long siege did Pyongyang fall to
the combined Chinese forces.7l
They burned the city to the ground, destroying
all the records of the 705-year-old kingdom, and with the incorporation of its
population of perhaps 4,000,000 persons into direct rule by China,72 the T'ang
empire reached its greatest extent.
The burning of the capital, which seems to have been an unnecessary act ion,73
proved also to be a blunder.
Although reconstruction began almost immediately
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and the new city became the center of the An-tung protectorate, 74 the possibility
of reconciliation, of the salving of national pride, was substantially diminished
by the initial holocaust.
To the inhabitants of the peninsula it must have ap
peared as one more instance of Chinese insensitivity, a feeling intensified by
the post-conquest administration.
The country was divided in the old manner into
tu-tu-fu, ohou, and hsien
, with a dual administration of Chinese and Kore
ans; purely Chinese rank was awarded to the pretender to the Korean throne, and
the defender of Pyongyang, a national hero, was exiled to the remote South of
China.75 These provisions, the natural culmination of Chinese plans for the
peninsula, were soon to prove of great benefit to Si 11a.
The accounts of the peninsular war as they appear in Chinese and Si 1 Ian sources
differ in several respects.
Even in this final campaign, the Chinese see their
allies as dilatory and unreliable, pointing out that General Kim Yu-sin's army
of 30,000 men arrived at Pyongyang only in time to share in its fall.'® The
preceding account of events is drawn in general from Chinese sources, and it is
time now to introduce the Si 1 Ian perspective.
This is best done perhaps by re
producing a document addressed by King Munmu to the Chinese general Hsiieh Jenkuei in 671, at a time when the estrangement of the two states was almost com
plete.
The text is preserved only in the Samguk Sagi and represents Munmu's
response to an ultimatum that within two days he either signify repentance for
"crimes" against China, or suffer the condign punishment of the two Chinese ar
mies poised to strike at him.77
|n his reply, the king recants but not without
listing fully his grievances and calling for their redress.
His letter throws
much light on Chinese policy in the peninsula and is important for the under
standing of subsequent events.
It is quoted in detail below.
In the twenty-second year of ohen-kuan [648], my late father went to
the court of China and received from the Emperor T'ai-tsung a gracious
decree [which said]:
"We now attack KogurytS for no other reason than our
compassion for Si 11a, harassed by the two states [of Paekche and Koguryo].
Yearly you are invaded, enjoying no time without trouble.
We have no de
sire for land nor for treasure or men and women [as subjects].
When we

paoify the two states^
the land south of Pyongyang and the territo
ry of Paekche shall both he granted to Silla, and peace shall reign for
ever." . . .78
Before the great task was completed, T'ai-tsung died and the present
emperor succeeded him, continuing to show us the kindness of before.
[Munmu here praises Kao-tsung elaborately and protests his loyalty to
him. ]
In the fifth year of hsien-oh'ing [66O], the emperor saw that his fa
ther's wish had not been carried out . . . and sent a great fleet and
troops.
My father was old and weak and he could not take the field . . .
[so] he ordered me to take command. . . . Even before the [Chinese] fleet
entered the river mouth, we had already defeated the great Paekchean
force and the two armies advanced together to the capital.
Together we
pacified one [opposing] state, and afterwards my father agreed with Su
[Ting-fang] that a Chinese garrison of 10,000 be left, and we sent my
younger brother with 7>000 troops to join the Ungjin garrison.
After the great [Chinese] army had returned, the bandit Poksin rebel
led west of the river [in Paekche] . . . [He besieged the garrison, to
tally cutting it off from aid and] I personally led a relief force
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there . . . and saved 10,000 Chinese troops from the tiger's jaws. . . .79
In the sixth year of hsien-oh'ing Poksin's followers increased and in
vaded [us] seizing land east of the river.
A thousand Chinese from Ungjin
were sent against them but were defeated with not a single man escaping.®®
After this defeat the Ungjin garrison begged us day and night for rein
forcements, [but] in Si 11a there were many epidemics and we could not
raise troops and horses.
The sad requests were difficult to refuse and we
did send many troops who surrounded the city of Churyu.^l
The bandits knew
our forces were small and attacked us, killing many and forcing a retreat.
The cities of the South then all rose together and joined the rebellion of
Poksin who again surrounded the garrison.
The road was cut off [but Si 11a
managed to get supplies to the garrison] . . .
In the sixth month my father died and my mourning duties prevented me
from taking the field [to resuce the garrison].
China ordered me to lead
troops to the North . . . and also to send supplies to [the Chinese forces
at] Py'Sngyang.
At this time, the Ungjin garrison sent a man to advise that
the garrison was isolated and in danger. . . . [Here follows a long expla
nation of why Si 11a gave priority to Py'?ingyang, and a report of how those
finally sent to the aid of Ungjin were destroyed].
In the first month of the second year of tung-shuo [662], the Chinese
commander Liu [Te-min]°2 together with our commander Kim Yu-sin and oth
ers set out to provision the Pyongyang troops.
At that time, rain, wind,
snow and the most extreme cold made men and horses freeze to death, and
the men and provisions could not get through.
The great army at Pyong
yang then wanted to go back, and the Si 11an troops with their provisions
also came back suffering from hunger and cold, their hands and feet fro
zen, and countless dead littering the roadway.
[Here follows a descrip
tion of how they were attacked en route by the Kogury'Sns] ... In less
than a month [after the disaster] the Ungjin garrison demanded still more
grain.
We had in total already sent tens of thousands of bushels in the
South to them and in the North to Py'8ngyang, so that the strength of the
people in our small state was exhausted and our livestock had died [of
starvation].
Agriculture was disrupted and the year's harvest gone . . .
[so that] the people could not find grass and roots sufficient to keep
themselves alive.
But the Ungjin garrison had an excess . . . [Here the
king explains how clothing was next sent to the garrison] . . .
When your protector-general Liu Jen-yuan^S was thus defending his dis
tant and isolated city, surrounded by bandits and constantly attacked by
Paekche, it is Si 11a who rescued him.
For four years we fed and clothed
10,000 Chinese troops. . . . Our loyalty and toil is great and worthy of
commiseration.
In the third year of tung-shuo [663] the conmander Sun Jen-shih®^
brought troops to relieve the garrison and we sent troops along [to help
him].
They reached Churyu and at this time the Japanese fleet was there
to help Paekche with 1,000 warships and their position was guarded by
Paekchean cavalry on the shore.
It was cavalry acting as the Chinese van
guard which first defeated the troops on the shore.
Churyu fell and then
after its submission the South was pacified.
[Here follows an explanation
of why Si 11a did not agree to sign a treaty with Paekche at this time] . . .
In the first year of t-Ln-te [66A] we received a decree from China blam
ing us for failure to conclude a treaty [with Paekche] and we sent men to
UngnylSng to swear the oath at an altar built there.^5 The place we swore
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the oath became the border between our two states.
Although the contents
of the treaty were not what we wanted, we dared not disobey an imperial de
cree.
[The treaty was formalized and the borders permanently fixed] . . .
In the second year of dh’ien-feng [667] we were told that the supreme
commander Li Chi had invaded Liaotung and I went to Hansong, assembling my
troops at the border.
[An explanation of how Si 11a finally advanced to
ward Pyongyang at Li Chi's instruction but was left in a bad position by
his withdrawal and retreated]. . . The next year we sent an envoy by
sea to discover Li Chi's movements and he received instructions that we
should advance and assemble at PyllSngyang.
In the fifth month the Minister
of the Right Liu [Jen-yuan] arrived, dispatched the Si 1 Ian troops, and we
advanced to Pyongyang.
I went to Hans'6ng to take [temporary] charge of our
troops and when the combined forces were at Chi-su°7 [the Koguryon king]
Namgon sent out troops for a decisive battle.
Our troops alone formed the
vanguard and we defeated his great force, destroying the morale of the
Pyongyang defenders.
Afterwards Li Chi chose 500 of our cavalry to speai
head the assault on the city gates.
Then Pyongyang fell.°°
. . . Our troops all complained then that for nine years they had been
in the field and finally had pacified the two states [but] the people were
totally exhausted. . . . [They felt that] the people [of Si 11a] should be
rewarded for their effort, but Li Chi let it be known [that he felt] that
Si 11a had failed to come when it was most needed and that this must be con
sidered.^9 When our troops heard this, their uneasiness grew. Also, our
meritorious generals, whose names are all recorded at our court, had al
ready reached the capital and said that Si 11a had been deprived of honor.
When the troops returned [and were demobilized?] the common people also
found their fear and uneasiness increased.
Also, the cities which once were ours but were seized over thirty years
ago by Koguryo, we regained in this campaign and we moved people into them,
setting up officials to guard them.
And [the Chinese] took these cities
and gave them back to Koguryo.
From the time Paekche was pacified . . .
Si 11a has been wholly loyal and has exerted great effort.
We know not
what is our crime. . . .
In the first year of tsung-ohang [688], Paekche moved the boundary
markers from where they had been fixed by the treaty.
They seized our
land and stole our slaves.
[Some of] our people they deceived, hiding
them in their land and they came often with false demands, refusing to
leave.
Also, their envoy told us they were rebuilding their fleet [only]
in order to attack Japan, but really [we know] they want to attack us.
When the people heard of it they were alarmed.90
[Here an abortive plot
initiated by the Paekchean wife of a Si 1 Ian tu-tu is described] . .^.
In the sixth month of the first year of hsien-heng [670], Koguryo plot
ted rebellion and sought to kill the Chinese officials.
We wanted to send
troops then, and first we sent to Ungjin saying that since Koguryo had re
belled, we had to send troops, and since both of us are imperial subjects,
we should cooperate in suppressing the rebels. . . . They sent their ssuma to sign a treaty with us saying that lest we suspect each other after
the campaign, hostages should be exchanged. . . . Although Paekche agreed to the exchange, it assembled troops in the city [where it was to
be carried out] and at night launched a [surprise] attack on us.9'
In the seventh month we sent envoys to China to settle the border
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question, and after examining the maps, we were ordered to restore all of
Paekche's old territory.
Before long, over the next three or four years,
one [state] gave and one took [even more land].
Our people have all lost
their original hope, and they say that for generations Si 11a and Paekche
have been bitter enemies.
Now they see that Paekche is being restored and
will again become an independent state.
In a hundred years our sons and
grandsons will be swallowed up.
Si 11a is a prefecture of the empire {kuoohia ohih ahou)^^ and it cannot be divided into two states. We want to be
one family, enduring without later calamity.
In the ninth month of last year we sent envoys to explain [this situa
tion] but they were shipwrecked and their replacements also failed to reach
China.
Afterwards the wind, cold, and waves made it impossible to report.
[But] Paekche sent messengers who reported that we were planning to
rebel. . . . Afterwards, because of Paekche's slander, advance or retreat
was seen as a fault and we have not yet been heard.
When your messenger brought your letter, I was astounded that Your Ex
cellency [Hsueh Jen-kuei] should have braved the storms and come so far
from across the sea.
I should have met you with proper protocol and of
ferings of wine and cattle at the border.
Living so far in a different
city, I failed to carry out the ceremonial and there was no time to wel
come you.
I request that you do not blame me.
I have read the message you sent which considers that Si 11a has already
rebelled but this is not our intent. . . .
Now I have explained my grievances, recording them all without rebel
liousness.
China has not sent an envoy nor heard my reasons [for my ac
tions].
[Instead] it sent an army of several tens of thousands . . . and
towering ships which fill the sea and anchor at the mouth of the [Kdm]
river.
You reprimand Paekche but attack Si 11a.
Alas! when the two states
[of Paekche and Koguryli] were not yet pacified, we were ordered to attack
them.
Now that the game has been slaughtered, it is we who are thrown into
the cooking pot! . . .
I write to protest our innocence, to ask you to consider the matter and
report it.°’
Although a number of Munmu's allegations, for lack of collaborating evidence,
must remain just that, certain of his grievances seem to be well founded.
If
T'ai-tsung had indeed promised to increase Sillan territory, the promise had not
been honored, and twenty years of Chinese Intervention had brought little but
hardship to the area.
The king seems to acknowledge, moreover, that China's ini
tial concern lay with the Internecine strife in the peninsula.
Yet in the admin
istrative dispositions It made after each major victory, a clear progression In
Chinese ambition is discernible.
After 663 Silla was recognized by China only as
the tu-tu-fu of Kyerim,9 and after the fall of Koguryb, the establishment of the
An-tung protectorate put Hsueh Jen-kuei and his garrison of 20,000 in overall
charge of peninsular affairs.95
On the other hand, Munmu's letter reveals the ambition of his own state, and
It is difficult to avoid the impression that Silla's alliance with the T'ang was
from the beginning merely an expedient.
From the time of the Sui expeditions
against KoguryS, the evidence shows that Silla had initiated a good deal of the
unrest on the peninsula,9o and some of Munmu's protestations about Sillan partici
pation in the campaign ring hollow.
He makes no mention of the "illness" of Kim
Yu-sin which prevented the troops of the great general from reaching Pyongyang
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97
until immediately before its fall,
and Chinese sources have nothing to say of
Sillan contributions to the taking of the city.
It is possible to see an element
of duplicity in the king's policy.
While he awaited his moment, the Chinese were
to exhaust themselves in the fighting and be cast more and more in the role of
imperialists, allowing the Koreans to see the advantages of Sillan rather than
Chinese hegemony.
The standard interpretations which see the emergence of Sillan
ambition only with the fall of Koguryo^® are perhaps therefore misleading.
Whatever the case, it is clear that within a few short years of its triumph,
China had significantly advanced the Sillan cause.
Hstieh Jen-kuei proved to be
a stern administrator, and instead of attempting to reduce anti-Chinese feeling
with leniency, he had rigidly enforced the sometimes ill-advised policies of the
distant court.
The most damaging of these was a decree in the summer of 669 is
sued, according to the Comprehensive Mirror, because rebellious feeling remained
strong among the Koreans.
A decree ordered that 38,200 [Korean] households be transported to the un
derpopulated areas south of the Yangtze and Huai rivers as well as to pre
fectures in Shan-nan and Chlng-hsi.
The Impoverished and weak were to
remain to support the An-tung protectorate.99
Thus almost four percent of the Korean population, representing probably the en
tire ruling class, was forcibly removed from the country.100
Among those who escaped, however, was a close relative of the deposed king, a
man called An Sting, who immediately made himself a symbol of resistance and raised
the standard of rebellion in 670.
With great perspicacity, Munmu used his posi
tion as the only remaining king in the peninsula, to give An Sung a patent of
kingship and grant him with his 20,000 followers asylum in Silla.101
The T'ang
considered both these Sillan actions to be rebellious, and it was when Munmu was
charged with "betraying the Mandate of Heaven and repudiating your father's in-

structions"102 ^^gt he wrote the letter quoted extensively above. Though his
apology was accepted in 671, he was by no means sincere, and from 671 to 675 he
initiated several forays into Paekche and engaged in numerous battles with the
Chinese who found allies only among the unreliable Mulguls.
In this period the
Sillan source grows increasingly boastful, and even though the king once more
made a formal apology in 675> China was almost certainly on the defensive.
Evidence is abundant of disaffected "nationalist" elements from Paekche and
Kogury?S deserting to Si 11a in these years.
By 677 Sillan power was entrenched all along the Taedong River, and Hslieh Jenkuei, who had suffered serious defeats in 676 was in despair.Since accepting
Munmu's apology and reconfirming his position in 675> the court had sent no re
inforcements and it was clear that none would be forthcoming.
As mentioned eai
lier, the year 675 offered the first hints of Empress Wu's usurpation and domestic
politics took precedence.
The entire Northeast was exhausted by drought and by
the constant drain on its manpower, and in 670 the rising power of the Tibetans
had driven so deeply into China that a projected feng-shan sacrifice for that year
had to be canceled.When two years later the Tibetans annihilated one of the
greatest armies China had yet raised, the court was plunged into turmoil and the
immediate imperative became the prevention of a Turco-Tlbetan all lance.^07 For
these reasons, China's last intervention in the peninsula was no more than a face
saving attempt at compromise.
In 677 the deposed king of Koguryi^ and the son of the last king of Paekche,
along with many of their exiled countrymen were sent back to their country in the
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hope that they could rally their people and check the Si Hans. 108 Both received
a curious combination of titles—Chinese court rank, a governor-generalship, and
a patent making them kings of two chwi. called Ch'ao-hsien and Tai-fang.109 This
seems to have been an innovation in colonial administration, an attempt to as
suage nationalist feelings with kingly titles while the kings were subordinated
to the Chinese protector with the title governors-general.
Predictably, it
failed.
King Pojang of Kogury?^ was engaged in a conspiracy with the Mulguls from
the moment he crossed the Liao and, when he was recalled to China, died on the
way.
Puyorung of Paekche was too frightened both of Si 11a and of his own people
ever to take up residence in his own state.
The next year Si 11a set up a northern
capital on the Taedong, and the seat of the T'ang protectorate abandoned its ad
vance back to Pyongyang and remained at Hsin-ch'eng in Manchuria.110 The entire
peninsula south of the thirty-ninth parallel became the preserve of Silla.
On his death in 68l King Munmu could well express both his satisfaction that
the borders were settled and his confident wish that "weapons be melted down for
agricultural implements."!11
His successors, Sinmun (68I-9I), Hyoso (692-701)
and Songdok (702-36) regularly sent tribute to China, received confirmation in
return, and only during the great Khitan rebellion of
of strained relations.112

696-98

were there any signs

In retrospect, the Korean policy of Kao-tsung and the Empress Wu is best seen
The theoretical basis of
as a progression from necessity to ambition to realism.
traditional Chinese foreign policy was the creation and maintenance of an external
order which mirrored the same relationship between ruler and subject as that which
existed inside the Wall.
Harmonious interdependence of "inner" and "outer" was
especially important in the case of a new emperor, and the early recalcitrance of
Koguryo could therefore not remain unchallenged.
It was principally the special
position of the Empress Wu in government which created the ambition to succeed
where T'ai-tsung had failed.
For this the conquest of KoguryS was sufficient, but
the attempt to incorporate the entire peninsula was too much.
Realization of this
fact was belated but it came in time to prevent further bloodshed, and the stra
tegic withdrawal of 677 salvaged at least some of China's prestige.
It was too
late, however, to prevent the virtual destruction of the fu~pn.ng system in the
Northeast and the economic depression which characterized the area during suc
ceeding decades.113 For a time, however, the court refused to admit the futility
of attempting to impose the tu-hu-fu system upon a people with administrative so
phistication and national aspirations of their own.
In 678 the empress as de facto
regent was dissuaded from a further attack upon Silla only by the dramatic death
bed plea of Chang Wen-kuan:
"Now the Tibetans have invaded and we are about to
send troops to the West to punish them.
Silla, although it claims it will not be
coerced (pu-shun), has yet to violate our borders."11^ The empress apparently
agreed that so long as Silla observed the forms of its tributary relationship,
could be permitted to exist in peace.

it

After 678 China's foreign policy turned exclusively to the West and to the North
and became increasingly a reaction to foreign initiatives.
The Tibetans, a people whose first recorded tribute mission reached China in

63A, had been rapidly extending their power in Central Asia since about
in 670 initiated a series of large-scale and generally successful raids
Chinese border.115
In the autumn of 678, having enticed an incompetent

650, and
on the
Chinese
commander and his force of l80,000 men to Kokonor (Ch'ing-hai), the Tibetans in
flicted upon him a crushing defeat which seems to have had the effect of
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substantially reducing the military resources of the Northwest.
It also made
the Tibetans an extremely formidable and confident foe, with Ssu-ma Kuang remark
ing, "Of all the barbarians who have flourished, no others could compare to
them."^^7 The court, which seems to have suffered some difficulty in raising
such a large force, was dismayed, and Kao-tsung convened his first recorded pol
icy debate, a meeting which produced only the timeworn alternatives:
Some wished to conclude a peace and give rest to the people.
Others
wished to strengthen [the borders] to prepare [for a great attack].
. . . Still others favored an invincible army to destroy them.^^°
The emperor, probably disappointed that no decision was reached,

rewarded and

dismissed the participants.
A slightly more original point of view, though one which still illustrates
the impoverishment of policy, came from a student at the state university, Wei
Yiian-chung, who was later to become a controversial chief minister.
Perceiving
that the military was becoming less and less capable of victory, he enumerated
its faults--its amateurism, its hereditary ranks, its unattractiveness as a ca
reer.
He pointed out the mediocre quality of leadership, charging that generals
were chosen for "daring and strength" or simply because they were descendants of
generals or military families, rather than for intelligence or knowledge of strat
egy and tactics.
He spoke of the sinking level of morale among the soldiery
because "since Su Ting-fang fought in Liaotung and Li Chi destroyed Py?5ngyang
rewards have not been distributed at all," and because the officials responsible
for this and the generals responsible for recent humiliating defeats had gone
unpunished.^19 His solutions were not novel since Liu Jen-kuei had suggested
the same things in 664—that the quality of military leadership be raised and
the system of rewards and discipline be properly administered.
His memorial
does, however, show that Liu's proposals had been ignored and, in enumerating
the basic causes of military weakness, it points up the most serious flaw in
T'ang "imperialism."
The T'ang empire was founded upon an essentially defensive military organiza
tion whose training was less than professional and which was essentially selfsupporting and self-equipped.120 jhe burden of fu-ping service thus imposed
upon the peasantry resident in the more than 600 ohun-fu was onerous, and a
large part of the vagrancy problem which arose during Chou can be traced to fu
gitives from the areas where the system was enforced.121
Recent research has
shown that the supplies a soldier was expected to provide for himself exceeded
in value the tax remission he received, and the land allotted to him was less
than he could expect to receive in the normal course of equal-field distribu

tion. 122 The crucial importance of special rewards is, therefore, clear and,
as we have seen, generals and officials became increasingly lax and corrupt in
this regard as time went on.
Moreover, as campaigns became more frequent and
of longer duration, the resources of the fu-ping became inadequate, and since
the Korean campaigns an ever greater proportion of the hsing-ohun or expedition
ary armies came to be made up of special levies.123 Because these forces were
only supposed to be constituted technically for the duration of a given cam
paign but often found themselves used as garrisons, it was crucial to provide
them with incentives.
Thus when Wei YUan-chung criticized the failure to bestow
honorific rank and other rewards on meritorious troops, he was condemning the
shortsightedness of a court which had yet to realize that it was rendering the
fu-ping obsolete.
Nor did the court understand that the hsing-ohun represented
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not an expedient but a transition to the future form of military organization.
During the Chou dynasty, other developments would bring about that realization
and pave the way for the later creation of a more "professional" military organ
ization under Hsuan-tsung.
In the last years of Kao-tsung the failings of the old system became painfully
obvious.
The Tibetan victory of 678 enabled them not only to effect an alliance
with the Western Turks,^24 but also to consolidate their control over the scat
tered tribes of the West who had been steadily defecting to them since their
seizure of the Four Garrisons in 670.125 Although by this time real power was
in the hands of the mGar clan,^^° the accession of an eight-year-old btsan-po
in 679 seems to have given the T'ang a temporary respite from Tibetan attack.
The empress wished to exploit this situation with a massive expedition, but P'ei
Hsing-chien spoke convincingly enough of the exhaustion of China's western prov
inces to dissuade her.
His subsequent diplomatic maneuvers broke the TurcoTibetan alliance and restored Chinese control to much of the lost terr1tory.127
P'ei's intervention was well-timed, for in the tenth lunar month of 679 yet
another threat loomed in the great rebellion of the Northern Turks.
Under Ashih-na Ni-shu-fu and A-shih-te Wen-fu, they rapidly seized all the twenty-four
prefectures established in the Shan-yii protectorate in 650, and persuaded both
the Khitans and Hsi to join them.128 Once again the troop levies began, and
P'ei Hsing-chien
won a resounding
regained control
raids.129 Sadly

led a force of 180,000 to the North.
His inspired leadership
if temporary victory, and by Kao-tsung's death the Turks had
of much of the Shan-yii area and the Tibetans had resumed their
for China, the succession crisis and the internal rebellions

of the next few years left it with little opportunity to confront the border
question, and during the Chou the Empress Wu was never able fully to repair the
damages caused by the neglect of
were already past.

683-69O.

The halcyon days of the T'ang empire

As we shall see, historians in general tend not to approve of the foreign
policy of the Empress Wu, regarding her as responsible for the decline of Chi
nese prestige in Central Asia and for the deterioration of China's own border
defenses.
In this judgment and particularly as it applies to the Chou period,
there is a certain validity, but the judgment is nonetheless superficial.
It
is true that the empress' deepest concerns, even in Kao-tsung's lifetime, were
political and dynastic and that her greatest care was domestic stability.
For
eign affairs never received the same priority and were always subordinated to
the above concerns, with the result that the creativity and vigilance so promi
nent inside the Wall were less conspicuous outside it.
And, of course, neither
Kao-tsung nor his wife had any firsthand military experience.
At the same time, foreign policy failures must be placed within the peculiar
context of the time.
The constraints both of tradition and of circumstance im
posed upon the empress operated with their greatest force in the realm of mili
tary and foreign affairs.
She knew that to be accounted great, conquest or, in
Chinese terms, "pacification of the barbarians" was necessary, but as a woman
she could have no clear perception of the soldier's life nor could she take the
field at the head of her troops.
This may help to account for the decline of
the fu-p-ing.
It may also be the case that a concept of empire radically different from
that of T'ai-tsung shaped the foreign policy of the period.
As I have pointed
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out, she and her husband were not responsible for the great swing to the West
nor for the intervention in Korea which marked the reign of their predecessor
and, as we shall see, during Chou Chinese troops were active outside the Wall
only once.
Kao-tsung and the empress came to power, however, at a time when the
commitment to empire had already been made and when any sign of weakness would
have been detrimental to dynastic interests, and possibly also to the empress'
own position and political policies. We must bear in mind that it is unlikely
she ever saw military endeavor in any terms other than as an extension of do~
mestic policy.
To her, results on the home front were what mattered, and these
demanded that T'ai-tsung's achievements be equaled or surpassed.
The Korean experience was, I suggest, the key to the empress' later foreign
policy.
It revealed not only the rewards of success but also its cost. After
the peninsula was lost to direct control, foreign policy became increasingly a
matter of reaction to foreigners' initiatives.
The empress seems to have de
cided to hold if possible what China already possessed but to acquire no more.
It was chiefly for this reason that to meet the invasions which occurred during
the Chou dynasty, she was able year after year to call upon truly amazing re
serves of manpower and raise armies which sometimes reached half a million.
While her people enjoyed domestic peace, they would fight more readily to pre
serve that peace than to extend the glory and prestige of the empire.
What Korea failed to teach, or rather what the empress failed to learn, was
that the two bases of T'ang foreign policy, the fu-ping and tu-hu-fu systems,
were incompatible. The latter aimed to “transform the barbarians" and succeeded
usually only in bettering their administrative skills and technical sophistica
tion.
But while providing for a good deal of self-government, China insisted on
deference and subordination with the result that it fueled ambitions of a protonationalistic sort.
Neither the fu-ping nor the hsing-ahun made provision for
the establishment of garrisons on foreign soil, and so could not provide the
requisite force in place for semi-colonial rule.
During the Chou, the empress
was often forced to rely on undignified expedients in dealing with the barbar
ians, and while these were successful in the short run, they left her successors
with problems greater than she had herself to face.
By 684 it was the shortcomings rather than the successes of the foreign policy
of the previous two decades which were most obvious, and their recognition prom
ised a greater realism in foreign affairs during the Chou period.

Chapter 9

THE CHOU DYNASTY

The Chou dynasty, which lasted from October 690 to February 705, was one of
the shortest in Chinese history.
The restoration of the T'ang, moreover, occui—
red not with the death of the Empress Wu but with her deposition.
Why, after
capping so long and successful a political career with China's only female usur
pation, did Wu Tse-tien end her career in failure?
But, one may ask, was this
denouement actually a failure?
Was the empress, first of all, attempting to establish a dynasty which would
endure for the conventional "myriad generations"?
In all likelihood, it seems
not.
I stated earlier that her loyalty to the T'ang, or at least to its aims
and achievements, was genuine, and that her regency and possibly her usurpation
were undertaken in response to perceived crises.
Beyond this she seems to have
given signs at the dynastic changeover that the T'ang was not to be deprived
permanently of the empire, and that her aim was to legitimate her own reign rath
er than to found a dynasty which the Wu clan would continue.
These signs were
both symbolic and substantive, and the first of them appeared at the very moment
of the founding since there is no evidence that Jui-tsung formally abdicated.
Since the third century A.D. dynastic founders had invariably used ritual abdi
cation as a formal preface to the transfer of power,^ and thus from the begin
ning the source of the Chou mandate was questionable.
In substantive terms, it
is important to note further that Jui-tsung was immediately declared his mother's
successor, and although his title was huang-ssu rather than t'ai-tzu,2 and al
though he had adopted the Wu surname, he held his position until 698, and then
it was his elder brother Chung-tsung who replaced him.3 Although the latter al
so accepted the Wu surname, contemporaries must have seen this as simple expedi
ency, and the important fact is that throughout the Chou the succession never
left the hands of the Li.
The ambitions of certain members of the Wu clan were
to make the succession question the most acrimonious and bloody of the period
but, as I shall show, the empress only briefly considered the possibility of a
Wu successor.
She may in fact have anticipated both the struggle and its form,
since even prior to the restoration she began to construct a close web of fam
ilial relationships between the Wu and Li clans,^ and was to continue to do so
in subsequent years.
In 699 she formalized this policy by having the leading
members of both clans swear an oath of concord at the ming-t'ang.S
A second important sign which pointed throughout the dynasty to the likeli
hood of a T'ang restoration was the lack of genuine instructional-symbolic in
novation by the empress.
In this she broke the well-defined pattern both of
conquering dynastic founders like Han Kao-tsu and usurpers who planned an endur
ing dynasty like Sui Wen-ti.
We find, for instance, no new law code, the founda
tion of no institutions of lasting importance, and no attempt at widespread
social reform.
With few exceptions, even the ritual coloration of the Chou var
ied little from the T'ang, and though red banners replaced the yellow of T'ang,^
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and "Wu" replaced "T'ang" in place names throughout the empire, court dress and
ceremonial, official titles and office names remained largely unchanged after

690.

In view of the empress' demonstrated concern with ritual and nomenclature,
it is particularly striking that she seems never to have chosen a "virtue and
element" \te-yim) for the Chou.7 Chung-tsung, as we have noted, could remark

at the restoration that the empress "did not disregard the old things," and on
grounds like these it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Chou Is
best seen as a caretaker regime and, indeed, was regarded in this way by the
Empress Wu herself,
I am not saying, of course, that this constitutes a full explanation for what
seems the relative inactivity of the empress during the Chou in comparison with
the decades prior to 690.
Other factors were certainly present, the most im
portant being the growing inflexibility of the central government as the T'ang
gained greater security, and also the relative success of its gradualist approach
to the paramount state concerns of consolidation of imperial authority at the
expense of the aristocracy.
I have earlier attempted to show how closely the
empress identified herself with these policies.
In addition, we must recognize that throughout the Chou the empress' position
remained rather tenuous.
She must have known that the acceptance of her claim
to be emperor was based chiefly on personal or charismatic factors, but that at
the same time a female Son of Heaven was a semantic and cultural violation of
the Confucian tradition to which the elite among her subjects, the group through
whom she had to work, gave perhaps their deepest loyalty.
For this reason, her
freedom of action was restricted, and she found herself more subject to the wishes
of the bureaucracy than might have been the case with a male ruler of similarly
absolutist temperament.
Her political defeats, which ranged from matters like a
failure to effect a planned reorganization of the provinces in the mid-690s to
her inability to protect her favorites, were more numerous than is generally
recognized, and although she was able to continue the trend toward dilution of
ministerial power, it is of great importance to recognize that without the pres
ence of her husband or son on the throne, she was less effective in government
than she had been prior to 690.
These considerations, although suggestive, still do not throw much light on
our earlier question of how the empress was able to endure even for fifteen years
in her anomalous position, and how eventually she invalidated her claim.
As
will be pointed out, her sensitivity to bureaucratic loyalties and her skillful
manipulation of the succession were factors in the maintenance of her position,
but for a wider explanation we might turn to a traditional source.
The New T'ang
Histopy, comparing her success to the failure of Empress Wei, says "reward and
punishment came from her alone and she did not borrow [the authority of] minis
ters.
She usurped above but governed well below {ahien yu shang erh ahih yu
hsia) and so could rule the empire.''^
If this is the case, it might be argued
that the empress used the same combination of political acumen and popular sup
port to which she owed her rise as the basis of rule during most of the Chou.
It was only in her last years, after she had delegated authority to unworthy
favorites, permitted corruption, and neglected the state, that she was forced
to retire.
It is difficult to tell if her deposition occurred because she had lost popu
lar suppott, though what evidence there is would suggest this was not the case.9
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It is equally difficult to judge with certainty whether any but the very small
number of ministers actually involved in the coup of 705 would have participated
in it had they been offered the chance.
The possibility exists, therefore, of
a very simple explanation for the deposition--superior planning on the part of
a small number of alienated bureaucrats.
Still the absence of identifiable sup
port for the empress at the end would seem to indicate that one of my earlier
suggestions remains valid.
The source of her legitimacy was personal, not norm
ative, and her occupancy of the throne was an aberration accepted partially be
cause it was seen to be temporary.
The level of her performance was, therefore,
subject to a scrutiny more rigorous than might be the case early in more con
ventional dynasties, and only while she continued to fulfill successfully the
well-defined role of emperorlO were her claims actually to be emperor accepted.
In sum, Wu Tse-t'ien was emperor by sufferance, her authority deriving not
from ritual abdication and, therefore, not in the fullest sense from Heaven.
Undoubtedly certain of her ministers continued to regard her as a usurper or,
In these circumstances she needed to
at best, as a self-proclaimed regent.
constantly demonstrate that the "young prince" was not ready for rule, or that
she was more capable than he and was preserving rather than changing his herit
age, or both.
In these circumstances there also existed ample precedent for
ministers, or for the young prince himself, to decide that the regency should
be brought to an end.
What the de facto ruler in this situation might consider
treason, could be regarded from the opposite perspective as an act of Confucian
loyalty and, indeed, of ministerial duty.
The history of the Chou may perhaps be more readily understood against this
background.
In spite of its short duration, the Chou might be divided for analytical put—
poses into four stages which seem to conform, admittedly with some artificiality,
to the traditional rhythm of the dynastic cycle.
The division between these
periods is not always clearcut, but certain turning points may be identified
and, using this form of analysis, we might posit that the first five years made
up the great days of the dynasty.
In this period the state was prosperous, ex
pansive and confident, and the court was characterized by administrative effi
ciency.
In 696, however, a downturn began, and from China's massive defeat by
the Tibetans early that year, serious problems of a financial and military nature
arose and were not arrested until late 697 with the gradual suppression of the
foreign threat and the rise to ministerial hegemony of Ti Jen-chieh.
This "dy
nastic revival" gave the Chou a second period of at least superficial prosperity,
but after Ti's death in 700 and the rise to unbridled supremacy of the Chang
faction, corruption began to run rife and a rapid decline set in which even the
removal of the empress in 705 was unable to stem.
Throughout the period, and
as counterpoints to this rhythm, there were also to be seen the general contin
uation of T'ang policies upon which I have already commented, and the gradual
decline of the empress' health and capabilities, especially in the final period
as she approached her eightieth birthday.
The Chou began, as might be expected, with several new ceremonial arrange
ments designed to emphasize the transfer of the Mandate.
These consisted chiefl
y
of such symbolic measures as the rearrangement of ancestral temples and sacri
fices,11 the changing of the banners to red, the substitution of "Wu" for "T'ang

It

ini place names and, most importantly, the transfer of the seat of government to
Loyang which had become the "Sanctified Capital" in (>Zk.
The declaration of a
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new capital was, of course, an act redolent with the traditional symbolism of
imperial prerogative, and we have seen earlier how in economic terms Loyang was
a logical capital site.12 At this time practical motives of a different sort
were also present, for it is likely that the empress was attempting to dissociate
herself from the T'ang capital and from the loyalist clans who had been drawn by
official posts to settle there.
As an extra measure of insurance, at least
100,000 households from seven ohou surrounding Ch'ang-an were resettled near
Loyang to strengthen the new center, and it is probably more than coincidence
that they were chosen from areas where the concentration of fu-ptng units was
highest.Ch'ang-an remained the western capital and was placed in the imme
diate charge of one of the Wu princes.
It is tempting also to see in this eastward shift of the capital a replication
of the pattern of the Han restoration or even to suggest that Loyang‘s Buddhist
associations and the prophecy of the commentary on the Great Cloud Sutra played
a part.
Whatever her motives, however, the empress rapidly set about turning
Loyang into a worthy rival to Ch'ang-an, beginning the huge task of walling the
city in 692,15 and continuing her earlier program of building temples, monuments
and public works.
The ming-t’ang complex became larger and more elaborate, and
in early 695 she completed the "Pivot of Heaven" (t’-ien-shu) , a pillar of iron
and bronze over a hundred feet high erected at the South Gate of the Forbidden
City to commemorate the "ten thousand virtues of the Great Chou."1° These con
structions were enormously expensive—the cost of the pillar, for instance, was
said to be beyond estimationl7—but, at the same time, their symbolic value was
great.
They constituted a demonstration of self-confidence by the empress, con
tributed to the "imperial air" {wang-ah’-i) of her capital and, in a more concrete
sense, were often measures of patronage of the type we have seen to be so im
portant

in the creation of state ideology.

I showed earlier that this was true particularly in the case of Buddhism, and
fine examples of financial patronage are found not only in the expansion of the
m'Lng-t'ang complex, but also in the fabrication of the "seven treasures" {ah'd-

paOj Sansk.

sapta ratna) in 693 after Hsiieh Huai-I presented a second sutra,
that of the "Precious Rain" {Pao-yu ohing), which reemphasized the empress' iden
tity as a cakravartTn.18 The Buddhist church was to benefit in numerous other
ways during early Chou—by gaining precedence over Taoism, encouraging the long
ban on the butchering of animals, and the stiffening of penalties for crimes
against church property--but it is a measure of the empress' experience and skill
that she did not forget Confucian sensitivities during this early period.
As we
shall soon see, her substantive concern with the linked issues of education, ex
aminations and official appointments continued to grow at least superficially,
and at the same time she distributed symbolic favors even-handedly.
It is in
teresting to note, for example, that in the same ten-day period in which she
founded the Great Cloud temples, she conferred a new honorific on Confucius, and
later in the dynasty was similarly to honor his favorite disciples.19 She mod
estly refused early requests to magnify her own titles and hesitated when it was
suggested in 691 that she perform the feng-shan sacrifices at Mount Sung in Ho
nan.20 When she eventually performed the rite in early 695» it was immediately
after carrying out the great sacrifices to Heaven and Earth at the southern sub
urb, and it was followed by the declaration of a year's freedom from the tsu tax
for the entire empirel^l

A second major way in which the empress appealed to Confucian sentiment was

130

Chapter 9

in her treatment of the few surviving members of the T'ang clan.
There were
well-established precedents, though too often honored in the breach, whereby a
former imperial house was permitted by its successor to exist in dignity, though
usually under surveillance.
In the early Chou Jui-tsung and his immediate fam
ily seem to have lived under virtual house arrest,22 but as early as 691 the em
press began to confer princely rank on her grandsons, beginning with the sons of
the former Crown Prince Hsien and later extending the privilege to the five sons
of Jui-tsung.23 Because various members of the Wu clan also bore princely rank,
this created a situation unprecedented at least since the Sui reunification but,
considering the strength of T'ang loyal ism, it was clearly a politic move to per
mit the coexistence of two "imperial" clans.
In measures like these it seems clear that the empress was concerned early in
the new reign principally to reinforce her credentials to rule, and that she not
only made provision for her own support and security, but was careful simultan
eously to balance measures which emphasized dynastic change with others which
could be construed as indications that the change was not necessarily permanent.
Her purpose, of course, was to broaden her appeal to those literati who might
be willing to serve the Chou in the belief that they were protecting the T'ang
heritage.
As a further enticement, she moved very quickly to alleviate the
terror which had been the greatest source of bureaucratic alienation since its
initiation in 681f.
The Chou, for instance, was scarcely six months old when Chou Hsing, the lead
er of the so-called evil officials, was charged with treason, found guilty and
murdered on the road to exile.24 According to one source, he had been responsi
ble for several thousand deaths,25 and though we might expect a certain exaggera
tion in the figure, it does not seem unreasonable when we consider that an up
right censor, permitted to investigate in mid-692, found him responsible for no
fewer than 850 miscarriages of justice.26 The empress, of course, had been long
aware of this danger, but prior to the usurpation had shown little scruple about
using it to her advantage.
Now, however, while she permitted Lai Chun-ch'en to
take over Chou Hsing's apparatus of denunciation and punishment, she responded
to criticism of her harshness by the appointment of good and courageous Judicial
officers to balance the bad, and by herself taking a personal interest in im
portant cases.
fiost famous of the good censors was Hsu Yu-kung, a man she appointed in spite
of his fearful refusals of office immediately after the dynastic change,27 and
she soon added to the censorate men like Yen Shan-ssu, Chu Ching-tse, and Chou
Chu2o who spoke with such conviction against the system of delation that after
mid-691, the Comprehensive Mirror reports, punishments began to diminish.29
|n
that same year, when Lai accused seven high officials of rebellious conspiracy
and managed to extract false confessions from them, the empress listened to the
plea of a ten-year-old boy and then released them from prison to conduct their
defense before her and prove themselves innocent.30
The question which must be asked here is why the empress permitted Lai Ch'unch en to remain in office and continue his activities after his dishonesty had
been exposed.
Several conjectures were earlier offered about the reasons for
her initiation of and support for the terror in general, and so long as a woman
occupied the throne most of these remained valid.
At this time, however, a more
concrete reason existed in the appearance in late

69I

of a campaign advocating

131

The Chou dynasty

31

the establishment of Wu Ch'eng-ssu as crown prince.
Initially the empress was
cool to the proposal, but seems at the same time to have flirted briefly with
the idea, since she permitted open representations in its favor to be made, and
when the expected storm of ministerial opposition arose, Ch'eng-ssu allied him
self with Lai to eliminate the most inflexible of his opponents.
In subsequent
months several "plots" were discovered, and numerous officials were exiled or
executed.
It is all too likely that the empress was not really deceived and
permitted the destruction of so many persons principally to reduce the influence
of T'ang loyal ism and to see whether the court could be intimidated into the sup
port of Wu claims.
She was conscious, however, that she could not go too far,
and so balanced the influence of the Lai-Wu faction by conferring virtual in
vulnerability on their most prominent enemy, Li Chao-te.
Chao-te was a ming-ah-Lng graduate from a family of officeholders who was vice
president of the Secretariat in 691.
An uncompromising and outspoken Confucian
even when in office and hence unpopular with his colleagues, he nevertheless
survived as paramount minister for two years from the time of his elevation to
tsai-hsiang status in mid-692.32 He was strongly opposed to a Wu succession,
and shortly after the matter arose he told the empress that "from ancient times
I have never heard that a nephew became Son of Heaven and [then] set up ancestral
temples for his aunt.
Your Majesty, moreover, received the guardianship {ku-

t'o) [of the empire] from Kao-tsung and if you give it to Ch'eng-ssu, then he
will be without ancestral sacrif ices1"33 A few months later the empress accepted
his argument that Ch'eng-ssu was a threat to her own power, and she abruptly dis
missed her nephew along with his relatives and supporters from their high posts,
necessitating the governmental reorganization which left Li Chao-te and his ad
herents supreme.3^ Wu Ch'eng-ssu was never again to hold tsai-hs-iang status
except f,or one month in 697His fall illustrates one of the most remarkable of
the differences between Wu Tse-t'ien and other female powerholders in China.
Although she frequently appointed Wu princes to positions of command in expedi
tionary armies and the Yu-1 in Guard, she cannot be said to have used male rela
tives in other ways to underwrite her political power.35

The career of Li Chao-te served the empress' purposes even with its unhappy
end.
During early Chou Li served as a vigilant counteracting force to Lai Ch'unch'en, curbing Lai's excesses and even frustrating his attempts to marry into
the great northeastern aristocracy,36 but the empress also clearly saw that Li's
role could last no longer than Lai's. When Lai was exiled for corruption in late
69^, she acted simultaneously on complaints about Li's excessive power and arbi
trary nature to also send him from the capital,37 and in 697 she had both men
executed on the same day even though Li was probably innocent of any capital
crime.3° Because Li Chao-te was also the most prominent defender of T'ang in
terests during the succession dispute, his fate shows how the empress could
manipulate the court factions to simultaneously keep both her own and the T'ang
restorationist partisans from dominance over the throne.
Li Chao-te's victory in expelling the Wu clan from their powerful positions
in 692 was a real one, and there are Indications that the empress feared that
it would lead the court to regard the succession as settled and so deprive her
of a valuable political weapon. Thus she began the year 693 with a magnificent
ceremonial which was remarkable not so much because she personally composed the
music for the 900 dancers, but because she chose her two nephews to make the
secondary offerings, excluding Jui-tsung from the proceedings.39 Shortly there
after she secretly had Jui-tsung's two favorite consorts executed on charges of
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sorcery laid by a slave girl.
Jui-tsung was either too cowardly or too diplo
matic even to raise the matter, but since one of the consorts was the mother of
the future emperor Hs'uan-tsung, the incident undoubtedly had its effect on his
later attitude toward his grandmother.^0 As heir apparent, Jui-tsung was in the
delicate position of being the most likely focus of any restoration plot, and
the empress seems to have deliberately emphasized the insecurity of his position
two months later when she first changed the princely titles of his five sons,
and then publicly executed two officials who had paid him a secret visit.On
this occasion he himself was denounced as a traitor, and for a brief period the
T'ang family's prospects hung by a very thin thread.
He was saved, however,
when one of his retainers, while being interrogated by Lai Chun-ch'en, attempted
to cut out his own heart to show his master's loyalty.
The empress is said to
have sighed at her inability to know her own son when she heard of it and halted
the proceedings so that, as the Conrprehens'lve Mirror remarks, "Jui-tsung, from ,
this [time] was safe (te-mien)The empress seems at this time to have de-\
cided definitively in favor of a Li succession, and she did not allow any fur
ther discussion of the matter until
considered.

698

when Chung-tsung's appointment was being

I suggested earlier an element of artificiality in the succession dispute,
contending that the empress' attitude was determined not by any serious intent
to have a nephew succeed her, but rather by her desire to attain certain politi
cal ends.
Among these the most important was undoubtedly the continued expansion
of imperial prerogatives at the expense of those of the tsai-hsiang group.
This
becomes abundantly clear when we place the succession dispute within the context
of other measures more overtly directed toward the same purpose.
Scholars have for some time recognized that during Sui and early T'ang a key
problem for the imperial house was the reduction of the pretensions and the ac
tual power of the great houses whose members had not only monopolized govern
mental authority but had also so often usurped the throne during the period of
disunion.
An earlier chapter discussed at length some of the ramifications of
this problem and showed that the T'ang solution lay essentially in the dilution
of the power of the great clans through the "bureaucratization" of status.
T'ai-tsung, as we have seen, attempted to establish the principle that status
was dependent upon service to the T'ang, and as a result he could attract to the
highest posts in his bureaucracy men of aristocratic or at least officeholding
background.
Particularly in the case of his tsai-hsiang, men of proud genealogy
were predominant, but because of his unique talents, the collegial-style gov
ernment which marked most of his reign was highly successful.
T'ai-tsung was
a big enough man to coopt the best of the well-born of his generation.
Inevi
tably, however, the chief ministers developed a sense of initiative and group
consciousness which T'ai-tsung's successors, Kao-tsung and Empress Wu, seem to
have regarded as highly dangerous and, as suggested earlier, the united opposi
tion of the tsai-hsiang to her rise led to the destruction of their leadership
and a period of over two decades when they were regarded by the throne as rivals
rather than partners in government.
Only in the last years of Kao-tsung, and
under P'ei Yen's competent leadership,^3 did signs of collegiality begin to
reappear.
It seems possible that had Chung-tsung supported the aspirations of
this group and allied himself with it against his mother, he might have avoided
deposition.
Instead he alienated P'ei Yen by threatening to continue, in the
persons of himself and his wife, the pattern of emperor-consort family government.
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and thus threw the tsai-hsiang into the arms of the empress during her seizure
of power in 68A.
P'ei's role in Chung-tsung's deposition was viewed by the em
press as having the unwelcome effect of reinforcing the prestige and ambitions
of the chief ministers and, as already suggested, this may have played a role
in P'ei's downfall.
His successor as paramount minister, Liu Wei-chih, perished
in 687 largely because he fought the empress' assertion of imperial over minis
terial prerogatives.^^ Until the rise of Li Chao-te in the early 690s and Ti
Jen-chieh in the late 690s, no dominant personality rose from among the tsathsiang. The tenuous nature of the empress' legitimacy required that this be
the case.

The manner in which the empress weakened ministerial power was not original
nor, indeed, did it create an irreversible trend, for Hslian-tsung's government,
at least in its early years, bore greater resemblance to that of T'ai-tsung
than to that of the empress.^5 This is just one more example of the general
lack of innovation during Chou mentioned earlier. The insecurity of the em
press' legitimacy dictated that she work as closely as possible within the
traditional framework.
Despite occasional appearances of fundamental reform,
she changed only the de facto balance of power at the top, and when her two im
mediate successors proved unable to fill her shoes, the status guo ante of T'aitsung's time reappeared. The Neit T'ang History "Judgment" quoted earlier dem
onstrates that her methods did not go unnoticed by the dynastic historians.
Her chief tactic was the manner in which she used her unquestioned right of
appointment and dismissal. To begin with, she expanded the number of ministers
holding tsai-hsiang status while at the same time shortening their tenure.
Thus
we find that in the late 690s as many as sixteen men held the rank, compared to
a previous high of ten^S and a much lower average. The highest estimate for
T'ai-tsung's reign is twenty-nine tsai-hsiang in twenty-one years while the cor
responding figure for the years 68A-705 is sixty-six.^8 Under T'ai-tsung, the
average tenure was seven years and under the empress, just over two.
This con
trast is suggestive, of course, of two highly different political styles, and
it seems no accident that factionalism was a much more pronounced phenomenon in
the Chou.
During the Chou only a tiny proportion of ministers reached tsai-hsiang rank
before the age of sixty and that even then ministers were shifted with such
frequency that consolidation and entrenchment were impossible.
Lou Shih-te,
whose career was otherwise remarkable for lengthy tenure in high posts without
demotion,^7 held four different positions and was four times sent away from the
capital on military duty during his six years as tsai-hsiang.
Even Ti Jen-chieh,
who enjoyed the fullest trust of the empress, held no fewer than seven different
positions during his three years as tsai-hsiang\
Furthermore, a fairly large
number of such appointments were preceded by such terms as "provisional" or
"acting" {chien-ohiao^ shih
so that appointees were openly made con
scious of a certain instability in regard to their tenure or qualifications.
An astounding eighty percent of the Chou tsai-hsiang suffered dismissal, some
to exile or death and others simply to a lower post.
For the reign of T'aitsung, the corresponding figure is thirty-three percent.^9
It is interesting
to note that among the early writings of the perspicacious historian Liu Chihchi is a fu of 695 which warns of the dangers of aspiring to high office.
He
entitled it, "Think Carefully" {Ssu-ohen fu)

The overlap of function and responsibility inherent in the role of the
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tsai-hsiang could be exploited by the empress to foster dissension and rivalry.
She did this by simultaneous, and sometimes also parallel, appointment of po
litical enemies.
Ti Jen-chieh, for instance, was the first elevated to tsa-ihsi-ang on the same day as Wu Yu-ning, and when Ti became Chancellery president
in mid-698, Wu San-ssu was made his opposite number in the Secretariat.
Im
perial relatives, sycophants, and the occasional mystic expert only in Taoist
magical practices^l were seldom to have lengthy tenure, but they were often
appointed simply to balance the opinions of their better qualified colleagues.
Their very appointment tended to devalue tsai-hsiang status and, by contrast,
to elevate the imperial institution.
Other traditional control methods were directed to the same end.
Special
rewards, usually in the form of personal commendations, silks or official rank
for the recipient's sons were conferred in ways that would remind ministers
that distinction was earned not merely by passing an examination or gaining high
office, but by pleasing the ruler while in office.
The empress used ministerial
remonstrance, something for which she is often praised,52 to encourage criticism
directed against her as a person, and discourage attempts to limit the scope of
imperial power.
She permitted ministers to openly ridicule her fondness for
auspicious omens or her penchant for making excessive numbers of appointments,53
but at the same time she discouraged the use of arguments based on precedent in
memorials to her, lest such precedents limit her prerogatives.
She also punished
participants in unseemly quarrels which occurred in the imperial presence.5^
Certain questions, like the succession or the role of her favorites, she re
garded as “household matters" and throughout the Chou refused to permit minis
ters to raise them, often on pain of death.55 This, of course, made nonsense
of the ancient tsai-hsiang claim of omnicompetence, but skillfully preserved
the appearance of free discussion in the court and undoubtedly enhanced the em
press' popularity among those too far removed to perceive the reality.
Finally, there were times during Chou when the empress simply excluded the

tsai-hsiang from her counsel, preferring to seek advice from outside their cir
cle.
Early in the dynasty her chief alternative seems to have been a group of
non-official advisers, popularly called the “North Gate Scholars" {pei-men
hsueh-shih).
Often considered the predecessors of the Hanlin Academy,56 these
men are first mentioned as a group in the year 67^, when Ssu-ma Kuang tells us
that they began not only to compile the literary works later ascribed to the
empress but were “secretly ordered to participate in decisions in order to di
vide the power of the tsai-hsiang."^"^
It is difficult to know how extensively
their services were used, though the empress did turn to them, for instance,
when her regular ministers balked at the grandiose nature of her ming-t'ang
plans, and she had the group's leader, Liu Wei-chih, second P'ei Yen in recom
mending Chung-tsung's depositlon.58 The standard sources make little mention
of them during the Chou, and perhaps because many entered the regular bureauc
racy, their coherence as a group was destroyed by then.
It is also possible
that the empress found less use for them as she turned more to her own family
and favorites, some of whom she realized were not without talent.
Wu San-ssu,
for instance, came almost to monopolize capital architectural projects, and the
Princess T'ai-p'ing and Shang-kuan Wan-erh seem to have served as confidantes
and secret advisers.59
In the last years of the dynasty the Chang brothers and
their many hangers-on played a similar role, enjoying privileged access to the
empress and sometimes refusing access to her even to the tsai-hsiang\
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It is important, as we view this process, to recognize two things.
First,
the empress enjoyed only a partial success in reducing the prerogatives of her
ministers and was forced on occasion to accept defeat in matters as trivial as
the curbing of her extravagance and as fundamental as her ultimate admission
that the succession concerned not just her household but the entire empire.®^
Second, although the bureaucracy was progressively
the top, it continued to expand and develop in the
As
into and promotion within it were facilitated.
sphere of bureaucratic activity tended to slip out

weakened and restricted at
lower levels as both entry
a consequence, an ever-larger
from under imperial control.

Early in 692, for instance, when the empress appointed to lower capital po
sitions a large number of provincials recommended by special commissioners and
did so "without inquiring [whether they were] worthy or stupid," there was a
common saying to the effect that even sawyers and pottery menders had become
officials.6l
In 695 Liu Chih-chi pointed out in a much admired memorial that
the empress' yearly Acts of Grace conferred so many promotions and honorific
ranks that official robes and insignia were encountered everywhere.
He com
pared her "excessive" appointments to gravel in need of sifting.^2
Without exact figures it is difficult to estimate, except in this impression
istic sense, how greatly the bureaucracy expanded during the Chou, and the task
is made even more difficult by the fact that the new men seem to have been ab
sorbed either into nominally menial jobs or through auxiliary appointments,
rather than through the creation of new posit ions.^3 But for our present pur
pose it is perhaps sufficient to demonstrate the existence of the trend.
The
Chou bureaucracy may not have been characterized by quality below the fifth
rank, but it was opening a way to genuine social mobility.
Its lower ranks con
stituted a huge pool from which those who showed ability might be drawn out and
elevated to the charmed circle of fifth-rank officialdom.
For approximately
one-fifth of the Empress Wu's tsai-hsiang, we have no information whatever on
their antecedents or previous careers, a fact which suggests that men of obscure
origin were at last reaching the highest posts and that at least some succeeded
in doing so even without formal examination.
The pressure from below which this phenomenon brought to bear upon those al
ready occupying high posts helps to explain, for instance, why the coup which
deposed the empress was the work exclusively of high officials, and it also
helps to explain why the Chou saw no further attack on the great aristoc
racy in the form of clan lists or marriage bans.
Such measures were no longer
needed.
If the tsai-hsicmg group in the Chou constituted a representative
sample, it seems clear that the scions of the great clans were coming to define
their status in bureaucratized terms by writing examinations and accepting cap
ital positions but, at the same time, were able to control only a small propor
tion of the most pivotal offices.6A
in other words, even if they continued to
fight for their own interests, they now did so on a field chosen by the throne
and which undermined their old regional power bases.
Little attempt seems to
have been made to balance appointments on a regional basis, and this would sug
gest that the great aristocracy was coalescing into a more coherent, less divided
interest group.
Subject to pressures both from above and below in their bur
eaucratic role, the great clans were clearly on the defensive during the Chou
and sought more to maintain than to advance their positions.
They were by no
means impotent and revived under Hsuan-tsung,^5 but by the eighth century power
struggles had become more internalized than before, and the throne now played
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a more powerful role thanks to the work of the Empress Wu.
One more consequence of the widening of the road to office was the extremely
high quality of those officials who reached the top.
The traditional historians
who so frequently criticize the empress are also consistent in their admission
that her abilities were great enough to attract into her service men like Ti
Jen-chleh, Li Chao-te, Hsu Yu-kung, Wei Yuan-chung, and many others whose tal
ents were hardly inferior to the ministers who had surrounded T'ai-tsung.
Ssuma Kuang, summarizing earlier views found in the dynastic histories, says that
although the empress made too many appointments, she rapidly dismissed or exe
cuted the incompetents, and that because of her decisiveness and her abilities
to use reward and punishment and to recognize talent, "the brilliant and worthy
of the time were all in rivalry to be employed by her."®° This is undoubtedly
true, but surely it was also the case that these talented men recognized the
validity and the value of many of her wider aims and desired to contribute to
their achievement.
Perhaps the strongest indication that this was so is that the political un
certainty, factionalism, and the continued existence of the terror of early Chou
could not undermine its efficient if unambitious administration.
The sharpest
contemporary criticism of the government, as we have seen, centered upon exces
sive number of punishments and appointments.
There were no signs of unrest out
side the capital.
Corruption, even when it involved the empress' closest
supporters, was dealt with swiftly.^7 For reasons to bementioned shortly, a
demographic shift was beginning
to come to the notice of the court, and in this
period attempts were made to tighten the census procedure and to create new ad
ministrative units to deal with
the growth of population in the Yangtze valley.^®
Both the Boards of Civil Office
and of War were expanded, presumably to keep
pace with their work load, and decree examinations were held, sometimes at the
rate of two a year.69 We find little evidence anywhere of maladministration
but rather that "the minds of the people were made up [in the empress' favor]."70
Another sign of her self-confidence was the creation of the Record of Current
Potittos (Shih-oheng chi) which recorded her every pronouncement and sent it
monthly to the History Office.71
The Chou suffered no setback in foreign affairs until 696 and, indeed, China's
prestige among its neighbors seemed to rival its mid-century height.
Tribute
missions appeared from Central Asia, India and Indochina, a new king was in
vested in Si 11a in 693.72 and by 696 over 1,000,000 foreigners had sought and
been granted permission to settle within the empire.
The largest group to enter
were 670,000 Western Turks of the Shih-hslng tribe, and large numbers of Ch'iang
and Man tribesmen were also incorporated.73
In December of 692 two of the
finest generals of their age, Wang Hsiao-chieh and T'ang Hsiu-ching,7^ who had
earlier persuaded the empress that the time was ripe for the recovery of the
Four Garrisons, inflicted heavy defeats on the Tibetans and reestablished the
An-hsi protectorate at Kucha for the first time in twenty-two years.
It is in
teresting to note that the empress seems not to have regarded this as expansion
ism, for on being informed of the victory, she remarked that the old borders of
the ohen-kuan era [627~650] had been restored completely and now were quiet.75
The frontier remained peaceful until early 6Sk when the Eastern Turks found
themselves a brilliant if erratic leader in the new khan, Mo-ch'o (Qapagan),
who soon dominated much of Central Asia and became the most formidable enemy of
the Chou.76 He wasted no time in testing China's border defenses but Chinese
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arms, even when led by Hsueh Huai-i or one of the Wu princes, were still formid
able.
These early raids were sporadic and brought Mo-ch'o so little profit that
he soon asked to submit, and in the winter of 695 he was permitted to do so with
a generalship and a ducal title.77
Mo-ch'o's submission was in a sense the high-water mark of the Chou.
It was
the last foreign policy success the dynasty was to enjoy for quite some time and,
moreover, was symbolic of the success of the policy of buying acceptance through
growth of rewards which had characterized domestic administration and, with the
single exception of the Four Garrisons, foreign affairs also.
In the widest
sense, the aim of this policy for the empress was to secure her legitimation,
permitting prosperity and inertia to do their work of reconciling bureaucrat
and commoner to the unprecedented rule of a female emperor.
This policy was,
however, costly.
Bureaucratic expansion, public works and patronage of Buddhism
accounted for much of the budgetary increase, but defense costs also mounted
rapidly as some of China's neighbors began to take advantage of internal dis
sension.
The empress had been successful in augmenting the fu-ptng system and
in the establishment of some new garrisons, especially in the South,7° but it
rapidly became evident that the demands on the state treasury were simply too
great.
Thus as early as mid-694 the empress had tried to assess her officials
the equivalent of two months' salary to support the military, but had been
forced to withdraw the assessment in the face of general opposition.79
In the
same month, the growing shortage of metal was demonstrated when farm implements
had to be melted down for the construction of the t'ten-shu.^^
At about the same time, officials began to identify still other causes of the
financial problem, foremost among them the failure of earlier attempts to tighten
census registration.
In 695 Li Chiao, a censor of distinguished lineage, a ahinshih graduate and a man of recognized literary talent, drew attention to the
growing number of vagrant households, a problem which he asserted had existed
He did not directly blame the central government for the
for some years.®1
phenomenon but rather the indifference of local officials who were lax about
identity cards {ahien-oh'a), and he pointed out the futility of recent attempts
to have local officials reform the situation.
He offered four solutions.
First,
the present law should be clarified and the government should show a tolerant
attitude to present offenders.
Second, a time limit of 100 days should be set,
during which the squatters could give themselves up and opt either to remain
where they were or return to their original homes.
Third, in either case they
were to receive amnesty and financial aid to get a new start.
Fourth, the whole
reform should be supervised by special censors sent out from the capital.
The empress is said to have approved this plan and actually to have appointed
the censors before she was forced to shelve it because of ministerial objections
whose grounds we are not given.There is evidence from Tunhuang that a similar
plan was implemented about 702-3, but its effect could not have been great since
Hs'uan-tsung faced the problem in greatly magnified form early in his reign.°3
It seems likely rather that the Chou continued to suffer from the problems Li
Chiao connected with the vagrants—tax evasion, local conflicts, and the toorapid growth of urban population—but that they were not viewed as serious
enough to require a concerted effort at reform.
These first signs of economic strain, followed by two successive political
defeats, coincided for the empress with the severe personal disappointment and
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weakening of prestige caused by Hsueh Huai-i's burning of the ming-t'ang complex
in early 695We have already noted how this event led to a shift in her ideo
logical priorities from Buddhism to Confucianism, particularly in symbolic
terms.Moreover, it seems to have fostered an atmosphere of freer speech at
the court.
Frank criticism of her plans to rebuild the mCng-t'ang^^ were voiced
as well as complaints, already noted, about excessive appointments and rewards
and lax provincial administration.
The empress' response varied:
she agreed to build a smaller version of the
rid herself of Hsueh Huai-i and other favorites®^ and, toward the

ming-t’ang3

end of the year, abolished the principle of anonymity {hu-ming) she had herself
introduced into the examinations, probably in 690.®7 While her reasons for this
are not altogether clear, it seems likely that such a measure would have appealed
to those already in office who would now find it easier to help their friends
and relatives gain entry into the bureaucracy.
Although her response to the
problem of vagrancy was a positive one, it seems that in these other areas she
continued to rely on palliatives rather than take the positive steps which might
have jeopardized her popularity. As we have seen, and in spite of the fiscal
problems so evident in 695 when she offered the feng-shan sacrifice at Mount
Sung, at the end of that year she declared an empire-wide holiday from that
year's tsu tax!°°
What impact this might have had we are not told, for domestic problems were
soon overshadowed by the renewal of the foreign threat with the massive defeat
sustained by the hitherto invincible Wang Hsiao-chieh and his deputy, Lou Shihte, at the hands of the Tibetans in April 696.®® The underlying causes of this
defeat are hard to identify since the sources provide no more than the briefest
outline of events among the Tibetans since the accession of the young btsan-po
in 679From what we can gather, the young ruler had initially lacked the
strength to wrest state control from the mGar clan who had been in power since
his grandfather's time.
It was a member of this clan, Lun Ch'in-ling, who was
responsible for the victory.90 Shocked by her first defeat during the Chou,
and with the Tibetans only a hundred miles from Ch'ang-an, the empress had no
time for retaliation before a new threat arose on her northern flank.
This was
the great Khitan rebellion which broke out in early summer.
This event seems to have been totally unexpected.
The Khitans had been
quiescent since 648 when T'al-tsung had incorporated them into the Ying-chou
tu-tu-fu^'^ under which they had come to enjoy a good deal of self-government.
The two rebel leaders Li Chin-chung and Sun Wan-jung had risen to high admin
istrative posts there but, as was sometimes the case, the Khitans had not been
fortunate in the Chinese officials placed over them, and the current governorgeneral seems to have been a hard and self-willed man who not only treated the
chieftains like slaves but had refused relief during a recent famine.92 This is
usually given as the immediate cause of the rebellion, but the dissatisfaction
with Chinese rule may have run deeper, since within a week Li and Sun had thou
sands of rebels under arms.
Since the Khitans were a relatively sophisticated
enemy and already lived inside the Wall, official response was both swift and
in earnest.
Twenty-eight generals at the head of an unspecified force were
sent against them, but in the first major battle, near present-day Peking, the
imperial troops were almost annihilated.
The disaster was compounded when the
Khitans used captured Chinese seals to forge orders which led the relief force
into an ambush.93
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In what was admittedly a desperate situation the empress initially over
reacted.
She made an unprecedented offer of official rewards to criminals and
private slaves who would enroll in the army,9^ she quickly began to transfer all
the troops from the Northwest as well as from Huai-nan and Shan-nan to Yu-chou,
and ordered the latter to make the 4,000-H march in a hundred days!
Even the
grain transport ships from the Yangtze valley were to be diverted and continue
with their present crews to the front.95 Critics at court objected to all of
this, and it is difficult to tell how many of these measures could be carried
out, for in the same month, June 696, Mo-ch'o's Turks drove into Liang-chou,
and the Tibetans, still in Lung-hsi, threatened to advance unless Chinese forces
were withdrawn from the Four Garrisons.96 Though now beset on three sides, the
empress recovered from her initial panic, and decided to rely upon the calm ex
pertise of officials like Kuo Yuan-chen and Ch'en Tzu-ang who had firsthand
experience of the frontiers.97 These men rapidly evolved a series of policies
which were ultimately to prove successful.
Turning first to the Tibetans, and acting on Kuo's perception of serious
rivalry between the ruler and Lun Ch'in-ling, the empress immediately sent en
voys to parley about a marriage alliance and an exchange of territory, but with
secret instructions to exploit the factional rivalry.9B Ch'en Tzu-ang had con
sidered the Turks and Tibetans to be a greater threat than the Khitans and, act
ing on his advice, the empress turned next to Mo-ch'o.
Fortunately for her, the
Turk had already revealed the nature of his ambitions, requesting not only that
the Turks settled inside the Wall be returned to him, but also that the empress
adopt him as a son and arrange an imperial marriage for his daughter.99 Knowing,
therefore, tht he had designs on the Chinese throne, the empress was able to
temporize while still encouraging his hopes, and to this end she promised to
consider his requests while meanwhile confirming him as khan and appointing him
an imperial general.
These marks of favor coincided with the death of the Khitan leader Li Chinchung, and Mo-ch'o seized the opportunity to attack the unprotected Khitan base
and capture the families of the absent leaders, as a result of which he was
granted still more distinctions from the empress.|t may be that the Turk
had his own interests at heart in this attack on a rival foreign power but,
whatever his motives, he substantially weakened the Khitans who now had no op
tion but to advance further south, and they rapidly reached Wel-chou, less than
two hundred miles from Loyang.
Here they halted for the winter, providing the
empress with a breathing space but ominous news soon arrived that the Khitans
were seeking local support for her deposition and the restoration of Chungtsung.
The year 697 opened gloomily.
Mo-ch'o had become impatient, and he began
once more to plunder the border prefectures.
At the same time, a well-connected
prefect named Liu Ssu-li was persuaded by a fortuneteller that he possessed
signs of greatness, and he rapidly began to form a party at court to help him
seize the throne.
The conspiracy seems to have been well advanced by the time
it came to the ears of Lai Chiin-ch'en who saw in it a chance to regain his lost
favor and reported it immediately by the special (shang-pi-en) procedure to the
empress.
Not fully trusting Lai, she put the investigation in the hands of a
grandnephew, Wu l-tsung, but he soon proved to be fully as unscrupulous as Liu,
forcing the guilty Liu to implicate many innocents, in all probability those
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most opposed to the Wu interests.
In all, we are told, thirty-six families,
"all distinguished shih of the empire," and over a thousand of their adherents
and relatives suffered the penalties of exile or death in this final purge.
It also brought Lai back to power, and although the empress used her typical
ploy and elevated his enemy Chi Hsii at the same time,^®3 Lai's power was great
enough to again create a climate of fear and dread in the court, and once again
to raise questions about the succession.
The atmosphere of the court was becoming even more confused just then because
of the meteoric rise of two unknowns, the half-brothers Chang, l-chih and Ch'angtsung.^^^ These young men, probably only in their twenties at
the time, were
the grandsons of a distinguished minister, Chang Hsing-ch'eng, and the elder of
them had used the yi-n privilege to take up an official career.
He was also
"white of complexion, of great beauty and skilled in music and song," qualities
seemingly shared by his younger brother Ch'ang-tsung who attracted the attention
of Princess T'ai-p'ing and won her recommendation.
Taking advantage of his ac
cess to the palace to speak to the empress of his brother, he secured an intro
duction for him, and before long both were awarded high rank and showered with
brocades, horses, slaves and other gifts.
In the popular literature of later
times and, indeed, even at the time, the rise of the brothers was attributed to
a sexual liaison with the empress,yet the standard sources not only portray
them as somewhat effeminate but specifically state that they were castrated
{oh'eng p'i-yang chih oh'ung). Moreover, the empress was seventy at the time,
and, although she was "skilled with cosmetics" and so able to conceal her age,^®°
it seems more likely that she favored the youths because they were diverting
company and, more particularly, because she believed that Ch'ang-tsung was the
reincarnation of the Taoist immortal Wang Tzu-chln.^®7 The empress had appar
ently begun to show the interest in personal immortality which characterized so
many rulers late in their lives.10^
Whatever the reasons for their rise, the Changs were soon the dominant per
sonalities at court, with even the various members of the Wu clan waiting at
their mansion gate and contending for the privilege of holding their bridles!l09
The Changs' relatives were also awarded gifts and honors seemingly without limit,
and life at court began to take on an almost frivolous cast.
The empress was
pondering whether to gild her nine recently cast tripods^lO even as the Khitans
smashed an army of 170,000, ki 1 led Wang Hsiao-chieh, and occupied Yu-chou with
great carnage. HI
As if this were not enough, Mo-ch'o at the same time presented what was vir
tually an ultimatum threatening rebellion unless he were awarded the entire Shanyii protectorate and unless all the Turks who had previously settled in six pre
fectures inside the Wall were returned to him.H2 jhe ensuing debate seems to
have jolted the court back to reality, and the empress inclined first to the
"hard line" of Li Chiao and T'ien Kuei-tao,H3 but was finally forced to the
side of the appeasers by the magnitude of the Khitan threat.
Thus she returned
to Mo-ch'o several thousand tents of settled Turks, along with huge bribes of
textiles, seed grain, farm implements and iron, as well as the promise of an
imperial marriage,H4 hoping this would temporarily satisfy him.
As summer ap
proached, she sent two more huge armies, one 200,000 strong, against the Khitans.
The source of these troops is unknown, but considering the enormous levies of
the past two years, these armies might be seen as one last great effort at na
tional salvation.
The overall commander was Wu l-tsung, a grandnephew of the
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empress whose military career was not a distinguished one.

^

His appointment

suggests that the troops might not have been wholly reliable and that the em
press was now more concerned with keeping close rein on the military than with
a frontier army's efficiency.
Fortunately for her, the tide now turned.
The Khitans seemed to have no ap
preciable success in winning over the Chinese in occupied areas and so sought an
alliance with Mo-ch'o, intending later to betray him.
The Turk, however, an
ticipated their bad faith by seizing their newly built storehouse and base in
Manchuria, taking all the booty they had hitherto gained.
It seems unlikely
that he planned any direct attack on the Khitans but news of his raid reached
them while they were engaged in battle with the Chinese and, fearing attack from
the rear, their Hsi allies mutinied and the rest of the army scattered.
Sun
Wan-jung was killed by his subordinates while in flight and the remnants of the
rebellious tribes joined Mo-ch'o.Thus at an enormous cost in men and money
and after the devastation of much of the Northeast, the Khitan rebellion came
to an end.
As was often the case with the empress, success brought a relaxation of the
harsher aspects of her rule.
Even as this final campaign against the Khitans
was in train, she had moved, albeit unwillingly, against Lai Chiin-ch'en and had
destroyed him before the final victory.
His fall was of his own making, for
since his return to favor he had, in open disregard of the law, denounced sev
eral high officials in order to seize their wives, concubines and possessions,
and had become ever more arrogant and unrestrained.
Either because he sought
supreme power for himself or because he was by now demented, he accused the Wu
princes and Princess T'ai-p'ing of engaging in a conspiracy with Chung-tsung
and Jui-tsung.
The princess, whose shrewdness seems almost to have matched her
mother's, responded by leading the accused in a countersuit.
Lai's rise had
been based, of course, on the fact that among his many false denunciations, he
had identified the occasional genuine plot, and on the basis of this service
to the state, the empress thought to pardon him.
Ironically, it was Chi Hsu
who had once been accused by Lai, who persuaded her otherwise and she permitted
his execution though, as we have seen, she sent his chief enemy Li Chao-te to
the same block.117 She also made her peace with Lai's faction.
The decree out
lining Lai's crimes also pardoned the many officials whom he had intimidated
into making false appointments.11^ Later that year she called together her
ministers and, explaining why she had placed such trust in Lai and in Chou
Hsing before him, acknowledged that she had been deceived and promised hence
forth to eschew such methods.119
It is impossible to gauge the sincerity of the empress' repentance, but it
is a fact that in mid-697 the terror finally came to an end.
Moreover, con
temporaries seem to have sensed the change of climate, for when Wu Ch'eng-ssu
and San-ssu renewed their succession claims early the next year, the ministers
united in opposition, showed no fear of remonstrati on, and in fact were able to
speak frankly with impunity.
Led by Ti Jen-chieh, who was henceforth to enjoy
the complete trust of the empress,1^® several went so far as to suggest the
regularization of the succession by the elevation of Chung-tsung, and Ti dis
posed of the old argument that the question was a "household matter" by pointing
out that for a ruler, all within the empire constituted his household.121
The
empress took time over her decision and, although in Ssu-ma Kuang's judgment it
was Ti who persuaded her definitively against a Wu succession,122 ironically
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enough, it was the Chang brothers who successfully urged Chung-tsung upon her. 123
It is unlikely that the initiative for this lay with them, but although they are
seldom credited with any political acumen at all, they could well have at least
recognized that their survival would depend on others once their protector died.
In the third month of 698, ostensibly for medical reasons Chung-tsung was brought
back to the capital.^^^
These events raise interesting questions about the nature of Wu Tse-t'len's
power, foremost among them perhaps the question of how important coercion was in
its maintenance. The answer seems to be that until the bureaucracy was satis
fied that the will of Kao-tsung was to be carried out and Chung-tsung was assured
succession to the throne, punishments were an integral part of the Wu regime, as
important to its survival as its state ideology or the winning of popular sup
port.
If this is so, my earlier suggestions on the highly personal nature of
the empress' legitimation are strengthened for, at the risk of repetition, it
must be pointed out that her rule had to produce divided loyalties within of
ficialdom. Though most high officials recognized that her ability exceeded that
of the rightful heir and therefore deferred to her claims, they also saw them
selves as guardians of the well-defined tradition requiring the Son of Heaven
to be a male. Thus the empress, whose whole career was in violation of this
tradition, could never be certain whether loyalty to her ability would remain
uppermost in her officials' minds.
Perhaps more than anything else, it is a
measure of the flexibility of T'ang Confucianism that compromise was possible
but, since this compromise came about only with the second decade of the empress'
de facto rule and since the compromise was essentially a Confucian victory, it
too was a measure of the strength of tradition. With the succession now regu
larized, the empress would be permitted to remain in power but only so long as
she continued successfully to fulfill the obligations of ruler.
This is not to say, however, that she became a "lame duck," a prisoner of the
upper bureaucracy, in the last years of her reign.
For instance, when Ti Jenchieh became paramount minister, she took care, as always, to balance his appoint
ment this time with a new position for Wu San-ssu.^^S She also stopped short of
proclaiming Chung-tsung as crown prince immediately and, as we shall see, she
insisted on the invulnerability of the Changs in spite of their increasingly
flagrant corruption. To increase her base of support in the lower bureaucracy,
she put Li Chiao in charge of the selection system in late 697 where he "began
the establishment of several thousand yuan-wa-i-tangand permitted the more
rapid advancement of lower officials within the bureaucracy.^^7
|n spite of
these measures, however, the effect of the terror's end and the return of Chungtsung was still enough to produce a greater spirit of cooperation between the
empress and her ministers and one which led to happy results, particularly in
foreign policy.
The defeat of the Khitans, and the necessity of placating Turks and Tibetans
to achieve it, seems to have led to the rise of a strong and articulate pacifist
party at court, and one which advocated for the first time the abandonment of
some previously gained territory.
In the winter of 697 Ti Jen-chieh put the
case for this into an erudite memoriall^S which first outlined China's natural
barriers against the foreigners, and pointed out that the wise rulers of ancient
times had recognized that conquest beyond these borders was the use of national
wealth to acquire worthless and unproductive land which would yield no revenue.
Ambitious rulers like Ch'in Shih-huang-ti and Han Wu-ti had impoverished the
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state with their expeditions.
Recently, he pointed out, successive campaigns
had eaten up huge sums of money and still continued to do so, in spite of the
fact that "in Kuan-tung there is famine, in Shu and Han [households] flee their
registration, and south of the Chiang and Huai the levies never cease, [so that]
people cannot return to their livelihood and one after another turn to banditry."
He recommended that the empress abandon her present policy and return to that of
T'ai-tsung.
For the North and West,^29 this would mean utilizing largely native
administrations, eschewing far-off garrisons and attacking foreigners only if
they rebelled. A-shih-na Hu-se-lo^50 should be made khan and placed in charge
of the Four Garrisons, while a scion of the old ruling family of Koguryb should
be given An-tung to hold.
Chinese troops should store up supplies and guard the
borders against attack while spying on potential enemies.
If the Turks and
Tibetans attacked in force they would risk defeat, and mere raids would reap
little profit.
According to the Comprehensi-ve Mirror, those conversant with foreign affairs
agreed with Ti.^^l Although the empress did not implement Ti's specific rec
ommendations, she tended during the remainder of the Chou to follow the general
policy lines he had set down. Judging from memorials which Ch'en Tzu-ang sub
mitted that year, the empress began to economize as early as 698.
She abolished
the T'ung-ch'ang army and the huge annual corvee which transported supplies to
the northwestern garrisons, and ended the levies and corvee in Chien-nan.^32
Even with Mo-ch'o, whose presence had made Ti's specific proposals impossible to
grant, the empress attempted conciliation.
Obviously seeing him as a greater
threat than the Tibetans whose invasion route she was content to garrison,'33
she abruptly agreed to a marriage alliance in the sixth month of 698, sending Wu
Yen-hsiu, the second son of Ch'eng-ssu, to marry Mo-ch'o's daughter.*3a jhe dis
patch of a prince of the blood to marry a foreign woman (rather than a Chinese
princess to marry a foreign male) was wholly unprecedented, a fact quickly pointed
out by orthodox officials. The empress quickly stilled her critics by demoting
one of them, Chang Chien-chih, to a remote southern prefecture.135 He would
return in 704 as tsai-hsiang and then take charge of the restoration coup.
The sending of a male "bride" to the Turks turned out to be a serious mis
calculation, for Mo-ch'o saw immediately that the empress had no intention of
granting his major demands and by this time he must also have realized that the
succession was to be the Li and not the Wu. Thus he pointed out to the envoy
who had accompanied Wu Yen-hsiu that he had wanted his daughter to marry into
the Li clan who had always treated his people well, and he threatened to restore
the T'ang.
In the eighth month of 698 he sent forth troops for that purpose and
achieved several rapid successes, with one of the three frontier armies upon
which he made a surprise attack submitting voluntarily and without a fight. At
the same time, he sent angry missives to the court, listing five grievances
against the empress and threatening to seize Ho-pei for himself.13o
Her response was to rouse the empire for yet another great effort, recruiting
four armies said to total 450,000 men and drawn in all probability from through
out the country.^37 Even a force of this size, however, proved unable to pin
down the mobile foreigners, and she was forced to call for even more troops.
This time the people balked.
In over a month, we are told, no more than 1,000
men responded to the call to arms,^38 and she was finally forced to play her
trump card.
In form acceding to a request from Jui-tsung, she declared Chungtsung heir apparent and two days later made him supreme commander (yuan-shuai)
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.139 The appoint
of the Ho-pei armies, supplanting her grandnephew Wu Chung-kuei.
ment of Chung-tsung was, in fact, a nominal one with Ti Jen-chieh actually fil
ling the post, but its propaganda value seems to have been great since the sources
tell us that before long 50,000 men joined the army.1^0 Ti was able to lead an
additional 100,000 men into the field, and this seems to have convinced Mo-ch'o
that the combined Chinese forces were too strong to fight and so he withdrew to
the steppes, leaving behind a death toll estimated by one source at 80,000 to
90,000 persons.1^1
His own army had swollen to 1»00,000 and as the various tribes
north of the Wall submitted to him, he briefly became the greatest power in
Central Asia, almost reconstituting the great T’u-chueh empire of the mid-sixth
century and exhibiting "a highly contemptuous attitude toward China."1^2
The empress' failure to complete the subduing of Mo-ch'o is the principal rea
son traditional historiography tends to regard the Chou as a weak dynasty, but in
retrospect this seems unfair. The Turks, after all, were driven from China and,
although Mo-ch'o was to return once more, his last raid was in no sense so seri
ous a threat as the invasion of 698.
It is unlikely, moreover, that the empress
had either the ability or the inclination to go onto the offensive. As mentioned
earlier, she faced a strong peace party at court, and she also had some doubts
about the reliability of her troops when those she did send in pursuit of Mo-ch'o
"did not dare to press [him]."1^3 She undoubtedly interpreted the reluctance of
the people to enroll in the army in 698 as a sign of their desire for rest and,
always sensitive to the popular mood, when Mo-ch'o withdrew she seems to have
decided that she would henceforth play a waiting game and use diplomacy rather
than war to deal with her enemies.
She was fortunate, therefore, when her Tibetan policy of fomenting internal
dissension at last bore fruit in the summer of 699* While Lun Ch'in-ling was
out of his capital, the young btsan-po used subterfuge to escape confinement and
struck hard at his enemy, seizing and executing 2,000 of Lun's supporters in the
capital. He then attacked and routed Lun himself.
Lun committed suicide and
his followers, including over 7,000 tents of T'u-yii-hun, sought refuge in Chi
na. 144 Perhaps in an attempt to consolidate his position, the btsan-po invaded
China the next year but was driven back when the experienced general T'ang Hsiuching bested him in six successive battles.1^5 Rather than follow up these vic
tories, the empress chose to consolidate, putting Kuo Yiian-chen in charge of
strategic Liang-chou.
During the next decade his capable administration is said
to have secured the borders, brought prosperity to the area, and won the respect
of the Tibetans.146 in 703 after yet another defeat, they resumed tribute pay
ments to China and requested a marriage all lance.147 The sources do not record
whether or not this was granted, but the accession of a seven-year-old ruler in
the following year (704) ensured that the Tibetans would pose no threat for the
remainder of the Chou.
Of Mo-ch'o little was heard in China until he again invaded early in 702. He
swept deep into Shensi and reached the empress' home prefecture of Ping-chou be
fore halting.
Chinese countermeasures were swift. The "Shan-tung Defense Army,"
made up entirely of northeastern troops had earlier been established for just
such an eventualityl^^ and, shortly thereafter, a still larger force was levied,
and nominally headed by Jui-tsung who received the title of supreme commander.
Although the Turks could not be pinned down, the rapidity of the Chinese response
seems to have impressed Mo-ch'o, and he retired without engaging in a major bat
tle.
In the sixth month of 703 he sent an envoy to request that his daughter be
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married to a son of Chung-tsung.
The sources are not specific on whether or
not his request was granted, but a marriage of some sort was certainly arranged
since Mo-ch'o sent a message of gratitude at the end of the year.^50 That he
remained active outside the Wall is evidenced by certain administrative changes
on the frontier,151 but after one more great victory at Ming-sha near Tunhuang
in
in

706, he
716.152

caused no further trouble in China.

He was assassinated by a rival

In view of these facts, the later stages of the Empress Wu's foreign policy
should be seen neither as unrealistic, overambitious, nor as a failure.
The diminution of foreign threats after 699 should perhaps have made possible
an attempt to solve some of the longstanding internal problems, but this was not
the case.
Part of the reason lies, of course, in the empress' age. Although
early in 699 she is said to have grown new eyebrows, shortly afterwards she suf
fered her first recorded illness while visiting Mount Sung, in Taoist legend the
site of a miraculous ascent to the land of the immortals by Wang Tzu-chin in
the sixth century B.C.153 Although she recovered slightly, she suffered a re
lapse the next year.
She improved again when she took an elixir of long life
fabricated by a Buddhist monk.154 Her health seems gradually to have declined
thereafter and with it her extraordinary
minish.
She may also have felt that the
was at last secure in her legitimation.
immediately after her second illness she
grandiose titles.155

administrative abilities seemed to di
time for relaxation had come, that she
Indicative of this is the fact that
divested herself of the last of her

A second reason for the administrative decline which characterized the last
years of the Chou is the death of Ti Jen-chieh in the autumn of 700. As the em
press put it, his death left the court empty156 and, though she lamented his
absence each time an important decision was called for, she was to find no one
to replace him.
It was partially for this reason that she made perhaps the worst
decision of her career, turning more and more to the Chang brothers for company
and for stimulation.
At the beginning of 699> and probably in response to complaints that the Changs
did nothing to deserve their favor, she had established for them a new institu
tion, the k'ung-hao fu or Office of the Crane. The crane, of course, was a sym
bol of longevity and the means by which Taoist immortals were conveyed to Heav
en,157 and the purpose of the office was ostensibly that of literary compilation.
Not only were a number of competent scholars appointed to it, but in 701 its mem
bers produced at least one large and important work.15°
In mid-700 its name was
changed to the feng-oh'en fu or the Office of Imperial Attendants, but by that
time it had already acquired a rather unsavory reputation as the site of evenings
of drinking, gambling, and other unseemly and undignified activities in which
the empress herself and high officials who wished to curry favor with the Changs
often participated.
Needless to say, this gave rise to scandalous rumors and,
the old T'ang History tells us, the empress went so far as to order that hand
some youths be recruited as attendants, an act which caused one official to
remonstrate:
Your Majesty has already granted intimate favor {nei-oh’ung) to Hsueh
Huai-i and to Chang l-chih and Ch'ang-tsung.
Surely this should be
enough.
Recently I heard that a head of the Servants of the Imperial
Apartments, called Liu Mu, himself claimed that his son Liang-pin was
white and pure, beautiful in beard and eyebrow. The chief administrator
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of the Gate Guard of the Left, Hou Hsiang, said that his virility {yangtao) and robustness surpassed that of Hsiieh Huai-i, and unassisted he
wanted to recommend himself as fit for membership in the Office of Im
perial Attendants.^59

It seems clear, therefore, that in the popular perception the office was viewed
as something akin to a male harem, and the empress' reputation suffered.
She is
said to have rewarded the author of the blunt memorial quoted above and remarked
that had it not been for his plain speaking, she would not have known the situa
tion existed.|n all likelihood this was true, for the empress' attraction
to the Changs seems to have been based more than anything else on their youth
and her belief that Ch'ang-tsung, whom she dressed in feathers and mounted on a
wooden crane, was the reincarnation of Wang Tzu-chin'^l and hence in possession
of the secret of longevity. When we recall that even the great T'ai-tsung, who
seems to have been far less superstitious than many of his contemporaries, was
not Immune from the lure of Immortality, her infatuation becomes more comprehen
sible.
These activities of the Changs, aside from the fact that they distracted the
empress from more important concerns and somewhat lowered her prestige, were
relatively harmless, and there is no record of Ti Jen-chieh, for instance, of
fering any protest. More harmful, however, was their growing tendency to inter
fere in politics and to indulge in corruption on a grand scale. This latter
activity became apparent almost from the beginning of their careers at court.
In fairness it must be acknowledged that the two favorites were less corrupt
than other members of their parvenu clan.
Chang Ch'ang-i, for instance, sold
posts lavishly.
On one occasion, when he forgot the given name of a client, he
had all sixty persons of the same surname on his lists appointed to office!1^2
When he and two other brothers were tried for corruption in 704, the three of
them were found guilty of accepting over A,000,000 cash in bribes, and others of
the Changs' proteges were just as bad.163
None of the Changs, it seems, possessed any degree of political talent or lit
erary ability and had been notable failures even in relatively unimportant pro
vincial appointments.16^ The old T'ang History explicitly remarks that when
Ch'ang-tsung was vice-president of the Board of Rites, he had to have documents
ghost-written for him.165
In spite of this, however, the two favorites had no
qualms about intervening in state affairs, and the empress, says one source,
often entrusted political matters to them.166 As a consequence late in 701 they
were responsible for an inner-court tragedy with wide ramifications when they
denounced Chung-tsung's son and daughter along with her husband, a Wu prince,
for criticizing the favor they enjoyed. The empress, in a burst of anger, or
dered all three to commit suicide, thus leaving Chung-tsung without an heir.
The existence of such an heir might have helped prevent the intrigue and blood
shed which marred the next two reigns.The Changs allied themselves with the
shrewd Wu San-ssu who was himself playing a double game by this time,16“ and this
formidable alliance so intimidated even the Li clan that in 701 Chung-tsung, Juitsung and T'ai-p'ing joined together in the sycophantic request that Ch'angtsung be granted princely rank!169 Most of the ministers, needless to say, now
feared to raise their voices against the favorites, with the single exception of
Wei Yuan-chung, an outspoken and upright man who had four times endured disgrace
at the hands of unworthy officials, but whose integrity and military ability had
gradually brought him to the somewhat diminished position of paramount minister
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He had twice indirectly attacked the fav

orites and now openly warned the empress against the "inferior men" {hstao-jen)
with whom she surrounded herself. The Changs accused him of treason and in 703
his trial involved much of the court.
172
The details of the trial have been recounted elsewhere,
but its outcome
illustrates how high the Changs had risen and the effect their rise had on the
court. Although in the course of the trial it became clear that Wei Yuan-chung
was innocent, and although the empress was warned that her behavior was begin
ning to cause good men to "slap their thighs at home" even though they had to
"gag their mouths at court"173 for fear of the Changs, she knowingly overrode
justice for the first time in her career, exiling Wei Yiian-chung to a low pro
vincial assignment in the Far South.
Even in the face of a concerted effort by
ministers to have the verdict reversed,174 she insisted it be carried out and
by so doing she began to convince some key people that she was no longer compe
tent to rule, and for a woman that was enough to undermine her legitimacy.
Deficiencies began to be noticed in other areas and, as problems went unsolved,
the support of various constituencies began to dissipate. The upper bureaucracy,
already somewhat alienated by her appointment policies and her support of un
worthy favorites was the first to defect. Though the empress was highly success
ful in the first years of the dynasty in minimizing high official opposition by
her patronage of Confucianism, by the late 690s it was becoming widely recognized
that her support had been more apparent than real.
In 699» for instance, one of
the grand secretaries, Wei Ssu-li,^75 memorialized on the state of education,
inspired, according to the Comprehensive Mirror by the fact that the empress often
used unscholarly {fei ju-shih) members of her own clan and relatives by marriage
for administrative and teaching positions in the imperial schools and supple
mented them with their own poorly trained students who gained their positions as
rewards for assisting her in ceremonials.176 Largely for this reason, Wei con
tended, over the last two decades the youth of the empire had come to have con
tempt for those charged with Confuclan learning and, as a result, shunned both
the schools and the doctrines they taught.
This made little difference to the
scions of powerful clans {kuei-men) who could still easily gain appointment
through favoritism, but poorer people were unable to rise and thus the bureauc
racy was becoming riddled with unworthy and Incompetent officials.
From the
time of Chung-tsung's deposition the bureaucracy had expanded rapidly, and at
the same time evil officials had risen to intimidate or execute those honest of
ficials who remained.
Corruption in the selection system and the avarice of
local officials had aggravated a bad situation. Wei's solution was to expand
the school system and order the sons of the nobility and upper classes to enroll
so as to ensure that they could use no other method to gain office. At school
they should be required to obey the rules, to venerate Confucianism, and assist
at the lectures of virtuous and erudite men. As a practical inducement to the
adoption of this plan, V^ei pointed out that it would assure a supply of highly
qualified officials at all levels, and instead of the present situation where
"more than half the empire's households have fled their registration, the tsu
and tiao [taxes] shrink, and our budget is insufficient," the state would be
prosperous and happy.^77
There is probably an element of exaggeration in Wei's argument, but evidence
from other sources tends to confirm his views on the extent of corruption in the
selection system and the declining standards of provincial administration.178
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The nature of our sources does not give us access to details of appointments to
the capital schools, but Wei is probably correctly identifying a trend since, as
we have seen, the literary emphasis in the examinations was regarded by some as
detrimental to a more substantive Confucianism, and the several "decree" examina
tions of the Chou seem also to have been literary in biasJ79
For these reasons
the last years of the empress may have seen the beginnings of a progressive fail
ure of the Confucian component of her state ideology, and although she made Wei
Ssu-li rector of the state university, the imbalance was exacerbated as she turned
more frequently to the mystical comforts of Taoism and Buddhism.
Recent scholarship has shown that quite aside from her relationship with the
Changs and her visits to Mount Sung, the empress seems to have developed a
greater interest both in Taoist festivals and literature in her last years, and
she bestowed her patronage on both.1®0 Still more conspicuous and more unpopular
with Confucians, however, were the fruits of her long support of Buddhism, a
patronage of whose dangers,I have tried to demonstrate, she was consistently
aware.
Nonetheless, by the year 700 officials could complain of how Buddhist
foundations surpassed even the imperial palaces in magnificence and of how monks
squeezed the people and disregarded their own Law.^”^
There were signs that after 700 the empress sought to compensate for her ear
lier patronage by, for example, ending the ban on butchery and attempting to tax
the clergy rather than the people at large for new images she wished to erect.1°2
These, however, were palliatives and, as we have seen, she remained intensely
Buddhistic until the end of her life. The effect of this partial withdrawal of
support may, however, have further weakened her position, by raising doubts
among the Buddhists about the reliability of her support without really appeas
ing the Confucians.
Certainly the report of a miraculous appearance by the Buddha
immediately after the ending of the butchery ban suggests an attempt by perhaps
opportunistic Buddhists to warn the empress not to abandon her Buddhist loyal
ties.^^3 Some dramatic act was necessary to restore this crumbling ideological
hybrid.
This may be why in November 701 the court returned to Ch'ang-an for the first
time in twenty years,181» and remained there for almost exactly two years. Al
though it is sometimes suggested she made the move for reasons of health, it is
far more 11kely that the empress' motives were political and ideological. Just
prior to the move, she had ordered the suicide of Chung-tsung's children, and
in that same month there had appeared the first open suggestion that she abdi
cate, in the form of a memorial from an otherwise unknown scholar, Su An-heng.
Su pointed out that she had held the empire in trust for over twenty years and
that since Chung-tsung had shown himself to be both respectful and mature, it
was time the throne be returned to him.
She had, moreover, more than twenty
grandsons who should occupy the princely ranks now held by the Wu clan, thus
ending the anomalous situation of having two imperial clans and avoiding trouble
in the future.While the empress failed to act on his suggestion, she re
warded rather than punished him, thus showing a clear recognition that his view
point was not an isolated one. The return to the T'ang capital, accompanied by
the proclamation of the new era name of oh'ang-an, was designed, therefore,
both to reduce political pressures and to show the sincerity of her Confucian
ism, for like the Duke of Chou she was preparing now to "hand over the throne
to the intelligent prince."

The Chou Dynasty

151

Although once back in Ch'ang-an the principal concern of the court was how to
deal with Mo-ch'o, the empress was also able to make some repairs in her ideolog
ical policy and to tighten the administration somewhat.
She now extended the^
examination principle to its logical conclusion by the establishment of the mil
itary examination,^®^ and she declared an absolute moratorium on punishments con
cerned with the early rebellions against her while ordering a reinvestigation of
Lai Chiin-ch'en's cases, an action which resulted in the rehabi1itation of many of
his victims.1®7 Several popular appointments including those of Li Chiao and Wei
An-shih were made, Wei Ssu-li was put in charge of the state university {kuo-tzu
chien), and a new type of censor was established.188 The order for the composition of a national history in 703^°^ was a Confucian act, and the placing of Wu
San-ssu at the head of the compilers may indicate that the empress was about to
withdraw from active life and wished to determine her place in history before
doing so.
Unfortunately, any restoration of her popularity among her ministers which
might have resulted from these measures and from the successful resolution of
the foreign problem was dissipated by her actions in the aforementioned trial
of Wei Yuan-chung, and when she returned to Loyang inmediately after the trial,
she deemed it prudent to leave her grandnephew Wu Yu-i in charge of (tiu-shou)
Ch'ang-an.^80
Back in Loyang, and with an energy and competence surprising in a beleaguered
and ailing woman nearing her eightieth birthday, the empress at last confronted
some of the long-standing problems of her dynasty.
Probably at the suggestion
of Li Chiao, who had regained tsa-i-hstang status in 703, she sent special com
missioners throughout the empire to examine the standards of provincial admin
istration on the basis of the six categories {liu-t'iao) used by the Han and
perhaps to deal directly with the vagrancy problem.^31
Shortly afterwards she
held a discussion on the problem of local administration.
Li Chiao and T'ang
Hsiu”ching argued that she was largely to blame for bad local government because
she used demotion to the provinces as a punishment for unworthy capital officials.
As a consequence, officials "all value capital posts and have contempt for pro
vincial posts." Her remedy was to take twenty experienced and able capital of
ficials and concurrently appoint them as prefects. According to Ssu-ma Kuang,
this experiment was a failure,^32 but it demonstrated the empress' consistent
concern for the people and her willingness to attempt unusual tactics to better
their lot.
It was on these grounds, too, that she was dissuaded from completing
a huge image of the Buddha in mid“70it^33 and, perhaps because of measures of this
sort, we find a good deal of evidence to suggesf that to the very end she re
tained her great popularity among the people.’®^
The same cannot be said, however, of the feelings of her bureaucrats.
though her staff increase in the second university at Loyang in early 704*35 and
the amnesty and rehabilitation of all the earlier victims of Chou Hsing and Lai
Chiin-ch'en at the beginning of 705
were undoubtedly popular, her expansion of
the number of sub-fifth-rankofficials within the bureaucracy still frustrated all
her efforts to win the united support of the higher officials. The empress had
always seen as one of her tasks the reduction of ministerial power relative to
that of the throne.
Her "excessive" appointments and rapid promotions within
the lower bureaucracy had been a useful weapon in this conflict and one which
had evoked numerous protests from high-ranking officials. With the rise of the
Changs, however, and the death of Ti Jen-chieh who seems to have served as a
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kind of buffer, there are signs that the empress finally reversed this policy.
In 701, for instance, the promotion process {k'ao) was tightened,197 Acts of
Grace, of which there had been eleven in the preceding eleven years, ceased and
when new posts were established, as in the case of the provincial censors, the
number of officials to hold them was specif led.198 At the end of 10k she abol
ished all the new posts established since 701.199
|t is unlikely that economic
motives alone were behind these decisions for she was still to suggest the erec
tion of new Buddhist images and build new palaces.Rather the policy seems
to represent an attempt, belated though it was, to woo the upper bureaucracy.
In so doing, of course, she risked the alienation of her allies below the fifth
rank, and it is perhaps because of this policy shift that she found no support
among them at the time of her deposition.
In retrospect, we may conclude that any attempt at this stage to win over her
ministers became impossible for the simple reason that they could not be recon
ciled to the role of the Changs at court. To the empress, of course, her fav
orites were a solace and a diversion, not to be taken seriously. The perspective
of her ministers, however, was different. To them the brothers were dangerous.
They had been responsible already for more than one miscarriage of justice and
for the spread of corruption and scandalous rumors which diminished the prestige
both of the empress and those whose duty it was to remonstrate with her. They
were, moreover, dangerous in a more direct way, for their party of hangers-on
was large, their association with the shrewd and ambitious Wu San-ssu was close,
and increasingly they alone determined who should have access to the empress.^®1
In the event of her sudden death, it was not impossible that they could yet over
turn the succession.
It seemed imperative to certain ministers that action be
taken quickly.
In the end, it was the continuing attempt of the empress to conciliate her
great ministers which brought about her downfall though short of returning to a
policy of terror, it is difficult to know what other course she could have taken.
In mid-70l( she permitted the trial of three lesser members of the Chang clan for
corruption and unwisely suggested that l-chih and Ch'ang-tsung be investigated
at the same time.
She was probably of the opinion that they were not directly
involved in their kinsmen's bribery and that by permitting the conviction of
lesser members of the clan, she would demonstrate her impartiality and thereby
disarm the critics of the favorites.
The tribunal found these men guilty.
It
also found that Chang Ch'ang-tsung had illegally occupied someone else's land
and imposed upon him a light fine which the empress was happy to confirm.
But
when the tribunal went further and pointed out that the law demanded he be dis
missed from all posts because of his brothers' proven crimes, she balked.
Secur
ing the agreement of one of her tsai-hsiang that Ch'ang-tsung "had meritorious
service to the state," she immediately amnestied him, and before Wei An-shih and
T'ang Hsiu-ching could complete their simultaneous investigation of l-chih she
transferred them to the provinces.^02 T'ang Hsiu"chlng was probably speaking
for all the other high officials when he secretly warned Chung-tsung before his
departure that the Changs' abuse of favor was certain to cause a revolution.203
This thought must by now have occurred both to the empress and to the Changs.
Her response was an unfortunate mixture of conciliation and overconfidence.
She appointed T'ang loyalists like Huan Yen-fan^O^ and, most notably, Chang
Chien-chih to tsa'i-hs'tang rank, and while she attempted to keep the customary
balance,205 she thus provided her enemies with a focus of leadership. The
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Changs, undoubtedly aware that in their recent crisis Wu San-ssu and his faction
had offered no support, responded by abandoning their policy of using Wu against
Li and decided instead to act on their own.
Whether or not the Changs made actual preparations to seize the throne is dif
ficult to know, but in January of 705 wall posters accusing them of conspiracy
began to appear. The empress refused to heed reports of these until on the
nineteenth of the month, specific charges of treason were laid against Ch'angtsung.206 According to his accuser, he had consulted a fortuneteller who told
him he had the physiognomy of an emperor and that if he erected a Buddhist temple
at Ting-chou, the empire would turn to him in support. This, of course, was a
capital charge and, taking no chances, the empress appointed a tribunal of three,
two of whom could be expected to vote for acquittal.207 As was also expected,
the third judge. Sung Chlng,208 dissented and as the court rallied around him,
she used her former tactic of appointing him as a provincial commissioner in
order to eliminate his opposition.
His courageous response was to point out that
such a commission was improper for one of his rank and when the empress, return
ing to her customary respect for the law, permitted him to remain in the capital,
Ch'ang-tsung's case was lost.
As Sung Ching continued to press his suit, he was joined by others, most no
tably Huan Yen-fan, and even by a genuine supporter of the empress, Ts'ui Hsuanwe1.209 Both attempted to convince her that it was in her own Interest and,
indeed, necessary for her survival to let the law take its course and, reluctant
ly, she sent Ch'ang-tsung to be tried once more by Sung Ching at the Censorate.
While the trial was still in progress, however, she changed her mind and dis
patched a messenger with an extraordinary pardon, freeing Ch'ang-tsung and thus
making him immune from further prosecution.
This act convinced the court officials that the ascendancy of the favorites
was complete and, as the empress returned to seclusion in a remote section of
the palace {oh’ang-sheng yuan) where the Changs alone were permitted to see her,
they determined to act. According to most sources, Chang Chien-chih, who was^
now tsai-hsiang and chief Imperial librarian, had determined to restore the T'ang
during his provincial exile,and now he set about recruiting a party to de
stroy the Changs by force.
Easily persuading Ts'ui Hsuan-wei and Huan Yen-fan
to join him, he added to his conspiracy the censor and pr^inent opponent of
both the Chang and Wu parties, Ching Hui,211 as well as Yiian Shu-chi who had
formerly served in Chung-tsung's household and was currently a member of Juitsung's staff.212 His presence was probably necessary to associate the princes
with the conspiracy, and it was he who gave Chung-tsung what little advance
warning of the coup he received.
All that remained now was to muster sufficient force, and Chang Chien-chih
turned naturally to the Yu-lln Guard, suborning the General of the Right, Li
To-tso, who some twenty years earlier had aided the empress in effecting Chungtsung 's deposition.
On both occasions he seems to have been motivated by con
cern for the welfare of the state.213 Chang also insinuated Huan Yen-fan, Ching
Hul and Li Chan, the son of Li l-fu, into positions of command in the Yii-lin^
Guard, almost "tipping his hand" for the Changs immediately countered by having
Wu Yu-i reappointed as general.21^ More than anything else this move demon
strates the skill of the Wu interests.
Since "several tens" of officials were
later to be disgraced as their adherents,215 the Changs might well have chosen
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another of their supporters for the post instead of a member of the Wu clan which
had already demonstrated its unreliability as an ally. The appointment smacks of
manipulation by Wu San-ssu, who had already assured his own future through a clan
destine relationship with Chung-tsung's wife and the marriage of his nephew to
the heir apparent's favorite daughter.216 In any case, Wu Yu-i seems to have
remained inactive while the coup unfolded, thereby ingratiating the Wus with the
conspirators.
Their preparations complete, the conspirators moved quickly. On the night of
February 20, 705 they gathered a force of just over 500 men at the Hsuan-wu Gate,
and sent for Chung-tsung. Although he had earlier approved the plan, Chungtsung now lost his nerve. While agreeing that the Changs should be destroyed,
he did not wish to alarm his sick mother.217 Li Chan, one of the messengers,
persuaded him that only his presence could now halt the action, and thus he agreed to accompany the conspirators to the northern gate. As soon as they caught
sight of him, however, the others smashed the gate and swept into the palace
grounds. Reaching the western pavilion where the empress slept, they ran into
the startled Changs in the courtyard and decapitated them on the spot. Awakened
by the clamor, the empress confronted the plotters, but must immediately have
recognized that the coup was a success. After addressing words of scorn to her
son and certain others of the plotters,2l8 she returned to bed, her half century
of power at an end.
The next day Chung-tsung took charge of the state and sent commissioners
through the provinces to announce the restoration. On the twenty-second of the
month he became emperor once more, though seemingly without a formal ceremony
of abdication by his mother. He granted her the title "Follower of Heaven,
Great Sage, Emperor" {Tse-t'ien ta-shen huang-ti)^^^ and transferred her to the
Shang-yang Palace west of the city where for the next year she remained an ill
but honored political spectator receiving bi-monthly homage from the court.
There is ample testimony, as mentioned earlier, that she remained popular among
the people and, it seems, even with some ministers who remained at court.220
It must have been with sardonic amusement that she saw Wu San-ssu so rapidly
maneuver himself into a commanding position in government, reenact some of her
old provisions, and render the five chief conspirators against her impotent.221
Nevertheless she was probably relieved to see the Li and Wu clans avoid strife
and instead join in close alliance to impose their will on court and empire.
On December 16, 705, as she prepared to die quietly in her bed at about the age
of eighty, she could afford to magnanimously renounce the title of emperor which
she had held so long and finally to forgive her earliest enemies, those who had
stood in her way so long ago when by becoming Kao-tsung's empress, she began
the climb which would end on heights greater than any other woman in China would
ever scale.

Chapter 10
RETROSPECT

In the highly polarized historiography concerned with the reign of the Empress
Wu there are only two areas of general agreement. Both Confucian critics and
her modern apologists see her personal achievement as an improbable one, and the
age over which she presided as one of significant historical change. Both per
ceptions are accurate but in their juxtaposition there is certain danger.^ The
temptation is great to see in her impressive strength of character the chief
cause for the social and political events of the late seventh century.
I have
tried to show, on the contrary, that Kao~tsung played a greater role than is^
generally recognized in the formation of imperial policy, and that it was while
her husband and son formally occupied the throne that the achievements of the
empress were most marked.
I have taken as a recurrent theme in this study the idea that the empress was
a woman of her times. Her social, economic and Judicial views could hardly be
termed advanced, and her politics differed from those of her predecessors chiefly
in their greater pragmatism and ruthlessness. The success of her usurpation and
the longevity of her power I have attributed largely to borrowed legitimation,
and have suggested that they were the result also of her ability to identify
herself more closely than had the rulers of Sui and early T'ang with most of her
subjects, those among whom she had been born and had spent her early life. To
this degree, at least, there is validity in the Maoist interpretation which sees
the masses as the driving force of history.
Indeed in many respects the Empress Wu behaved much like one of those sturdy,
matriarchal T'ang widows whom we encounter in the Tunhuang manuscripts. Like
them she was independent, occasionally eccentric, eager to protect her own family,
and in the end, dedicated to the preservation of her husband's property and its
inheritance by their son. And so, when all is said, we might best think of her
as "the widow. Li," protagonist of the most spectacular romance of her epoch and
also the most archetypical of the women of her time.
At a higher level we might also choose to regard the career of the Empress Wu
as a story of the attainment and maintenance of power, and of the sometimes unin
tended results of its use.
In her career we can see Illustrated the tendency of
power to seek its own maximization, and we see this tendency collide with a tra
dition of only limited flexibility. The Confucian state system denied the throne
to a woman, but was willing temporarily to compromise that prohibition.
It re
mained firm, however, in its determination that no woman should establish a dy
nasty. The manner with which the empress treated the succession question would
seem to indicate that she was fully aware of this, and when on her deathbed she
renounced her imperial title it must have been in the knowledge that history
would Judge her a usurper. Because she displays many signs of being concerned
with her .historical reputation it seems reasonable to conclude that her seizure
of the throne was not an act lightly undertaken. She was motivated perhaps not
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so inuch by raw ambition as by a perceived necessity.
History and historians have been reluctant to acknowledge this possibility,
and it goes unremarked even in modern studies.
It is for this reason that I
have made much of her service and her loyalty to the T'ang. Perhaps I have
given It undue emphasis, but the fact remains that it was in the course of her
very successful partnership with Kao-tsung that T'ai-tsung's work of consolida
tion and centralization was brought to fruition. The T'ang was thereby enabled
to embark upon a confident and expansive third generation which set it off from
all the ephemeral followers of the Han and, indeed, even from the Sui whose
rapid fall seemed to validate the preceding pattern of short dynasties. By the
time of Kao-tsung's death, and in spite of the many problems which were begin
ning to emerge, the T'ang seemed secure or, at the very least, to have won an
enduring vote of confidence from the people. The failure of Li Ching-yeh's re
volt is a strong indication that this is true, and it is important to note that
since Li claimed to be in rebellion on behalf of Kao-tsung's heirs, it was the
Empress Wu whom the people saw as the true guardian of dynastic and national
interests.
In 684, with the rebellion suppressed, the empress must have felt a certain
pride.
In less than three decades she and her husband had achieved a great
deal. They had maintained a high level of domestic peace and prosperity and
had won the allegiance or at least the acquiescence of the aloof super elite
of the Northeast. They had claimed greater successes in foreign policy than
any dynasty since the Han, and they had firmly established an appointment sys
tem perceived by the middle and lower ranks of the shth class as a way to en
hance their status and to achieve the perquisites of high office. The "Two
Sages'" state ideology had come to be accepted by most of the elite as both
viable and balanced. These policies and others like them had achieved dynastic
legitimation. By 684, the weakest points in legitimizing terms were at the
center and at the top. An ambitious consort clan like the Wei or an overpowei—
ful minister like P'ei Yen could still have undone the work of decades, and
this the empress perceived.
It was perhaps more for this reason than as a step toward eventual usurpa
tion that she took the regency in 684, and the terror which followed can be
seen as part of a much wider policy than one designed simply to eliminate bur
eaucratic opposition to her rule:
it can be seen as the essential component
of a plan to free the imperial institution from bureaucratic domination.
It
was, therefore, the logical culmination of the T'ang policy of disarming po
tential and actual rivalry to the throne by the great aristocratic clans by
inveigling them into bureaucratizing their status.
This is not
we can see the
most audacious
rather than as

to excuse the terror. By regarding it in this light, however,
proclamation of the Chou with its female founding emperor as the
way of all for the empress to test the success of T'ang policies
a sign of the megalomania of a remarkable woman.

Numerous objections can be raised to this interpretation and just as many
to my related proposition that the empress founded the Chou with every inten
tion of restoring the T'ang. The most pertinent of these objections is also
the simplest--that it is far-fetched. After all, if Wu Tse-t'ien sought simply
to create a freer and more independent monarchy, why was it necessary to found
a new dynasty when Jui-tsung had shown himself amenable to a regency of indefinite
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length? Several answers are possible, but the most convincing is to be found
in the fact that for three decades Wu Tse-t'ien had been in reality if not in
name the equal of the emperor. During that period she had come to identify the
interests of the monarchy with her own and to see that as an institution evolv
ing away from the constraints of self-seeking aristocrats (and more recently
from the factiousness of bureaucratized aristocracy), the monarchy had united^
China and had brought to its people the greatest measure of peace and prosperity
they had known since the Han.
In short, in her eyes this was the achievement
of an independent monarchy and it was also her achievement. Formal recognition
by all of a female emperor would symbolize for all time the freedom of the im
perial institution.
If the emperor could be a woman, the emperor could be and
do anything! Moreover, when we recall that she had always shown a deep faith
in the supernatural, it seems reasonable to believe that she was convinced by
the Pao-t’u and the Great Cloud Sutra that Heaven itself was demanding that she
accept the Mandate. Could it not have been that this was what made her decide
to risk the opprobrium of history?
During the Chou, continuity was the rule and the watchword. Only in her
patronage of Buddhism did the empress depart substantially from T'ang prece
dents, and even this departure may be seen as a measure to aid legitimation.
If Taoist messianism were by no means a spent force, it was less relevant in
the mid-T'ang than at the dynasty's foundation and Taoism had always been a
less effective force than Buddhism for dynastic consolidation among the people.
Real innovation and real conflict in the Chou were political and were restrict
ed chiefly to the upper bureaucracy.
It was here that the empress saw the new
rivals to absolutism and here that both her fate and her historical reputation
were determined. Chung-tsung's statement at his restoration that she had re
spected the heritage of the T'ang was probably more than filial convention.
The battles she fought against the throne's would-be limiters helped strengthen
the hands of her eighth-century T'ang successors.
There remains still the question of ultimate aim, of whether Wu Tse-t'ien at
any point contemplated the foundation of a line of Wu emperors.
I admit that
in saying she did not, I appear to stand on shaky ground. To remark that in
698 Chung-tsung's reappointment secured a T'ang restoration proves nothing, and
some might wish to read my account of the succession struggle during the Chou
in quite a different light. Were not the empress' manipulations of sons and^
nephews designed to "test the wind," and could not the novelty of her symbolism—
a new capital and a new calendar, her monuments and her palaces--be seen, as
some contemporaries saw them,as signs to be associated with the beginnings of
a dynasty whose aim was to endure the conventional ten thousand generations?
This view is tenable but I hold to my interpretation. Never during the Chou
dynasty did the succession rest with the Wu clan and, what is more, innovation
of both a symbolic and a substantive type was more marked in the six years of
the preceding regency than in the fifteen of the Chou. And, finally, it need
not follow that because the empress had a reputation for excess in her punish
ments, her spending and her pleasures, she was similarly excessive in her desire
for familial power and historical immortality as a dynastic founder. Her entire
career is a testament to her acute and seasoned understanding of the nature of
female legitimation, and in her own dynasty, as I have shown, she was always
willing to listen to those ministers like Ti Jen-chieh who reminded her of its
limitations. She owed far more to the Li clan than to the Wu and she knew also
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that, like any other woman of her time and place, it would be in the ancestral
temple of the T'ang that her sacrifices would be made.
The most I can admit is that in the heady
Cloud Sutra and all the other signs that she
the idea of an enduring Chou, but soon faced
tradition, she quickly deferred again to its

days of the Fao-t'u and the Great
was Heaven's chosen, she toyed with
with the realities of an immovable
interpreters.

The Empress Wu was in power for almost half a century, and I have mentioned
that her accomplishments were many.
In attempting to explain her successful
legitimation I have also suggested that in some respects she came to embody the
cosmopolitanism, self-confidence and eclecticism which were characteristic of
the first half of the T'ang.
In other respects she embodied the flaws of her
age, most particularly in the static, almost timeless, view she held of the
world, and consequent failure to realize and act upon the problems engendered
by the growing complexity of her society.
Chinese historians have not treated her kindly, yet her legacy was a real one.
For better or worse, she modified the relationship between the imperial family
and the greatest of the old clans, and that between the ruler and his ministers.
In neither case did she complete the task she had set upon, but she furthered
or perhaps initiated a trend, and her tactics would be used, though not acknowl
edged as hers, by ambitious rulers of later times. The examiniatlon system, at
least in its literary emphasis, was as much her creation as it was that of its
founders, and the results of the reforms she made in the system were to be seen
not only in the superb bureaucracy she bequeathed to Hsiian-tsung but also in
the poetic creativity which graced his reign and that of his successors. Her
orchestration of the evolving relationship among Confucianism, Taoism and Bud
dhism, and of the tensions between church and state were to have consequences
throughout the T'ang. Moreover, even if certain of her policies, such as the
misuse of the fu-plng and the unwarranted expansion of the bureaucracy achieved
only short-term goals for which the dynasty would later pay too high a price,
almost to the end of her life she acted with resolution, panache, and a constant
awareness of her subjects' Interests.
It is little wonder that in the popular
imagination of later times she was monumentalized, and that in a novel like^
Flowers 'In the M-lrror (Chtng-hua-yuan) we find her not only instituting civil
service examinations for women but successfully commanding in mid-winter that
all the flowers bloom for her pleasure.
It might be well before concluding to point to a dimension of seventh-century
history almost wholly neglected in this study: the condition of the country in
general and that of the peasants in particular during the empress' regime. On
this matter many questions could be raised but, as I said earlier, the narrow
focus of contemporary sources must preclude definitive answers. At the same
time, popular attitudes were a key element in the success of Wu Tse-t'ien's
legitimation and since we find no primary sources which articulate these atti
tudes, we are perhaps justified in some careful speculation about their origins.
There is ample evidence, to begin with, that the reign of Kao-tsung was gen
erally prosperous. Agriculture buffered little disruption except in areas
affected by natural disasters or the expansiveness of his foreign policy and,
with only minor problems, equal-field redistribution was successful.
It is^
only from the time of his death that we begin to hear of economic difficulties
which would affect the people at large—inflation, counterfeiting, food
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shortages and declining government services, registration abuses and the ap
pearance of fugitive households. Complaints about these matters became more
frequent throughout the Chou but, as we have seen, there was no substantive
economic reform.
Such matters are relative.
It must also be conceded that the Chou saw no
signs of popular unrest nor any of the omens which indicated that Heaven desired
a change of Mandate. The people had twice demonstrated their support for the
empress by refusing to join rebel movements against her and, as far as we can
tell, they remained constant to the end. The source of their loyalty is dif
ficult to define and it may be that inertia, conservatism and love and respect
all played a part. What we know for certain is that her legitimizing policy
was aimed at the people as a whole. Her patronage of Buddhism and her founda
tion of the Great Cloud temples, her public humiliation of great ministers and
proud clans during the terror, her measures to raise the status of women, the
record number of her Acts of Grace with their lavish conferrals of goods and
honorific rank, her twelve-point memorial and other measures of this kind were
designed to benefit the people and, whether sincere or not, served as public
affirmation of her concern for them and so won their support.
It seems fair to
suggest that the people came to see Wu Tse-t'ien as a competent, decisive and
clear-sighted ruler, frank both in her virtues and in her vices.
In their eyes
at least, possession of these qualities made the fact of her sex irrelevant.
Kuo Mo-Jo, in the final appendix to the 1963 edition of his play Wu Tset'ien, cites several instances of the popularity of the Empress Wu among the
people of Kuang-yuan county in Szechwan where there has long existed the belief
that this was the place of her birth. Most striking is the fact that right up
to the present day the people of the area have continued to observe the twentythird day of the first month of the lunar calendar as the day they believe to
be her birthday. No emperor of traditional China could ask for a finer tribute!

Appendix A
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE EMPRESS WU

The following five examples, drawn from early in the career of the Empress
Wu, are intended chiefly to demonstrate the process of historical selection op
erative in the three sources most influential in shaping subsequent historical
opinion, the two dynastic histories and the TCTC.
In each case, the difficulty
of factual certainty is apparent and, with it, the basis of prejudice for the
historian's choice of interpretation. Comparison of the three sources provides
a gauge to the relative hostility of each and makes clear the overwhelming im
portance to each of Wu Ching's shih-tu as a primary source.
Example 1
CTS
6:
HTS

76:

3075:3.
3867:1.

TCTC 195, p. 613^.

'

4*41' ’ ;§

T
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^
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s: ''The daughter
ghter of the former tu-tu of Ching-chou, Wu
The TCTC notice says:
Shih-huo, was fourteen years old. The Emperor [T'ai-tsung] heard of her beauty
and summoned her into his harem where she was given the rank of ts'a.i-,jen."I I The
two earlier sources are similar to the TCTC in diction and detail, although the
HTS adds the information that T'ai-tsung had been a widower "for a long time."
His wife had died in mid-636, so that if Ssu-ma Kuang's dating is correct he
waited a year-and-a-half at the most before adding to the harem!
The degree of similarity is explained in the k'ao-i notice: "The Annals of
Tse-t'_[en in the CTS say she died at the age of eighty-three but the T'ang-li
M
, the T’ang-oh'ao nlen-tai chi
Chiao Lu
.11,
the T[ ung-ohi
, the T’ang-n'ien hsiao-lu ^
by Ma’Tsung
, the Sheng-yun t'u
the ffui-z/ao ^ ^
all
say she died at the age of eighty-one. The T'ang-lu
the Hui-yao
say she entered the harem in the thirteenth [not the eleventh] year of ahenkuan [639”6A0].
[However] since she entered the harem at the age of fourteen,
and because of the shih-tu of Wu Ching says she died at the age of eighty-two,
I place her introduction into the harem in this [eleventh] year."
in this account two points are striking. First, Ssu-ma Kuang is willing to
accept the authority of the shih-lu on the empress' age over contradictory
sources which are far more numerous and, in the case of the CTS, equally author
itative since Wu Ching made a primary contribution to both. Second, it is clear
that not a single one of the sources at Ssu-ma's disposal, including the shihlu, makes reference to Wu's entry into T'ai-tsung's harem.. This uncomfortable
fact seems, therefore, to have been expunged successfully from contemporary and
official history, probably through the empress' influence.
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Her entry into the harem seems to have been dated only in two sources and
both place it in chen-kuan 13» 638. Neither the T’ang-tu nor Su Mien's Hui-yao
(completed in 804) is extant, but the T'ang hui-yao is of course based upon the
latter and contains the following passage (ohuan 3, p. 23)
. Since the diction is very close to the notices in
CTSj HTS ana TCTC, the Hui-yao probably formed the basis for all three.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Empress Wu attempted delib
erately not only to conceal her incest with T'ai-tsung but also her true age.
The motives for the former are obvious but unless we attribute to her a certain
vanity, the latter seems puzzling.
Example 2
CTS
51:
HTS

76:

TCTC 199,

3279:3.

[i

1 hM

A

3866:1.. SS
>. 6288.

T s ^4i.(’ R, f i tjL r»f-

•

k * ''ri ^ .
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The disparity among sources here is marked. The CTS suggests that the Em
press Wang and her mother actually engaged in sorcery and, therefore, angered
Kao-tsung, while the other two sources regard them as innocent, seeing the sor
cery charge as a calumny fabricated by Wu Chao-i. Ssu-ma Kuang explains in the
k'ao-i: "The CTS biography of the Empress Wang says she was frightened and ill
at ease so that she and her mother secretly sought out a witch and engaged in
black magic. When this became known she was degraded. Now I accept what is
written in the shih-lu."
The CTS view is clearly dependent upon a source other than the shih-lu and
one more favorable to the Empress Wu since the charge of sorcery would be suf
ficient grounds for Kao-tsung to depose Empress Wang. Other extant sources
offer no corroboration of either interpretation, although the frequent use of
the T'ang-li by the CTS will be demonstrated later. The TFYK 333:5a records
that Liu Shih, uncle of the Empress Wang, was demoted to the provinces when his
sister, the empress' mother, was "punished by being forbidden entry to the pal
ace," and his subsequent demotion was for "revealing palace secrets" {ahin ohungyu). The reference here is almost certainly to the sorcery charge, and it is to
be expected that Liu Shih told his side of the story. See TCTC 199, p. 6288.
On the other hand, it may be argued that in the relatively complete account
of the debate surrounding the elevation of the Empress Wu, the above incident
is unmentioned. Kao-tsung, even when challenged by Ch'u Sui-liang to show that
the conduct of Empress Wang was anything but blameless, seems to have remained
silent.
I am not convinced that this is conclusive since Kao-tsung similarly
forbears mention of the alleged murder of Wu Chao-i's daughter by the Empress
Wang, and the whole debate may have been severely edited to show the latter in
a favorable light. The TCTC 199, pp. 6286-7 does admit that the two rivals "ex
changed slanders and accusations," so that Ssu-ma Kuang's decision here to rely
on the shih-lu rather than the CTS is perhaps more a reflection of bias than of
conviction.
In general, the machinations of the inner palace were never very clear to
contemporary historians since there existed no mechanism for obtaining reliable
information. For this reason, the T'ang-li, a work in forty ohuan by Liu Fang
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is particularly valuable. His biography, CTS 149: 3479:2 and HTS 132: 3975:3t
records that much of the information therein was based on his conversations with
the famous eunuch Kao Li-shih whose sources of information for events within the
harem might be more accurate than those available to the official historians.
In the example above, for instance, I suspect that the CTS notice follows the
T'ang-li and is the proper interpretation. The Empress Wu, after all, is known
to have had a network of palace spies charged with reporting on her rival and,
given the prevalence of witchcraft at the time, almost certainly had grounds
for her accusation. She herself had to answer the same charge in 664.
The varying versions of the incident also demonstrate a greater hostility to
the Empress Wu on the part of the HTS and the TCTC than on the part of the CTS.
This is a consistent tendency.
example
6: 6075:3. ^ %!L%CTS
76: 3867:1.
HTS
TCTC 199, p. 6z88^fr-\ ^

The source dispute nere, although parallel to the second example, is differ
ent in that it concerns a public event about which the historian could be ex
pected to have certain knowledge. The HTS and TCTC suggest that the remonstrance
of Han Yuan and Lai Chi prevented Kao-tsung from creating a new category of concubine to be awarded to Wu Chao-i, while the CTS maintains that she was actually
granted the title. The k 'ao-i says: “The T'ang-li dates this event in the
fourth month, but now I follow the shih-lu. Han Yuan and Lai Chi had not reached
the posts of shih-ahung and ahung-shu-ling [respectively] by the fourth month
[of 655]. The T'ang-li also says their remonstrance was unsuccessful, but the
decree which established the [new] empress refers to her as [the] Chao-i [con
cubine].
If this is the case, she was never granted the title of oh'en concu
bine.
I now follow the Hui-yao."
Ssu-ma Kuang is on firm ground here. The appointment of Han and Lai in the
fifth month to the posts mentioned can be verified even in the CTS annals of
Kao-tsung, and no other source mentions that the oh'en-fei title was ever award
ed.
It is of interest that the Shih-lu seems to have noted the event but not
the outcome, since the k'ao-i cites the Hui-yao as its authority. Wu Chao-i's
reception of the title must have been at least a tradition of the palace since
the CTS is here clearly reproducing the T'ang-li. Several other examples could
be drawn to show how highly the authors of the CTS regarded the T'ang-li as a
source and how they often preferred it to the shih-lu. Ssu-ma Kuang's view is,
of course, different. See Example 4.
My own reading of the T'ang-li notices concerned with the Empress Wu and
preserved in the k'ao-i makes clear the vast difference between official and
non-official history. A separate study would not be amiss.
Example 4
CTS 65: 3310:3 [biography of Wu-chi].[iC] O : ^

CTS

80: 3340:

[biography of Sui-1 iangj.

^
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3922:3 [biography of Wu-chi].
HTS

0
HTS

^

^

105:

. -Mr I-

®
•

105: 3923:3 [biography of Sui-lianq].^'3.-.
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TCTC 199, pp. 6289-90. Ji ^ j J
This episode, in which Kao-tsung solicits the support of the four most pres
tigious of his ministers for the plan to elevate Wu Chao-i to empress, is one
of the best known of the century.
It will be noted that the two dynastic his
tories are in perfect agreement while Ssu-ma Kuang glosses the salient point.
His k'ao-i notice says: "The T'ang-li records that when Wu-chi and the others
were about to enter [the audience hall] Sui-liang said that [Kao-tsung] was
going to ask about the empress and asked whether he should remonstrate. Wu-chi
told him that however strongly he did so, he would himself support him. When
they went in, the emperor looked at Wu-chi and said, 'The greatest of all crimes
is to be prevented from continuing one's line. Now, my empress is barren and
I want to depose her and establish in her place the daughter of Wu Shih-huo.
What is your opinion?' Wu-chi said, 'Ever since the twenty-third year of chenkuan [6I49-650], your [late] father placed his trust in Sui-liang.
I would rath
er you asked him.'
If this story is true, then Wu-chi betrayed Sui-liang.
I
do not accept it."
This is one of the very few instances in the k'ao-i in which Ssu-ma Kuang
relies solely on his own judgment and offers no supporting evidence.
It may be
that the shih-lu fails to mention the incident, but in view of its centrality
to the crisis I find this hard to accept and reluctantly conclude that Ssu-ma
Kuang suppressed it. Support for this view comes from the fact that the CTS
passages above actually elaborate on the T'ang-li story and so must have had an
additional source, and also from the fact of Ssu-ma Kuang's extraordinary fond
ness for Wu-chi. Note his remarks in TCTC 199, p. 6267, in connection with T'ai
tsung's dying words to Wu-chi and, more particularly, his treatment of Wu-chi's
complicity in, or instigation of, the charges which brought death to the inno
cent Li K'o
See TCTC 199, p. 6280.
The historical significance of the controversy lies in the fact that if Wuchi is seen to be an opportunist, his opposition to the Empress Wu may have
been less disinterested than is usually portrayed, and her later actions against
him therefore Justified. Even in the case of her so-called revenge, there is
some room for doubt. See the next example.

\s:
HTS

3310:3. I'f

105: 3922:1..

TCTC 100, p. 6312.
Although the details differ in each account, the sources agree that Hsu Ching
tsung fabricated a charge of treason against Wu-chi by having someone send a
secret denunciation to Kao-tsung. The k'ao-i notice is extremely long, quoting
extensively from the shih-lUy mentioning contradictions with the CTS, and pro
testing Wu-chi's innocence.
It then continues: "The shih-lu in recording the
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incident is careless {lu-mang]$^ ^ ), and discrepancies are found from begin
ning to end so that the whole truth cannot be known. Thus I abbreviate, giving
the general significance, and that is all. . . . The shih-Zu, [however], com
pared to the CTS biography is earlier and more detailed, and since the biography
is later and more brief, it is less worthy of reliance."
In this passage we see most clearly the reason for the TCTC tendency to rely,
wherever possible, on the shih-Zu and to favor its interpretation over that of
the dynastic histories in spite of Ssu-ma Kuang's equation of the two in his
T'ung-ohien shih-Zi, l:3"^a. Several additional examples of the process are
adduced in Li Shu-t'ung, T'ang-shih k'ao-pien, pp. 238-9.
In view of the hos
tile attitude of the shih-Zu, especially when compared to the T’ang-Zi, and in
view of the tremendous prestige of the TCTC, it is not surprising that the Em
press Wu has fared badly in traditional historiography.
While in the example above the point of dispute is a matter of detail rather
than interpretation, it should be noted that the CTS is supported by the T'angZi, the Shih-t'ung and, in some areas, by the shih-Zu itself! And the CTS, un
like the ETS and TCTC, nowhere mentions that Hsu Ching-tsung was acting directly
under the orders of the Empress Wu. His reasons for the destruction of Wu-chi
were easily as strong as her own, and it is entirely possible that he acted on
his own initiative. Ssu-ma Kuang {TCTC^ Zoo. oit.) as much as admits the speculatory nature of his judgment with the unsupported statement, "The empress
ordered Ching-tsung to await his chance and entrap him [Wu-chi]," and one won
ders how he knew even this much.
If the k’ao-i reproduces the full shih-Zu
report, there is no mention there of the influence of the Empress Wu.

Appendix B
THE TSAI-ESIANG, 618-705

The following list attempts to provide in tabular form a brief biographical
sketch of every man who held tsai-hsiang^ or chief ministerial status from the
beginning of the T'ang to the deposition of the Empress Wu. The principal
source of information is HTS 61: 377^:1, the table of chief ministers, but be
cause of errors and omissions in it additional information is taken from the
annals and biographies of the CTS and from later studies like TCTC and princi
pally from the Nien-i-shih ssu-p'u, chuan 33, Yen Keng-wang's T’ang p'u-shang
oh'eng-tang piao provides some information not found elsewhere. Where the ac
tuality of appointment is disputed, I usually include the man in question so
that the list may be as comprehensive as possible.
The
hsiang
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

names are arranged in chronological order based on the date when tsaistatus was first awarded, and the key to the information is as follows:
Dates (age given in Chinese style).
Native place and the T'ang province to which it belonged.
Ancestry.
Examination.
First official post mentioned in the biography in the dynastic history.
Recommendation (by whom).
Year and lunar month when tsai-hsiang status was first awarded.
Length of tenure of tsai-hsiang status.
Descendants.
Remarks, and Western-language sources in which more information may be
found. For the latter, the three abbreviations used are:
Exconens - Le traite des examens by R. des Rotours.
Fonotionnaives - Le tvaite des fonationnaires et de 1 ’armeey by the
same author.
Eberhard - Das Toba-Reioh Nordohinas by W. Eberhard.

The term "family extinguished" {ahia-k’ou chi-mo) refers to the punishment
elaborated in the text whereby the immediate family of a criminal is either ex
ecuted, or exiled and deprived of political rights.
In many cases, it will be
noted, rehabilitation occurred before the deposition of the Empress Wu. "Ex
ecuted by the Empress Wu" simply means that the event occurred between 68^1-705,
and "in exile" means that the man in question had either been demoted to a
provincial post or exiled to Ling-nan before his death. The length of tenure
(category h) is based entirely on my own calculations.
In many cases a chief
minister was given a particular commission outside the capital during his tenure.
Unless there is specific mention that he was at the same time deprived of tsaihsiang status, I include this period in his tenure although he could scarcely
exercise his court functions. This is done chiefly to permit consistency of
analysis since the actual time consumed by special assignments is invariably
vague.
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The native place is in every case taken from the CTS biography, and the term
"eminent clan" is used only when explicitly so stated by the same source.
I
chose this methodology for the sake of consistency, and because the CTS most
nearly represents contemporary opinion. But caution is necessary. First, the
authors of the HTS display a much more pronounced aristocratic attitude, so
that many tsai-hsiang are listed in the table there as members of great clans
when their connection was very tenuous and in spite of the fact that their bi
ographies in the same work offer different pen-wang. This is the case with the
Empress Wei and, for instance, with Li l-yen (no. 63). Second, there are prob
lems of geographical terminology. Hsueh Yuan-ch'ao (no. 6l) came from Fen-yin
P'u-chou, a place also known as Ho-tung, and the home of the emi
nent l^-tung Hsueh clan.
Is there a reason beyond historical ignorance why the
authors of the CTS do not identify the affiliation? Third, there is the prob
lem of false claims. Li l-fu (no. 39) is the most obvious example, but the
list of tsai-hsiang more successful than he in establishing in history their
false claims could be readily expanded.
A thorough search through epigraphical evidence would yield a substantially
more accurate list, but I see little to be gained in such a line of inquiry.
The connection between the tsai-hsiang and the great houses strikes me as an
artificial one, for there is probably no case in the seventh century of a man
rising to the rank of chief minister solely on the basis of family eminence.
The aristocratic cast of high officialdom in the T'ang is a noteworthy phenom
enon, but unless it is shown that (a) the consciousness of these officials was
more aristocratic than bureaucratic after the attainment of high office, and
(b) family background alone could form the basis of ministerial cohesion or
factionalism, this approach to the history of the period should be subordinated
to others.
The chief value of presenting the information in this form is the demonstra
tion of a trend away from personalized government. Several facts should be
noted in this regard.
First, the rapid decrease in the incidence of recommenda
tion. At least after the 660s advancement became increasingly structured, and
the highest posts were filled by men with a bureaucratized mentality and an un
derstanding of the system.
Influential connections and the ability to win
general notice by outstanding performance or virtue diminished in importance.
Even the extension of the recommending privilege by the Empress Wu seems to
have had little effect at the highest levels of government. Second, the diminu
tion and virtual disappearance of marriage relationships with the imperial fam
ily. Third, the progressive shortening of tenure, as ministers were increasingly
regarded by the ruler as instruments of policy rather than as colleagues. De
motion and the shifting of posts may be regarded in this light as well as being
seen as mechanisms of imperial control or the assertion of prerogative. Fourth,
the rising importance of examination as a qualification for high office, a
phenomenon discussed in the text.
The information presented here shows clearly the importance of a family tra
dition of officeholding.
I find fewer than a dozen men under the empress who
achieved tsai-hsiang status after beginning with examination alone. Twice that
number had no degree but came from families which, although not among the pre
eminent clans even at the local level, had held office earlier in the dynasty.
The yin privilege must have played a part, but I suspect that intangible factors
were of greater significance.
It will be noted that few tsai-hsiang were with
out descendants in bureaucratic positions, but that few of them equaled the
eminence of their forebears. This is a suggestive trend and worthy of pursuit
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in the later T'ang.
The tsai-hsiang sample, while conducive to misinterpretation, is by no means
barren and, particularly if combined with other definable groupings such as high
officials in the six Boards, could yield many more insights into T'ang govern
ment. The order of advancement and the relation of lower posts to the eventual
attainment to tsai-hsiang rank, the role of military men, the development of
specialized functions, and the relationship of the tsai-hsiang to regionalist
problems could all be explored with profit.
Shih-min;:^

1.
2.

3.

k.

^ = T'ai-tsung

.

Li
si Chi ^ ^ . CTS 57: 3292:3, HTS 88: 3893:1.
P'
a. ca. 571-63Q.
'H’l
in Ho-tung.
b. P'u-chou
c- Father and grandfather officeholders. Lineage praised by Kao-tsu but
family poor.
i
d. No examination. „
■
e. Pu-ohou chu-pu
f. None mentioned. Early friendship with Kao-tsu.
g- 618: oheng.
h. 8 years.
i. Son marries a daughter of Kao-tsu, grandson official career under
Empress Wu but executed by her.
j. The nriost favored of Kao-tsu's ministers.
iao Yu ^
. CTS 63: 3304:3, ETS 101: 3915:1.
Hs
575-6/»l
du
a.
b. Nan-Ian-ling
.
Imperial
family
of
Liang,
married to Sui family.
c.
d. No examination.
,
Min-pu shang-shu ^ ^ 1'^ % •
e.
f. None.
g. 618: oheng.
h. 9 years.
i. Son marries a daughter of T'ai-tsung and has official career.
j* A prominent Buddhist. Several quarrels with T'ai-tsung and once disenrolled. Eberhard, p. 40, no. 32.
Liu Wen-ching
. CTS 57: 3293:1. UTS 88: 3892:3.
a. d. 620 at age 52.
t
ab. Claimed P'eng-ch'eng
, but family had lived at Ching-chao
.y^ ^\Li
for generations.
c. Grandfather an officeholder, father dies in battle, and Wen-ching
succeeds to his posthumous position.
d. No examination. _
^ /
& Chin-yang ling
^ .
f.
g.
h.
i.

Close friend of P'ei Chi who introduces him to Kao-tsu.
618:6.
2 months, then disenrolled for treason.
When family rehabilitated, two sons have official careers and one
marries princess.
j. See Eberhard, p. 5^, no. 5^ for clan claimed by Wen-ching.

168

5.

Appendix B

Tou Wei
a. d. 618:'
b. See no. 6.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

^

.

CTS 61: 3301:1, HTS 95: 39Qi>:3.

Tou K'ang's uncle.

—
“
—
—
Appointed 618:6 but dies same month.

h. --

6.

i. Son has official career.
Tou K'ang %
. CTS 61: 3301:3, HTS 95: 3904:3a. d. 621. ^
b. Fu-feng
in Kuan-chung.
c. Eminent clan. C^sort family of Sui, and K'ang is son of Wen-ti's
daughter Wan-an ^
.
d. No examination.
e. High honorary positions in Sui.
f. Youthful friendship with Kao-tsu.
g. 6l8:6.
h. 2 months, then made general.
i. Two sons, primarily military careers.
j. In early T'ang this clan produced 7 officials above the third rank,
5 above the fourth, more than 10 above the fifth, and three times
married princesses as well as placing several of their daughters in
the harem. An unparalleled achievement according to CTS. Eberhard,
p. 383, no. 69.

7.

Ch'en Shu-ta
• CTS 61: 3301:1 , HTS 100: 3912:3.
a. d. 635. ^
b. Wu-hsingin Chiang-nan.
^
c. Imperial family of Ch'en dynasty, l6th son of Hsuan-ti
d. No examination.
,
e. Nei-shih she-jen
^
•
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

8.

.

Early allegiance to T'ang.
619: oheng.
7 years, 10 months.
No children mentioned.
A poet and scholar who left works in 15 ohuan.

Yang Kung-jen

.

CTS 62: 3302:4, HTS 100: 3912:3.

a. d. 639. ^ A
b. Hua-yin^
in Kuan-chung.
c. Imperial^family of Sui dynasty.
d.
e.
f.

No examination.
.
Prefect of Kan-chou “o
j Captured by Kao-tsu's troops early in rebellion and persuaded to join
T'ang.
g. 619:10.
h. 6 years, 9 months.
i. Son and grandson have official careers. Brother, nephew, niece, and
great-grandson marry into T'ang family. Also the clan of the Empress
Wu's mother.
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Eberhard, p . 73, no. 87.
CTS 63: 330it:2, HTS 100: 3912:4.
Feng Te-i
i
le
60.
d.
627
at
a. Kuan-chou
‘'^‘*'1 in Ho-nan.
b.
Father and grandfather officeholders. Marriage relation to eminent
c.
Lu clan of Fan-yang.
No
examination.
^
d.
Sui hsing-ohun dhi-shih /\^
army of Yang Su.
e.
f. Surrendered territory to T'ang.
j.

9.

•M

g- 620:2.

10.

11

h. 7 years, 4 months.
1 . Son marries daughter of Kao-tsu. Has official career. Nephew also an
official.
Possibly connected with Feng clan of Eberhard, p. 36, no. 21. Also
known as Feng Lun
P'ei Chij
^
Sui-shu 67: 2507:1, Pei-shih 38: 2869:4, CTS 63: 3305:
3, HTS 100: 3913:1.
a. d. 627 at age over 80.
^ .
b. Ho-tung
c. Eminent clan, father and grandfather officeholders.
d. No examination.
e. Secretary-tutor to Ch'i prince
f. Deserts Tou Chien-te to join T'ang.
g. 624:12.
h. 1 year.
i . Son has official career under Kao-tsung.
Long experience
j • Foreign-affairs expert and map maker of Western regions.
makes him something of an elder statesman in reign of Kao-tsu.
Eberhard, p. 380, no. 61.
Yu-wen Shlh-chi '•f
CTS 63: 3305:4, HTS 100: 3913:3.
a. d. 642.
^
b. Ch'ang-an
-)tr .
Imperial
family
of Chou, marriage to Sui and T'ang families.
c.
M
/jfc
d. No examination.
Sui
shang-nien
feng-yu
'n'
e.
'
f. Close friend of Kao-tsu.
g. 625:12.

12.

h. 1 year, 9 months.
i. Son has official career.
76, no. 96.
j. Friendship with T'ai-tsung. Eberhard,
chi 4^7Cj ^ CTS 64:3306:4.
Li Yuana. Killed by T'ai-tsung in coup of 626.
in Kuan-chung.
b. Claimed Lung-hsi fil '3^
T'ang imperial family, fourth son of Kao-tsu (b. 609)
c.
^
d. No examination.
T'a-i-yuan-ohun shou ^
jSf W .
e.
f. None.
g. 625:12.

h. 6 months.
i. 5 sons, all executed by T'ai-tsung.
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j. His concubine of the Yang clan, later taken by T'ai-tsung,
introduced the Empress Wu into the harem.
Tu Yen
'/^ . CTS 66: 3312:2, HTS 96: 3905:4.

probably

d. 628.
Ching-chao y.
[Ch'ang-an].
Uncle of Ju-hui (see no. 17).
No examination.
1 ^
Sui ah'eng-feng long
Kao Hsiao-chi
g. 627:9.
h. 11 months.
i. Son inherits title.
j. ExamenSi p. 241; Eberhard, p. 68, no. 78.
Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi -fe
. CTS 65: 3309:3, HTS 105: 3922:2.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

14.

a. d. 659.
^
b. Loyang
.
c. A T'o-pa clan, offices and titles for seven generations, Wu-chi's
sister married to T'ai-tsung.
d. No examination.
e. After military posts in T'ang conquest, pi-pu lang-dhvng
f. A close friend of T'ai-tsung from youth.
g. 627:7.
h. Total almost 16 years.
i. Family extinguished in 659“60.
j. See text and Eberhard, p. 33, no. 10.

15.

Kao Chien
CTS 65: 3309:1, HTS 95: 3903:3.
a. d. 647, aged 71.
b. Po-hai
in Ho-nan.
c. Eminent clan, imperial family of Ch'i, married into Ch'ang-sun and
T'ang families.
d. No examination.
.
v
e. Sui ohih-li tang
•
f. Probably received first Sui post by recommendation.
g. 626:7.
h. 8 years, 1 month.
i. Son marries daughter of T'ai-tsung, holds high posts, killed by
Empress Wu because of relationship with Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi.
j. Also called Kao Shih-1 ien
. Eberhard, p. 42, no. 41.

16.

Fang Hsuan-ling
. CTS 66: 3310:4, HTS 95: 3905:1.
a. d. 648 at age 70.
b. Ch' i-chou ^’I'l in Ho-nan; moved to capital in the Sui.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

.

Ancestors neld office since Wei.
Chin-shih at age 18.
lu-oh'i wei
.
Wen Yen-po
^ rjL et at.
626:7.
^

h. Total almost 30 years.
i. Two sons, one married to daughter of T'ai-tsung, have official career,
conspire to rebel, family reduced to commoner status early in reign of
Kao-tsung.
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17.

18.

19.

j. With the exception of Wei Cheng, probably the most Important of T'aitsung's ministers.
Tu Ju-hui ^
CTS 66: 3311:^, ^TS 96: 3905:3a.
b.
c.
d.

d. 630 at age 46.
Ching-chao '^.^16 [Ch'ang-an].
Officeholders in Chou and Sui, son marries into T'ang family.
First to pass the hs'uan in Sui.

e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

Kan-yang
wei
................
Kao Hsiao-chi
^
and Fang Hsuan-ling
(no. 16).
628: aheng.
2 years. Resigns because of illness.
Son and grandson have official careers.
He was nephew of Tu Yen (see no. 13)- Examens, p. 241.

Li
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Ching
■ . CTS 67: 3312:3, STS 93: 3900:3d. 649 at age 79Yung-chou ^ •;*lj near Ch'ang-an.
Father ana grandfather held office in Sui and Wei.
No examination.
t
j.
Sui Ch' ang-an-hsien kung-ts 'ao
^ If Tvv 0 •
Yang Su and Niu Hung 4 5*-

4-1-

g. 628: aheng.
h. 6 years, 11 months.
i. Son and younger brother have official careers.
j. Career primarily military. Fonati-onna-ires^ p. 6.
Wang Kuei X li . CTS 70: 3318:2, HTS 98: 3908:3a. d. 639 at age 69.
b. T'ai-yuan
in Ho-tung.
c. Ancestors held posts in Liang and Ch'i but had declined to impoverish
ment before Kuei was orphaned.
d. No examination.
e. Sui feng-^i-tang
f. Li Kang
.
g. 628:12.
h. 4 years, 4 months.
i. Two sons have official career, and the younger marries a princess.
Eberhard, p. 70, no. 8la.

20.

Wei Cheng
Pei-shih 56: 2932:2, CTS 71: 3320:1 , HTS 97: 3906:3a. d. 643 at a^ 63b. Ch'u-lu
in Ho-pei.
c. Father held low office in Ch'i. Cheng early orphaned and impoverished.
d. No examination.
-?
e. Clerical staff of rebel Li Mi; T'ang mi-shu oh'eng
^ .
f.
gh.
i.
j.

21.

None mentioned,
629.
13 years, 6 months.
Four sons have official careers, one executed by Empress Wu.
Examens, p. 242. Wechsler, MirvoVj pp. 33~79 and IO6-I66 offers a full
treatment of Cheng's life and career.
Wen Yen-po
|j|. CTS 61: 3300:3, HTS 100: 3912:1.
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

d. 637 at age_64.
T'ai-ytian iKin Ho-tung.

Father officeholder in Ch'i and Sui.
No examination.
Sui wen-tin tang ^

Ch'in hsiao-wang Chiin

g. 630:2.

22.

h. 7 years, 4 months.
i. Son marries daughter of Kao-tsu, has official career. Many relatives
hold high posts.
j • Considered one of the most successful families of early T'ang.
i Chou MU . See no. 55.
Ta
I
I
a. d.633.
b. Hsiang-chou -Jr’^’ij in Ho-pei .
c. No ancestors mentioned, biography says family poor.
d. No examination.
4
e.
Wei,#^^ and P'ei Chu.
Captured by T'ai-tsung.
f. Su
Sui men^sig tu-shih

n -f

g. 630:2.

■

h. 3 years, 4 months.
i . No sons. Adopts nephew Chih-te (see no. 55).
j • No formal education. Noted for repression of literature while in charge
of examination system.
23.

Hou Chtin-chi
CTS 69: 3316:2, HTS 94: 3902:2.
a. Executed for treason, 643.
b. Pin-chou
'M‘| in Ho-pei.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

24.

No ancestors mentioned.
No examination.
Military posts with T'ai-tsung early in conquest.
None mentioned.
630:11.
10 years, 2 months (nominally; often out of capital).
Sons exiled to Ling-nan.
Military career.

Yang Shih-tao
a. d. 647'

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

^

.

Hua-yin^F.^
in Kuan-chung.
Younger brother of Kung-jen (see no. 8).
No examination.
Honorary posts in early T'ang.
None mentioned. T'ai-tsung impressed by his calligraphy.

g. 636:6.
h. 7 years, 6 months.

25.

CTS 62: 3307:1, BTS 100: 3912:4.

/s

Demoted 645 for connection with Korean failure.

i. Son has official career, married to T'ai-tsung's niece, executed for
suppression of aristocracy while in charge of examination system.
Liu Po
5^. CTS 74: 3326:4, NTS 99: 3911:4.
a. Ordered to jpmmit suicide, 645.

b. Ching-chou

Y’|-| in Shan-nan.

c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. No examination.
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e. Huang-men shih-lang-^ ff
f.
g.
h.
i.

under rebel Hsiao Hsien.

None mentioned, thoug'h wide military reputation.
639:11.
5 years, 1 month.
Son has official career and has Empress Wu rehabilitate father.

26.

Ts'en Wen-pen
. CTS 70: 3319:1, HTS 102: 3916:3.
a. d. 645 at age 51.
b. Nan-yang
in Shan-nan.
c. Father and grandfather officeholders.
d. Esiu-tsai.
Li. > .
e. Chung-shu shih-lang T 5 4^
under rebel Hsiao Hsien.
f. Li Ching.
1
g. 642: aheng.
h. 3 years, 4 months.
i. Nephew reaches tsai-hsiang status under Empress Wu and is executed
for opposition to Wu Ch'eng-ssu. See no. 69.

27.

Li Chi
. CTS 67: 3313:2, HTS 93: 3901:2.
a. d. 669 at age 76.
b. Ts'ao-chou ^ d-l-j in Ho-nan.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

28.

No ancestors mentioned, poor family.
No examination.
Bandit, joins Li Mi, becomes general of Kao-tsu.
None mentioned.
643:4.
6 years, 8 months.
Son has official career, but family extinguished after grandson's re
bel lion.
j. See text and Fonotionnaires, p. 7.
Chang Liang 5S.. CTS 69: 3316:4, HTS 94: 3902:3.
a. Executed 64^for treason.
b. Cheng-chou
•J'hl in Ho-nan.
c. Peasant backgrouna.
d. No examination.
e. Joined Li Mi in rebellion, subordinate to Li Chi who brings him to T'aitsung's force.
f. Fang Hsuan-ling (no. I6).
g. 643:7.
h. 2 years, 7 months (accompanies first Korean expedition).
i. Family extinguished.
j. Noted as particularly compassionate to lower orders of society. Prob
ably innocent of treason.

29.

Ma Chou
I9j . CTS 74 lin-.l, HTS 98: 3909:2.
a. d. 648 at age 48.
b. Ch'ing-ho^'^
in Ho-pei
c.
d.
e.
f.

>rphaned, impoverished.
No ancestors mentioned, or|
No examination.
Prefectural clerk.
Ghost writer of impressive memorial for General Ch'ang Ho
this b rings him to attention of T'ai-tsung.

. and
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9h. 3 years, 5 months.
Son has official career; like his father, much concerned in selection
system.
ExamenSi p. 2k0.
30.

31.

CTS 80: 3339:3, HTS 105: 3921:1,
Ch'u Sui-1iang
a. d. 658 at a^ 63 in_____
^_____for opposition
___ ____ _________
disgrace
to Empress Wu.
b. Hang-chou
’J'l'f in
Chiang-nan, but lived in Lung-yu.
c. Officeholding family.
d. No examination.
^ ^
e. Clerical post under rebel Hsiieh Chu
•
f. Ou-yang Hslin
and Wei Cheng. ' *
g. 6klr.9.
'
h. 3 years, 9 months.
i. Family exiled to South.
j. See text.
Kao Chi-fu S
. CTS 78: 3336:3, ffTS 104: 3921:3d. 653 at ^age 58.
Te-chou
inHo-pei.
Officeholders in Wei and Sui.
No examination.
,
.
Chih-dhou tsung-Taian-fu hu-ts 'an-ahicn Yy
None mentioned.
9 6A5:2 (disputed appointment, more likely 649:9)h. 4 years, 3 months.
i. Son has official career but exiled to South in 664 because of connec
tion with Shang-kuan I.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
-

32.

YU Chih-ning T. CTS 77: 3335:4, HTS 104: 3920:4.
a. d. 665 at age 78.
b. Yung-chou^ V*l‘| in capital area.
c.
d.
e.
f.
gh.
i.
j.

33-

Officeholaers in Chou and Sui.
No examination.
t ^
Sui kuan-shih-hsien oh’ang-shih idj
^ •
None mentioned,
649:58 years, 4 months. Resigns 659 because of age.
Son and grandson have official career.
Famed for erudition and for outspokenness.

CTS 74: 3328:1, HTS S3: 3912:1.
Ts'ui Jen-shih
a. d. ca. 650-J^ at ,age over
___ 60.
-b. Ting-chou‘7'/’| in Ho-pei.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

No ancestors mentioned.
Decree examination at beginning
of wu-ve
wu-te voio-o//
(618-627).
ng or
Kuan-ohou lu-shih ts 'an-ohun
Ch'en Shu-ta (see no. 7)
648: cheng.
1 month.
Son and grandson have official careers serving together under Chung-tsung.
The latterreaches tsai-hsiang status.
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Chang Hsing-ch'eng
. CTS 78: 3336:i», HTS 104: 3921:4.
a. d. 659 at age 67.
b. Ting-chou
in Ho-pei.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. Decree examination in early T'ang.
*P
^
e. Sui yeh-dhe-t'ai san-ts’ung yium-wai-lang %
f. Famous tutor recommended by a Sui dh’a-hs-lao-tien
also by Fang Hsuan-ling.
g. 650: oheng.
h. 2 years, 9 months.
i. Son has official career after succeeding to father's post. His col
lateral grandsons were the two notorious favorites of the Empress Wu.
j. Noted for close association with the young Kao-tsung, for his opposi
tion to T'ai-tsung's regional bias, and for bringing many Northeasterners
into the government.
Liu Shih
^ . CTS 77: 3334:3, HTS 112: 3938:3a. d. 659 in^xile.
b. P'u-chou
•/•|*| in Ho-tung.
c. Officeholders since the Wei, married into Tou clan, and his niece was
Kao-tsung's empress.
d. No examination.
i. ^ x /
e. Chung-shu she-jen 't ^ ^ A.. f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

36.

None mentioned. Rapia rise when niece married to Kao-tsung.
651: oheng.
3 years, 6 months.
Resigns as Empress Wu rises.
Family extinguished. Grandson holds posts in k'ai-yuan (713-742).
Biography stresses his innocence, is very hostile to Empress Wu.
Eberhard, p. 54, no. 55-

Yii-wen Chi eh
No biography.
a. d. 653 at age 67b. —
c. Possibly related to Yu-wen Shih-chi (no. 11).
d. —
e. —
f. —
g. 651: oheng.
h. 2 years, 3 months.
I.

--

j. Possibly Eberhard, p

37.

76, no. 96.

Han Yuan
. CTS 80: 3340:4, HTS 105: 3923:3.
a. d. 659 at age 54 in exile.
b. Yung-chou
near Ch'ang-an.
c. Father andr grandfather officeholders.
d. No examination.
e. Ping-pu shih- tang
.
f. Inherits dukedom.
'
g. 652:3h. 3 years, 10 months. Demoted 657-8 for opposition to Empress Wu.
i. Family extinguished.
j. Possibly Eberhard, p. 38, no. 25-
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38.

Lai Chi/^/D'. CTS SO: 3341:1 , HTS 105: 3923:4.
a. d. 662 at age 53 in battle with Turks.
b. Yang-chou
•ll'l in Huai-nan.
c. Father a famous Sui general killed by Yu-wen Hua-chi.
d. Chin-shih.
e. T’ung-shih she-pen
tK.
f.
g.
h.
i.

39.

None mentioned.
652:9.
3 years, 4 months. Demoted 657"8 for opposition to Empress Wu.
No descendants mentioned.

Li l-fu
. CTS 82: 3343:2, ETS 223 shang: 4l63:3.
a. d. 667 at a^e 53, in exile.
b. Ying-chouj^ 'jl-l in Ho-nan, but claimed membership in the much more
prestigious^hao-ch’un
Li clan.
Grandfather held low office.
No examination.
Ali- In 634.
Provincial Commissioner'
Li Ta-liang ^ A*Liu Po
25), and Ma Chou (no. 25)
655:7.
gh. 7 years, 9 months.
Son ^
receives many posts and honors,
Assists in coup which
i.
deposes Empress Wu.
With Hsu Ching-tsung (no. 42) the most important of the empress' early
supporters. A byword for cunning and opportunism; his biographies are
a source for much historiographical hostility to the Empress Wu.
FonotionnaireSi p. . 158.

c.
d.
e.
f.

40.

CTS 81: 3341:2, ETS IO6: 3925:1
ui Tun-1 I
7i
tSd. ca. 656 at over 60.
Yung-chou ^ ')'hj near capital.
An eminent northeastern
Grandfather president of Board of Rites in Sui
clan who moved to Kuan-chung at end of Wei.
.
d. No examination.
T 'ung-shih she-jen Aw .
e.
f. None mentioned.
9 653:1.
h. 2 years, 9 months.
i. Son and grandson have careers; like their father, mostly in Board of War.
j- Eberhard, p. 65, no. 77a.

Ts
a.
b.
c.

*
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Tu
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Cheng-1un
SL.
. CTS 70: 3319:4, ETS IO6: 3924:2.
d. in exile in 658 after disagreement with Li l-fu.
Hsiang-chou
'j-l-f in Ho-pei.
No ancestors mentioned.
Esiu-tsai (with his two brothers, numbered among about ten who succeeded
in this examination in the Sui).

..Ira

Sui yu-ohH-wei
Wei Cheng.
''
656:3.
2 years, 8 months.
No descendants mentioned.

.
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kl.

Hsu Ching-tsung
. CTS 82: 3342:1*, eTS 223 shang: 4l63:l
a. d. 672 at age 8l.
b. Hang-chou
and considered an eminent Chiang-tso family.
c. Father a Board president in Sui.
d. Hsiu-tsai.
g
~i
j.
y_/-

ssu-fa sHu-tso

e.

g.
h.
i.
j.

43.

^

■

657:3.
13 years.
Grandson has good career. Son probably also an official.
Probably the single most important minister during the first decade of
the empress' power. Great importance in the historiography of the
century. See text. FonotionnaireSj p. 158.

Hsin Mao-chiang JS
a. d. 659:11.
' '
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

^

No biography.
''

—
—
—
—
—

658:11.
1 year.
—
Possibly Eberhard, p. 40, no. 35.

44.

HsU Yu-Shih
CTS 59: 3297:2, HTS 90: 3896:4.
a. d. 679.
b. Kao-yang
in Ho-pei.
c. Remotely a soxithern family, officeholders since the Liang.
d. Chin-shih.
^
,
e. Huang-men shih-tang
^
^57.
f. None mentioned but father important general under Kao-tsu.
g. 659:4.
h. 3 years, 7 months. Demoted 662 for quarrel with Li l-fu.
i. No descendants mentioned.
j. Seven members of family active in seventh century.

45.

Jen Ya-hsiang
. No biography.
a. d. 662:2.
b. —
c. —
d. —
e. —
f. —
g 659:5.
h 2 years, 9 months.
i
He was Su Tingj Sole mention of Jen is in the CTS biography of Turks
fang's deputy in the expedition of 657.
Lu Ch'eng-ch'ing^ 7$<-’ CTS 81: 3341:3, HTS IO6: 3925:2.

46.

a. d. 670 at age 76.

^
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b. Fan-yang ;2»in Ho-pei.
Father and grandfather officeholders, eminent northeastern clan.
c.
d. No examination.
e. After service in military posts at beginning of ohen-kuan (627“650),
became k'ao-kimg yuan-wai-langxj] ^
'^P .
'
'
f. Succeeds to father's dukedom.
659:5.
9Dismissed for incompetence.
h. 1 year, 2 months.
i. No direct descendants mentioned as active in government, but 3 brothers
all have posts in seventh century,
j. Eberhard, p. 58, no. 63.

hi.

Shang-kuan I
CTS 80: 33^1:2, HTS 105: 3924:1.
a. Executed 664 as moving spirit in attempt to depose Empress Wu.
’M‘| in Ho-nan near Loyang, but lived at Chiang-tu
b. Shan-chou
'
c. Father held office in Sui.
, .
ju
,
d. Chin-shih.
Hung-wen-kuan ahih hsueh-shih
^
“i" •
e.
f. Yang Kung-jen (no. 8) .
g. 662:9.
h. 2 years, 3 months.
i. Family extinguished. Grandaughter advances from palace slave to pri
vate secretary of Empress Wu.
In reign of Chung-tsung becomes important
political figure, a noted literary patron, and briefly given charge of
assessing examination candidates.
j. A poet of renown who has given his name to a concise^et ornamental
style of composition sometimes called "five-word"3- 5 poetry. Took
vows of Buddhist monk.

h8.

Tou Te-hsuan ^
HTS 183: 3904:4.
d.
666
at
age
69
.
a.
in Kuang-chung.
b. Ch'i-chou
Grandfather
married
to Chou family, father inherited his title. Tec.
hsuan is a grandnephew of Tou Wei (no. 5) and Tou K'ang (no. 6).
d. No examination.
e. Served on Kao-tsu's staff in conquest.
f. None mentioned.
g. 664:8.
h. 2 years.
i. None mentioned.
j . Biography recounts incident of 664 in which Kao-tsung personally and
ceremonially appoints 10 men to tsai-hsiang status to show his reverence
for the institution.

hS.

Yueh Yen-wei.^
CTS 81: 3342:3, HTS 99: 3912:1.
=
7a .
j
'y 'I
a. Hd. a
676
b. Ch'ang-an.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. No examination.
ination.
1
e. Chi-shihz-ohung .“^4 3 T
%I rtnJ
f. None mentioned.
g. 664:12.
h. 4 months.

^ iJ.
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i. Son gains high position.

Executed in Chou.

50.

Sun Ch'u-yao
. CTS 81: 33^2:3, HTS 106: 3926:2.
a. d. ca. 660.
b. Ju-chou 7]^’^ijin Ho-nan.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. No examination.
e. ChH-wang yu-ohi
f. Makes personal impression on T'ai-tsung.
g. 664:12.
h. 4 months. Dismissed for misdemeanor.
i. Son a general in reign of Jui-tsung. Killed by Khitans.

51

Liu Jen-kuei
- CTS 84: 3346:1, HTS 108: 3928:3.
a. d. 685 at age 84.
b. Pien-chou yj; -M-j in Ho-nan.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. nu
No 6X0I111
examination.
Q«
ria c I un •

e. Hsi-ohou ts'cm-oKim
f. Chang Jen-ch'iian
g-

t

^

'H'J ^ ^ •
^

665:10.

h. Though some appointments disputed, probably about 19 years.
Son officeholder, executed in early Chou with immediate family,
One
grandson official under Hsuan-tsung.
One of the heroes of his age who won his reputation in Korea. Eberhard,
p. 378, no. 52.

52.

No biography.
Chiang K'o
a. d. (ill.
b. —
c. —
d.
e.
f.
g- 665:3.
h. 6 years, 11 months.

53.

Chao Jen-pen
CTS 81: 3342:3.
a. d. 670.
b. Shan-chou
in Ho-pei.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. No examination.
e.
f.
g.
h.

54.

Tien-ohung yu-shih

yr-x

T'ai-tsung.
None mentioned.
667:6.
Disputed. Probably 3 years, 4 months. Dismissed because of quarrel
with Hsu Chlng-tsung.
i. No descendants mentioned.
j. Once punished for making his own copy of secret edicts. Eberhard, p.
369, no. 12.
Yang Hung-wu
^ • CTS 77: 3333:4, HTS IO6: 3925:1.
a. d. 668. ^
^
b. Hua-chou^ '/•I'J in Kuan-chung.
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c.
d.
.
e
f..
g.
h.
i

55.

Officeholders. Collateral branch of Sul family (see no. 8).
No examination,
Tso-oh 'ien-niu pei-shen ^
^
Mother
of
Empress
Wu.
^
Mother of Emp
667:6.
10 months,
3 sons, all have official^careers before the Empress Wu bans all de
scendants of Yang Su ^
from holding capital office. All sent to
provinces, returning only after restoration.
Eberhard, p. 73, no. 89.
aS>
CTS 70: 3319:1, HTS 99: 3911:3.
Tai Chih-te

fil

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

d. 679.
,
Hsiang-chou
Ho-pei.
Nephew of Tai Chou and adopted by him (see no. 22).
No examination.
Hsi-t'ai shih-lang ^
.
None mentioned.
'
667:6.
Disputed appointments. Probably 11 years, 7 months.
No descendants mentioned.

56.

Li
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

An-ch'i
• CTS 72: 3323:4, HTS 102: 3917:3d. 670.
Ting-chou
in Ho-pei.
Father and grandfather high officials.
No examination..
3n.
Fu-hsi tang
None mentionec
667:6.
3 months.
Grandson has career.
An-ch'i much praised for handling of selection system, and as the third
generation of his family to hold high court office and draft edicts,
etc.

57.

Chang Wen-kuan
. CTS 85: 3348:4, HTS 113: 3939:2.
a. d. 677 at age 73.
b. Pei-chou
'/'I'f in Ho-pei. Moved to Wei-chou,^^’H’j at end of Sui.
c. No ancestors mentioned. Orphaned.
d. Ming-ohing.
__
1 ^
e. Ping-ohou ta'an-c/zun^ ^ •
f. Li Chi (no. 27).
''
g. 667:6.
h. 13 years, 3 months.
i. No sons mentioned. Brother and uncle have official career.
j. Prevented the last attack on Si 11a. Uncle of Li Chiao (no. 123).
Fonotionnaives3 p. 10.
Yen Li-pen
A. CTS 77: 3334:2, HTS 100: 3914:2.

58,

a. d. 673.
.
'*
b. Yung-chou
-jfjfrom Sui period.
c. Father held Sui posts.

A family of artisans and builders.
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d. No examination. Primarily a painter.
e. First post mentioned is chiang-tso ta-ohiang

59.

.p ,
tp

—
•

f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

None mentioned.
668:12 (provisional).
4 years, 11 months.
Sons mentioned but seem not to have entered public life.
Considered by contemporaries to be an incompetent administrator.

Li
a.
b.
c.

Ching-hsuan
. CTS 81: 33^*2:1, UTS 106: 3925:^*.
d. 682 a^ age 68.
Po-chou
*M’| in Huai-nan but claimed Chao-chun.
Father h^d office.

d. No examination.
e. Tutor of Kao-tsung.
f. Ma Chou (no. 29) and HsU Ching-tsung (no. 42).

669:2.
10 years, 6 months. Demoted after defeat by T'u-fan.
Son has good career, but executed when Empress Wei falls.
Famed for his administration of the examination system when he reput
edly recruited "over 10,000 men" each year, including many of his own
clan and friends. Married three times into the most eminent northeastern
clans. The great personal following he enjoyed coupled with a quarrel
with Liu Jen-kuei led to his downfall. Exconens, p. 245*
60.

Hao Ch'u-chun
. CTS 84: 3347:1, HTS 115: 3942:1.
a. d. 681 at age 75b. An-chou
•)l | in Huai-nan.
c. Father an early supporter of T'ang but dies when Ch'u-chun is 10.
her its title of hsien-kung.
d. Chin-shih in 628•^
.
e. Chu-tso tso-lang ^
f.
g.
h.
i.

In-

Kao Shih-1ien.
669:3About 12 years.
Grandson executed by Empress Wu. By publicly cursing her on the way
to execution, begins custom of gagging prisoners. Family stripped of

honors.
j. With Hsu Hu-shih responsible for bringing many southerners, especially
from his own area, into government.
61.

Hsiieh Yuan-ch'ao
. CTS 13: 3325:1, UTS 98: 3909:1.
a. d. 683 at age 62.
b. P'u-chou
jl l in Ho-tung.
^
c. Father and grandfather held office, succeeds to title of nan ^
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
J.

marries into T'ang family.
No examination.
T’a-i-tzu she-gen
T'ai-tsung personally impressed with his erudition.
676:3.
7 years, 4 months. Resigns because of illness.
Two sons become noted scholars and high officials.
Eberhard, p. 40, no. 34.

,
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Lai Heng ^
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

63.

6l».

65.

66.

.

CTS 80: 33^1:1, ETS 105: 3923:^.

d. 678.
Elder brother of Lai Chi by different mother.
See no. 38 for father.
No examination.
No information.
None mentioned.
676:3.
2 years, 8 months.
No descendants mentioned.

4k

CTS 81: 3342:2, HTS 105: 3924:1
Li I -yen
a. d. 688.'
> t>ut part of eminent Lung-hsi Li clan with which T'ang
b. Wei-chou
family claimed connection.
c. Father and grandfather officeholders.
.
d. Chin-shih.
T'ai-yuan
wei
is first specific office mentioned.
e.
f. Li Chi (no. 27).
g. 676:4.
h. 6 years, 11 months. Offends emperor and resigns in fear,
i. Younger brother and four grandsons have official careers.
Kao Chih-chou ^ ^
CTS 185 shang: 3559:4, HTS IO6: 3924:4.
a. d. 683 at age 82.
’M‘( in Chiang-nan.
b. Ch'ang-chou
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. Chin-shih.
Fei-hsien ling W
^ .
e.
f. None mentioned
g. 676:6.
h. 3 years, 5 months.
i. No sons, but marries daughter to son of close friend and sponsors his
career.
Chang Ta-an
. CTS 68: 3316:1, HTS 89: 3895:1.
a. d. 684.
^
b. Wei-chou
'7I'| in Ho-pei.
c. Father a general and close friend of T'ai-tsung. Older brother high
official.
d. No examination.
e. Not noted.
f. None mentioned.
g. 677:4.
h. 3 years. Demoted when Crown Prince Hsien falls in 680.
i. Son has official career.
j. Associated with Hsien's commentary on Hou Han-shu.
ui Chih-wen ^
.
CTS 185 shang: 3559:4, HTS IO6: 3924:3.
Ts
d.
683
at
age
57.
a.
b. Hsu-chou
in Ho-nan.
c. Father and grandfather officeholders.
d. No examination.
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e. Ling-ohou tu-tu-fu ssu-ma '
f. None mentioned.
g. 679:4.
h. 3 years, 11 months.
i. Two sons as well as his elder brother have official careers.
P'el Yen;^j^^ . CTS 87: 3351:3, HTS 117: 3945:2.
a. Executed 684, supposedly conspiring to assassinate Empress Wu.
b. Chlang-chou
'J'l'j In Ho-tung.
c. No ancestors mentioned, but student In Eung-wen kuan.
d. Ming-ching.
nJ .n
J&, tS'
e. P’u-ohou ssu-ts’ang ts’an-onun^ ^ ^ •
f. None mentioned.
'
'
g. 679:4.
h. 5 years, 6 months.
I. Two sons have official careers.
j • Biographies assume Yen's Innocence of treason. Fonationna-ires^ p. 12.

68.

Kuo Cheng-1
jT — .
CTS 190 chung: 3581:4, .ffr/S IO6: 3924:4.
a. Executed 689 at age 82.
In Ho-pel.
b. TIng-chou
No
ancestors
mentioned.
c.
d. Ckin-shih
Chung-shu she-jen
^
A- .
e.
f. Hsueh Yuan-ch'ao (no. 6I).
g. 682:4.
h. 1 year, 8 months. Dismissed when Chung-tsung deposed.
No descendants mentioned.

69.

Ts'en Ch'ang-ch'len
CTS 70: 3319:3, ETS 102: 3917:1.
a. Executed 69I.
b. Chi-yang
In Ho-nan.
c. Nephew of Ts’en Wen-pen who adopted him (see no. 26).
d. No examination.
,
,
e. P-Cng-pu shih-tangg? .
f. None.
g. 682:4.
h. 9 years, 1 month. Opposed elevation of Wu Ch'eng-ssu to crown prince.
I. Son has career, executed shortly after his father, and the tombs of
his ancestors desecrated. A grandson Is appointed to high office by
Empress Wu In the oh'ang-an period [701-705], an act signaling the
restoration of political rights for the descendants of many of her
victims.
Wei Hsuan-fung^'^
. CTS 87: 3352:1, ETS 117: 3945:4.
a. Ordered to commit suicide in 689 at age 73.
b. Tlng-chouJ^'//‘I in Ho-pel.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. Chin-shih.
^ A.
J
•
e. Ssu-lieh
f. Li Shen-11
.
682:4.
g.
h. 7 years, 5 months.

70.
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71

I. Third son an official of Hsuan-tsung.
j. Well-known memorial on examination system.
Wei Hung-min ^
biography.

Examensj

p.

IkJ.

a. Dates unkn^n.
b.

—

c. --

d. —
e. —

f. —
g. 684: aheng.
h. 10 months.
Demoted because of connection with P'ei Yen.
Liu Wei-chih I'J
i:. CTS 87: 3351:4, HTS 117: 3945:372.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
73.

Ordered to commit suicide in 687 at age 57.
Ch'ang-chou
in Chiang-nan.
Grandfather a Ch'en prince, father holds high office in Sui and T'ang.
No examination.
Reputation for 1 iterature, appointed to Chao-wen-kuan b5
Probably Liu Ku-yen
'g' and Li Po-yaoj^^-fe
684:2
3 years, 5 months.
No sons mentioned. Elder brother held high posts.
Paramount minister while he held tsai-hsiang status
North Gate
scholar.

Wu Ch'eng-ssu
]83: 3553:1 , HTS 206: 4109:2.
a. d. 698 reputedly of chagrin.
b. T'ai-yuan A.
in Ho-tung. .
c. Son of Wu Yuan-shuang
half-brother of the Empress Wu.
d. No examination.
e. Shang-i feng-yu )
f. Called from exile to be heir tc
to Empress Wu's father.

74.

g. 684:5.
h. 8 years, 9 months.
i. One son forced to commit suicide by empress after offending the Chang
brothers, another active in the reign of Chung-tsung until the coup
against San-ssu.
j. See text.
Li Ching-ch'en;:^
.
No biography.
a.

b.
c.

d.
e.
f.
g. 684:10.
h. 1 month.
75.

Transferred to lower post.

Shen Chun-liang
a. --

b. c. --

No biography.
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76.

77.

d. —
e. —
f. —
g. 684:10.
h. 4 months. Transferred.
Ch'ien Wei-tao ^
a.
b.
c.
d.

Executed 688*,' probably in connection with Princes' Rebellion.
—
—
Decree examination in 675-

e.
f.
g.
h.

—
—
684:10 (disputed; second appointment 688).
9 months.

Ts'ui Tzu
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

78.

79.

No biography.

•

No biography.

-—
—
"

g- 684:10.
h. 5 months. Sent as commissioner to Ho-pei.
i Fang-chih i ^ ^ • ^TS 103: 3919:4.
We
a. Executed in 'early Chou for opposition to Wu Ch'eng-ssu.
[Ch'ang-an].
b. Ching-chao^
Grandfather
was
ming-ohing
and officeholder in Sui.
c.
d. No examination.
e. Not noted.
f. None mentioned.
g- 684:11.
h. Disputed. Probably 5 years, 3 months,
Family extinguished.
j • Eberhard, p. 386, no. 84.
Ssu-ch' i en ^
CTS 88: 3353:2, HTS 116: 3943:2.
We
d.
689
.
^
a. Cheng-chou
'J'fj in Ho-nan but remotely from Ch'ang-an area.
b.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
.
t
d. Chin-shih.
/S
ling-oh'eng
ling
e.
f. Kao Chi-fu (no. 3U anc Huang-fu Kungg- 685:2.
h. 2 years, 1 nxjnth. Resigns due to age.
i. Two sons both reach tsai-hsiang status. See nos. 131 and 135j • An admirable and uncompromising official. Eberhard, p. 72, no. 85.

11

80.

^ . CTS 86: 3350:3P' ei Ch'u-tao
Dies
in
prison
in
690
.
a.
in Ho-tung.
b. Chiang-chou
Father and gr^dfather officeholders, his daughter married to Crown
c.
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d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

81.

Prince Hung. Eminent clan.
No examination.
Na-yen
.
None mentioned.
685:2.
5 years, 6 months. Slandered by evil officials.
No sons mentioned.
Eberhard, p. 380, no. 61.

Liang-ssu ^
. CTS 75: 3329:1, HTS 103: 3919:2.
d. 690 at age 85.
Yung-chou
near Ch‘ang-an.
Father ancT grandfather held office in Chou and Wei, and father also had
successful career in Sui and T'ang.
d. No examination.
r\
_a.
t
e. Chou-wang-fu ssu-ma
^
'
Su
a.
b.
c.

f.
g.
h.
i.

82.

None mentioned.
685:5.
k years, 9 months.
Son has career but exiled to Ling-nan in Chou, causing erasure of fam
ily honors. Grandson regains dukedom at restoration.
j. An example of an innocent man charged by evil officials and saved by
intervention of the Empress Wu. Eberhard, p. 381, no. 63.
Wei Tai-chia i ^
- CTS 77: 3333:3, HTS 98: 3910:2.
a. d. in exil^ ca. 69u.
b. Yung-chou ^'^l-l near Ch'ang-an.
±/
c. Grandfather high Sui office, father, Wei T'ing
high office and
noble title in early T'ang. Married into T'ang family.
d. No examination.
e. Tso-oh'ien-niu ifff.
g.
h.
i.

None mentioned. Military renown.
685:6.
3 years, 11 months. Exiled for defeat by T'u-fan.
Younger brother has successful career. Son awarded fifth rank because
of father's early military success. Cousin to Wei An-shih (no. 125).
j. Little talent in civil realm. An object of scorn when he was placed
in charge of examination system. Eberhard, p. 386, no. 8^.
83.

Chang Kuang-fu
. CTS 90: 3360:3.
a. Executed 689. for sorcery and possible treason.
b. Ching-chao ^
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

8k.

No ancestors mentioned.
No examination.
^
Ssu-nung shao-oh ’ing
^
•
None mentioned. Gained merit in Princes' Rebellion.
687:5.
2 years, 3 months.
Family extinguished.

Wang Pen-1i
a. Dates unknown.
b. —

No biography.

187

The tsai-hsiang, 618-705

c.
d.
e.
f.

9- 688:9.

h. 1 year, 5 months.

85.

Fan Li-ping
19® ohung: 3581:4, HTS 201: 4100:3.
a. Executed 69Q f^r collusion in treason.
b. Huai-chou 'j^'7■^^ in Ho-pei.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. No
liVi/ w^Olll
examination.
I I 10 L I wl I •
Chou-wang-fu hu-ts’an
e.
f. North Gate scholar.
g. 689:1.
h. 6 months.
i. No sons mentioned.

^

j ^
^

86.

ie\
. CTS 189 hsia 3576:4, ETS IO6: 3926:2.
Hsing Wen-we
t' provinces for graft.
a. Suicide in exile 69O-I. Demotion to
b. Ch'u-chou
in Huai-nan.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. No examination.
, 7
7
e. T'ai-tzu tien-shan oh’eng
•
f. None mentioned, but early fame as scholar.
g. 689:10.
h. 1 year. Demoted.
i. No sons mentioned.

87.

CTS 183: 3553:3, ETS 206: 4109:3.
Wu Yu-ning
Cousin^^^9 ^ of the Empress Wu. See text.

690:2.

88.

h. Disputed. Probably 3 years, 3 months.
Shih Wu-tzu;)t-^i^ • CTS 90: 3360:3, ETS Il4: 3941:1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

89.

^

Committed suicide in 69I.
Hsuan-chou
in Chiang-nan.
Father officeholder.
No examination.
No information.
None mentioned.
690:9.
4 months. Slandered by Lai Chun-ch'en.
No descendan^ mentioned.

Fu Yu-i
. CTS 186 shang: 3564:4, ETS 223 shang; 4163:4.
a. Suicide'* in prison 691.
b. Wei-chou'7*l‘| in Ho-pei.
c.
d.
e.
f.

No ancestors mentioned.
No examination, a ,>7 ^
Bo-kung ohu-pu
^
'
Rises by flattering Empr«s Wu, claiming to have seen favorable omen
for usurpation.
g. 690:9.
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h. 11 months. Probably planning treason.
i. Sons and grandsons imprisoned for some crime between 705 and 707.
j. Called the "Minister of the Four Seasons" from the various colors of
his robes when he received four promotions in one year. Responsible
for the notorious massacres in Ling-nan of the exiled families of the
victims of the terror.
90.

ic,

Ko Fu-y"uan 4^#
• CTS 70: 3319:^, HTS 102: 3917:1.
a. Executed 691:10. Opposition to Wu Ch'eng-ssu.
b. Pien-chou
'J’/'l in Ho-nan.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

91.

92.

Uncle a Sui official.
Ming-ohing^ and famed for literary attainments.
Yu-shih ta-fu
None mentioned. Elder brother an official of Kao-tsung.
691:6.
k months.
No descendants mentioned.

Jen Chih-ku
. No biography.
a. No dates.
b. —
c. —
d. —
e. —
f. —
g. 691:6.
h. 7 months. Demoted to provincial post.
Y'ueh Ssu-hui
Ms ^ • See no. 49.
a. Executed 691:10. Opposition to Wu Ch'eng-ssu.
b. Son of Y'ueh Yen-wei (no. 49) .
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

93.

Ti Jen-chieh
a. 630-700.
b. Ping-choU'.:^
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

94.

—
—
-—
691:6.
4 months.
^9: 3356:1, HTS 115: 3941:2.
•7'1’j

in Ho-tung.

Same native place as Empress Wu.

Father and grandfather officeholders.
Ming-ohing.
Pien-ahou p'an-tso y-t
Yen Li-pen (no. 58).
691:8 for 4 months. Reappointed 697:8.
2 years, 10 months.
Sons and grandsons officeholders. Two sons known as bad officials.
The most famed official of the Chou, and only one who enjoyed the whole
trust of the Empress Wu. See text.

Ou-yang T'ung
. CTS 189 shang: 3575-3, HTS I98: 4090:4.
a. Executed 89L ^^or opposition to Wu Ch'eng-ssu.
b. T'an-chou
;lj‘| in Chiang-nan.
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c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

95.

96.

97.

Three generations of officeholders from Ch'en dynasty.
No examination but early fame as scholar.
Chung-shu she-Jen
^
•
None mentioned.
®
691:8.
2 months.
No descendants mentioned.

P'ei Hsing-pen
biography.
a. No dates.
b. Possibly brother of P'ei Hsing-chien.
c. —
d. "
e.
f.
g- 691:9.
h. k months. Exiled to Ling-nan.
^741-ail •
’97: 4088:1.
Li Yu-tao
a. No information.
Ho-pei.
b. Chao-chou^__
c. Grandfather ancf nephews officeholders.
ler ana nee
d. No examination.
e. Not mentioned.
f. None mentioned.
g. 692:1.
h. 8 months. Exiled to Ling-nan.
i. No sons mentioned.
j. Eberhard, p. 376, no. 43.
Ts'ui Shen-chi
. CTS 77: 3335:3, HTS 109: 3930:2.
a. Died in reign of Chung-tsung.
b. Pei-chou
‘J'lj in Ho-pei.
c. Father a military career and, as early partisan of Empress Wu, recip
ient of title to which Shen-chi succeeds.
d. No examination, though younger brother is ming-ching.
e. Ssu-pin oh'-lng '•J
f. None mentioned.

98.

g- 692:2.
Exiled to Ling-nan.
h. 7 months.
i. No descendants mentioned.
Yuan Chih-hung"^^
. No biography.
a No dates.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g- 692:2.
h. 7 months.

99.

Li Chao-te

Exiled to Ling-nan.
87: 3352:3, HTS 117: 3936:1
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

Executed 697 after being slandered by Lai Chun-ch'en.
Ch'ang-an 3
,
Father a
and prefect under T'ai-tsung but dies in disgrace.
Ming-dhing.
Feng-k’o shih-lang lliL 1%!^
•
None mentioned.
692:8.
1 year, 5 months. Posted to Turkish army.
No descendants mentioned.
Dominant minister during period of tsai-hsiang tenure. Too uncompromis
ing to be popular and his dismissal a result of his having too much
power.

100. Yao Shou
. CTS 89: 3358:1, BTS 102: 3918:1.
a. d. 705 atj^ge 7^.
b. Wan-nien^||
near Ch'ang-an.
c. Grandfather officeholder, orphaned while young.
d. Ming-dhing.
e. T*ai-tzu-kung men-tang
f. None mentioned.
g. 692:8.
h. 3 years, 1 month. Transferred to provincial post.
i. Younger brother passes ming-dhing, has rapid rise, holds many of same
posts as brother.
j. A wholly good minister. Expert on ming-fang and ritual generally.
Responsible for creation of office of shih-oheng-dhi
Fonotionnaires, p. 159; Eberhard, p. 386, no. 86.
101. Li Yuan-su4^^^. dTS 106: 3925:A.
a. Executed 697-'"^'

102.

b.
c.
d.
e.

Younger brother of Li Ching-hsuan (no. 59).
See no. 59No examination.
Wu-te ling ^

f.
g.
h.
i.

None mentioned. Probably aided by brother.
692:8.
4 years, 5 months. Charged with treason.
No descendants mentioned.
Yuan-tsung ^fu
. CTS 90: 3360:3, ETS 114: 3941:1.

Ts
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Grandfather an officeholder under Kao-tsu.
No examination.
Ch 'iu-kuan shih-lang
‘
None mentioned.
*

g-

692:8.

ui

d age over 90 in reign of Chung-tsung.
Cheng-chou Up‘J-lj in Ho-nan.

h. 2 years. Exiled to Chen-chou^;^7'/j because of enmity of other officials.
i. No descendants mentioned.
j • Known as a harsh official.
103. Wang Hs’uan

f^

a. Dates unknown.

.

No biography
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b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

g- 692:8.
h. 1 month. .Exiled to Ling-nan.
lOA. Lou Shih-te^
CTS 93: 3366:2, ETS IO8: 3929:4.
Lou Shih-te
d.
699
at
age
7h.
a.
■)’l| in Ho-nan.
b. Cheng-chou
c. No ancestors'mentioned.
d. Ckin-shih before the age of 20.
•
e. Chiang-tu wei
f.
g- 693:2 [disputedi.
Ch'ang-yeh
2 months.
h. 6Lu years,
i. No descendants mentioned.
j • A rare combination of civil and military talent, serving the state in
high posts for over 30 years.
105. Wei Chu-yuan % &
92: 3364:4, HTS 123: 3958:4.

g

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Killed 710 at age 80 in coup.
Third cousin of Wei An-shih (no. 125)
Three generations of officeholders.
No examination.
Ssu-pin shao-ah'ing
^ ^

Related to Empress Wei.

None mentioned.
''
693:9.
g.
h. Disputed. Probably 1 year, 10 months in all.
i. No descendants mentioned.
j Rise due to connections but a highly competent official.

■ CTS 88: 3354:4, HTS 116: 3944:4.
106. Lu Yuan-fang
'.
701
,
shortly
after
demotion.
a
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

g.
h.
i.
j.

Su-chou ^ ')')■
in Chiang-nan.
Eminent clan. Offices since Ch'en but father unmentioned.
Ming-ahing and decreee examination y\.
Chien-oh 'a yu-shih
^
.
None mentioned.
”
I
693:9.
Disputed. Probably 2 years. 2 months. Demoted for arrogance about
tsai-hsiang prerogative.
Son rises to tsai-hsiang under Chung-tsung.
Regarded as incorruptible. Consulted by Empress Wu on all promotions
and demotions.

#4

107. Tou-lu Ch'in-wang
. CTS 90; 3360:2, HTS 114: 3941:1.
a. d. 709 at aje over 80.
b. Ching-chao ^
[C h'ang-an].
c. Three generations of officeholders, marriage into both Sui and T'ang
families.
d. No examination.
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e. Ssu-pin-oh ’ing v I
f. None mentioned.
9- 693:9.
h. 2 years, 4 months. Transferred (no reason given).
i. No descendants mentioned.
j. Considered an expert in political survival
Possibly Eberhard, p. 382,
no. 70.
108. Su
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Wei-tao
CTS 94: 3368:1, HTS 114: 3940:4.
d. 706 at age 58.
Chao-chou
'Jl’l in Ho-pei.
No ancestors mentioned.
Chin-shih befor^the age of 20.
Hsien-yang wei Bj, f ^ Jcf .
P'ei Hsing-chi^/ I ^
g- 694:3.
h. 6 years, 7 months. Dismissed for overburdening the common people when
he moved father's tomb.
i. No sons mentioned. Younger brother has career.
j. Criticized for failure to innovate in his long tenure of high posts.
Known as the "fence sitter."
109. Wang Hsiao-chieh ^
. CTS 93: 3366:2, ETS 111: 3935:3.
a. Killed 696 in Khitan'^rebel 1 ion.
b. Ching-chao
.
No
ancestors
mentioned.
c.
d. No examination.
e. Military career. T'u-fan expert.
f. None mentioned.
g. 694:4.
h. 1 year, 11 months. Dismissed because of defeat,
i. Son has career, becoming general for Hsuan-tsung.
no. Wu Shih-fang

No biography.
Dates unknown.
—
-—
—
—
g. 694:7.
h. 1 month.
Retires to search for magic elixir.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

111. Yang Tsai-ssu
a. d. 709.
b. Cheng-c hou

CTS 90: 3360:1, ETS 109: 3930:3.
')'l'f

i n Ho-

nan.

c. No ancesstors mentioned.
d. Ming-ahing.
^
,
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

4

Esuan-wu wei ^ ^ A .
None mentioned.
694:8.
5 years, 4 months. Transferred to become censor.
Younger brother and grandson have careers.
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j. Known as a flatterer, sycophant to Chang brothers and expert in sur
vival.
112. Chou Yun-yuan 1? A fu.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

g.

CTS 90: 3360:4, ETS 114: 3941:1.

d. 696. ^
,
Yu-chou'j^'H‘1 in Ho-nan.
No ancestors mentioned.
Chin-ahih before age 20.

Su-oheng yu-shih ohung-oh 'eng

j.
^

/k

\b ^

j

•

None mentioned.

694:10.

h. 1 year, 4 months. Dies in office.
i. No descendants mentioned.

113. Sun Yuan-heng
a. Executed 697.
b. -c. —
d. —
e. —
f. —
g< 696:4.
h. 9 months.
114. Li
a.
b.
c.

-

No biography.

No biography.
Tao-kuang
d. ca. 700 in nOnor.
Remotely Hua-chou
') l'l in Ho-nan; moved to Wan-nien in the Sui.
Father a Sui genera? who joined T'ang and was rewarded with dukedom

and imperial surname.
d. No examination.
e. Pien-chou>*p )-|| prefect.
f. None mentioned.
g. 696:9.
h. 1 year, 4 months. Transferred to provinces.
i. No descendants mentioned.
115. Wang Fang-ch'ingX ^ ^. CTS 89: 3357:3, HTS IO6: 3942:4.
a. d. 702 in honor.
b. Yung-chou ^near Ch'ang-an. Until moving north in the Chou, con
sidered ari eminent Chiang-tso clan.
c. Four generations of officeholders, but Fang-ch'ing orphaned at age I6
d. No examination.
- ^ v
Yueh-wang-fu ts 'an-ohun
^^
e.
f. None mentioned.
g- 696:9.
h. 1 year, 11 months.
i. Son holds office under Hsuan-tsung.
j* A bibliophile and expert in ritual. Much honored by Empress Wu.
sibly Eberhard, p. 385, no. 81.
116. Wang Chi-shani.>^4 •
90: 3359:1, HTS II6: 3944:3.

Pos

a. 617-699. Dies in semi-disgrace after criticizing Chang brothers.
b. Lo-chou_^;^ •>/-( in Ho-nan.
c. Father a Sui general, joins T'ang, wins dukedom, and dies in Korea.
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d. Chi-shan succeed^ to father's title.
e. Tso-feng-yu ^ ^
.
f. None mentioned. '

No examination.

g. 697:A.
h. 2 years, k months.

Asks for holiday and never recalled.
i. No descendants mentioned.
j. Lacked formal education, but much praised by contemporaries.
role in ending of terror.
Tsung
Ch'u-k'o ^. CTS $2: 3365:4, ffFS 109: 3930:4.
117.
a. Executed ^0 in coup.
b. P'u-chou^’ )i ( in Ho-nan.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Large

No ancestors mentioned, but marriage relationship to Empress Wu.
No examination.
Fang-shao-ohien r} ‘V jj* .
None mentioned. Elder brother urges usurpation.

g. 697:6.

h. Disputed. Probably 11 months in all.
i. Family extinguished.
j. Closely connected with Chang brothers.
—CT5 183: 3553:2, HTS 206: 4109:4.
118. Wu San-ssu
Son of Wu Yllan-ch'ing
, half-brother of the Empress Wu.
See text.
^
g. 697:6.

h. Disputed.
119. Tu
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
1.
j.

120.

Probably 2 years, 2 months.

Ching-ch'uan
HTS 116: 3944:4.
d. ca. 698 on the road to provincial post.
Chi-chouin Ho-pei.
No ancestors mentioned.
Ming-ohing.
Tien-ohung shih-yu-shih
^
‘
None mentioned.
694:8 for 5 months, 697:10.
1 year, 2 months. Transferred.
No descendants mentioned.
An upright man, contributed to preservation of justice during the
terror. Eberhard, p. 68, no. 78.

Chi Hsii
, CTS I86 shang: 3565:3, HTS 117: 3946:2.
a. d. in exile 700.
b. Lo-chou
in Ho-nan.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. Chin-ohih.
j,
e. Ming-t'ang wei
.
f. None mentioned. Rises by denouncing conspiracy.
g. 698:11.
h. 1 year, 3 months. Dismissed for insulting Wu l-tsung and because his
brother gains a post under false pretenses.
i. No descendants mentioned.
j. Responsible for many executions during the terror and closely connected
with Chang brothers, but secretly a T'ang loyalist. Much favored by
Empress Wu.
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121. Wei Yuan-chung
■ CTS 90: 3362:4, ETS 122: 3954:4.
d.
ca.
710
at
age
over
70.
a.
b. Sung-chou ^'7|-j In Ho-nan.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. Failed examination candidate.
Appointed to mi-shu sheng
^ on strength of unsolicited memorial
e.
in 678.
f. None mentioned.
g. 698: intercalary last month.
h. 4 years, 1 month.
i. 2 sons have careers.
j • A principled and uncompromising official. Three times exiled from
capital but much valued by Empress Wu. Helped compile her shi-h-tu.
122. Yao Ch'ungJ^l£,

.

CTS 96: 3371:1 , ETS 124: 3959:1.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

651-721.

Decree examination T
‘
.
P 'u-ohou ssu-ts ’ang
yjS -ff\ ^ ^ •
Su Liang-ssu (no. 81).

g.

698:1.

Loyang, more remotely from Shan-chou
'J'l'l in Ho-nan.
Father an officeholdei* under T'ai-tsung.

h. 5 years, 7 months. Resigns to care for mother,
Three sons have official careers.
or Yiian-chih ^ Z>.
Also known as Yao Yuan-ch'ung ^
^4: 4-u^
tion of
the Empress u..
Wu. ExamenSj^pp 254-5.
123

Wept at deposi

Chiao
. CTS 94: 3368:1, ETS 123: 3957:4.
6A4-713.
Chao-chou^^
in Ho-pei.
Three generations of officeholders. Considered eminent clan.
of Chang Hsi
d. Ch-in-shih before age of^20.
Chien-dh'a yu-shih ^ ^
e.
f. None mentioned.
Li
a.
b.
c.

g.

Nephew

698:10.

h. 3 years, 4 months. Demoted at restoration.
i. No sons mentioned.
j- A remarkable career, balancing sycophancy to Wu clan with some of the
frankest renronstrance of his time. An important literary talent,
leaving collected works in 50 ahuan. Nephew of Chang Hsi (next entry)
ExamenSj p. 245; Eberhard, p. 52, no. 51.
124. Chang Hsi
CTS 85: 3349:1 , ETS 113: 3939:3a. Died earl^in reign of Jui-tsung.
in Ho-pei.
b. Pei-chou
Nephew of Chang Wen-kuan (no. 57) and uncle of Li Chiao (no. 123).
c.
d. No examination.
e. Not mentioned.
f. None mentioned.
g- 700:7.
Exiled for accepting bribes.
h. 6 months.
No
descendants
mentioned.
i.
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125. Wei An-shih t^To. CTS 92: 3364:1, ETS 122: 3955:4.
a. d. 714 at age 64.
b. Ching-chao
.
c. Three generations of officeholders. See no. 82.
d. Ming-ohing.
e. Ch 'ien-feng wei
f. Su Liang-ssu (no. 8l).
g. 700:10.
h. 3 years, 10 months. Demoted for opposition to Changs.
i. Two sons and several other family members have official careers.
lated to Empress Wei.
j. Eberhard, p. 386, no. 84.

tS.ll. .

126. Li Huai-yuan ^
a. d. 706 in nonor.
b. Hsing-chou
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
127. Ku
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

g.
h.
i.
128. Li

Re"

CTS 90: 3360:2, HTS 116: 3945:1.

')li in Ho-pei.

No ancestors mentioned.
Improverished orphan.
Ssu-k'o \VO
Ssu-ti shao-an'ing ^
None mentioned.
^
'
701:2.
5 months. Resigns because of age.
Son and grandson have successful careers.
Much favored by the Empress Wu.
Known for his frugal tastes and love
of nature.
Ts'ung^l
. HTS 102: 3918:4.
d. 702'In^honor.
Su-chou ^ 'Jl'l in Chiang-nan.
Father and grandfather officeholders from Sui.
No examination.
Li-pu shih-lang
•
None mentioned.
'
'
701:5.
1 year, 5 months. Dies in office.
No descendants mentioned.
Chiung-hsiu
^ . CTS 62: 3304:1, HTS S3: 3911:2.

a. d. between 7u7 ancr710.
b. Eminent Lung-hsi clan.
c. Three generations of office and titles.

ft 'W,

d. Three decree examinations
iltf
and ohin-shih,
e. Hsiang-ahou ts’an-ahun fH
"J .
f. Empress Wu values his 1 iterary'^taTent and places him precipitately in
charge of examinations.
g. 701:6.
h. 2 years, 8 months. Demoted when attacked by other officials for his
association with Chang brothers.
i. Son has career, but family extinguished in k’ai-yuan (713-742) because
of his treason.
j. His mother was of low-born family, but his wife of the eminent Ts'ui
clan. Eberhard, p. 48, no. 50.
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129- T'ang Hsiu-ching ^

a.
b.
c.

•

CTS 93: 3366:3, HTS 111: 3935:^.
d. 712 at age 86 in honor.
Ching-chao Jf.
•
Grandfather and great-grandfather have military careers. Father un
mentioned.
Ming-ching before age 20.
^
Wu-wang-fu tien-oh'ien
^

d.
e.
f. None mentioned.
g. 703:7.
In office at restoration.
h. 1 year, 5 months.
Elder
son
succeeds
to
rank and has civil career. Second son a general.
i.
The
greatest
expert
of
his time on western frontier affairs. Much
j.
valued by Empress Wu.
130. Chu Ching-tse

CTS 90: 3359:3, JITS 115: 39^2:3-

a. d. 709 at age 75*
•J'l'l in Ho-nan.
b. Po-chou
c. Notable family; famed since Chou for Confucian virtue.

Ancestors un-

mentioned.
d. No examination.
.
e. Po-shui wei
f. Wei Yuan-chung (no. I2l)
g. 703:7.
h. 7 months. Resigns because of age.
i. No descendants mentioned.
j. Known for frankness. An historian of note.

131

Wei Ssu-1i a1 o - IL .
a. d. 719 at ac e 66.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

h.
i.
j.

CTS 88: 335^:^, HTS 116: 39^3:3.

'jH in Ho-nan.
Cheng-chou
Ssu-ch'ien
(no. 79) .
Son of Wei
Ch-in-shih. ling 1?
Shuang-liu
Recommended by his father.
70A: aheng (disputed).
11 months. Transferred when his brother reaches tsai-hsiccng status.
Three sons, all have good careers.
A relative of the Empress Wei. Eberhard, p. 72, no. 85.

CTS 91: 3361:A, HTS 120: 3952:3.
638
706
.^
0
ies
on
road
to
provincial demotion.
a.
Po-lingJ4P^
in
Ho-pei.
b.
Eminent clat^ Father held low post.
c.
. ,
, .
d. Ming-ahing.
K'u-pu yuan-wai-lang
^
'
e.
None
mentioned.
”
'
f.
g. 704:6.
h. 6 months. Still in office at restoration.
i. Two sons have official careers. Younger brother a high official in own
time.
Exemplar of the best features of the northeastern aristocracy.
Ebarhard,
p. 65, no. 77a.

132. Ts' ui Hslian-wei
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133. Chang Chien-chlh
. CTS 91: 3361:4, HTS 120: 3952:4.
a. 625-706. Destroyed by Wu San-ssu.
b. Hsiang-chouX'J)( in Shan-nan.
c. No ancestor^^entioned.
d. Chin-shihj and decree examination of 689 when he was first of more
than 1,000 candidates.
Ch
Hng-oh ’eng oh 'eng
^ .
e.
f. Ling-hu Te-fen, Yao Cn'ung (no. 122), and Ti Jen-chieh (no. 93).
704:10.
gh. 3 months.
In office at restoration.
1. Son a bad official, partly responsible for father's downfall.
j • Leader of restoration coup.
Fang Jung^
.
CTS 111: 3403:3» UTS 139: 3985:3 [Biography of son
134.
Fang Kuan].
a. Exiled 705, died shortly thereafter.
b. Loyang.
c. No ancestors mentioned.
d. No information.
e. No information.
f. None mentioned.
g. 704:10.
h. 3 months.
In office at restoration.
i. Son has biography.

135. Wei Ch'eng-ch'ing
CTS 88: 3354:2, HTS II6: 3943:3a. d. ca. 709 in h^or. ^
b. Son of Wei Ssu-ch'ien (no. 79).
c. Above.
.
. , _
d. Ch'in-sh'ih.
Yung-wang-fu
ts
’an-aKim
e. None mentioned.
^
f.
704:11.
gh. 2 months.
Demoted at restoration for connection with Chang brothers.
i. No sons mentioned.
Much praised for his work in presiding over examination system. Skilled
in literature and helps compile the shih-lu of Empress Wu as well as
composing a separate work called Tse-t’ien huang-hou ohi sheng-wen
Eberhard, p. 72, no. 85.

(
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NOTES
(Works ore mvuxlly cited in abbreviated form. For full citations, see abbrevi
ations on page xii and the bibliography.)
Chapter 1
1. According to some classifications of Chinese mythology, the sister of Fu
Hsi, called Nu Kua, was numbered among the san-huang of antiquity and so might
be considered China's first female ruler. See Ch'en Teng-yuan, Kuo-shih chiuwen, V. 1, pp. hk-kl. The chronology of the reign of the Empress Wu is subject
to some dispute, but by correlating the dates of the earliest sources given in
the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien k'ao-i, I suggest that her elevation occurred on No
vember 2k, 655, that the Chou dynasty was proclaimed on October 16, 690, and
that the T'ang restoration occurred on February 23, 705On the empress' titles, see THY 3, PP- 2J-k, CTS 6:3077:1, NTS 76:3868:2.
Citations are to the K'ai-ming edition of 1935, and references take the form of
chiian: page: section, as above. References to the TCTC are from the Ku-chi ch'upan-she edition (Peking, 1957) which intersperses the k’ao-i and the Hu Sanhsing commentary in the text. Other editions noted in the bibliography have
been used occasionally for textual verification.
2. One of the best-known novels is the Sui-T’ang yen-i attributed to Lo Kuanchung in the fifteenth century and revised in a hundred hui by Ch'u Jen-huo,
probably about 1681. The chapters pertaining to the empress begin at hui 70.
An even more famous example is the Ch'ing work (Thing-hua-yuan by Li Ju-chen.
A large erotic literature concerned with the scandals of the Chou court
and the empress' "lovers" also exists, many of these works transmitted only in
Japan. Professor Herbert Franke of Munich has recently called to my attention
two manuscripts found in the Harvard-Yenching Library, the short novel Ju-ichun chuan (anon.) and the Seng Huai-i chapter of the Seng-ni nieh-hai, some
times attributed to the painter T'ang Yin. A long novel called Wu-hen-t'ien
(noted by Sun K'ai-ti, Chung-kuo t’ung-su hsiao-shuo shu-mu, p. 151) does not
seem to be pornographic.
Several modern works are rather sensationalistic. Among these are the
T'ang-kung erh-shih-ch'ao yen-i by Hsu Hsiao-t'ien and the Li-tai ti-wang hsingai mi-wen published under the pseudonym Ling-yun Ko-chu. Some Japanese have
been similarly impressed by this aspect of the empress' life, and a representa
tive product is Hayashi Fusao, Chugoku senya ichiya.
In recent drama, two well-known plays are Kuo Mo-Jo's four-act Wu Tset'ien, first performed in 1959> and T'ien Han's Hsieh Yao-huan, first published
in Chu-pen, 1961, no. 7-8, pp. 6-A3- Like Wu Han's "Hai Jul Dismissed from
Office," the latter play is an attempt to use an historical figure to criticize
the Maoist regime, and it was suppressed in the Cultural Revolution.
In recent
days the empress' career has once again been widely discussed because of attempts
to compare her with Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing. On this question see Chung-kuo
tsa-chih, July 1975, pp. 39-44.
Works in English include Lin Yu-t'ang's imaginative novel Lady Wu, and the
late Robert van Gulik's successful series of Judge Dee mysteries based upon Ti
Jen-chieh, the most famous of the great ministers of the Empress Wu.
3. For a summary of the debate in the 1950s see Albert Feuerwerker, ed..
History in Communist China (Cambridge: M.l.T. Press, 1968), pp. 132-135- A
more detailed discussion is Tonami, "Zui no boetsu."
4. See Gardner, Historiography, and several studies in Beasley and Pulleyblank, Historians.
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5. On Easton's views, see A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York,
1965), particularly pp. 286-305, and for Weber, The Theory of Social and Econ
omic Organization (New York, 1957).
6. Weber, pp. 326-7.
7. For this and some of the following perceptions, I am indebted to an un
published manuscript by Anne Thurston of Yale University, "Authority, legiti
macy and power: A reformulation."
8. In the year 696. See TEY 7, p. lOA, CTS 6:3076:2, and HTS ^:36^2:1.
9. TCTC 207, p. 6559.
10. CTS 6:3077:1 and HTS k:3(>h2:k.
11. I am uncertain here of my translation of the phrase ch’u-chi-u chih ying-mo
12. The reference here is to the legendary Fu Hsi. The phrase runs tang haohsi chih li-shu
.
13. TTCLC 2:3b, CTW 17:10b. At a recent ACLS conference at Asilomar, Calif
ornia in June of 1975 the late Professor Arthur F. Wright suggested that it was
unlikely Chung-tsung himself was responsible for this decree. While I tend to
agree, I believe that its very promulgation is the important point since it por
trayed Tse-t'ien as a legitimate ruler rather than as a usurper.
H. THY 63, p. 1094.
15. TCTC 208, p. 6596.
16. THY 63, pp. 1095-97.
17. Ibid.
18. CTS 6:3075:3.
19. HTS 4:36^3:3. On the compilation of the T'ang histories see des Rotours,
ExamenSt pp. 111-112.
20. See des Rotours, Examens^ pp. 111-112.
21. T'ang-shu chih-pi 3:6b-7a and 2:23ab respectively.
22. T'ang-shu chih-pi 4:1 ab.
23. HTS 76:3867:3.
24. Kuang never refers to her as anything but t'ai-hou, reporting the usurpa
tion of 690 in the following terms: "The empress dowager accepted {k'o) [the
title] huang-ti and the request of the ministers [to establish the Chou]." TCTC
204, p. 6467.
25. For Chu Hsi's listing of the dynasties he considered to be legitimate, see
his introduction to the Chih-yuan k’ao-ting t’ung-chien kang-mu. The kang-mu
follows Shen Chi-ch'i's suggestion and, considering Chung-tsung to be the legiti
mate monarch, lists his whereabouts in each year of the Chou before outlining the
history of the period.
26. See Note 1 to this chapter and Yang, Excursions^ pp. 27-44. This article,
entitled "Female rulers in ancient China," appeared originally in HJAS 23 (196061), pp. 47-61.
27. From the "Speech at Mu." See Legge, Shoo King, pp. 302-303.
28. Karlgren, Book of Odes, no. 264.
29. Analects, XVI1:25.
Legge, in the Four Books, uses the translation "girls
and servants" for nu-tzu yu hsiao-jen
•
30. On this term see Pan Ku, Former Han, v. 1, p. 192, n. 1.
31. Ch'u, Han Social Structure, pp. 73”74.
32. See, for instance, Nien-erh-shih cha-chi, v. 1, pp. 40 and 57.
33. San-kuo chih, Wei-chih 2:0924:2. The edict uses the term fu-cheng,"a\A in
government."
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Yang, Exoursi-onSj pp. 50 ff. The cases in which female regency seems to
have been accepted followed closely the Han precedents: the extreme youth of
the heir, the illness or inability of a reigning emperor to manage government,
and the issue of an edict of permission from a dying emperor.
35- Sui-shu 36:2457:3.
36. Although most studies contrasting the northern and southern dynasties re
mark on the relative freedom of women in the North, a monograph on the subject
would be most welcome, lenq, Family Instructions, p. 19, translates an observa
tion of the late sixth century: "in the city of Yeh it was the custom for women
to handle all family affairs, to demand justice and straighten out legal dis
putes, to make calls and curry favor with the powerful. They filled the streets
with their carriages . . . begged official posts for their sons and made com
plaints about injustice done to their husbands. Were these customs handed down
from the T'o-pa Wei dynasty?" The wife of Sui Wen-ti {Sui-shu 36:2457:2), nee
Tu-ku, was perhaps typical of this sort of woman and was considered by contem
poraries to be almost a partner in her husband's government. On the first T'ang
empresses, see CTS 51:3278:4 ff.
37. CIS 52:3283:2.
38. NTS 76:3869:2.
39. Biography in CTS 190
:3581 :1 and EIS 201:4100:3.
40. The full text is found in WYYH 646:llb-12b and CTW 199:la-2a.
41. See, for instance, CIS 6:3077:1 and the examples from all three works
cited in Appendix A. Several others are pointed out in the text.
42. Yuan Shu entitles olvuan 30 of his T'ung-ohien chi-shih pen-mo "The Cal
amity of the Empresses Wu and Wei" and, as earlier noted, Chu Hsi portrays her
as an ambitious and unscrupulous usurper in the hang-mu. Wang Fu-chih, in Tu
t'ung-ohien lun^ oKuan 21, details the weakness and stupidity of Kao-tsung,
impugns the motives of the Empress Wu in all her acts, expresses outrage at her
executions, and even refuses to credit her with such well-knwon innovations as
the palace examination.
Fang Hsiao-ju, in what seems to be the prevailing view
in the Ming, exhibits a similar attitude in such works as his Hsun-ahih ohai-ohi,
ohuan 5.
Chao I seems to hold a fairly balanced view of the empress both in his
Kai-yu ts'ung-k'ao^ ahuan 41, and in his Nien-erh-shih aha-ahi where ahuan 19
contains two essays, one condemning her excessive punishments and the other
praising her ability to accept remonstrance and to use the best possible men in
her administration.
In ahuan 3 of the latter work, however, he compares her to
the Han Empress Lu and states unequivocally that from antiquity, her evil was
unparalleled. Wang Ming-sheng, in the Shih-oh'i-ohih shang-ohiao reflects the
hostile attitude of the T'ang official histories.
43. In her own time, of course, the empress did not lack defenders, and tal
ented literati like Li Chiao, Ch'en Tzu-ang and the poet Shen Ch'uan-ch'i turned
their considerable skills to the praising of her reign. Generally, however,
these were conventional, commissioned works and of little historiographical im
portance.
The first important defense of the empress as a ruler came from Lu Chih,
one of the most important of T'ang Te-tsung's ministers. See CTS 139:3453:4 and
HTS 157:4015:3. His political writings are favorable to her, admiring her skill
ful use of officials and her ability to hold the support of the people. See, for
instance, Lu-hsuan-kung ah'uan-ohi^ ahuan 7 {Ch'ing hsu t'ai-sheng ch'ang-kuan
ahu-ahien shu-li ahuxxng. Another noted T'ang figure, Li Chiang {CTS 164:3056:1

202

Notes to Chapters 1 and 2

and HTS 152:^007:3) holds a similar view. See Li- hsiang-kuo lun-shih ohi^ ohuan
299 hsia.
In the Sung, the only figure of note who seems to have been favorably dis
posed was Hung Mai whose biography is to be found in Sung-shih 373:5460:3. His
writings are of great range and make frequent reference to the Empress Wu and
developments of her reign. While he censures her for the rise of supernumerary
officials {jimg-oh'i son-pi, ohuan 7), his wider view as stated in the Jungoh'i hsu-pi is that as a ruler she was the equal of Han Wu-ti.
The Ming scholar Li Chih whose career is outlined in Ming-shih 221:7622:
3, suggested that no recent ruler had measured up to her standard in the ability
either to know men or to value talent. He praised the internal peace of her
reign and considered her generally a model for subsequent ages. See Li Chih
ts’ang-shu, ohuan 48.
44. Ch'en Yin-k'o, "Hun-yin chi-t'uan," pp. 33“51.
45. See Ts'en, SuiT'ang shih, chapter 13; and Lu, Sui T'ang Wu-tai shih, v.
1, pp, 126-149.
46. These works are Lu Chen-yti, Chien-ming Chung-kuo t'ung-shihj Ch'ien Potsan et al., Chung-kuo ti-shih kai-yao; and Shang Y’ueh et al., Chung-kuo Zishih kang-yao, especially pp. 128-132. Both Professors Lu and Ch'ien have writ
ten separate articles on the empress.
47. See the fifty-page appendix to Kuo Mo-jo's Wu Tse-t’ien in the second edi
tion (1963) which introduces a good deal of new information and concludes that
the empress' reign was perhaps the high point of the T'ang and the keystone of
the dynasty's greatness. Yang Chih-chiu, Sui-T’ang summarizes favorable com
ments on the empress since Chao I and portrays the Chou as an era of great pros
perity and rapid development in agriculture, handicrafts, textiles and water
control. Wu Han, a central figure early in the Maoist cultural revolution,
wrote about the empress in 1959. His paper, reproduced in his Teng-hsia dhi,
pp. 140 ff., is a well-argued if poorly documented apology dismissing the stand
ard charges against her as little more than the bias of traditional historio
graphy, and praising the use of her reign by influential scholars like Fan Wenlan to discredit the Kuomintang. The reference here is to Fan's pioneering
survey Chung-kuo t'ung-shih ohien-pien.
48. Wu Tse, "Kuan-yu Wu Tse-t'ien," and "Lun T'ang-tai ch'ien-ch'i."
49. These are The Empress Wu by Fitzgerald, Wu Tse-t'ien by Li T'ang, and
Sokuten Buko by Toyama Gunji.

Chapter 2
1. CTS 6:3075:3, NTS 76:3871:1 and 4:3640:3- A good deal of information is
also to be found in the annals of Kao-tsung, CTS 4:3070:4, and HTS 3:3638:3.
2. The principal compilations of this kind, in addition to the Ts'e-fu yuankuei, are the T 'ai-p'ing kuang-ohi and the T ’ ai-p' ing yu-lan. All date from the
Sung and their composition is outlined by Kuo Pai-kung in Sung ssu-ta-shu k'ao.
3. The chief anecdotal sources used are:
(a) Ch’ao-yeh oh'ien-tsai by Chang Cho dating from the early eighth century.
(b) Feng-shih wen-ohien ohi by Feng Yen dating from about 8OO.
(c) Ta T'ang hsin-yu by Liu Su, composed 807.
(d) Liu pin-k'o hsi-hua Zu by Wei Hsuan, composed 856.
(e) T'ang ohih-yen by Wang Ting-pao, ca. 955.
(f) Nan-pu hsin-shu by Ch'ien I, composed between IOO8 and 1016.
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(g) T’ccng yu-ttn by Wang Tang, ca.

1100.
Details on several of these works may be found in des Rotours, Examens.
h. The empress' writings extant today constitute only a small proportion of
those attributed to her in the various bibliographies. Her official writings
are found in such works as the WIYH and TTCLC and are conveniently collected in
CTW 95:4a ff., T'ang-wen shih-i 8:19a ff. and T'ang-wen hsu-shih 1:3b ff. A
number of her surviving poems are found in Ch'uan T’ang-shih 5:51b ff.
The bibliographical sections of the RTS {ohuan 57-60) list no fewer than
twenty-three works issued under her name and comprising in all almost 700 ohuan.
Among these were such large-scale compilations as the Kao-tsung shih-lu (Ver
itable Records of Kao-tsung), Ch'ut-'kung oht (Collected Writings of the oh'u-Lkung Period) and Lteh-nu ohuan (Biographies of Eminent Women), each of them at
least 100 oKuan in length. Most corranentators acknowledge that the majority of
the works ascribed to the empress were in fact composed by the so-called North
Gate Scholars, but their scope and range is indicative of her denranstrated lit
erary interests and also of her use of Confucianism for legitimizing purposes.
5. On T'ai-tsung's attempts to manipulate the record, see Wechsler, Mi-vvov^
pp. 19 ff.
On several occasions Empress Wu revealed a concern with her place in his
tory, for instance when she told Ti Jen-chieh that she wanted her own dynasty
to enjoy a reputation equal to that of the Han. See CTS 89:3357:2. Conspicuous
examples of her overt influence upon the historical process are cited through
out the text, and both Wu Ching and Liu Chih-chi had occasion to complain of the
low standard of historiography in her period of power. During the Chou, in 702
and 703, memorials from Liu Ylin-chi and Chu Ching-tse emphasized the great im
portance of true records, obliquely criticizing the bias of contemporary compila
tions. On these criticisms, see CTS 190 ohungand RTS 202:4101:1 for Liu
and CTS 90:3353:3 and RTS 115:3942:3 for Chu. The memorials are abstracted in
TRY 63, pp. 1100-1.
6. CTW 11:25b. The edict comments on the prominence of the Wu clan and the
"talent and conduct" of the empress which led to her selection for the harem.
Her behavior in the palace is said to have won her renown and, contrary to all
other evidence, she is said to have gotten along well with the other palace
women. The edict further implies by the use of the term hsi.en-tz'u that Wu
served Kao-tsung's mother rather than his father and that it was bestowed upon
him by his father {sheng-ohHng) . This was equivalent to making her empress
{t'lmg-oheng-dKiin) . Needless to say, much of this was untrue.
7. Pulleyblank, in "Kaoyih," outlines the compilation of the shih-lu and kuoshih of the seventh and early eighth century and identifies some of the figures
involved.
8. In Baokgroundj pp. 3"5, and Appendix A of this work.
9. See Wechsler, Mirror, pp. 24-27, TRY 63, p. 1094, and T^K 554:1 la. ^
10. See, for instance. Appendix A, example 1, where the shih-lu identified is
attributed to Wu Ching.
11. On Tsung, see CTS 92:3365:4. He is said to be the inventor of the new
characters the empress promulgated shortly before her usurpation. His work was
in eighteen oTuian.
12. TRY 63, p. 1094, TFYK 554:17a. The RTS, the Shih-t'ung 12:30a, and the
Ch'ung-wen tsung-mu ohih-shih-lu all mention this work.
It was in twenty ohuan
and a decade later was revised in thirty ohuan by Wu Ching and Liu Chih-chi.
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According to the k'ao-i 8:16a, ta-yeh 9, it was this revised version that was
used by Ssu-ma Kuang.
13* See THY 63, p. 1098 and TFIK 556:17a. Liu, in his well-known letter of
resignation {Sh'Lh-t'ung 20:10a-15b), complained that an official historian was
for the most part compelled to follow the directions of his supervisor in what
he wrote.
14. On the historiographical standards of Liu Chih-chi, see Beasley and Pulleyblank, Htstorians^ pp. 135“36 and note, for instance, the k’ao-i notice for
t'ien-shouj second month in TCTC 204, p. 6463, where the shih-tu posits a natural
death for a minister said elsewhere to have been executed on the empress' order.
15. On Hsu, see CT3 82:3342:4 and HTS 111 shang:k\(>l:\ .
16. Wechsler, Mirror, p. 25n. See also Pulleyblank, "Kaoyih" for some brief
remarks on the composition of T'ai-tsung's shih-lu. The CTS mentions the shihtu both of Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung in 20 ahuan authored by Fang Hslian-ling, and
a second shih-tu in 40 ahuan for T'ai-tsung, authored by his brother-in-law
Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi. For Kao-tsung there are two listings: one in 30 ahuan by
Hsu Ching-tsung and one in 100 aKuan under the name of Empress Wu.
The HTS notice offers more information, listing a Kao-tsu shih-tu by Ching
Po {CIS 189 shang-.l51(>-2, HTS 198:4091:4) under Fang's supervision, and suggests
that is was revised by Hsu Ching-tsung. Another work by Ching and supervised by
Fang is the Chin-shang shih-tu which clearly refers to T'ai-tsung {THY 63, p.
1092). This seems to have been supplemented in 650 by Wu-chi's additional 20
aiiuan, becoming the Chen-kuan shih-tu in 40 ahuan {THY, toa. ait. and TFYK 554:
30a and 556:12a). The HIS is the only source to mention a 30-ahuan Huang-ti
shih-tu by Hsu Ching-tsung. This work seems to have been used by Ssu-ma Kuang
(see next sentence in text) and, if so, it must have been used by the dynastic
historians as wel1.
17. K'ao-i 8:10b, ta-yeh 12/12.
18. See note 16.
19. See note 16.
20. See, in addition to his biographies mentioned in note 15, THY 64, pp.
1103-4, and Wechsler, Mirror, p. 25.
21. THY 63, pp. 1092-3.
Interestingly, Kao-tsung refers specifically to in
cidents in the kuo-shih prior to 649, strengthening my conjecture that Hsu Chingtsung was largely responsible for our knowledge of the history of this period.
22. See Appendix A.
23. See, for instance, the remarks of Shen Chi-ch'i, a compiler of the kuoshih in 780, THY 63, pp. 1095 ff.
24. CTS 58:3296:1.

Chapter 3
1. See Note 21 to this chapter.
2. The text of this inscription is found in WYYH 875:1a and CTW 249:1a. See
also the memorial from its author, Li Chiao, thanking the empress for the rewards
he received on its completion. WYYH 592:2a and CTW 246:7b.
In 669 the empress changed the name of the bureau in charge of her father's
tomb from Hao-ling shu to P'an-lung t'ai and, according to the Sung epigraphical
collection Pao-k'o ts'ung-pien 7:22, the stele itself was erected in 700. The
Chin-shih tu 25:5b describes the stele and tells us that the calligraphy was that
of Chung-tsung.
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Citations are from the WIYH text.
3. Just northwest of present-day Ch‘eng-ku hsten in Shansi, about six miles
east of the Fen river; see HTS 39:3723:1. TT 179:11b and THI 70, p. 1257. For^
geographical references I depend chiefly on Hiraoka Takeo, ed., Todat no gyoset
ohiri.
,
k. I am not certain of the sense of the phrase which runs yi-nmeng _ ku-cmen
l3
parallel HFS passage runs yin-pel ku-ehieh
^ .
5. According to TCTC I83, p. 5732, Wu Shih-huo was occupying this post in
617, and TFYK 345:22a gives a more specific chronology, indicating that he was
appointed at the time of Kao-tsu's attack on Hsi-ho ohim which would mean_the
sixth lunar month. See also TCTC 184, p. 5739 and Nunome,Zui Toshl kenkyu^ pp.
117 ff. The post of ssu-k’ai was in charge of armor, weapons, etc. See des
Rotours, FonctlonnalveSf v. 2, p. 5116. For a good discussion of fu-jui^ see a paper recently presented by Anna
Seidel to the ACLS conference on legitimation at Asilomar in June of 1975* The
paper is called "Dynastic treasures and Taoist lu registers."
7. Biographies are found in CTS 58:3295:1 and HTS 90:3896:1 for Liu, and in
CTS 194 shang:35S(>-3 and HTS 105:3923:1 for Ch'ang-sun.
8. Neither of them has a biography. From the description of the incident
found in TCTC I83, pp. 5733 ff. we know that Wang Wei was deputy llu-shou at the
time and inferior, therefore, only to Kao-tsu. Both he and Kao were executed in

617.
9. No biography.
10. Another name for the ssu-k’ai post mentioned in note 5.^
11. On the honorific post of kuang-lu ta-fu^_ see Fonotionnaives^ v. 1, p. 35.
Both the Pei and the HTS call the dukedom I-yuan, but I am unable to verify that
such a geographical designation existed. On the rank of chun-kung^ see FonotionnaiveSy v. 1, pp. 45 and 451.
12. That is, president of the Board of Public Works, a position of the third
rank, second grade. The Pei adds that the real revenues {shih-shih feng) of 8OO
households were awarded with the fiefdom.
13. On the position of tu-tu or governor-general, see Fonetionnaives, v. 2,
pp. 668 and 675 ff. Ching-chou was 1730 li from the capital.
14. President of the Board of Rites. The Pei adds that T'ai-tsung expressed
great sorrow at this death and suggested that he be called "loyal and filial.
15. CIS 58:3295:4. The biography is in HTS 206:4109:2 and the genealogy in
HTS 74 shang:38kS:3. The latter is summarized without significant alteration
in Shen Ping-chen, Evh-shih-wu-shih pu-pien, n. 3, P- 7575 (K'ai-ming ed.).
16. Chapter 5 offers several observations on contemporary beliefs about hered
ity. We might also note in this regard the remark of Sui Yang-ti, ''From the
house of a general must come a general, and from the house of a minister, a min
ister." {TCTC 182, p. 5672). The suggestion that Wu Shih-huo was of rather ob
scure origin and mediocre ability was also, therefore, a comment on his offspring.
17. Li Chiao {CIS 94:3368:1 and HTS 123:3957:4) was an aristocrat from one of
the great lineages of Chao-chou. At a precocious age he passed the ohin-shih
examination and showed a great deal both of literary and administrative talent
early in his career. The collected works mentioned in his biographies are no
longer extant, but a large number of his own memorials and those he wrote for
members of the Wu clan still survive. See dW 242 to 250. He seems to have
been a highly skilled politician and in spite of his close identification in the
Chou with the Chang brothers, he survived their fall with only a temporary demo
tion to the provinces.
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His major positions were In the Chancellery, Secretariat, and History Of
fice, and though some of his memorials are sycophantic, there are also many
severe remonstrances and suggestions for administrative improvements. He was a
skilled politician and the TFYK preserves a number of notices which show that
his literary talents were widely recognized. See 551:5b as well as A60:3a, 671:
25a, and 327:24a.
18. The charge was made by several tsai-hsiang in the course of the contro
versy surrounding her elevation and was raised again during the rebellion of Li
Ching-yeh. These instances are outlined in the text.
19- T'ai-p’ing kuang-oh-C 137:4b. The local history T'a'i-yuan shih-dhi is at
tributed in the HTS treatise to Li Chang {CIS 164:3506:4 and HIS 152:4008:3) and
was 14 ohuan in length.
Li was posted in T'ai-yiian sometime between 847 and 860
to that his account is some 250 years after the fact. Because of its almost
identical wording, an article on Shih-huo in Wei Hsin-tzu, Shu-pen fen-men kuchin lel-sht-hj 15:10ab, seems also to be based on Li's work.
20. The post of aheng was of the seventh rank, third class, too low to con
fer the yin privilege of facilitated bureaucratic entry upon any of Wu Hua's
sons. Since the Pei also points out that he died before Wen-ti, it seems logi
cal to conclude that the family resided in Loyang sometime between 589 and 605.
21. As I shall suggest in Chapter 5, the Wu lineage was probably not included
in the carefully researched Shih-tsu chih of T'al-tsung's reign and was first pub
lished, though in abbreviated form, in the Hsing-shih lu of 659It was not un
til Kao-tsung's death, and in two stages, that the empress began to embellish
her genealogy in an effort to win acceptance and bolster her legitimation in an
age where genealogy retained a good deal of importance.
In 684, just after her seizure of the regency, she erected ancestral tem
ples for five generations of her ancestors and bestowed posthumous honors on them
{ETS 75:3867:2 and TdC 203, p- 6422).
Included at this time were:
(a) Wu K'o-chi who was said to have held the post of san-dh'i ah'ang-shih
in the T'o-pa Wei. His existence is confirmed in no other source, though the HIS
treatise adds the information that he held the positions of ta-ohung-aheng ssut’u and yueh-wang ah'ang-shih and inherited the title of shou-yang kung. His
wife was of the P'ei clan, perhaps the eminent Ho-tung lineage examined by Yano
Chikara, "Kizoku seiji."
(b) His son Ch'u-ch'ang held the position of Yin-ahou ssu-ma during the
Ch'i (550-577), succeeded to the ducal title, and was posthumously made t'ai-wei.
The HTS adds that he was sometime ahen-y'uan ahiang-ahun, the first military post
in the family. Chu-ch'ang has no biography in the dynastic history, but his ex
istence is mentioned by Liu Tsung-yuan (773“8l9) in his Lung-ah'eng lu 72:9a.
Nunome, Zui Toshi, p. 142, also accepts the truth of this part of the genealogy.
Chu-ch'ang's wife was of the Liu clan.
It is of some importance to notice the
Wu identification with the Ch'i dynasty, a fact which later contributed to the
empress' acceptance by the great northeastern clans.
(c) The family fortunes in the later Chou seem to have taken a turn for
the worse. Chu-ch'ang's son Chien did not succeed to his father's rank and held
only the low military post of ts'an-ahun. The HTS mentions a posthumous award of
prefect of Ch'i-chou. His wife's maiden name was Sung, and it is interesting to
note that the Wu clan, unlike the contemporary local Chinese elite, seems to have
avoided marriage with foreign surnames.
(d) Of Wu Hua the HTS says that in addition to his aheng position at Lo
yang, he was posthumously awarded the rank of Ping-chou prefect, further confirm
ing the family connection with that area. His wife was of the Chao clan.
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(e) Wu Shih-huo, his fourth son, was entitled t'ai-shih and Prince of Wei
in 684.
After a thorough search for collaborating evidence to establish the truth
of the genealogy, I am Inclined to believe that it was a true record.
It was
promulgated, after all, at a time when claims could easily have been checked
and when there existed a number of potential opponents who must have been eager
to prove them false. The empress was in no position to risk public ridicule at
this stage of her career and the genealogy therefore does not claim too much.
In the second stage of genealogical publication, four days after the proc
lamation of the Chou, Wu Shih-huo was posthumously entitled emperor {T’ai-tsu
hsiao-ming kao huccng-ti) . At this time a sixth-generation ancestor, Wu Hsiashih, said to have been duke of Chin-yang during the Wei, was added to the gen
ealogical list. While this award strengthens the family connection with the
Wen-shui area, it seems strange that he went unmentioned in 684 even though only
five ancestral temples were established, and I am reluctant to accept the claim.
TCTC 204, p. 6467 and ETS 76:3867:4 point out that at this time the progenitors
of the clan were identified as King Wen of Chou and his son Wu. See Shih-ohi
4:13:2 and 4:13:3* This was a perfectly conventional move paralleling the T'ang
claim of descent from Lao Tzu and might also be seen as a bid for Confucian sup
port in her new dynasty.
In sum, we have complete certainty in the Wu genealogy only to the em
press' paternal grandfather but a high likelihood of truth to the fifth genera
tion.
On the distaff side, the Yang clan of the empress' mother was divided into
five branches, and hers, the Kuan-wang, was the second.
It took Its name from
Yang Hung {Sui-shu 43:2469:1) who was tsu-tzu (son of paternal male third cousin)
to Sui Wen-ti. Hung held numerous posts during the Sui until he aroused the jeal
ousy of Yang-ti and is classified as one of the "four eminents" of the dynasty.
His younger brother Ta {Sut-shu 43:2469:4) was the maternal grandfather of the
Empress Wu and served as chief minister {na-yen) under Yang-ti. He died in a
military campaign, probably in 6l6, leaving a son and daughter, the empress'
nrather. Her own background is outlined in Ta Chou wu-shang hsiao-ming kao huanghou pei-ming^ CTW 239:2a, by Wu San-ssu. The inscription dates probably from
693 when she received the title. Judging by the pei-ming, which accords with
TCIC 201, p. 6369 and disagrees with CIS 183:3553:2, she lived from 579 to 67O.
There is no record of an earlier marriage, though she was in her thirties when
her father died.
22. See Chapter 5*
23. Summarizing the evidence from earlier notes, it seems that the clan held
a fiefdom until the sixth century and even after that maintained its landowning
character and military tradition. Numome, Zui Toshi, p. 144, concludes without
citing evidence that the Wu could be numbered among the hao-tsu or magnate clans.
On the matter of their local prominence, some interesting evidence has
recently come to light through one of the Tunhuang manuscripts from the Peking
collection. This is wei 79 (discussed further in Chapter 5) and is, in brief,
a list of clans prominent in T'ang times in the various prefectures of the em
pire. This list has been studied by several scholars, and an excellent review
of the literature on it and related documents is found in Johnson, Medieval Chi
nese Oligarchy, pp. 62-88. Johnson demonstrates a connection between this list
and one of similar nature found in the Sung geography T'ai-p'ing huan-yu chi and
presented in Ikeda, "Todai no gumbo hyo," pp. 320-323- Leaving aside the ques
tion of the validity of the relationship, an Interesting concordance appears In
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the parallel sections on Ping-chou.
f o 11 ows:
I

Net 79> which has several lacunae, runs as
^
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The T'a'L-pHnq huan-yu ohi says:
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While the nature of the connection between the two sources makes the evi
dence suggestive rather than conclusive, the similarity is striking and the same
is true when other parts of the list are compared. The possibility that the em
press' own prominence caused the inclusion of her clan in the list can be dis
counted since this did not happen in the case of great contemporaries like Ma
Chou, Wei Cheng, Ti Jen-chieh and Chang Yueh. At the very least, the concordance
of the two lists strongly supports other evidence of the clan's local importance.
2h. WYYH 875:36. On the T'ang p'i-ohao system of appointment see Tonami,
"Chusei." Tsukiyama, fodai^ pp. 209 ff.
contains several relevant but less co
herent remarks. Although the three principal literary examinations were estab
lished in the Sui {T’ang yu-tin 8:12b and T’ang ohih-yen 1:3b), all our evidence
shows that only a minute proportion of officials took a degree and that appoint
ment was based principally on the yin privilege, on recommendation and p'i-chao.
25. Ibid. The governor was Yang Liang, and his biography {Sui-shu 45:2^71:3
and Pei-shih 71:2971:2) places him in Ping-chou in 597. Nunome, Zui-Toshi^ p.
128, lists Shih-huo among six early adherents of the T'ang who had held Sui of
fice.
26. WYYH 875:4a. Yang Su's biography {Sui-shu 48:2475:2 and Pei-shih 4l:
2882:2) contains no mention of the incident. The Empress Wu, at the urging of
the Chang brothers, was to ban Yang Su's descendants from capital office. See
TTCLC ll4:7b and CTW 95:12a. This perhaps supports the truth of the Pei story.
27. WYYH 875:4b-5a which erroneously calls the book Ku-ohin tien-yao.
In
terestingly, CTS and TCTC accept the belief that the book was given to the em
peror while HIS does not mention the incident. The Shih-oh’i-shih shang-ahiao
86:9ab specifically rejects it.
28. WYYH 875:5b. The rebellion occurred in 613 and is outlined in TCTC 182,
pp. 5671 ff. and in the biography of the rebel leader Yang Hsuan-kan. See Suishu 70:2510:4 and Pei-shih 41:2883:2. The best secondary treatment is Nunome,
Zui Toshijpp. 19“49.
29. WYYH 875:5b.
30. WYYH 875:6a.
31. Ibid. On Li Mi, see Sui-shu 70:2511:4, Pei-shih 60:2939:4, CIS 53:3283:
2, and HTS 84:3886:4. See also the numerous references in Bingham^ Founding.
32. WYYH 875:6a.
33. WYYH 875:6ab.
34. Kao-tsu's campaign here against the rebel Li Fei is well documented, but
no source mentions the participation of Shih-huo.
35. WYYH 875:6b. Omens in the form of dreams were of great importance at the
time. See, for instance, the biography of Lu Ts'ai in CIS 79:3338:4 and HTS 107:
3926:4. Fu Yu-i {CIS I86
3564:4 and HTS 223 shang:k](>3.h) committed sui
cide because of his dream of imperium. The TFYK account of the dream (766:12b)
does not suggest that Shih-huo touched the heavens.
36. WYYH 875:6a-7b.
37. WYYH 875:7a.
38. WYYH 875:7b. The posts were nei-shih-ling and na-yen.
39. Ibid.
40. Fonctionnaires, v. 1, p. 8.
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TFYK 626:7b and 627:6a. According to Yen Keng-wang, T'ang p’u-shxng
oh'eng-lang piao^ v. 1, pp. 222-3, Shih-huo held the board presidency from 620
to 62A or 625 when he was commissioned to Yang-chou.
Both edicts seem to date from early 620 since the second gives his rank
as yu-hsiang su-wei- and the Pei records that he held the post early in the year.
The edict mentions that although Shih-huo had lost both his wife and two sons,
he had not reported [and asked for a leave of absence] so that he could be re
garded as a model.
Another index of Kao-tsu's regard is the fact that Shih-huo was among
fourteen men granted the extraordinary privilege of amnesty-in-advance in 6l8.
See UTS 88:3893:2, biography of P'ei Chi.
kl. WYYH 875:10a.
k3. Shih-huo's first wife was of the Hsiang-1i clan, the first foreign sur
name to appear in the family tree. On the surname, see Dai kamja giten 8, p.
8315.
His second marriage into a clan so much more exalted than his own has
always been a puzzle to historians. Ch'en Yin-k'o in "Li-T'ang," pp. 553"6, is
forced to claim that Shih-huo's timber dealings brought him into contact with
Yang Ta who was charged with a number of building projects in Loyang. The ex
planation in the Pei, confirmed in TFYK 853:16a, is much more plausible.
In it
Kao-tsu suggests to Shih-huo that he take a new wife and recommends Madame Yang
as a virtuous and intelligent woman. He is said to have delegated the Kuei-yang
princess to serve as go-between, and he offered to have the state bear the mai
riage expenses. The Pei, exaggerating, places Kao-tsu in the role of go-between.
The Kuei-yang princess, incidentally, was married to Yang Shih-tao, son
of Yang Hsiung, and therefore first cousin of the bride. Her choice shows the^
difficulty of marriage between social unequals in the T'ang. Nunome, Zui-Toshij
pp. 314-69 presents a full account of the marriage connections between the im
perial clans of the Sui and T'ang.
On the marriage, see also CTW 239:10ab.
44. WYYH 875:8ab.
45. WYYH 875:9a. On Yang-chou, see CTS 40:3223:1, NTS 41:3727:2, and THY 71,
p. 1270, and on Fu Kung-shih, see OTS 56:3920:3 and HTS 87:3891:4. According to
the dating in the TCTC 190, pp. 5970-71, the appointment would have been made
Just after the third month of 624.
Kuo Mo-Jo conjectures that Shih-huo was also posted to Li-chou in this
year since he believes the empress was born here and accepts the traditional
date of 624. See note 50. This seems unlikely since TFYK 671:24a and the Pei
both place him in the capital prior to his appointment, and we know that he re
mained in this post for more than a year. See also TFYK 690:19a.
46. TFYK 677:21b and WYYH loo. ait.
47. On the rebellion, see TCTC 192, pp. 6032 and 6039It occurred at the
end of 627.
Li-chou was in Shan-nan {CTS 39:3220:1, EPS 40:3725:3, THY 70, p. 1237,
and TT 176:9b).
48. WYYH 875:9b.
49. WYYH 875:10a.
In addition to his post as governor-general of Ching-chou,
he is said to have been charged with the military affairs of six additional pre
fectures. The Pei exaggerates the posting, calling it ta-tu-fu^ but its addition
al assertion that it was accompanied by T'ai-tsung's commendation is confirmed by
TFYK 681:17b and T'ang-wen shih-i 1:7b.
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50. The time and place of Empress Wu's birth have been a perplexing problem
since primary sources give three different dates. See the first example in Ap
pendix A.
If she was born in 623, 624 or 625, then she would have been born
either in Ch'ang-an or in Yang-chou where her father was posted in those years.
Kuo Mo-jo suggests in the appendix to Wu Tse-ften, pp. 152-59 and in an
article in Ktiang-ming jih-pao^ September 26, 1962 that her birthplace was Lichou. He bases this belief on a poem by Li l-shan, found in CTShih 20:47a and
T 'ang-jen pa-ohia shth 2:10a, in which Li-chou is given as the birthplace of the
“Golden Wheel," a title used by the empress during the Chou.
I have found ad
ditional confirmation for the belief in Yu-oh'-C sheng shih ahien-ohu by the
Ch'ing scholar Feng Hao (2:30b-31a). Feng quotes Hu Chen-hsiang, a Ming expert
on T'ang literature.
Kuo Mo-Jo goes on to mention a 1955 archeological expedition to the area
(see K'ao-ku, July I960, pp. 53~57) which excavated a stele identified by the
leader of the expedition, Chang Ming-shan, as belonging to a temple built to com
memorate the empress in her birthplace. Professor Chang cites other manifesta
tions of the belief, among them certain place names and an annual festival on
the twenty-third of the first lunar month, supposedly in celebration of her birth
day.
The stele contains some 800 characters, and Kuo quite convincingly estab
lishes its authenticity {Wu Tse-ften^ pp. 135-39). There are several lacunae,
three of them occurring in the key passage which Kuo reconstructs to form a spe
cific statement that the empress was born in Li-chou. His case is convincing.
The question of birthdate now arises.
I am not persuaded by Kuo's con
jecture that Shih-huo was posted to Li-chou in 624 because his movements that
year are accounted for, and because the stele says the event referred to occurred
when he was tu-tu. This can be no earlier than 627.
Kuo also calls attention
to an anecdote in which the soothsayer Yuan T'ien-kang {CTS 191:3590:2 and HTS
206:4l06:l) predicts the empress' imperium while she was still an infant in the
care of her nurse.
Even in its most detailed form, TFYK 860:27a and T 'ai-p 'ing
kuang-chi 224:2b, the story is too vague to be dated and says only that Yuan
stopped in Li-chou on his way to the capital at the request of Madame Yang. The
T'ai-p’ing kuang-oh-t^ oKuan 221, does mention a trip to the capital but in 632.
I have no doubt that the incident is authentic, but I would use it rather to
demonstrate that the empress was born later than 624.
What seems to emerge here is that the empress' age was generally unknown
even to contemporaries. Since I find convincing the evidence that Li-chou was
her birthplace, I believe she was born either in 627 or 628, making her approxi
mately the same age as Kao-tsung.
51.
875: lOab.
52. WYYH 875:10b ff.
53. See note 50.
54. See note 21.
55. See Appendix A, example 1.
56. TdC 194, pp. 6121-22; and see Wechsler, Mirror^ p. 137.
57. HTS 76:3867:!. The same source also says that the future empress was
highly pleased at her summons to the harem even though the chances of advance
ment were slim.
Interestingly, the CTS does not mention the incident.
58. T'ai-tsung had a large harem whose organization is outlined in CTS 51:
3278:3 and THY 3, PP- 32-33. There were nine ts’ai-jen, all of the fifth rank.
See a\so TCTC 199, P- 6284. T'ai-tsung ultimately had fourteen sons, of whom
his wife bore three, and twenty-one daughters. See CTS 76:3331:1 and Nunome,
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Zui-Toshij pp. 3^1“5759. Following the lead of Ch'en, "Hun-yin chi-tuan," several scholars have
demonstrated the primacy of political concerns in_the choice of imperial concu
bines in the T'ang. See especially Nunome, Zwi-Tosht, pp. 31^“67- On these
grounds Wu's choice is rather puzzling since she was the orphaned daughter of a
man with no enduring influence and T'ai-tsung, moreover, had already three con
cubines of the Yang surname.
Kuo Mo-jo, Wu Tse-fien, pp. 117 ff• > is eloquent
on the subject of her beauty, but it is difficult to find contemporary collabora
tion that she was outstanding.
My own explanation is based on a notice in ETS 80:3877:3 "The mother of
Ming, prince of Ts'ao, was originally the concubine of [T'ai-tsung's executed
brother] the prince of Ch'ao, T'ai-tsung 'favored' her and wanted to make her
[his] empress. Wei Cheng remonstrated . . . and he gave up the plan." CTS 62:
3303:1 identifies the lady as the niece of Yang Shih-tao. This made her a samegeneration cousin of Wu. Other evidence {T’ang-oh-ien 6, pp. 51"2) suggests the
favor of the Yang concubine dates from the late 630s.
If this was the case and Wu came to T'ai-tsung's attention through her
cousin, her entry into the harem was unlikely to have occurred in 637 as Ssu-ma
Kuang dates it. She was fourteen sui at her entry so that, if my suggested birthdate is correct, the event probably occurred in 6^0. While the element of specu
lation in this chronology is great, I believe that it is warranted by the numerous
contradictions in the sources.
60. TCTC 199, PP- 6259“60. The prophecy surfaced because of an astrological
configuration which presaged the rule of a woman, and because of a popular tra
dition that the T'ang would be overturned after three generations by a female.
Although T'ai-tsung managed to have the suspected threat, a general whose nick
name as a child had been "Fifth Lady," executed, he was told that he could not
cheat destiny and that although the female ruler would destroy most of the T'ang
clan, she would be merciful in her old age.
It is interesting to note that the
commentary on the Great Cloud Sutra refers to this tradition.
61. TCTC 199, p. 6267. T'ai-tsung's Yli-hua Palace seems also to have had
quarters in it for the crown prince {TCTC 198, p. 6253 and HTS 3:3638:3)62. The origin of the story may be the 68A polemic of Lo Pin-wang quoted
earlier. The standard histories are silent on the matter and TCTC 199> P- 628A,
simply says that she "pleased" Kao-tsung when he came to wait on his father.
63. See CTS 6:3075:3, ETS 76:3867:1, TCTC 199, P- 6284, TEY 3, P- 23, and
Ch'ang-an ohih 9, P- 115- The major discrepancy in the sources lies in the name
of the convent, with ETS and Ch'ang-an oh-vh calling it An-yeh, and the others
the Kan-yeh.
I am unable to verify the existence of the latter in any of the
nine sources indexed by Hiraoka and Imai in Choan to Rakuyo.
Hu San-hsing in
TCTC3 loo. olt. suggests that Ssu-ma Kuang is in error. Fitzgerald, Empress Wu^
pp. 17“19> gives an account of the incident, using the wrong name.
64. A story given in all the primary sources. The concubine Hsiao was one of
the three highest consorts, placed directly below the empress in the first rank.
65. The question is fully treated by Li Shu-t'ung, T'ang-shih k'ao-pi-en, pp.
310-335. Professor Li advances five reasons which, he believes, render invalid
the traditional account. These are given below with my comments interpolated.
(a) The account has a number of inconsistencies of which the most impor
tant is the contention that Kao-tsung visited the convent on the "taboo day"
{ah-i-gih) . This would be the third day of the fifth month in 650, and he was
not in the capital at the time.
Here Professor Li is assuming that it is T'ai-tsung's "taboo day" which
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is meant. There were, however, several of these days each year to commemorate
both emperors and empresses. THY 23, pp.
ff.
I am unable to verify that
Kao-tsung was out of the capital at this time.
(b) HTS 76:3867:1, the only source to date Wu's return to the palace,
places it "at the end of ohen-kuan [627-650]." If she had taken the tonsure, it
would require two years for her hair to grow out to the customary length for con
cubines.
This seems unconvincing since the shaving of the head accompanied final
vows, and I am not certain that former concubines actually became fullfledged
nuns. The form of the tonsure in T'ang times may not have meant a complete shav
ing of the head.
(c) Kao-tsung's decree of 656 releasing a number of former concubines from
the palace {CTW 12:1a) indicates that it was the older consorts who entered the
convent.
It is therefore unlikely that Wu went.
While I agree that all concubines were not necessarily forced into a con
vent (see, for instance, THY 3, pp. 35~3l) > I read the decree differently and
would interpret the phrase nien-tao kung-Qen
fang-oh'u
as "the older palace women were already ordered to be sent away." I think
the subsequent phrase that many women still remained refers to the younger con
cubines, since the decree was probably Inspired by Wu's fear of female rivals.
I agree with Professor Li's conclusion.
(d) The decree establishing Wu as empress (Chapter 2, n. 6) claims that
T'ai-tsung bestowed her on his son. This is untrue and was probably inserted in
the record to explain why she did not enter the convent.
I believe the claim was made to suggest that Wu had never had relations
with T'ai-tsung and absolve Kao-tsung from the charge of incest which had in fact
been leveled against him.
(e) There is no evidence that the Empress Wu ever favored or supported the
An-yeh monastery.
It was not chosen to commemorate her. The obvious explanation,
of course, is that she wished to conceal any connection with the monastery which
had taken in T'ai-tsung's consorts whether she had ever been there or not.
In
summation, I do not believe that Professor Li makes a very convincing case even
though I accept his conclusion.
The issue, I think, is so confused because we have no idea of the source
of the story. The confusion of detail may suggest more than one source, and the
lack of any reliable chronology compounds the problem. Professor Li suggests sim
ple fabrication by Hsu Ching-tsung to show his patrons in a favorable light by
emphasizing the jealousy of Empress Wang, and that Wu later destroyed all those
who knew the truth. Ching-tsung's shth-lu of Kao-tsung became the official ver
sion.
I find this an appealing explanation and would add the notion that it was
an explanation concocted late, probably around 657~8 when the shih-lu was being
completed.
Initially, Kao-tsung hoped the fact of incest could be concealed, but
when he found it was impossible, a second and more elaborate justification was de
veloped.
I believe that Wu was simply concealed after T'ai-tsung's death, pos
sibly at the An-yeh monastery, since she and Kao-tsung had already planned to
continue their liaison and sought thereby to avoid immediate scandal.
An article in Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 12, 1962 under the pseudonym
Ching T'ang accepts the nunnery story but is puzzled by the chronology and tries
to show that the Empress Wu returned to the palace in 651 or 652.
66. See CTS 6:3075:3 and 51:3279:3. The best known incident in the rivalry
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is the allegation that Wu killed her own infant daughter in order to blame Em
press Wang and give Kao-tsung an excuse to depose her. See NTS 76:3867:1 and
TCIC 199, PP- 6286-7. Interestingly, the event is not recorded in the CIS and
Ssu-ma Kuang concludes his account by pointing out that Wang failed to clear hei
self. For Fitzgerald's views on the matter, see Empress Wu, pp. 22-23.
The Empress Wang {CIS 51:3279:2 and BIS 76:3866:A) was from the same pre
fecture as Wu, the daughter of one of T'ai-tsung's officials. The clan already
had a marriage connection with the T'ang, and her great-aunt, a princess, seems
to have had her married to Kao-tsung before he became crown prince. Her great
misfortune was sterility, and in 652 she adopted one of her husband's sons by
another consort so that an heir could be proclaimed.
Her uncle Liu Shih {CIS 77:333^:3 and BIS 112:3938:3) seems to have risen
to tsai-hsiang rank because of his niece's position, and it was his resignation
in the sixth month of 65^ which signaled publicly that she had lost favor. See
TCIC 199, p. 6285.
67. TCIC 199, pp. 6283-'4.
In the third month of 65^ Wu persuaded Kao-tsung
to elevate the posthumous titles of the thirteen ministers considered to be Kaotsu's earliest adherents, thereby enhancing her father's prestige.
It seems
likely that the court recognized his motives.
68. In mid-655 when the important debate, outlined in TCIC 199, PP- 6289 ff•>
took place, the tsal-hsiang body was composed of Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi, Ch'u Suiliang, Lai Chi, Han Yuan, Yu Chih-ning and Li Chi. Their careers are summarized
in Appendix B.
69. The principal studies, in addition to Ch'en Yin-k'o's cited above, are
Yokota, "Bu-Shu seiken seiritsu no zentei"; Matsui, "Sokuten Buko no yoritsu o
megutte"; Chang, "Lun T'ang K'ai-yuan ch'^ien ti cheng-chih chi-t'uan"; and Lo
Lung-chih, "Lun T'ang-ch'u kung-1i-ssu-hsiang yu Wu Chao tai T'ang ti kuan-hsi."
70. TdC 199, p. 6267. T'ai-tsung also told his son that while Wu-chi and
Sui-liang were alive, he need have no anxiety about the empire.
There is a good deal of evidence that Wu-chi hoped to dominate Kao-tsung.
This is conveniently summarized in Sun Kuo-tung, "T'ang chen-kuan."
71. See Wechsler, Mirror, Chapter k.
72. TdC 200, p.. 6293.
73. The validity of the incest argument is a moot point, and it is perhaps
significant that it was raised by Ch'u Sui-liang, a southerner. There is a good
deal of evidence that this sort of union was common in Central Asia and not un
known in North China at the time. See Ch'en Ku-yiian, Chung-kuo hun-yin shih:,
Chapter 3, and Lin Hui-hsiang, Wen-hua sen-lei hsueh, pp. 214 ff. Lin T'ien-wei,
Sui-T 'ang shih hsin-pien, pp. 56-75, amply demonstrates the Turkic cast of the
T'ang court by listing 164 great ministers whose lineage was wholly or in part
"barbarian." Both levirate and sororate marriages are attested in the biography
of Li 0 {Sui-shu 66:2503:2 and Pei-shih 77 • 7-3^5-2.) •
In the T'ang imperial clan, the practice was not unknown, and we have
earlier noted T'ai-tsung's desire to raise his brother's consort to the position
of empress. Though it is not generally known, he also took the consort of a halfbrother, releasing her on Wang Kuei's objection. See HIS 78:3908:2. The T'ang
marriage laws {TLSI 12-14, especially 14, pp. 123“5, snd TRSI, p. 248 ff.) seem
to contain no prohibition, and Chung-tsung, Hsuan-tsung, and Shun-tsung were all
involved in similar relationships.
Sui-liang's objection, therefore, seems less important than the political
reasons for tsai-hsiang opposition. Kao-tsung, as earlier suggested, attempted
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to conceal Wu's relationship with his father, but he did so probably in deference
to the feelings of the more purely Chinese of his ministers.
It was, after all,
an age marked by the reassertion of Chinese cultural values.
7h. Chapter 2, n. 6.
75. For this and the following interpretations, see note 69 above.
76. On Li l-fu, see Appendix B, no. 3977. See note 69 above.
78. iMd.
79. Ibid.
80. TCFC 199, pp. 6291-2, especially the commentary. For Empress Wu's view
on "household matters," see Chapter 9, pp. 13^ and l/*3.
81. See the biographies of the victims in Appendix B, nos. 14, 30, 32, 37 and
38. A]so TCTC 200, pp. 6303"^ and 6312 ff.
82. CIS 51:3279:3 and TCTC 200, p. 629^. She had the hands and feet of the
women cut off and drowned them in a wine barrel.
83. Tore 203, pp. 6i»10-ll. See a] so THY 30, pp. 556-7 and lu-hai 157:29b.
While there is a certain rhetorical exaggeration in the account, there
seems to have been an equal degree of truth.
In 665 Kao-tsung complained that
his ministers never remonstrated, only to be told by Li Chi that this was be
cause there was no need to do so. TCT'C 201, p. 63^3. The first real remon
strance is dated 682 by Ssu-ma Kuang, TCTC 203, PP. 6AIO-II.
84. TCTC 200, p. 6294 tells how Kao-tsung visited the prison of his ex-wife
and, at her request, changed its name to Court of Recollection {Hui^hsin yuan).
On his reaction to the charges against Wu-chi, see TCTC 200, p. 6313.
85. TCTC 200, p. 6313.
86. See TCTC 200, p. 6322 and CTS 6:3075:2. Ssu-ma Kuang here follows the
CIS in admitting that the empress was highly intelligent and well versed in lit
erature and history.
87. TCTC 200, pp. 6309 and 6317 where the commentary identifies the various
administrative centers. See also Chapter 8.
88. THY 85, p. 1557. This census was designed to keep up-to-date the system
of nine grades to which each household was assigned. See Twitchett, Finanoidl
Administration^ pp. 29 ff.
89. See CTS 4:3071:4 ff. On the new office, see Fonationnaires^ v. 1, p. I87.
90. CTS 4:3071:4.
91. TCTC 200, p. 6308, and Chapter 5.
92. CTS 4:3071:4 and TCTC 200, p. 6308. See also Chapter 6.
93. TCTC 200, p. 6295 and THY 3, p. 24.
94. CTW 12:6ab. The edict begins by tracing back Loyang's history as a good
capital site to the Duke of Chou and comments upon its favorable strategic and
economic location.
It points out that earlier dynasties had established the prec
edent of two capitals and that since Loyang had often been one of them, it had
become a majestic city.
Its central location facilitated the payment of taxes
and tribute and henceforth it would be the residence of the ruler.
95. CTS 4:3072:4 and TCTC 201, pp. 6344 ff.
96. Ssu-ma Kuang, TCTC 201, pp. 6342-3, begins his account by remarking the
empress' initial humility and willingness to serve Kao-tsung and suggests that
for this reason he was willing to elevate her in spite of opposition. As time
went on, she is said to have arrogated more and more power to herself, much to
her husband's chagrin. See a\so ETS 105:3924:1 and Fitzgerald, Empress WUj pp.
44-47.
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97- Appendix B, no. k7.
98. NTS 105:3924:2.
99. TCTC 201, p. 6343. "Two Sages" dates from 66O.
100. CTS 6:3075:3. The same work dates her real power from about 675 when she
was offered the regency. On this question see also Chou, Han-T'ang, p. 631, and
CTS 5:3074:1.
101. Sui-shu 36:2457:2. Wen-ti's wife, of course, was not nearly so prominent
in government as Empress Wu, and the Sui-shu specifies that the term "Two Sages"
was used within the palace.
J02. CIS 5:3074:1 and TCIC 202, pp. 6375"76. The phrase is she-dhih kuo-oheng
^
I03. See the exhaustive study of the ceremonial by Chavannes, T'ai Chan, and
my Chapter 4.
104. See Wechsler, M-irror, especially pp. 123-25.
105. as 4:3071:4. On the official posts held by the empress' half-brothers,
see TCIC 201, p. 6349 which also outlines the source of discord in the family.
106. TCIC 201, p. 6349 and EIS 76:3867:1-2.
107. CTS 183:3553:1, NTS 76:3867:2, and TCTC 201, p. 6350.
108. On Min-chih, see CTS 183:3553:1, TCTC 202, pp. 6366-7.
It is interesting to note that the HTS account of his death (76:3867:2)
portrays him as an innocent victim of Wu's suspicion that he considered her the
murderer of his sister.
109. Their biographies are found in CTS 183:3553:1 ff. and HTS 206:4109:2 ff.
On their arrival at court, see TCTC 202, p. 6372.
no. CTS 5:3073:4 and 3074:1.
111. HTS 76:3867:2.
112. TCTC 201, p. 6365. The offer may have been connected with serious drought
in Kuan-chung at the time. See CTS 5:3073:3.
113. CTS 5:3074:1, HTS 3:3640:1, and TCTC 202, p. 6372.
114. TCTC 202, p. 6372.
115. Submitted in the twelfth month of 674. The fullest text is in HTS 76:
3867:2; see also CTS 5:3074:1, THI 37, pp. 675-76, TFIK 564:56, and TCTC 202, p.
■

6374.
116. HTS, too. ait. With the exception of the provisions relating to the Taote ohing and the mother's mourning period, the standard sources offer no evidence
of action. Notices in TFIK 80:10b and 490:10ab suggest that early in 675 various
promotions were made and taxes and corvee lightened, and that on some of the othe
provisions no formal edict was needed.
117. See Chapter 8.
118. TCTC 201, pp.
See also TFIK l80:7a. The remonstrance went on to
suggest that Kao-tsung would be betraying his heritage should he fail to bequeath
the empire to his son.
119. TCTC 202, p. 6377. See also TFIK 261:17b, THI 2, p. 20, and CTS 5:3071:1.
120. TCTC 202, p. 6377. The k'ao-i points out that neither the shih-tu nor the
CTS hint at murder.
121. HTS 76:3867:2.
122. See note 124.
123. See CTS 86:3350:1 and HTS 81:3878:3. Conversely, the ill health of the
crown prince may have provided the empress with a convenient explanation for his
sudden death, and it may be that she made certain it was mentioned in his epitaph
For the epigraph!cal collections containing this, see Ch-in-k'o t'-i-pa so-y-inj p.
53b.
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124. His biography is in CTS 86:3350:3 and HTS 81:3878:3- There is no direct
evidence of illegitimate birth beyond the rumor referred to in the text and his
reaction to it.
125. CTS 5:3074:1. This seems to be yet another indication that Kao-tsung
retained his independence.
126. CTS 86:3350:3127- TCTC 202, p, 6397- The CTS gives no details.
128. Kao-tsung, according to Hsien's biography and THY 4, p. 42, regarded him
as a most precocious and talented child and rewarded him lavishly for his Hou
Han-shu commentary. At the same time, he remarked in 678 on how he loved most
his youngest son who had just married a praiseworthy woman and, after Hsien's
fall, expressed disapproval of his reading matter. TCTC 202, pp. 6397"98. The
Empress Wu is said to have attempted to instruct him in his duties by sending
him uplifting books and personal instruction. CTS 86:3350:3129- CTS 86:3350:3, THY 4, p. 42, and TCTC 202, p. 6397130. TCTC 203, p- 6419- Though Ssu-ma Kuang states flatly that the empress
ordered her son's death, he does not identify his source. Neither of the of
ficial histories suggests openly that she did so.
131 - See
17:5a.
132. TCTC 203, p. 6406. There were precedents for the establishment of a
t'at-sun in the Chin and Ch'i dynasties.
133. CTS 5:3075:1.
134. CTS 5:3074:4.

Chapter 4
1. Most notably Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past.
2. In "Sui ideology."
3. These questions are succinctly discussed in John B. Starr, Ideology and
Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), Chapters 1 and 3.
4. There are, of course, no accurate estimates of the proportion of the Chi
nese population which gave its primary allegiance to Buddhism in the sixth and
seventh centuries, but Wright, "Sui Ideology," conveys a realistic impression
of its great importance in the eyes of the state, and there are a number of sug
gestive Indications to be found in the works of Gernet, Tsukamoto and Michlhata
cited in later notes.
5. See the remarks in Bingham, Founding, pp. 51 ff- on the "Savior Li"
myth and the much more systematic treatment by Seidel, "Image."
6. A distinction first emphasized in 1940 by Lu Chen-y'u in his Chung-kuo shehui shih ahu wen-t'i which seems to have become standard in later works like
the cooperative volume Chung-kuo wen-hsueh shih (Peking, 1958). Note also
Levenson's reflection on the paradigm in Confuaian China, v. 3, PP- 56 ff.
7. See Yamasaki's "Bukkyo fukk5" and "Zui no Y5dai." Ch'en Yin-k'o, "Wu
Chao" offers more specific information on the empress' mother and the Yang clan,
and Ch'en, Buddhism, pp. 194 ff., presents a good summary.
8. See, for instance, TD 52:2108, PSTS 3, P- 456a.
9. Ch'en, "Wu Chao," p. 14310. See note 8. The author, Yen-tsung, states that Madame Yang was in fact
important to the survival of the church.
11. Chapter 3, n. 52.
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12. Chapter 3. n. S6.
13. TCTC 200, pp. 6294-95.
14. See Sui-shu 75:2520:2 and CTS I89 shang15. TCTC 200, p. 6294.
It was, of course, Hsu Ching-tsung who brought the
formal accusations against those who had opposed Wu's elevation.
16. TCTC 201, p. 6342.
17. CTS 4:3071:4. On the new ritual, THY 37, p. 670, and on the extension
of filial piety, THY 26, p. 498.
18. THY 64, p. 1117.
19. This was Liu Hsiang-tao whose memorial is discussed in Chapter 7- His
comment is found in the abstract of this critique, TT 17, p. 93b.
20. In addition to the sources mentioned in the preceding chapter, see the
succinct history of the ceremonial during the T'ang in THY 7, PP. 79 ff. Also
CTS 23:3159:1.
21. Chavannes, T’ai Chan, p. I85. On the ceremony of 665, see also TCTC 201,
pp. 6344 ff., CTS 5:3073:1, TFYK 36:2a, 40:20b, 780:24a and 80:9a.
The celebration of 665 seems to have been appropriately timed, and Ssuma Kuang remarks on the general prosperity which had followed five successive
bountiful harvests. Foreign representatives attended from as far away as Persia,
attesting to the success of Chinese arms. The quoted passage is also found in
CTW 97:lab.
22. CTS 23:3160:2. The occasion of his remark was an order to prepare a brief
on the feng-shan which Hsuan-tsung was considering at the time. On Chang, see
Pulleyblank, Baakgvound, p. 194.
It is of interest to note that Empress Wu be
came the first woman ever to participate in the great sacrifice of the Southern
Suburb in 669. TFYK 596:28b.
23. TCTC 201, p. 6346.
24. CTS 23:3159:4.
25. TCTC 201, p. 6347. See also TT 20, p. Il4b.
26. CTS 5:3074:1, TFYK 30:5a, THY 1, p. 3, and TCTC 202, p. 6372. See also
Tz’u-haii pp. 262 and 266.
27. On the changes of 662, see TCTC 200, pp. 6326-27, CTS 4:3072:3, and HTS
3:3639:2. The new names were given in two stages, in the second and fourth
month of the year, and while it is difficult to identify a consistent source of
inspiration, the new titles seem in the main to have been wholly new or else de
rived from those used at the height of the Han.
It may be possible, therefore,
to see the changes as a reassertion of Chineseness, an attempt to dissociate the
T'ang from the "barbarian" regimes which immediately preceded its rise. The
motive of ritual replication seems also to have been present and, if so, the
reversion to the old names in 670 {TCTC 201, p. 6365 and CTS 5:3073:3) was an
acknowledgment of error. The year 670, of course, was an economic low point in
Kao-tsung's reign with the worst drought and famine of the period, and was marked
by other ritual attempts at solution like the change of n-ten-hao and the empress'
offer to abdicate.
The second change, as comprehensive as the first, occurred in the ninth
month of 684, shortly after the accession of Jui-tsung. See TCTC 203, p. 6421,
CTW 96:11a, and WYYH 463:6b. On this occasion the chief inspiration for the new
names seems to have been the Chou-tt so that the Six Boards, for instance, were
designated by Heaven, Earth and the four seasons. As we shall later see, a few
came from the Taoist pantheon and some were unprecedented, so that the purposes
were probably ideological and designed to signal a new and prosperous era.
28. See Pan Ku, Former Harij v. 3, PP. 103 ff. On the close connection between
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Chou-ti symbolism and usurpers and reformers, see Tanigawa, "Keii."
29. CTW 6:6b~7a, THY 49, p. 859, Kuang hung-ming ohi 25, TD 52:283c. The
claim was reasserted in each subsequent reign: by Kao-tsung in 666 {CTW 12:13b)
and Chung-tsung in 708 {CTW l8:8a). On T'ai-tsung's edict, the disputed date
and the possibility of a second one in 64l , see Michihata, Chugoku Bukkyush-C, p.
153.
30. See note 531. TCTC 204, p. 6374, THY 49, p. 859, CTW 95:4a, and TTCLC 113:4a. The edict
reviews the Buddhist omens which helped bring the empress to the throne.
It is
of importance to note that an edict of 675 had given the clerics of both churches
equal places at the court. THY 49, p. 859, TFYK 60:10a.
32. CTS 5:3073:1. On these foundations, see Tsukamoto, Ntsht Bukkyo, pp. 24
ff.
33. TCTC 201, p. 6347. On a similar move by Wen-ti, see Wright, "Sui ide
ology," p. 87.
34. HTS 83:3884:2, TFYK 303:20b, and THY 50, p. 870.
In spite of her 1-ater
importance, little is known of T'ai-p'ing's early life. The youngest of Kaotsung's three daughters and the only one born to the empress, she was only six
when her ordination occurred. The HTS tells us that a palace was remodeled to
look like a convent, but the princess seems to have found the monastic life un
congenial, and in 68I she was married in a lavish ceremony marred by the acci
dental burning of the trees along the processional route {TCTC 202, p. 6402 and
TFYK 84:17a). Her husband died in prison at the end of 688 {TCTC 204, p. 6453),
and two years later she married Wu Yu-chi, a grandson of Shih-huo. This was
part of her mother's plan to unite the Li and Wu clans, and the sources say she
had to arrange for the death of Yu-chi's wife to make it possible.
From this time, T'ai-p'ing became her mother's closest confidante, and a
mark of her favor is the fact that she came to hold a fief of revenue {shi-h-shth
feng) of 3,000 households, almost ten times the statutory limit for a princess.
TCTC 204, p. 6466 and CTS 183:3554:2.
35. There is still no systematic study on the development of organized Tao
ism from Han to T'ang, but see, in addition to Seidel's works cited earlier,
her Divinisation and Maspero's Taoisme. Ware's "Wei Shu and the Sui Shu on Tao
ism" is still useful, as are several sections of Tokiwa, Bukkyo to Jukyd Dokyo.
Several works in the TD refer to the size of the canon and the activities of the
church in the early T'ang. See, for instance, TD 49, Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai
12:581b ff.
36. WHTK 29, p. 271c. This was one of the suggestions of her twelve-point
memorial. While her motive was most closely connected with Taoist ideology, it
is also possible that the Tao-te ohing was chosen for its mother imagery and its
assertion of female superiority.
37- In 678.
See THY 75, p. 1373 and TFYK 639:19a.
38. The best study is Tsukamoto's "Haibutsu."
39* Maspero, Taoisme^ pp. 15 ff. and II6 ff. See also the extensive bibli
ography in Seidel, Divinisation.
40. Wright, "Sui ideology," pp. 86-87.
41. TCTC 205, p. 6484.
Some of the most conspicuous omens, besides those
mentioned in the text, are a three-legged chicken in 684 {TFYK 46:12a), a new
mountain peak in 686 {THY 70, p. 1243), an unseasonal snowfall in 693 and the
footprint of the Buddha in 701 {TFYK 15:15ab). These are also mentioned in the
standard histories.
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Like earlier T'ang rulers, she found it necessary to prohibit magical
and superstitious practices among the people and did so in 689 and 695. See
THY kk, p. 797, and CTW 96:2a.
k2. TCTC 205, pp. ()kSk-S5- See Appendix B, no. 110.
43. See Chapter 9.
kk. Kamata, Chugokuj p. 120.
45. See, for instance, TD 49, Fo-tsu fung-ohi. 39:368a and 369a for reference
to her votive patronage at Lungmen and the monks she received in this period.
Tsukamoto, Shtna, pp. 372 ff., shows that the greatest activity at Lungmen oc
curred in the second half of the seventh century. We might also note an edict
of 673 prohibiting the cruel snaring of animals, TFYK 42:15a.
46. On the history of the conflict see Ch'en, Trans formation^ pp. 78_ff. and
Yen Tsung's PSTS. The origins of the problem are examined in Itano, "To-Shin,"
and Tokiwa, Bukkyo to Jukyo Dokyo, pp. 56 ff. contains some useful references.
Yang-ti's edict is discussed also in Ch'en, Buddhism, p. 202.
47. This is suggested at a number of points in the text and by two articles
in Wright and Twitchett, Perspectives, pp. 239~307. The Fo-tsu t'ung-ohi, not
always a reliable source because of its late date, mentions an early directive
that clerical conduct should be guided by the Hsiao-dhing.
See 39:365b.
48. Chen-kuan oheng-yao (Ssu-pu pei-yao ed.) 7:10a-llb, quoted by Michihata,
Bukkyoshij p. 336. T'ai-tsung once remarked on the importance of Buddhist de
votion among his people {THY 47, p. 836) and, as the two articles in Perspectives
(see preceding note) make clear, considered it important in his state ideology.
49. Fo-tsu t'ung-chi 39, TD 49:364b suggests that the edict was rescinded two
years later, while Fo-tsu ti-tai t’ung-tsai W , TD 49:569a puts the original
edict in 632 and does not mention its withdrawal. Caution is necessary in the
use of Buddhist sources.
50. Ch'en, Transformation^ p. 8l, and Michihata, Bukkydshij p. 339. See also
THY 47, p. 836 and Fo-tsu t’lmg chi 39, TD 49:367a.
51. CTW 12:4a. See also Kuang-hung ming-chi 25, TD 52:284a; PSTS 3, TD 52:
455b. The edict is dated the sixteenth day of the fourth month in Fo-tsu li-tai
t'ung-tsai 12, TD 49:580b.
52. Michihata, Bukkyoshit p. 337 and Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai^ loc. cit. On
Wei-hsiu, see SKSC 17, TD 50:8l2b.
53. Ch'en, Transformation3 pp. 79~80, and Michihata, Bukkyoshij loc. cit.
Prince Hsien, of course, was still a child and unless he had been in some way
connected to the church as a child, it is difficult to know why he was chosen.
The crown prince, of course, had been called Hung because of the force of the
name in Taoist messianlsm, and Chung-tsung, we are told, was called Fo-kuang
Wang because of a light appearing at his birth. See Fo-tsu t'ung-chi 39, TD 49:
367a. The brief to Madame Yang is found in PSTS 3, TD 52:456a.
54. Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai 12, TD 49:580c.
I am not sure what forms the
civil rank {su-kuan) took.
55. Most particularly PSTS 3, TD 52:455b ff. and the CTW which preserves a
total of thirty-six briefs connected with the debate, only seven of them advo
cating freedom from obeisance. Michihata, Bukkyoshi^ pp. 33S~S1, has summarized
the arguments of both sides and identified some of their sources. The discus
sion in the text is based largely upon his work.
56. Tao-te ching, chang 25. The ssu-ta are the TaOj Heaven, Earth, and the
ruler.
57. See, for instanc
^
v. 1, and note the early ap
126-144) which, in their atpearance of such works
tack on Buddhism, began with its unfilial nature. See Ch'en, Buddhism, pp. 51-52
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58. Quoted In Ch'en, Transformation, p. 79. The original is found in Kuanghung ming-ohi 25, TB 52:286a.
59. For the references, see Michihata, Bukkyoshij p. 3^3.
60. CTS 73:3325:^ and NTS 102:3918:3. The member of a clan originally from
Tunhuang and, in the T'ang, one of the most eminent of Ho-hsI, Ling-hu, Te-fen,
had held high posts under the first two emperors. A very erudite man, he had
worked both on dynastic histories and the Shih-tsu chih.
Shortly after the pai
controversy, he resigned his posts and died in 666 at the age of 8^*. His biog
raphy contains no suggestion of Buddhist loyalties.
61. See Appendix B, no. 58.
62. CTW 12:7b, Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai 12, TB 49:56la. See also. Ch'en,
Transformation, p. 80.
63. SKSC 17, TB 50:8l2c. With no confirmation elsewhere, even in PSTS, I am
inclined to doubt the statement.
6k. CTS 8:3081:2.
65. Yang Ssu-hs'uan {CTS 62:3303:2), who submitted a joint brief with Yang
Shou-chueh, was a maternal cousin of the empress. Yang Ssu-chien and Yang Ssucheng {HTS 71 shang:3Q^k:k) were his brothers. Yang Ling-chieh {HTS 71 shang:
381A:2) was from a different branch of the same clan and with Ho-lan Min-chih,
the empress' nephew, the Yang clan thus accounted for five briefs. Lu Ts'ai
{CTS 79:3338: it) was a close associate of Hsu Ching-tsung and Li Ch'un-feng who
are mentioned as advocates of the imperial party in PSTS^ and both he and Li
submitted briefs.
Li l-fan was the brother of Li l-fu, and Ch'iu Shen-chl was
an adherent of the empress later used to dispose of her son Hsien.
Other examples could be adduced but the role of Hsii Ching-tsung, and the
stance of the Yang clan which contrasts so strongly with that of the empress'
mother, are perhaps sufficient to illustrate my point.
66. Chapter 3, n. IO8.
67. Perspectives, pp. 239~265._ See also the short exploration of T'ai-tsung's
Taoist bias in Yuki Reimon, "Shoto Bukkyo."
68. Kao-tsung was by no means an ardent supporter of Buddhism, and I agree
substantially with the conclusions of S. Weinstein's "Imperial patronage of
T'ang Buddhism," in Perspectives, pp. 265-306. At the same time, he recognized
the force of Buddhism among his subjects when he founded a temple to commemorate
his mother {CTN 11:6b), and when in an edict attempting to place an abbot he
commented specifically that Buddhism was declining in the West but flourishing
in the East, i.e., in China.
{CTW 11:8a). His establishment of the Kuo-fen
temples in every prefecture after the feng-shan sacrifice in 665 was the great
est act of patronage the T'ang had yet seen and led the monk Tao-shih to con
clude his great encyclopedia of 668, the Fa-yuan chu-lin, with the Judgment
that no former ruler was comparable to him.
I commented earlier on his public
stance of respect for Hsuan-tsang, and Buddhist sources comment on other con
cessions toward the church such as his exemption of their literature from the
use of "taboo" characters. See Fo-tsu t’ung-chi 39, TB ^9:369a.
69. Tsukamoto, Nishi Bukkyo, pp. 21 ff. and earlier references.
70. Z’urcher, Buddhist Conquest, v. 1, pp. 19^"5", T'ang Yung-t'ung, Han-Wei,
pp. 217-219.
71. See, for instance, Ch'en, Buddhism, pp. 279 ff., and Wright, "Sui ide
ology," pp. 95-96.
72. Tsukamoto, Shina Bukkyoshi, pp. 273 ff. and 58I ff.
73. See Eberhard, Tobareich, Chapter I8, and Shigematsu, "To-So." The TFYK
921:17b notes that a man called Sung Tzu-hsien had gained some credence and a
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rebellious following in 613 by calling himself an incarnation of Maitreya.
I
find no formal prohibition of the sect in the T'ang until 715.
7k. Fo-tsu t'ung-ohi 39, TD A9:36?c. The late date of the source and the
lack of confirmation elsewhere make the notice somewhat suspect.
75. TEI 48, p. 846. This event, recalled in 684, accounts for the change of
era name to kuang-ohai.
Soothill and Hodous, Diationoj-y of Chinese Buddhist
Terms, p. 202a, gives a short history of the temple founded to commemorate the
event. The incident is also mentioned in the commentary on the Great Cloud Sutra.
76. TCTC 203, pp. 6413-14.
77. The k'ao-i notice, ibid, says that another source calls him the yueh-

kuang wang or candraprabha.
78.
79.
80.
in the

Note 27 above.

Tz'u-yuan, p. 339c.

It was the era name from 685 to 689.
See Wright, "Sui ideology," p. 90, and on the history of the institution
T'ang, TEI 11, pp. 271 ff. The best examination of the symbolism of the
ming-t'ang and its origins is Granet's Pensee ohinoise, especially pp. 175 ffand 210-29. Wang Mang, of course, also used a ming-t’ang for legitimizing pur
poses. See Pan Ku, Former Eon, v. 3, PP- 191-94.
81. in the eleventh month of 689. See ETS 76:3867:4, TCTC 204, pp. 6462-63,
and the Act of Grace which promulgated the measure, WIIE 463:1b and CTW 96:16b.
In the act, the empress remarked upon how the writing system had become
progressively confused and complicated so that even scholars had difficulty in
understanding some of the characters. As part of a continuing reform, she was
issuing twelve new characters which would preserve the foundation of the words
while illustrating their meaning. The first of the new forms was the rei^acement of the Chao in the empress' own given name by a new character Chao M
whose components symbolized the heavenly bodies illuminating the void below.
We cannot, of course, eliminate the possibility that the two components of the
empress' new name were chosen for their Buddhist significance. The top of the
character is vidyd, the Buddha-wisdom which enlightens and destroys illusion,
while the lower part is sunya, the empty or illusory.
Some sources simply attribute the fabrication of the new characters to
the empress but they were, in fact, the invention of Tsung Ch'in-k o {CTS 32.
3365:4 and ETS 109:3930:4), a close supporter and a relative by marriage.
While the new characters have been a source of fascination to scholars,
especially to those Interested in the epigraphy of the period, there seems^to
exist no consensus on their form. The only full secondary study is Tokiwa s
"Bu-Shu shinji." In it, nineteen new characters are identified showing that the
list was, in fact, supplemented.
It is also clear that the new forms were used
universally for fifteen years, and examples have been found both in Tunhuang
and in Japan.
The new characters are given below:
Heaven
Earth
Sun
Moon
Star
Prince

^

A
©
0
i |l

^

Year
Beginning
Country
Year
Minister
Life

M ^ *

^
£
4-

i
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Upright

JL

Luminous

Man

A.

Sage

Proof

G i ve

03
*»»»

it

The nineteenth i s probably a variant form.
A number of these characters were used in the reign titles of the empress and
so appeared in all official documents.^
Tokiwa also finds
used for
"ten thousand" since 693, but I am not
convinced that this was one of the empress' new characters.
As a legitimizing device, the new characters might have been intended to
suggest an implicit comparison with the legendary Inventor of a script or pei—
haps to emphasize the "new beginning" of a second Chou ruling the united empire.
Alternatively, they might be seen simply as a sign of the Confucian ruler's con
cern with literacy and education.
82. The fullest account of this figure is in CTS 183:355^:3; see also TCTC
203, pp. 6A36-37. He obtained the surname Hsueh when the empress had him adopted
into her daughter T'ai-p'ing's family, since he was not himself of the shi-h class.
83. Ch'en, Buddhism^ p. 222, seems to suggest that while palace chapels had
existed in earlier dynasties including the Sui, they date from 69I in the T'ang.
It seems clear from Huai-i's biography that this was not the case though I have
seen no earlier reference in the dynasty. On ministerial complaints about Huai-i
and the request that he be castrated, see TCTC 203, p. 6^f^l.
81*. For a full examination of this event, see the sources cited in note 91
below.
85. The two T'ang histories use the term "falsely compiled" {wet-ahuan or weitsao), while Ssu-ma Kuang, who says it was a four-ohuan work while all extant
versions are in six, simply says it was composed and presented.
{TCTC 20A, p.
61»66). The Fo-tsu t’ung-ohi says it was "translated by imperial order" {dh'ih-i)
and the Seng-shVh Vueh says it was retranslated {dh’ung-i) . Similar discrepan
cies exist on the matter of the number of monks involved.
86. Yabuki, Sangatkyo, pp. 716 ff.
87. Ch'en, Buddhismj p. 217, and Tsukamoto, Nisshi Bukkydy p. 27.
88. HTS 76:3867:4.
89. TCTC 204, p. 6469, CTS 6:3076:1, and HTS 4:3641:3In most cases the
foundation of the Great Cloud temples Involved only a name change for existing
establishments, and Tsukamoto, Nisshi BukkyOj p. 29, shows that large and power
ful temples were chosen. The source of the new monks is unspecified.
90. In contrast to the equality of Buddhist and Taoist foundations In 666.
It must be noted that in 689 the empress stripped Lao Tzu of the honorific be
stowed at that time. THY 50, p. 865.
91. The first full study of the Tunhuang evidence is to be found in Yabuki,
SangaikyOj pp. 686-76I. His reconstruction is based upon Stein 2658, and it is
upon the text reproduced in his work that my translation is based. More recent
ly his research has been supplemented by Shigenoi, Todai^ pp. 203-37 which looks
at the longer and generally superior version of the commentary, Stein 6502.
I
might note here that the prophetic passages of the sutra which are to be found
in the commentary occur in Chapters 4 and 6 of the Great Cloud Sutra and that my
citations are to TD 12, no. 387, PP- 1097 and 1107.
92. This need has now been answered with the publication of Forte, Potitioal
Propaganda. This most useful work which examines the circumstances and problems
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of the sources, composition and meaning of the commentary reached me only when
my own study was in press preventing me from incorporating the author's findings.
Forte gives a full translation of Stein 6502 and though our translations differ
only in minor respects, the reader is referred to his much fuller annotation of
the text and his resolution of certain problems which had baffled me.
93. For an exposition of these lines see Shigenoi, Todaij pp. 205 ff.
Sk. In the translation which follows, I have supplemented the lacunae at the
beginning and end of Stein 2658 by the use of Stein 6502 and have sometimes used
the latter to correct errors in the former. Where the text uses the term shenhuang, I have translated "the empress" for purposes of clarity and, for the same
reason, have occasionally turned direct quotation into indirect speech.
95- Yabuki, Sangaikyd, p. 721 promised a fuller study of this work but, as
far as I can tell, never carried it out. The Cheng-ming ohing seems to have
been a short work, highly prophetic and popular in character which was classified
as false or dubious in both the Sui and T'ang indexes.
Four or perhaps five cop
ies are to be found in the Pelliot, Stein and Otani collections but a full study
has yet to be undertaken.
It is of interest to note that even in the Chou in
dex {Ta Chou K'an-ting ohung-ohing mu-lu, 15, p. 427c) the work is classified as
false though it is cited with some frequency in the commentary.
96. At this point the following note is inserted in small characters in both
copies of the manuscript:
"Maitreya" (Mi-lo) is a Sanskrit word which [in Chinese] is translated as
the "Compassionate One" its'u-shih) . As the V'UnatakZvtt-sutva puts it,
"the merciful and compassionate mind is that of the woman [or daughter]."
The empress corresponds to this meaning.
97. Cf. Legge, I-ohingy 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1899), p- 425.
98. Chapter 5, n. IO8.
99. I suspect that this term refers to the Pao-t'u since ETS 76:3867:4 re
cords that in August of 688, the stream in which it was found was renamed Kuangwu, probably as a means of drawing attention to the Wu surname. There are many
references to the text of the Kuxxng-wu ming throughout the commentary which
leads one to believe that the inscription was much lengthier than previously
thought or, alternatively, that the reference is to another prophetic stone al
together. See Yabuki, op. oit., pp. 229-31 where the scattered references are
collected to give a rough reconstruction.
100. I am of the view that the reference here is to the classical Ho-t'Uj a
prognostic text supposedly transmitted by the Yellow Emperor to King Wen of Chou.
It enjoyed great currency in the Han and was later outlawed because of its sub
versive potential. See Dai kanwa Jiten 6:17245:182 and the remarks of A. Seidel
in "Dynastic treasures." Granet's discussion in Pensee^ pp. 148-74, is most
enlightening. The text also allows the possibility here that Ho-t'u refers to
an omen specific to Empress Wu in which case the quotation should be lengthier.
101. The first three T'ang emperors. See also TCTC 204, p. 6447.
102. Here the most ancient terms for local officials are used.
I am uncertain
why.
103. The name of the Li clan was changed to Hui "viper" after the Princes'
Rebellion. See Chapter 5*
104. A feared figure in Buddhist mythology ruling a race of cannibalistic,
black-bodied, red-haired demons in the southwestern kingdom of the heavens.
105. A reference to the new mountain peak of 686. See CTS 37:3203:4 and THY
70, p. 1243.
106. Unless the passage is a pun on the word shan which also means monastery.
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I am not sure how the connection is made by the commentators.
107. P'an-Zung "ascending dragons" were part of the empress' decor in the

ming-t 'ang.
108. See TRY 11, p. 277*
109. See Ta-fang teng wu-hsiang ohing^ in TV 12, p. 1098a. The cakravartTn
was the universal monarch "whose chariot wheels roll everywhere without hin
drance," and JambudvTpa, strictly speaking, was the southernmost of the four
Buddhist kingdoms. Mochizuki, Bukkyo daigiten (Kyoto, 1958), v. 1, p. 317,
says that JambudvTpa was also used for eastern lands like China. See also TCTC
204, p. 6466.
no. TD 12, p. 1107a.
111. I am unable to identify this reference though the title suggests a Bud
dhist prophecy.
It is quoted on other occasions in the commentary.
112. TD 12, p. 1097c.
113* Wu Tse-t'ien had established at the time of the feng-shan sacrifice
that as Heaven was associated with the emperor, Earth was associated with the
empress.
114. See Legge, I-ehing^ p. 430.
115« Wu, of course, was the second of Madame Yang's three daughters.
116. By using the characters "son" (^ ) and eighteen
, the Li surname
is composed (
). The reference is to the ballad tradition {t'lmg-yao) of
omenology upon which we earlier commented.
^
117. It will be recalled that Wu was named Mei ^ "beauteous" when she
entered T'ai-tsung's harem.
118. The phrase t'u-ohung in the Shu-ch-ing (Legge, p. 428) refers in fact to
Loyang.
119. The bureaucratic expansion in the Chou will be discussed later.
120. In this passage we see three of the empress' nten-hao used. Kuang-chai
was adopted in 684, yung-oh’ang in 689, and sheng-li in 698.
121. The phrase might also be translated "has not ruled long."
122. In the fashion
ir •
123. TD 12, p. 1096c.
124. TD 12, p. 1107a.
125. Ib-id. This passage shows that the commentators knew that the church
might trespass on its new favor, and it also helps to explain why an emperor
like T'ai-tsung had had the sutra so frequently chanted.
126. See note 74 to this chapter.
127. In imitation of the Emperor Asoka (r. about 274-237 B.C.) who is said
to have built 84,000 stupas. Sui Wen-ti used the same model.
128. The first five commandments against killing, stealing, adultery, lying
and intoxication. They bind both laity and clergy. The passage is found in
TD 12, p. 1098a.
129. The passage might also mean "good spirits protect her person."
130. Mira is the destroyer who appears in different categories like desire,
falsehood, etc.
131. Since Maitreya was the Buddha and not a bodhisattva, the inclusion of
this passage is a very significant one.
132. I am unable to locate any text by this name and suspect a reference to
the many ah’an-wei texts associated with the Confucian Classics. Seidel, "Dy
nastic treasures," offers a convenient summary of the literature.
133* Wei Yuan-sung was a well-known fortuneteller of the Northern Chou and
seems to have been instrumental in the Buddhist persecutions of 574-77- He is
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described sometimes as "one who attained the Way" and, as a Taoist, may have
written some of the messianic ballads current at the foundation of the T'ang.
Some of his sayings, engraved on stone, were presented to Kao-tsung in 674 and
locked away. Translation is extremely difficult.
134. Shih-min was also the given name of T'ang T'ai-tsung.
135. Another of Empress Wu's era names.
136. The phrase ta-sheng hsuan-cht here is unclear.
I can locate no text
with this title and so translate literally.
It has been suggested to me that
there might be a connection with the Amitayus Sutra (Wu-liang-shou ohing).
137. 1 think the meaning here is that in the I-ohing hexagrams, the fifth
place from the bottom is that of the ruler.
In this case it should be a broken
or "female" 1ine.
138. This is an alternate name for the Pao-t'u discussed in the following
chapter. See NTS 76:3867:3.
139. The theme of T'ang continuity is resumed at several points in the com
mentary, and I will later suggest that this is how the empress saw her role.
140. Probably an attempt to depict the Wu surname in the fashion jJ:.+ ^ ~
•
141. This is probably a contemporary augury but one which may echo the clas
sical Eo-t'u which contained a tung-t’u.
142. I am rather unsure of my translation here.
143. TD 12, p. 1107a.
144. TD 12, p. 643b. There are three extant versions of the sutra, and the
quotation is from the most recent or "southern" text.
145. See TD 27, p. 912a for the quotation.
146. As mentioned earlier, Ch'en Yin-k'o regards this as evidence that the
empress was early placed in a Buddhist convent.
1 find his argument unconvinc
ing.
147. The empress' father was posthumously entitled T'ai-huang, though the
phrase might also mean "the great emperors" of the past.
148. I cannot identify this character.
149. A prognostical work in one volume compiled in the reign of T'ang T'aitsung and said initially to have contained sixty prophecies.
150. Sl^n-lung was the last of the empress' era names adopted just before her
deposition.
151. This prophecy turned out to be wrong since the empress changed her era
name before the end of the year.
152. I find no specific mention elsewhere of a plot headed by these two men
although the standard sources confirm their execution.
It seems that three ex
planations are possible:
(a) that the executions were a residue of the Princes'
Rebellion of 688 since Li Ch'ang was a member of the imperial clan and P'ei Chien
a relative by marriage, (b) that the persons executed were involved in the plot
of 689, discussed in Chapter 6, n. 70, or (c) that the charges were fabricated
by the overzealous penal officials active in the terror and are thus unmentioned
in the official sources.
I am of the view that there was indeed a last-ditch
stand against the proclamation of the Chou and the Western Capital would be a
natural focus for it.
153. The numerous lacunae hereafter make coherent translation from Stein 2658
impossible. Stein 6502, as I said earlier, is much longer and my translation
has covered only 284 of its 375 lines. The most interesting facet of the remain
ing portion is perhaps the extensive use of Taoist omenology, most particularly
the inscription of the famed K'ou Ch'ien-chih of Mount Sung and Yu Hsien-chang of
the Western Mountain. The last omen mentioned is the new mountain peak of 685
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which, as I will suggest, is identified by Confucian historiography as the first
sign of the impending usurpation.
15^. Wright, "Sui ideology," pp. 97 ff., in pointing out how Wen-ti stopped
short of proclaiming himself the tathagata, suggests that this formula had been
used by the rulers of the Northern Wei. This tactic and the hostile reaction
of the South against it is studied by Takao, Chugoku.
It is important to note,
however, that the Wei precedents were neither so elaborate nor systematic as the
actions of the Empress Wu who established special temples and monks and who used
her imperial title, her architecture and ceremonial to establish her claim.
155- Ta-fang-teng wu-hstang-oh'ing 6, TD 12:1107a. The vision described was
not a particularly original one and might be compared with that of another of
Dharmaraksa' s translations, the Fo-shuo Mi-lo hsia-sheng ohing:, TD 14:453.
156. Eloquently translated in de Bary, Souraes, v. 1, pp. 175~76.
157. CTS 6:3076:2, HTS 4:3641:4, and TCTC 205, PP. 6492, 6494 and 6496. The
empress took her full title in three stages.
In the autumn of 693 and in re
sponse to a petition of 5,000 names solicited by Wu Ch'eng-ssu, she called her
self "Golden Wheel," the symbol of the cakravartTn. For this move the immediate
inspiration was the presentation of a second sutra, that of the Precious Rain
(Shigenoi, Todai, pp. 218 ff.), which portrayed her as a dakravartTn and was fol
lowed by the erection in the ming-t'ang of the sapta-ratna—the seven treasures
of the dakra. See Soothill and Hodous, p. 303a, and TCTC3 loo. ait.
In 694 Ch'eng-ssu again sponsored a petition of 26,000 names requesting
an augmentation of title, and "Peerless" was added. Ch'eng-ssu seems in this
to have been flattering his aunt in hopes of gaining the succession. Only at
the beginning of 695, and with no apparent reason, was "Maitreya" added to the
title.
The sequence is somewhat puzzling in view of the importance the empress
attached to the Maitreya omen and to which she referred on other occasions. See,
for instance, CTW 97:6b-7a, her preface to the new translation of the Hua-yen
Sutra. In the second month of 696, and immediately after the ming-t'ang burned,
she divested herself of "Maitreya the Peerless" {TCTC 205, p. 6502), seeming
therefore to connect the assumption of the title with the calamity which fol
lowed. Her initial reluctance to call herself Maitreya might perhaps be attribu
ted to humility and reverence.
158. Yabuki, SangaikyOj p. 726.
159. K’ai-yuan shih-ahiao lu 18:39b, in TD 55. The "three evil treasures"
were the Great Cloud omens, the claim of the empress to be Maitreya reborn, and
the Great Cloud temples erected under the auspices of the "false monk" Huai-i.
160. TRY 49, p. 859 and TCTC 204, p. 6473- The edict is found in TTCLC 113:
4a and CTW 95:4a.
161. THY 49, p. 859. See also Fonotionnaires3 v. 1, p. 412, n. 1. Accord
ing to TTLT 18:13a-14b, the tz'u-pu was to supervise the Buddhist and Taoist
clergy and nominate their temple heads (sangha, Ch. san-kang) as well as the
bhadanta {ta-te) of the capital.
It later carried out a triennial census and
registration {TEST, p. 859).
Earlier in the T'ang, the affairs of the church had been overseen by two
offices attached to the Board of Rites, the Ch'ung-hsiian shu which was primarily
concerned with Taoism and the Hung-lu ssu whose principal function was the man
agement of tribute envoys. The implications of this organization are that Bud
dhism was seen as an extension of Taoism and as a foreign religion.
On the matter of clerical discipline and state regulation, see Moroto,
"TSsho," pp. 66 ff.
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162. The only sect to rise after the Chou was that of Ch'an, and it might be
argued that its principal tenets were developed prior to the end of the Chou.
163. See TCTC 205, p. 6498. According to Ssu-ma Kuang, the expense was so
great that the treasuries were emptied to pay for it. See also TCTC 205, pp.
6499-6501. On the opposition to Buddhist expenditures, see THY 49, pp. 857 ff.
164. See the commentary translated in the text. Whether or not the mingt'ang was ever so simple as the ideal would suggest is difficult to know, but
thosewho protested the plan of 696 to reconstruct it seem to have seen it in
this light. This is discussed in later notes.
165. See Mochizuki, Bukkyo daigiten^ v. 8, pp. 221 shang.
166. TCTC 205, p. 6498.
167. See, for instance, CTW 95:8a and TTCLC 80:llb for a decree of 696 con
demning excessively elaborate funerals and other forms of commemoration. The
clan instructions of Yao Ch'ung (Appendix B, no. 122) warned his descendants
against excessive patronage of Buddhism. CTW 207:5b.
168. THY kS, p. 857, TFYK 327:21b, and TCTC 207, pp- 6549-50. Ti Jen-chieh
criticized not only the wealth of the church but the burdens which the clergy
placed on the people by the non-productive nature of their vocation, their sale
of sutras and relics, and their disregard of the law. He went on to point out
that as a compassionate religion. Buddhism should not be the cause of imposing
labor upon the people.
The empress apparently rescinded the call for corv6e labor but continued to
make collections from the clergy for five months.
Li Chiao later pointed out
that over I70 million ohHen had been collected and suggested that this be dis
tributed to the poor at the rate of 1,000 oh’-len per household. The suggestion
does not seem to have been followed. THY 49, pp. 857-58.
169. THY k\, p. 731, CTS 6:3076:1, and TCTC 205, P- 6482. Ssu-ma Kuang adds
that the ban included fishing and, since there was drought and famine in the
South, caused starvation. Human life was thus deemed less valuable than animal
life.
Bans on butchery seem first to have been enacted in China under Liang
Wu-ti, and there are examples in the Sui and T'ang though usually for the space
of three days.
It is difficult to know how severely the ban was enforced, but
TCTCy too. ott. mentions one high official nearly cashiered for contravening it,
and the memorial of Ts'ui Yung which resulted in its lifting indicated that it
had caused much suffering among the poor though the rich had often managed to
avoid it. THY 41, p. 731- Ts'ui's biographies are in CTS 94:3368:3 and HTS Il4:
3940:1.
See also Huang, T'ang-tai fo-ahiao, pp. 107 ff170. THY 41, p. 746. This meant that crimes against state property entered
the ta-ni category of punishment. TLSI 1, pp. 15 ff- and 19, p- 61. This en
actment occurred shortly after Buddhism was attached to the tz'u-pu^ again em
phasizing its position in the state.
171 - TCTC 205, p. 6469. The notice says that only the nine men who, with
Huai-i, were responsible for the commentary were awarded the red (instead of
black) cope and the silver belt ornament of fourth-rank officials. Judging from
Stein 2278, reproduced by Yabuki, Sangaikyo, pp. 748 ff., the award was much
wider. Twenty-seven monks are given name and rank, and several who had no con
nection with the Sutra are hsien-kung.
Since the document in question is another
containing omens of the empress' imperium, its compilers are likely to have been
Great Cloud monks.
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172. See, for instance, Huang, T'ang-tai fo-ohiao, p. 67, and Weinstein's
remarks, "Imperial patronage," in PerspeativeSj p. 265.
173. See Ch'en, Transformation3 pp. 85 ff.
17^. Ch'en, Transformation^ pp. 85 and 92.
175. Ibid.
176. See Ch'en, Trans formation3 p. 95 and Michihata, Bukkyoshi, pp. 137-77
for a more general examination of the problem of clerical discipline. Wright,
"T'ai-tsung and Buddhism," in Perspectives, pp. 261-63, has some interesting
remarks on another attempt to regulate the clergy through a sutra called the I-

ohiao ohing.
177. See, for instance, TLSI 2, pp. 48-49 which outlines the punishments for
such offenses as fornication {ohien
), disrespect to or assault upon super
iors, mistreatment or killing of slaves, theft, etc.
In most cases, punishment
was heavier than that imposed for the same offense upon commoners. See also
Ch'en, Transformation3 p. 102.
178. CTW 95:9b, 96:5b, and 95:11b respectively. The first two date from 698
and 700.
I have been unable to date the third.
179. See the several references to the abuses of this period in Gernet, As
pects ^oonomiques. See also TCTC 209, p. 6624.
180. See note I68 above and see the remonstrance in 704 by Chang T'ing-kuei
{CTS 101:3385:1 and HTS 118:3946:1) found in TCTC 207, p. 6571. As a result
of this memorial, the empress halted her plan to erect a huge and costly image.
181. TD 50, no. 2061.
182. Hsuan-tsang (600-664) has a full biography in TD 50, Ta-tz'u-en-ssu santsang fa-shih chuan3 no. 2053 and SKSC 4:721b. Tz'u-en (632-82) was his succes
sor and the systematizer of Fa-hsiang doctrine. SKSC 4:725b.
When Hsuan-tsang returned to China in 645, T'ai-tsung had supported his
translation work and Kao-tsung continued this patronage. He seems to have had
a fondness for Tz'u-en, setting him up in the temple he founded for his mother,
listening to his lectures and composing a eulogy for him.
183. The best account of Fa-tsang's life and the historiographical problems
surrounding it is Kamata, Chugoku, pp. 129 ff. See also SKSC 5:732b, and Ts'ui
Chih-yuan's biography in TD 50:280c.
On Chih-yen, see Fa-tsang's biography of him in TD 5^Hua-yen-ohing
oh'uan-chi 3. He lived from 602 to 668 and though he seems to have been at court
the favored position of the Fa-hsiang school meant that he received little support
The Hua-yen or Avatamsaka school derives its name from the massive sutra
first translated in 403. See the Hua-yen ohing oh'uan-ahi TD 51:153a.
It is
often considered the most sophisticated and recondite of Chinese schools. The
most useful study for the T'ang is that of Kamata, cited above, and Chang, Bud
dhist Teaching is an ambitious attempt at an overview of the sect.
184. THY 48, p. 848 and Hanada, Bukkyo Dai3‘ii3 v. 5> p. 3149a. The THY mis
takenly dates the foundation in 675 rather than 670 and, according to SKSC 2:
719a, there was a T'ai-yuan temple in each capital.
185. Kamata, Chugoku3 p. I30. On the conferral of honorific names, see Huang,
T'ang-tai fo-ahiao3 pp. 64 ff.
186. K'ai-yuan shih-ohiao tu 3, TD 55:564a, SKSC 2:719a. Also associated with
them at the time was the monk Buddhapala who came from Kabul in 676 {SKSC 2:717c)
Divakara translated eighteen texts before his death and the K'ai-y^n shih-ohiao
lu says the empress contributed a preface to his canon.
187. SKSC 2:718c. The notice here gives the impression that the empress con
sidered the former translation inadequate and, hearing of the exixtence of an
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earlier Sanskrit version in Khotan, sent a messenger to summon Siksananda. The
origin of the belief is probably the claim she makes in her preface to the new
translation. Kamata, Chugoku, p. 130 mentions some of the other collaborators.
See also K’a-i-yuan sh-ih-ohiao lu 3, TD 55:566a.
188. Found in CTW 97:5b and TD 10.
189. SKSC 1:710b. After his two maritime pilgrimages to India in 67I and
685, he brought back to China over AOO texts he had collected. The empress is
said to have met him at the gates of Loyang, showered him with gifts and set him
to work on the Hua-yen translation. She later supported his other translations
and his studies of the lands he had visited since she "respected the Law and
valued the man." KYSCL 3, TD 55:968bc.
Chavannes, Memoires translates from his
work.
190. See, respectively, Lt-tai fa-pao cht, TD 51:184a, and SKSC 5:732b on
Heng-ching who became Master of Precepts {shou-ohieh shih), perhaps because of
the Yang clan's friendship for T'ien-t'ai. Other examples are found in SKSC 19:
832b on Wu-hsiang, and 20:836b on Ch'u-chi of Pure Land, as well as Pao Ssu-wei
(3:720a), Bodhiruci (3:720b), Yin-tsung (4:731b), Tao-tsun (8:758a), Tao-ch'eng
(14:791b), Hui-an (l4:823b), etc.
191- Hui-neng {SKSC 8:754b) was invited at the request of Shen-hsiu but, be
cause of illness, did not attend.
192. SKSC 8:755c. The empress may have played a part, though unintentionally,
in the eclipse of northern Ch'an by its southern rival. Yamasaki,
pp.
197 ff-> sees the success of northern Ch'an in gaining imperial support and con
verts among the upper classes as the cause of southern Ch'an's greater success
among the commoners and hence its longevity.
Further instances of the empress' support for northern Ch'an are found
in CTW 97:6b and in the fact that Shen-hsiu is one of only three monks to be
given an official biography. See CTS 191:3592:2.
193. Ta-Chou k’an-t-ing ohung-ohi-ng mu-luj TD 55:372c.
194. Kamata, Chugoku^ pp. 144 ff., and more recently, Weinstein, "Imperial
patronage," in Perspectivesj pp. 265“306.
195- Weinstein, op. dt., pp. 274-91196. Kamata, Chugoku^ pp. 134 ff. Ch'an had not yet systematized its doc
trine at the time of Fa-tsang's schema, but in the second highest category of
"abrupt teaching" he placed such basic Ch'an doctrines as that of sudden enlight
enment and the ineffable character of all religious experience.
197. Chang, Buddhist Teaching, p. ix.
198. Chang, Buddhist Teaching^ pp. 28 ff.
199. THY 36, p. 657 and CTW 78:8ab.

Chapter 5
1. On Chung-tsung, CTS 7:3077:2, HTS 4:3642:4, and THY 1, p. 4. He was born
in late 656 and, prior to his elevation to crown prince in 68O, had held only the
usual sinecure of younger imperial sons, the position of mu in the two capitals.
See FonctionnaireSi v. 1, pp. 396-404 and v. 2, 884-904. There is no record
either of civil or military administrative experience beyond this.
2. TCTC 203, p. 6416. The complete document is found in TTCLC 11:3b and
CTW 13:20a.
3. Yang, Excursions, p. 314. TCTC 203, p. 6416. P'ei Yen, the paramount minister, memorialized to ask
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that the coronation take place without delay.
5. Empress Wei {CTS 51:3279:3 and HTS 76:3868:2) was a member either of the
Yung-chou or Tu-ling branch of the Wei clan, both of them extensive and powerful
and both having produced consorts and chief ministers earlier in the dynasty.
Wei became Chung-tsung's consort only after the death of his first wife who had
incurred the displeasure of the Empress Wu, and was to give him only a son and
a daughter. The son was executed in 701. The total domination of Wei over her
husband is traditionally dated from his exile in 684 when in gratitude for her
support, he is said to have promised her a free hand should better days ever
come. She seems to have become virtual ruler on his restoration and was respon
sible for much of the corruption and administrative decline which marked the
period. Some sources accuse her of poisoning her husband in 6IO, an allegation
which Ssu-ma Kuang accepts {TCTC 209, pp. 6641-2).
6. TCTC 203, p. 6417. See also CTS 87:3351:3 and HTS 117:3945:2. The em
press' father had been made prefect when Chung-tsung became crown prince in 68O,
and this customarily was the highest post he should have held. Chung-tsung
wished simultaneously to raise the son of his wet nurse, a man not of the "clear
stream," to the fifth rank.
7. CTS 87:3351:3 and HTS 117:3945:2.
8. Sun Kuo-t'ung, "San-sheng-chih" sees the transfer of the Cheng-shih fang
to the Department of State Affairs as a result of the gradual shift of depart
mental importance. The evidence is quite convincing and fails only to account
for the timing of the move, since the Chancellery had lost its paramount position
prior to 684. What is more, the Chancellery was at that time under Liu Jen-kuei
(Appendix B, no. 51), a man of greater experience and prestige than P'ei Yen and
the one person feared by the empress at the deposition. TCTC 203, PP. 6418-19.
It seems therefore to have been an inappropriate moment for P'ei to assert his
leadership.
I believe that to Professor Sun's analysis we must add the character and
ambition of P'ei Yen.
It seems clear from his biography that he was highly am
bitious, once trying to cashier P'ei Hsing-chien, of whom he was jealous, and
remaining as close as possible to the crown prince as Kao-tsung died. Since Jenkuei was over eighty in 684, P'ei Yen found it a propitious moment to seize con
trol of the tsai-hsiang group and was especially hostile to the plan to replace
Jen-kuei with Empress Wei's father since this would obviously dilute his personal
power.
It was for this reason, I think, that he took the extreme step of betray
ing Chung-tsung to Empress Wu.
Subsequently, he became the strongest advocate of a restoration of power
to Jui-tsung and his failure in this may have led him to the attempted coup of
which he was accused later in the year.
9. TCTC 203, p. 6417. See also CTS 86:3351:3.
10. TCTC 203, pp. 6417“18, and note the commentary. On the Yu-lin Guard, see
FonotionnaireSi pp. 555“560, and more particularly Ch'en, Cheng-dhih shih^ pp.
39 ff. for a demonstration of how the Yu-lin Guard determined every palace revo
lution in the early T'ang. At this time they numbered only about a hundred men,
most of them retainers of the Li clan {CTS 106:3396:2), so their willingness to
depose Chung-tsung is doubly interesting. Their number was to be greatly in
creased in 689 by the Empress Wu, and under Chung-tsung's restoration the force
reached 10,000. THY 72, pp. 1291-92. See also Pulleyblank, Baokgroundj pp. 6467.
11. CTS 7:3077:1 and TCTC 203, p. 6420. Chung-tsung, demoted to Prince of
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Lu-ling, was soon transferred to Ch'un-chou, even farther from the capital. Em
press Wei gave birth to the notorious Princess An-lo on the way.
12. On Jui-tsung, see CTS 7:3079:1, NTS 5:3643:3, and THY \, p. 513. TCTC 203, p. 6418.
14. Ibid.
15. See Ch'ii, Han Social StTuotvcce, p. 74.
16. See the excellent short review by D. Sternberger in the Intevnational
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), v. 9, pp. 244-48.
17. Found chiefly in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, A. M.
Henderson and T. Parsons, trs., (New York, 1947), pp. 152 ff. Weber, of course,
distinguishes three pure types of legitimacy: the traditional, charismatic, and
the legal-rational.
18. See particularly D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New
York, 1965), and A. Etzioni, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Po
litical Processes (New York, 1969). These and other sociological theories are
very well reviewed in an unpublished paper by Anne F. Thurston, "Authority,
legitimacy and power: A reformulation," which is part of a Ph.D. thesis for Yale
University.
I am Indebted to her for some of the ideas which follow in the text.
19. Thurston, "Authority," pp. 49 ff.
20. See, for instance, TCTC 203, p. 6418 in which she admits self-assumption
of the regency.
21. TCTC 203, p. 6419.
I have seen no instance of "hanging the curtain" prior
to its usage by Empress Wu, and it might therefore have been her own innovation
cast aside at this time.
22. See the two biographies cited in notes 7 and 8 above.
23. CTS 183:3551:1 and TCTC 203, p. 6419.
24. TCTC 203, p. 6419, and see Chapter 4.
25. TCTC 203, p. 6422 and THY 12, pp. 294 ff. and 15, pp. 325 ff. Subsequent
discussions on the ancestral temples in the T'ang invariably referred to the
sacrilege of Empress Wu. Arthur Wright, in a recent paper on the formal proce
dures by which Sui Wen-ti legitimized himself (Asllomar, 1975), emphasized the
importance of ancestral temples and titles.
26. TCTC 203, p. 6422.
27. The Act of 684 is found in TTCLC 3:4b, WYYH 463:6b, and CTW 96:11a. See
also TFYK 15:14b ff. For Empress Wu, this Act and that of 689 are the only ones
extant in their entirety.
28. I have divided the document somewhat arbitrarily into three sections which
seem to contain provisions of the same nature.
29. I do not mean to suggest here that Wu was openly and consciously following
the model of Wang Mang.
If anything, she avoided exact duplication of his ac
tions. The use of Chou-li symbolism, however, seems to have had a great appeal
to rulers concerned about their legitimacy. On the peculiarly Confucian use of
literary titles see Dubs' remarks in Pan Ku, Former Han, v. 3, pp. 104 ff.
30. The Phoenix Court and Luan [a type of phoenix] Terrace were used respec
tively for the Department of State Affairs and the Chancellery. The luan, for
instance, is said to have conveyed the Han Taoist adept Mei Fu to the land of
the immortals. The phoenix had since ancient times been a sign of the impending
appearance of a sage-king.
31. The era name was changed to kuang-chai to commemorate the discovery of'
relics described in the last chapter.
32. CTW 17:10a.
33. See CTW 17:8b and I4b-l6a.
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3h. Several examples are given in Chapter 9, and we might note the specific
criticism of the frequency of the Acts by Liu Chih-chi in 695- TCTC 205, pp.
6500-01 and THI 81, pp. 1494-5.
35. CTW 96:15a. On the new branch of the Censorate, see THY 60, p. 104l.
36. See Twitchett, Finana-iat Adm-CntStratton and the succinct summary of the
T'ang tu-ltng system by Ikeda in "Ritsuryo." On the census itself, TEST, pp.
242-45.
37. CTS 94:3368:2.
38. CTW 96:15a.
39. See Pulleyblank, Baakground, Chapter 5, and my remarks in Chapter 8.
The usual starting point in discussing the decline of the fu-ping is the Yehhou dhta-ohuan {Yu-hat 138:20ab), translated by Pulleyblank, Background^ p.
143. Yeh's remarks seem to have been influential in Ch'en Yin-k'o‘s suggestion
[Chapter 6] that Empress Wu deliberately weakened the fu-ping^ and the conten
tion of Ku, Fu-ping^ p. 216, that her reign was "the decisive first step" in
the decline of the institution. Hamaguchi, "Fuhei" has explored the question
in detai1.
Generally speaking, the aspects of the Chou blamed by modern scholar
ship for the fu-ptng decline are:
a) The political climate of the Chou court--factionalism and disputes among
tsat-hsiang and generals, as well as the empress' disgrace or execution of so
many high military officials.
b) The empress' excessive use of the troops.
c) The expansion of her personal bodyguard and the use of eunuchs in it. The
Yu-1 in Guard came to overshadow the fu-ptng and exercise too much control over
the court.
d) The overgenerous conferral of honorific rank, even to the nonmilitary, which
destroyed the merit principle. Tangible rewards of land and grain were cur
tailed in spite of promises to the contrary so that expectations were disap
pointed.
e) Landlord and official classes scorned the fu-ptng and hired peasants, often
the poor and weak, to serve for them. Worse, they bribed the officials in
charge of draft lists to exempt them so that peasants were unfairly conscripted
or quotas were left unfilled. Tunhuang evidence makes clear this absolutely
key factor in the decline of the system.
f) The government could not control the problem of vagrant or fugitive house
holds. Unable to tell who was eligible for fu-ptng service, it was unable to
equalize the burden.
As we shall see, there is some evidence that all of these factors were
present in the Chou, but because our evidence is scanty, it is difficult to
judge the degree to which they affected the system's decline.
it should not
be too much to say, however, that the list alone reveals something of Wu's at
titude toward the system, and it seems unreasonable to deny that she failed to
offer it support or contribute to its viability.
Her motives are difficult to discern, and I can agree with Professor
Ch'en only in the widest sense. The fu-ptng was at its most basic level an
instrument of centralization, but because the initial distribution of units
was so weighted in favor of the Northwest, contradiction was inherent from the
first.
If the system had to be weakened in the name of regional equalization,
then Professor Ch'en is right.
I am not sure, however, that this was the case.
By the Chou dynasty, two ill-fated rebellions had demonstrated that a
viable centralization had been achieved and that the T'ang system could
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withstand even a female ruler. As we shall see, the hard-pressed northeastern
prefectures strongly resisted the invasions of Khitans and Turks and their in
vitations to collaborate in the deposition of the empress.
In these circum
stances, the fu-ping had no function that could not be better served by profes
sional armies, and what is more, its inadequacies had become apparent as early
as mid-century when it was first used as a semi-permanent garrison in Korea
and when the decline in its morale came to imperial notice. By the Chou dynasty
it was probably too late to arrest the decline without a full-scale reform and
for reasons I shall mention later, this was impracticable.
In short, while I admit that the Empress Wu bears much of the responsi
bility for the decline of the fu-ping^ I am not convinced that she consciously
set out to destroy it.
40. CTW 96:15ab.
41. The most striking use of recommendation for appointment came in 686 when
the establishment of the Urn began a continuing process whereby anyone who felt
himself qualTfied for office could recommend himself for appointment.
In ad
dition, decrees were issued after 684 whereby present officials were asked to
recommend their own replacements and, in some cases, to suggest up to three
names {THY 26, p. 89O). Specified ranks were often ordered to recommend, some
times the third rank and above {THY 53, P- 920) but more commonly fifth rank
and above {TFYK 67:27b ff.). On occasion, the hereditary principle was served
by having officials recommend "sons and nephews" {THY 53, p. 919) or, converse
ly, those "not of powerful or influential clan" {CTW 13:l4a, Kao-tsung). De
crees calling for recommendation were issued both on auspicious occasions and
calamitous ones, as in the case of the burning of the mi-ng-t’ang {CTW 96:2b).
An edict of Kao-tsung in 677 commanded that capital officials above the third
rank every year recommend all whom they knew of civil or military talent or
good character {CTW 13:l4a and TFYK 67:28a).
In the Chou we find commissioners sent out to seek worthy men, and pre
fects and tu-tu enjoined to recommend so that, as will be shown, the empress
became the butt of much criticism. Monographic study of the frequency with
which she used this method of recruitment relative to other T'ang rulers would
be useful.
Judging from CTW 95:14b, there were legal penalties for a bad recommenda
tion in response to these decrees, and several biographies suggest that exist
ing officials were reluctant to recommend since their own fate was then tied to
that of their proteges. Yang Tsai-ssu (Appendix B, no. Ill) "never once rec
ommended another" in the course of his successful career.
42. From a memorial of 685. See Ch'en Tzu-ang ohiy p. 184.
43. Discussed in detail in Twltchett's "Note."
44. On Li Chi, see Appendix B, no. 27.
45. TCTC 201, p. 6360.
46. A good study of the area in this period is Ch'uan Han-sheng, "Ching-chi
ching-k'uang."
47. The names and former ranks of several of these figures are found in TCTC
203, p. 6422.
48. The rebels restored the era name of Chung-tsung and claimed to be acting
on his behalf, but there is no indication that he was even cognizant of the
rising. The use of a double for the deposed Prince Hsien throws suspicion on
Chlng-yeh's motives. See TCTC 203, pp. 6423-24.
49. On Lo Pin-wang, see CTS 190 shang:3S^\HTS 201:4100:3 and Kuo Mo-jo's
speculation on his fate in Wu Tse-t'ien^ p. 147. The manifesto is found in CTW
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197:1a and is abstracted in TCTC 203, pp. 6423"4.
50. A reference to the duties of a ts’ai-cen concubine in the imperial ward
robe. Fitzgerald, Empress Wu^ p. 97, renders the passage, "Formerly she served
T'ai Tsung with her body and then made use of an occasion when [Kao Tsung] was
changing his clothes to commit fornication with him."
51. The reference here is probably to Wu's niece rather than to her sister
(Chapter 3, n. 107), and there is, of course, no evidence that Wu had anything
to do with the death either of Kao-tsung or of her mother.
It is interesting
to note that Pin-wang makes no reference to the murder of her infant daughter
or, indeed, to Prince Hung.
52. Here Pin-wang is referring to Jui-tsung's exclusion from politics and
also perhaps to the rapid rise of the Wu nephews.
It might be noted that Wang
Mang was also charged with murdering the ruler and planning usurpation in Chai
I's rebel manifesto in 8 A.D. Pan Ku, Former Han, v. 3, PP- 235"36.
53- There is no evidence that Ching-yeh received Kao-tsung's testament or
that he ever held a post higher than prefect.
54. The ambiguity might be deliberate here since the rebels were using the
names both of Crown Prince Hsien and of Chung-tsung.
55- CTW 197:1a ff.
56. TCTC 203, p. 6424.
57- The imperial force consisted of 300,000 men led by one of the T'ang
princes, and amnesty was extended to all who would voluntarily submit. Fitz
gerald, Empress WUj pp. 98 ff, outlines the campaign. On the leader of the
force, see CTS 60:3298:3 and HTS 78:3872:4.
58. The advice of Wei Ssu-wen, about whom nothing is known except that he
was a demoted censor.
See TCTC 203, PP- 6426-2759- See Pulleyblank, Background, pp- 75"8l, and the references cited in later
chapters.
60. TCTC 203, p- 6426.
61. On the end of the campaign, see TCTC 203, PP- 6430-3162. ETS 117:3945:2. See also TCTC 203, PP- 6425-6 where the k'ao-'l examines
the conflict.
Ssu-ma Kuang repeats a story from the Ch’ao-yeh oh'ien-tsai which
also suggests that P‘ei Yen was connected with the rebels but concludes that the
allegations arose from his enemies, and so refuses to give credence to his guilt.
63. Note 8 above and TCTC 203, P- 6425.
64. TCTC, loc. ait. and HTS 117:3945:2.
65. TCTC 203, p. 6426. "I know that P'ei Yen was rebellious. . . ."
66. CTS 87:3551:4 and TCTC 203, P- 6425.
67- TCTC 203, p. 6432. On Ch'eng, see CTS 83:3345:2 and HTS 111:3935:2.
He had been a prominent and successful commander against the Turks and had been
given a command in the Yu-1 in Guard just prior to Chung-tsung's deposition, in
which he assisted. This perhaps indicates a very close relationship to P'ei
Yen. Two of his friends were also prominent among the rebels, so that his de
fense of P'ei may not have been the sole reason for his execution. The Turks
are said to have rejoiced at his demise.
68. TCTC 203, p. 6432, k’ao-i which traces the incident to the T'ang t'ungohi, a source which Ssu-ma Kuang refuses to accept. The story is also found
in HTS 76:3867:369. TCTC, too. ait.
70. Discussed in Chapter 971. TCTC 203, p. 64l8. Chung-tsung had apparently been generous with his
hunting attendants and one of them expressed dissatisfaction at his deposition.
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On the establishment of these attendants, see TCTC 195, p. 6l4l.
72. CTS 186 shong-:356A: 1.
73* CTS3 too. ait. and TCTC 203, pp. 6^39"^0. See also Fitzgerald, Empress
Wuj pp. 115“117.
74. TCTC 203, pp. 6437-38, THY 55, pp. 956-59, FonotionnaireSi v. 1, pp.
143-46, and Feng-shih wen-ohien ohi 4, pp. 42-44. Some sources suggest there
were originally four urns, only later united into one.
75. TCTC 203, p. 6438.
76. Ch'en Tzu-ang ohi, pp. 216-17. The memorial is abstracted in TCTC 203,
pp. 6440-41.
77. See Chao I, "Wu-hou chih jen," in Nien-erh-shih oha-ahi^ 19, pp. 25758 and the lengthy discussion in Hamaguchi, To oaho. The question is explored
in Chapter 6.
78. See TCTC 192, p. 603I and 193, p. 6O8O. Wechsler, Mirror3 notes several
occasions on which T'ai-tsung withdrew edicts on the advice of Wei Cheng or
others.
79. On Liu, see Appendix B, no. 72. He was an early favorite of the empress,
seconded P'ei Yen at Chung-tsung's deposition, and was paramount minister from
the time of P'ei's death. On this occasion, he challenged the legality of an
order to have him investigated for bribery and adultery.
80. TLSI 3:1, pp. 40 ff. lists three types of punishment for errant officials.
The first was removal from present office, the second the stripping of all posts
including honorific ones, and the third "eradication of name." The latter was
the most severe and meant that the official lost all offices and titles and paid
tax and corvee according to his basic status {pen-se). Once convicted, a man
could hand on to his sons none of the privileges of rank and was often himself
without livelihood. The penalty of eradication was often applied together with
those of exile or of ohi-mo {TLSI 17:3, p. 40) in which the criminal himself,
his father and son(s) were executed with the sole concession that those under
fifteen and over sixty could be strangled rather than beheaded. His mother,
daughter(s), wife and concubines, his grandfather and grandson(s), brother(s),
sister(s), and slaves all became state property while his land, dwellings and
property were confiscated.
81. TCTC 206, p. 6513.
82. TCTC 205, pp. 6491-92 and Fitzgerald, Empress WUj pp. 150-151.
83. TCTC 203, pp. 6438-39.
84. TCTC 183, p. 6061.
85. The most famous was Hou Ssu-chih, a cake seller who rose to the Censorate
after convincing the empress that illiteracy was no barrier to the fulfillment
of his functions. TCTC 204, p. 6464.
86. TCTC 203, p. 6439.
87. For this rather insidious principle see TLSI 1:1, pp.
. In 697 the
empress commented that she had always seen the confessions of those who were
executed. TCTC 206, p. 6523.
88. On Hsu Yu-kung, see CTS 85:3349:1 and HTS 113:3939:3. A summmary of the
trials in which he acted as defender is found in TT I69, pp. 894c ff. and TFYK
616 and 617. A case could be made to suggest that the precedents set by the
cases he won contributed to making the law more lenient during the terror.
89. TCTC 206, p. 6523. On Yao, see Appendix B, no. 122. The phrase I have
translated as "followed their own interests" might be rendered "took care of
things without hindrance."
90. CTS 183:3554:4 and TCTC 205, p. 6498. A censor had been given permission
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to examine the monk's conduct but Huai-i rode his horse into the courtroom,
dismounted briefly, then rode out again. The empress did not order a retrial
but gave the censor permission to exile the many ruffians with whom Huai-i had
surrounded himself.
91. TCTC 203, p. (>h37.
92. Sources here are contradictory. The Turkish raids, which had become a
problem in Kao-tsung's last years, had increased in intensity and in early 685
the Chinese had suffered a great defeat in Hsin-chou, losing over 5,000 men.
Three months later they were able to recoup their losses, and the An-pei pro
tectorate was moved to T'ung-ch'eng to accept the surrender of the defeated
tribes. TCTC 203, p. 6435 and Hu San-hsing locate the new center.
I think
the date given, however, is a year too early since THY 73, p. 1309, Yu-hai
133:20a, Yuan-ho ohun-hsien t’u-ohih 4, and Ch'en Tzu-ang ohtj, pp. 190 ff. sug
gest that the move occurred in conjunction with the abolition of the Shan-y'u
protectorate which was put under a garrison commissioner in the fifth month of
686. See also Ts'en, T’u-ohueh, pp. 309-20 for a full examination of events.
Ch'en Tzu-ang at this time had just left a post in Kan-chou, and the
long memorial cited is our best contemporary source for the state of the Turks
and the Uighurs in the period.
In it Ch'en suggested first of all that the
court discard its arrogant refusal to receive the so-called Shih-hsing tribes
who had just inflicted heavy defeats on the Uighurs without instructions from
China. Second, he suggested that the new An-pei protectorate be substantially
strengthened and much better supplied in order to deal with the surrendered
Turks. Finally, he recommended that since Kan-chou was the key to the defense
of the Northwest and was also an object of plunder both to the Tibetans and the
Chiu-hsing Turks, more Chinese should be settled there. Pointing out that the
3,000 kuan-hu there supplied scarcely a hundred good troops and were unable
even to bring in the annual harvest, it was entirely possible that all three
prefectures of Kan, Liang and Su would soon be lost to the foreigners along
with the entire Ho-hsi region.
The situation he describes was all too typical of the protectorate sys
tem in the late seventh century. The memorial is also found in Ch'en Shth-iah-Ly 8.
93. In 689, Loyang for the first time produced more ohin-shih than Ch'angan. Teng-k'o ahi-k'aOy first year of yung-ah'ang.
94. See respectively, THY 69, p. 1213 [687], THY 69, p. 1213 [685] and THY
56, pp. 965-66 [685].
95. See, for instance, TCTC 205, pp. 6477-78.
96. The precise origins and definitions of yuan-wat officialdom are unclear.
The Hu commentary, TCTC 201, p. 6356, suggests that the first time one of these
supernumeraries received equivalent rank and emoluments {yuan-wai- t'ung-oheng)
was 654 but implies that the practice did not become widespread until 668. THY
58, pp. 1003 ff. lists many of these appointments as they were regularized in
the Boards, and I have found that in .the decade following 668, yuan-wai offi
cials were added almost every year to one or another of them.
Because this was a time when officialdom generally was expanding, the
new appointments were warranted and probably beneficial, especially in the
Board of Civil Office.
In 697, however, a massive increase occurred when Li
Chiao, in charge of the selection system, "began the establishment of several
thousand yuan-wai-kuan{TCTC 206, p. 6525-)
I think this meant that the
practice was extended to the provinces.
Ironically, Li Chiao advocated a
great reduction in these positions in 706, contending that they performed no
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service but drew salaries and extorted from the people. CTW 247:26.
97. TT 7, p. 40c. See also THI 89, PP- 1623-4, Yu-hai 80:l8b. On these
problems, there are several useful remarks in Twitchett, Financial AdministratioHi especially pp. 66 ff.
98. The literature on the question of registration and vagrancy has grown
very large since the Tunhuang discoveries, and a good review of the problem is
Nakagawa, "T5-S5 no kakkyo." Pul 1 eyblank's comments \r\ Background^ pp. 27~32,
are still useful and the modifications suggested by Tonami, "T5 no ritsuryo,"
solve many of the outstanding questions. Li Chiao's thorough memorial of 695
on the problem has been translated by Balazs in "Beitrage," pp. 27 ff• Judg
ing from his remarks, the problem had existed for some time but the measures
of 684, mentioned earlier, seem to have kept it under control.
99. See THY 91, p. 1652 and TCTC 204, p. 6445 respectively.
100. .See Chpater 4, note 28.
It is difficult to account for the attraction
of the Chou-ti although the Confucian doctrine of rectification of names cer
tainly played a part. Analects 11:23 and 111:14 provide a clue, the latter
reading: “Chou had the advantage of viewing the two past dynasties. How com
plete and elegant are its regulations.
I follow Chou." (Legge, Four Books^
p. 31).
101. Pan Ku, Former Han^ v. 3, P- 219- Like the Pao-t’u^ the stone found in
6 A.D. was white with red writing. Seidel discusses omens of this kind in
“Dynastic treasures."
102. CTS 6:3075:4, HTS 76:3867:3, and TCTC 204, p. 6449. See also the com
mentary to the Great Cloud Sutra translated in the preceding chapter.
103. Chapter 4, n. 96. Evidence from Tunhuang suggests a longer inscription.
104. TCTC 204, p. 6449 and HTS 76:3867:3I have found no previous instance
of a ruler adopting the title shen-huang though there may be some connection
with the san-huang of antiquity or perhaps to the shen-huang of Taoist myth
ology who possessed the secret of immortality.
105. See Chapter 4, note 80.
106. TCTC 203, p. 6425.
107. HTS 76:3867:4. TCTC 204, p. 6449, suggests that after the discovery of
the Pao-t'uj the empress determined to usurp and decided to eliminate the im
perial clan.
108. See, for instance. Pan Ku, Former Han, v. 3, PP- 191-92, and Wright,
“Sui ideology," pp- 89“90109. TCTC 204, p. 6449, which suggests that the princes were beginning to
make plans to save the state {kuang-fu). See also CTS 64:3307:4, biography of
Li Yuan-chia.
no. On Li Chuan, CTS 64:3307:4, HTS 79:3875:1; on Ch'ung, CTS 76:3332:3 and
HTS 80:3877:1- On the rising generally, TCTC 204, pp. 6449-53 and Fitzgerald,
Empress Nu, pp. 121-23- The imperial forces were not large, consisting of two
armies of about 100,000 each.
111. TCTC 204, p. 6467. Ssu-ma Kuang points out that Princess Ch'ien-chin
who had introduced the empress to Hsueh Huai-i was the only adult survivor,
and TCTC 205, P- 6485 offers a rough estimate of the number of victims.
112. TCTC 204, p. 6451.
113- THY 50, p. 865114. TCTC 204, p. 6454 and HTS 76:3867:4. CTShih 5 preserves the verses she
is said to have composed for the ceremonial at the Lo River. On the calendar,
see TCTC 204, p. 6462.
115- CTW 96:20b, TTCLC 4:1b.
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116. Chapter
note 82.
117. A suggestion of Lin Yu-t'ang in the novel Lady Wu which I do not find
very convincing.
It is interesting to note, however, the legend that Yii was
able to compose the Hung-fan after receiving the Lo-shu which was engraved on
the shell of a turtle which emerged from the Lo River. Acker, T'ang and PveT’ang Texts^ v. 1, pp. 85-9^, looks at some legends of this sort.
118. TCTC 204, p. 6463. See Chapter 7.
119. Wright, "Sui ideology," pp. 93~104.
120. See Ch'en, Transformation^ pp. 82 ff.
121. Wright, "Sul ideology," pp. 85“86, discusses the most notable example,
that of the Northern Chou.
122. CTS 6:3075:4.
123. NTS 109:3931:1. The diviner was attempting to show Chung-tsung that
the Chou and T'ang were the same and that the course of events could have been
predicted on the basis of eight signs.
124. Shigenoi, Tddai, pp. 216-33125. Ta-fang teng wu-hsiang eking 6, TD 12:1107a.
126. Chapter 4, n. 157.
127. TCTC 204, p. 6467.
128. Tz'u-y'ium, p. 1688b.
129. See Legge, Book of Historyj v. 2, p. 298. The comparison may seem
forced, but in view of the preceding replication of Chou symbolism and the fact
that the empress was to choose red as the color of her banners, it does not
strike me as unreasonable.
130. CTS 6:3076:1, HTS 76:3867:4, and TCTC 204, p. 6467.

Chapter 6
1. See Chapter 1, notes 46-49*
2. See Miyakawa Hisayuki, "Outline of the Nait5 hypothesis," and Miyakawa
Ichisada, "Four ages."
3. The thesis is presented most systematically in Parts I and II of Chengahih shiht pp. 1-94.
4. Ch'en, Cheng-ahih shih^ p. 14.
5. See, for Instance, Wechsler, "Factionalism," in Perspectives, pp. 87“
120, and the several remarks in Johnson, Oligarohyy pp. 128-130.
In an earlier
version of his work, Johnson listed three broad categories of objection to
Ch'en's thesis, and these seem worthy of mention here.
In the first place,
Ch'en's belief that the ruling class polarized along historico-geographical
lines because of the rivalry between Chou and Ch'i does not give sufficient
weight to the fact that the imperial clans of both originated in the so-called
Four Garrisons, and that the ruling group in both was composed of precisely the
same type of clan; that is to say, of Hsien-pei and collaborating Chinese who
were not numbered among the preeminent surnames of the time.
This latter fact is important because while the refusal of the north
eastern elite to collaborate with the Ch'i and the Sui is well-known, the cor
responding attitude of the northwestern clans usually goes unremarked. Liu
Fang, in his Hsing-hsi tun (see note 8), identified as the preeminent of the
Northwest the six clans of Wei, P'ei, Liu, Hsileh, Yang and Tu. While they
were prominent in the government of Sui and T'ang, they seemed to play hardly
any role at all in the Chou central administration and so can hardly be
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identified with Yli-wen T'ai's "northwestern bloc." The Imperial clans of Sui
and T'ang both claimed kinship with the purely Chinese elite of this area, but
it is well established that these were spurious claims and that both were of
Six Garrison (Wu-ch'uan) origins. For this reason there seems no cause to
assume a political polarization of the T'ang ruling class on purely regional
grounds.
I shall later show that friction arose more from perceptions of cul
tural and racial purity than from geography.
The second criticims of Ch'en's formulations is one applied to his defi
nitions. To him the T'ang "ruling class" consisted of "the [imperial] Li clan
and the high civil and military officials," so that the local and semi-official
power structure receives too little consideration. His use of such terms as
"class" and "social revolution" are rather vague and, more seriously, his at
tempt to divide the so-called Shan-tung and Kuan-chung blocs by the existence
of the T'ai-hang Mountains is hardly adequate. To cite only one example, the
native place of the Empress Wu lies to the northwest of the range yet, as I
shall show, she was considered by contemporaries to be an "easterner.''
Finally, Professor Ch'en seems never to resolve a basic contradiction.
After depicting so clearly the regional rivalry in Part I of his book, he moves
on in Part II to the struggle between the new [post-Empress Wu] and the old
elites, writing on p. 53, "Before the Empress Wu destroyed the old 'Kuan-chung
First' policy, the T'ang ruling class had been made up not only of the Chinese,
non-Chinese, and semi-Chinese clans of Yli-wen T'ai's northwestern bloc, but atso of the gveat Shan-tung otccns who in tradition followed that of the northern
dynasties. Men of this type composed almost the whole of the upper bureauc-^
racy. . . ." [My emphasis]. A comparision of this passage with that quoted in
the text shows a direct contradiction, caused by an initial failure to define
closely the ruling class.
These criticisms, of course, do not invalidate Ch'en's work, but they do
suggest that some modification is required.
6. Of several reasons which could be cited, the most important is that ex
tant sources provide information on only a tiny proportion of the T'ang popula
tion, and that with the exception of the Tunhuang manuscripts, no local history
has survived. Twitchett, "The composition of the T'ang ruling class,
in Pev—
speotives, pp. ^7“85.
7. See CTS 1^9:3^79:3 and NTS 132:3975:3.
8. The full text is found in CTW 372:7a-llb and in an abbreviated form in
UTS 199:4093:4. It is the only lengthy discussion of the subject remaining
from T'ang times.
9. This distinction was the most crucial in medieval status terminology and
was sanctioned both by law and by custom. While shu is rendered conventionally
by "commoner," the term shih has yet to find a suitable English equivalent, and
rather than use "scholar," "gentry" or "literati," I prefer to leave the word in
its Chinese form and define the characteristics of the group.
The best studies on the term are Hilda's Shina and his supplementary re
marks in "Rikucho." Miyakawa, Eikuohbshi kenkyu (Tokyo, 1956) attempts to make
the distinction a precise one, and Hao, Liang-Chin demonstrates the wide range
of status terminology used even within the shih class. Miyazaki's Kuhon shows
that the meaning of shih varied over time and differed in North and South.
Johnson, Oliganohy^ Chapter 1, pp. 5"17 elaborates upon some of this research.
Working from these studies, the following salient characteristics of the
shih in the early T'ang might be isolated:
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(a) They were generally and by social convention recognized to constitute a
class distinct from the shu.
(b) The criminal code granted them no concessions on the basis of social as
opposed to occupational status (Johnson, Oltgarohy, p, 8).
(c) They were exempted from corvee, and this privilege was a mark of their
social status (Miyazaki, Kuhorij, p. 2kS, and Mao, Ltang-Chin, p. 283).
(d) State schools, both central and provincial, tended to admit only the shih^
but Miyazaki's view (p. 2^7) that education was reserved to the shth is an over
statement .
(e) Chih status depended principally upon the sanction of other shih and was
beyond the power of the emperor to confer (Chou, Wei Chin, pp. 99"100).
(f) The hallmark of the shih was culture: morality, high standards of con
duct, loyalty to discipline and tradition, a certain commitment to noblesse
oblige and to the self-consciousness of class. Within these limits, it was an
hereditary status.
(g) The shih were distinguished by an exclusive marriage circle and by a de
termination not to marry below their station (Mao, Liang-Chin, pp. 230-37).
There was no statutory ban on marriage with commoners (Niida, "Rikucho," p. 22).
(h) Status and officeholding were closely connected. Commoners found it ex
ceedingly difficult to enter the bureaucracy and, although never barred de jure
from officialdom, tended to rise only in unusual circumstances, chiefly through
military prowess in periods of dynastic change. For the shih, state service was
an important means of preserving their status, but it was not all-important, and
culture and lifestyle combined with social recognition permitted some clans to
eschew office while retaining prominence. See, for example, Ochi Shigeaki,
"Nancho no koseki mondai," Shigaku zasshi, 69:8 (i960), pp. 9^0-64. Shih status
could be gained by office, but office was granted generally only to those who
already possessed shih status.
It is this final point which has led Japanese scholarship in this century
to characterize the entire post-Han era as that of the "aristocratic society" to
which Toyama's book of readings Kizoku shakai provides an excellent short intro
duction. Johnson, Oligarchy, pp. 5~hS, is a most useful new addition to the
literature on the subject.
10. A term discussed later in the chapter.
I prefer the translation "magnate
clans" which perhaps conveys something of the close regional ties, military
prowess and "feudal" organization which seem to have been common to their tra
dition.
Liu Fang provides a useful insight here, for by T'ang times the term
seems to have included a connotation of opposition to centralization and was
applied most frequently to the northeastern clans.
11. The term yu-hsing is used consistently throughout the essay as the gen
eralized description of the most important clans on the national level.
12. These terms have received less attention than shih and shu, probably be
cause the latter was the more common distinction until the middle T'ang. Sev
eral translations, such as "noble and base" or sometimes "free and unfree" have
been used, but these are not altogether satisfactory since chien is often used
for servants, slaves, artisans, merchants, prostitutes, etc., and kuei seems
often to have been highly relative and to have meant simply "non-ahien." It
was replaced by the term Hang "free" in T'ang law. There now exists a full
study of the chien class in the T'ang. The opening chapter in Hamaguchi To ocho
discusses the distinction.
13. It was members of this group who were most prominent in the high official
dom of the early T'ang and who constituted Professor Ch'en's "Kuan-chung bloc."

Notes to pages 71-73

241

On the ssu-hsing question which follows in Liu's essay, see Johnson, Otigarahyj
pp. 28-30, and note TCTC 140, p. 4394, where Hu San-hsing anachronistically
applies the term to the first four clans of the realm. This seems to have been
T'ang usage.
14. The only mention I find is in T'ai-p'ing kuang-ohi l84:4la, and the bib
liographical treatises of the T'ang histories make no reference to the monk's
work. The T'ung-eh'Lhi ahuan 66 which is probably our most complete listing of
genealogical works, mentions neither this nor the next two works listed by Liu
Fang.
15" I find no other reference, though the title seems to indicate that this
was a statewide compilation.
16. Again I find no details of this work, and it seems odd that it goes un
mentioned at the time the Shih-tsu chih was compiled. As the first work since
the Han to apply to the entire country, it should have been a primary source of
reference.
In this connection, we might note the growing tradition in northern
dynasties of compiling national status lists, and the parallel development where
by the definition of preeminent surnames came increasingly to be divorced from
local prominence.
It seems clear that whereas in the Wei each prefecture had
its preeminent surnames, these later compilations listed only clans of wider
prominence and, therefore, some prefectures would go wholly unmentioned.
It is important to note here that the termmao-hsing seems to refer to
Chinese clans of long and proud lineage and suggests that the Sui was more am
biguous than is generally thought in its "anti-aristocratic" policies.
17. On Lu, see CTS I89 hsia:lSlland UTS 199:4092:3. His work is attested
in the CT5, HTS, TFIK, T'ung-ahih and Yu-hai which also mention an earlier com
pilation called the I-kuan p'u. He died in prison in 696 and is considered by
Liu Fang as the father of T'ang genealogical studies.
18. CTW 372:7a-llb.
19- Numerous anecdotes from the dynastic histories could be cited to demon
strate this, and some are to be found in Ikeda On's draft chapter for Volume 3
of the forthcoming Carribri-dge History of China^ "The decline of the T'ang aristoc
racy." We might also note, for instance, Nan-shih 56:1754:4 which tells of a
man who had the "bearing, [official] qualification and style" of the shih and
requested the Southern Ch'i emperor to confer the status. After consultation
with his social arbiters, the emperor had to confess that he could do nothing
since "the shih-ta-fu really stand beyond my authority [in this matter]."
Chou, Wei Chin, pp. 98-99, cites this anecdote to demonstrate the snob
bery and the necessity of peer recognition which were part of the shih group,
but it seems equally valid to suggest that it was lack of lineage which led to
the rejection of the aspiring shih.
Wei-shu 60:2035:2 contains a memorial from Han Hsien-tsung asking that
shih "i* and shu
have separate living quarters in Loyang rather than being
assigned their places on the basis of official rank.
In it, Han contends that
official rank is transient, its holders rising and falling. On the other hand,
if artisans were to cultivate the conduct and standards of the shih, they would
not reach the status in a hundred years. He went on to say that if the sons of
the shih followed the behavior of the artisans, they would become like them in
a single morning.
Some scholars, for instance Johnson, Oligarohy, p. 8, see this as a de
nial of the hereditary principle.
I believe that Han is suggesting that shih
status can be lost but that "conduct and standards" are in themselves insuffi
cient to gain the status. The emperor might bestow high office or expose

2k2

Notes to Chapter 6

non-shih to their superiors in the hope of raising their status but, according
to Han, both tactics are futile.
These examples suggest, therefore, that while office and culture are at
tributes of the shthy they are not the determinants of the status.
I shall
later attempt to show the tenacity of the hereditary principle in relation to
the early-T'ang attempts at status fixing and even in the form taken by its
regulations concerning the examination system.
20. Said in relation to Wang Hung, Sung-shih ^2:1550:4, an imperial favorite
who sought shth status. Similar statements are found in Miyakawa, R-ikuehOj pp.
376 ff. and Chou, Wet Chin, pp. 99 ff.
21. The secondary literature on this subject is large, and T’ung-ahih 66,
pp. 783c ff. gives some idea of the volume of these compilations, listing 131
works in the four categories of arrangement, those by rank, rhyme, single area
and single clan. Cheng Ch‘iao, T'wig-chih erh-shih-Vueh 1:1b, tells us that
under the T'ang, "the study of lineage and clan reached its zenith." A good
overview of the subject is the important article by Utsunomiya, "Todai kijin."
A number of studies cited in later notes shows the prevalance of falsification.
22. CTW 372:10a. This passage offers an interesting insight into Ch'en's
Northwest-Northeast hypothesis. The greater role of Kuan-chung in the govern
ment of the early T'ang was perhaps as much a matter of choice and regional
proclivity as of dynastic policy.
23. THY 37, p. 663.
24. CTS 57:3292:4. The minister is P'ei Chi (Appendix B, no. 2) who, though
poor in his youth, considered himself a member of the eminent Ho-tung P'ei clan
which is systematically studied by Yano, "Kizoku seiji." Note also Kao-tsu's
conversation with Tou Wei (no. 5), CTS 61:3301:1, in which he speaks in a sim
ilar vein.
25. The lengthy debate on the origins of the T'ang clan has centered chiefly
on whether their lineage was purely Chinese or Hsien-pei, and Ch'en, Kuo-shih
ohiu-wenj, v. 2, pp. 2 ff. collects most of the Important data. Ch'en Yin-k'o
has three articles on the subject in CYYY but his suggestion that they were a
decayed branch of the Chao-chun Li clan seems to have been effectively rebutted
by Chu Hsi-tsu, "Po Li-T'ang," and Liu P'an-sui, "Li-T'ang." Though conflict
ing evidence makes the problem very vexing, I am of the view that the Lung-hsi
connection was false and that it should be seen in the same light as the Sui
attempt to claim connection with the eminent Hung-nung Yang clan.
26. On the bride gift, see Okamoto, "Todai heizaikS." Okamoto shows that
the gifts were often of very great value and as important as the letters of
engagement in formalizing the marriage. Since the northern dynasties the state
had attempted to define the gifts in terms of official rank, but social status
seems to have been of greater importance. See also TRSI 3:27 and 30, pp. 245
ff. and Nien-erh shih oha-ahi^ ahuan 15, v. 1, p. 197.
27. On the compilers, see respectively Appendix B, no. 15; CTS 77:3333:2 and
HTS 98:3910:2; Appendix B, no. 26; and CTS 73:3325:4 and HTS 102:3918:3. The
large literature on the subject is extremely well reviewed by Ikeda's "Tocho."
In this literature the background of the compilers is generally neglected.
The reason for their choice is difficult to know. Te-fen and Wen-pen
had been the compilers of the Chou-shu in the large project of 629 and so could
claim historical expertise, but neither of the other two seem to have been dis
tinguished scholars. Both of them, however, were from relatively eminent clans,
both held the highest positions in the Board of Civil Office, and both had pres
ent marriage connections with the imperial clan. The Ling-hu and Wei clans
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shared the background and regional origins of the T'ang, and the grandfather of
Ts'en Wen-pen had been closely identified with the Later Liang and so may have
been included to represent the South in an attempt to achieve regional balance.
Kao Shih-lien was probably the key figure, not only as head of the proj
ect but as the only northeasterner in it. He claimed descent from the imperial
clan of Ch'i, and thus his Six Garrison origins and the fact that he was the
uncle of T'ai-tsung's wife would effectively set him apart from the four great
northeastern clans against whom the list was directed.
Therefore, although the chief compilers reflected the regional balance
typical of the upper bureaucracy in the early T'ang, it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that the group constituted a "packed jury." Their first verdict
must have been a great surprise and attests to the overwhelming prestige of the
northeastern clans and the dichotomy between office and social status which was
still so strong.
28. Ikeda, "Todai," in perhaps the most important study to date correlates
Tunhuang evidence with later sources to reconstruct the fullest list of eminent
T'ang clans.
Interestingly, the Wang and the Hsieh do not seem to appear in the
lists. Moriya's classic study of the T'ai-yuan Wang clan, Rikuoho, identifies
two branches early established in the South and remaining prominent for three to
five centuries, so it may be to one of them that T'ai-tsung refers. Both of the
northern Hsieh clans mentioned by Ikeda had southern branches.
29. T'ai-tsung is reported to have chosen marriage partners for the imperial
clan only from the households of his meritorious ministers and to have refused
even to discuss the possibility of a northeastern marriage {TCTC 200, p. 63I8).
His great ministers, however, men like Wei Cheng, Fang Hsuan-ling and Li Chi,
did not hesitate to seek brides from these clans once their fortunes were made.
This was an important phenomenon since it was not only the bride gift but the
influence of and aid from in-laws at court which helped keep these clans solvent.
See also Nunome, Zui-Toshi, pp. 358-9 and 362-3, which offers a complete
list of the marriages of T'ang princesses, confirming the boycott of the north
eastern elite.
30. This was Ts'ui Min-kan whom the dynastic histories call Ts'ui Kan since
"min" was a taboo character under T'ai-tsung. The Ts'ui clan was composed of
ten branches and Min-kan belonged to that of Ch'ing-ho. At the time of the
list, he was vice-president of the Chancellery, a post of the fourth rank, and
Wei T'ing was his opposite number.
The diction of CTS 65:3309:3 creates something of a problem here, since
the passage in question is usually interpreted to mean that Ts'ui was placed
above the imperial clan.
I am not sure this was the case. The rather sketchy
descriptions of the Shih-tsu oh-ih which remain tell us that the work contained
100 c^ziian and placed all the preeminent clans of the empire in nine ranks.
It
seems unlikely, therefore, that there would be only one clan in the first rank
and T'ai-tsung was probably objecting to equality rather than superiority.
It would be well to take note here of two possible interpolations In the
parallel HTS account found in 95:3903:4.
In the first T'ai-tsung is said to
have instructed his compilers to "rank first the imperial house and follow it
with the consort families. Demote new clans and promote the old, placing the
great {kao-liang) on the right and the lesser {han-ohun) on the left." Second,
just before pointing out that he wished to honor the officials of his own court,
he is reported to have said, "For many unbroken generations to be kung^ oh'ing,
or ta-fu—that is what should be defined as a great family {men-hu)
Both these statements are somewhat suspect since they contradict the
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main criterion for inclusion, that is, present official position. Since this
is confirmed in every other source, the NTS statements must be rejected. They
do, however, illustrate the quandary in which the compilers found themselves
and suggest the possibility that the finished work was organized in such a way
that the first two ranks were monopolized by the Imperial and consort families
with the other clans spread through the remaining seven.
31. CTS 65:3309:2. See also TCTC 195, pp. 6135-36 and THY 36, p. 66k.
32. Moriya, BikuahD, especially pp. 135"36, shows how narrow the marriage
circule of the T'ai-yuan Wang, who were often grouped with the northeastern
ssu-hsingj remained throughout the T'ang; and an unpublished M.A. thesis by
SaitS Aiko for Tokyo University has shown in meticulous detail that this was
true for the other super elites of the Northeast. The contrast with the LiT'ang clan, whose first rulers had married into the Tu-ku, Tou, and Ch'ang-sun
clans, should be noted.
The refusal to marry with foreigners was principally a matter of pride,
but a suggestion by Ts'en, Swi-T'ang shih^ v. 1, p. 117, has merit. He points
out that dissociation from the central power of the foreign regimes was also
dissociation from exploitation of the peasantry and so became a source of pop
ularity among the people.
33. TCTC 143, pp. 4393-6. The passage also offers some information on the
Wei perception of the ssu-hsing and their relation to the Lung-hsi Li clan.
The northeastern elite was not wholly successful in preserving its daughters
from the foreigners.
34. For a general exposition of the clan rules, see Liu, Clan Rules.
In the
T'ang the two most celebrated sets of rules were those of Mu Ning and Han Shou,
both from prominent northeastern clans.
See CTS 155:3487:3 and HTS 163:4026:1.
Among the ssu-hsing, the Ts'ui were most famous for their life style, cohesive
ness and piety. See, for instance, HTS 182:4062:2, the biography of Ts'ui Tzuyuan, and note how the qualities they instilled in members suited them for of
ficial careers and maintained them as the predominant T'ang clan. The biography
of Ts'ui Hsuan-wei (Appendix B, no. 132) contains an admonition from his mother,
nee Lu, that as he embarked upon his official career he should not seek profit
for himself or his clan but seek only honesty and integrity. Another fine ex
ample of clan rules are those of Liu Tz'u {CTS 165:3508:2) whose seat was near
the capital but who had close marriage ties with the Ts'ui. See also Utsunomiya
"Todai kijin," pp. 493 ff. and Takeda, "T5dai shizoku."
35- The best-known case is that of Ts'ui Hao whose execution in 450 led to
the decimation of the entire northeastern aristocracy.
See Wang l-t'ung, "Ts'ui
Hao."
36. Evidence could be adduced to support each of these points, and I suspect
that these are what T'ai-tsung had in mind when he suggested that the people of
Kuan-chung and Shan-tung were different in their way of thinking {CTS 78:3336:4)
An incomplete study I have made of the data in the HTS tsai-hsiang table sug
gests that in the two generations from the inauguration of the Sui to the death
of T'ai-tsung, the number of officials produced by the northeatern ssu-hsing
was proportionately almost the same as that of six super elite clans of Kuanchung identified by Liu Fang but, as several scholars have suspected, the pro
portion of central officials was appreciably lower.
Interestingly, a fairly
high proportion of these provincial appointments was made in the Northeast in
spite of the fact that since the Sui attempts had been made to restore the Han
practice of avoidance. The reasons, I think, are the same as those in the
northern and southern dynasties recently explored by Kubozoe's "Gi-Shin." The
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long resistance of the Northeast to the T'ang and its continuing hostility
meant that Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung not only used intermediaries like Wei Cheng
and Ts'ui Kan there but seem also to have permitted the region a greater degree
of autonomy. See, for instance, TCTC 186, p. 5823.
A current debate in Japanese scholarship concerns the precise relation
ship between the aristocracy and the rural community {hsiang-t'ang). What seems
clear, however, is that the peasants, even in the T'ang, were still in the habit
of looking to the great clans in their area for relief in times of calamity.
The early T'ang seems to have been slow to usurp these relief functions in the
Northeast, and I shall show that Kao-tsung and Empress Wu were more active in
this respect.
37. See Pulleyblank, Baakgroundj, pp. 75 ff- and the literature reviewed there.
38. See, for instance, Ch'en Yin-k'o, "Hao-chieh," which stresses the cohesion
and military prowess of the group, demonstrating that T'ai-tsung's coup depended
on them. Matsui, "T5dai," shows that the term was also used commonly for the
aristocracy of the Southwest which shared many characteristics with those in
the Northeast.
Kikuchi, "Setsudoshi" is the best short treatment of the haochteh as a distinct group and their influence on the societal structure.
39. CTS 82:3343:4 and TCTC 200, p. 6315.
1 am sceptical about this in view
of the forced revision, the treatment of the northeastern ssu-hstrig^ and the
fact that the quoted passage occurs only in the biography of Li 1-fu.
It met
approval, I think, only in relation to the Hsing-shth-lu.
40. TTCLC 110:4a, TFYK 159:7a, and THY 83, p. 1528. The ban was issued in
the sixth month of 642 and is discussed with its secondary literature in Ikeda,
"T5ch5," pp. 51 ff.
In it T'ai-tsung again attacks the northeastern clans say
ing that traditions and standards of conduct there have declined, and while the
clans still enjoyed local prominence and renown, they had fallen into poverty
and rejected the propriety of marriage by interesting themselves primarily in
the wealth of those clans who wished to marry with them. They turned weddings
into a business proposition. Although T'ai-tsung accused the clans of Shansi
(Yen-Chao) of the same fault, his regional bias is clear.
41. TCTC 200, p. 6318.
42. See Appendix B. Ts'ui Jen-shih was from Ting-chou in Ho-tung, and I find
no relationship with the eminent Ts'ui of Ho-pei.
43. The sources disagree. CTS 82:3343:4 claims that Li l-fu initiated the
recompilation because his clan was unranked, and TCTC 200, p. 6315 says Hsu
Ching-tsung asked for a revision because the empress' clan was unranked. NTS
95:3903:4 and THY 36, p. 665 cite both reasons.
I find it hard to believe, in
view of Shih-huo's career, that the Wu clan was unranked and prefer the THY
wording: "was not clearly ranked." This would suggest that the empress was
unsatisfied.
Li l-fu was very conscious of his inferior clan status and falsely
claimed membership in that of the Chao-chiin Li clan. He had to resort to in
timidation to enforce the claim but when he attempted to use his false status
to marry his son into the northeastern elite, he was rebuffed. His motives for
desiring a new list were therefore strong, and he may also have inspired the
marriage ban issued the same year that he was attempting to marry his son. See
TCTC 200, p. 6318.
44. The compilation of 659 was delegated to twelve men of whom we have the
names of only five. Of these, only Li l-fu and Lu Ts'ai {CTS 79:3338:4 and
HTS 107:3926:4) are known in any other context. With the exception of Li l-fu,
none occupied a position above the third rank, and one even held a tiu-wai- post!
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Since the compilers represented neither great clans nor the upper bureaucracy,
a new concept of status was reflected in their choice.
kS- The table is based on information found in all the standard sources and
follows that of Ikeda, “Tocho," p. ^>8.
The chief differences lie in the size and scope of the works.
In ad
dition, the Hsing-shth-tu makes an exact correlation of official rank and rank
within the treatise and deletes all but the immediate family of the man ranked.
The list of 659 was much larger than its predecessor and reflects the growth in
officialdom and in the number of persons rising through the military in a time
of foreign expansion. The approximate number of clans and persons ranked is
difficult to know because we are by no means sure that the term ohia
is
similarly used in both lists, nor indeed are we certain of the exact meting of
the term. Johnson, OZi-gardhy, pp. 91-92, sees oh-ia as a subdivision of hsing
which might be translated as "surname" or "descent group," and this seems
justified in view of the form of the list. We must be cautious, however, about
equating dh-la here with "family" or "household," a unit in T'ang times of five
or six members, since if we did so we would find ourselves with an unbelievably
small ruling class—less than .02% of the population.
In the table I have chosen
to translate the term chia as lineage in full realization that the rendering is
unsatisfactory, but in the hope that it will underline the fact that we are deal
ing with a special sort of "family." Imabori, "Todai shizoku," convincingly
establishes a difference in the size of shih and shu households, and Niida, Shtna,
p. 337, suggests an average figure of ten persons in what would here be termed
a chta. This, of course, is about double the size of an ordinary hu. Moriya,
RikuohOi pp. 1^3 ff. assembles evidence of a much larger figure but, after find
ing that a hundred was not uncommon, is reluctant to use the figure. Judging
from specific cases of clans punished by Empress Wu, I would tend to put the
number of individuals in a chia at between ten and thirty in this case. See,
for instance, TCTC 200, p. 6317, and 206, p. 6513.
^6. CTS 82:33^3:^. HTS 223 shang:uses the term dh'ang-shih. This is
rather puzzling. Since a stated aim of the compilation was to form a nexus be
tween status and official rank, it could hardly be left unrevised and was probably
intended to serve as the basis of future lists.
47. CTS 82:3343:4, NTS 223 s/zang-;4163:3. and 2W7 35, p. 665.
Ikeda and John
son are both of the view that the burning did not serve its purpose since the
list of 707 was to be based on the Shih-tsu ohih. This shows, however, only
that some copies survived and underestimates the symbolic importance of the
act.
In any case, the Hsing-shth lu was the standard of status measurement for
half a century of rapid social change and so of greater importance than T'aitsung's compilation.
48. Note 36 above.
49. CTS 82:3343:4, HTS 95:3904:1, THY 83, pp. 1528-29, TCTC 200, p. 63I8,
and Yu-hai 50:25a.
In the ban seven surnames and eleven chia were forbidden to
intermarry, and the bride gift was limited so that chia of the third rank or
above could receive 300 p'i of silk [a pH was 1.8 by 40 feet] and one of the
eighth rank received fifty pH.
It had also been the practice, if the groom's
house were higher than the bride's, for his ohta to accept double these gifts.
This was now forbidden.
50. See the studies of Moriya and Salto cited above, and Tsukiyama, Todai,
pp. 163 ff.
51. Chung-tsung reissued the ban, probably in 707 when the new clan list was
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compiled. The standard sources do not mention the event but, judging from WYYH
900:7a, this final prohibition specified five surnames, mentioning the Northern
Wei head of the clan by name and numbering the sons of each, so that the decendants of a total of forty-four men were forbidden to intermarry.
In the case
of the Ts'ui, eight generations were represented so that the scope of the ban
was wide, including perhaps 300 chta.
52. On the fondness of the empress for Loyang, see Ch'iian, T'ang-Sung and
Ts'en, Sui-T'ang shih^ v. 1, pp. 142-47Both political and economic factors were present in the lengthy sojourn
of the court at Loyang from the time of the empress' rise, and while 1 accept
the belief that there existed antipathy between her and the northwestern clans
concentrated near Ch'ang-an, I also believe that she and Kao-tsung were attempt
ing consciously to reconcile the Northeast.
It is significant that immediately
after the marriage ban in the intercalary tenth month of 659, they went to Lo
yang where they were to stay for two years. This was, incidentally, a prosperous
time in the Northwest and a period of drought in Ho-pei.
In 660 there was a
good deal of construction in Loyang--palaces, bridges, marketplaces, etc., and
it was also from here that Su Ting-fang's great Korean expedition was launched.
See THY 30, p. 560 and 86, p. 1577, and TCTC 200, p. 6320.
The growing importance of Loyang had been evident from about 656 when the
first new palace in many years was built there {THY 30, pp. 551~2 and note the
reasons why the first T'ang emperors did not build there), and when in early 657
the officials at Loyang were declared in all respects equal to their Ch'ang-an
counterparts. THY 68, p. 1190. As noted earlier, Loyang became the Eastern
Capital at the end of that year.
It seems clear that the emphasis on Loyang
reflected not only an appreciation of political and economic realities but,
more specifically, was an attempt to reconcile the Northeast.
In 660 when Kaotsung and the empress made a well-publicized trip to Ping-chou, the geographical
origins of the empress were further emphasized.
53- The exception was the Cheng clan of Jung-yang, and T’ang-kuo shih-pu^
shang, p. 21, tells us that even in the T'ang they were considered reluctant to
move from their native place. My calculations show the following distribution
of tsa-t-hsiang from the ssu-hsing:

Ts'ui
Lu
Li
Cheng

Kao-tsu
0
0
0
0

T'ai-tsung
0
0
0
0

Kao-tsung
(from 659)
2
1
2
0

Empress Wu
4

0

6
0

54. CTS 189 ?zsia:3578:1, and see Utsunomiya, "TOdai kijin," p. 59 for other
sources. The work was suggested in 707 and completed seven years later. See
also Ikeda, "Tocho," pp. 48 and 56. Lu, Sui T'ang, p. 788, contends that this
was the last of the state-sponsored treatises, and although there is evidence
of other, much smaller works (Utsunomiya, "Todai kijin," pp. 59 ff-), this was
certainly the last large-scale manifestation of state concern with status fix
ing.
55. The compilers were all high officials. Headed by Wei Yuan-chung (Ap
pendix B, no. 121) and Chang Hsi (no. 124), they included five Board vicepresidents, most of whom were concurrently appointed to the History Office.
Wei's death put a temporary stop to the project but Liu Ch'ung, who made the
original proposal, continued to work with the historians Wu Ching and Liu
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Chih-chi and five others to complete the project. Hs'uan-tsung had it corrected
and brought up-to-date by Liu Ch'ung, Liu Chih-chi and Hsueh Nan-chin. See THY
36, p. 665. The same source notes that Liu Chih-chi had recently created a
stir by publishing the first honest and critical genealogy of his clan.
56. TFIK 560:20b. See also CTW 235:2a.
57. TFYK 560:21a.
58. CTS 189
:35?8:1. The use of the Sh-ih-tsu ohih as a model is usually
explained in terms of an aristocratic revival after the Chou.
I doubt, however,
that this was the case as early as 707, and I suspect rather that it reflects
a nostalgic wish to associate the era with "the good government of dhen-kuan"
and to eradicate the influence of Empress Wu in as many respects as possible.
59* The story is told of Hsueh Yuan-ch'ao (Appendix B, no. 6I) and is found
in T'ang yu-lin 4, pp. l40-4l.
Interestingly, his biography tells us that he
was a compiler of the kuo-shih while attached to the Hung-wen kuan and also that
he was married to a T'ang princess. The anecdote may therefore be apocryphal,
but if not, his preference in wives is doubly interesting.
The T'ang-kuo shih-pu contains several anecdotes of the sort.
60. See, for instance, the essay from Shen Kua's Meng-oh'i pi-t'an translated
by Twitchett, "T'ang ruling class," in PerspectiveSj pp. 54-56.
61. My own estimate. See note 45 above.
62. TCTC 200, p. 6308, from a memorial by Liu Hsiang-tao, discussed in the
following chapter. Liu counts 13,465 tiu-nei. officials in 657 and says that
1,400 more entered the bureaucracy annually. The list of 659 was to include
those who had reached the fifth rank, perhaps one-tenth of this figure. Of
these higher posts there were a total of about 3,000 in capital and provinces
so that, considering the figures in the Hsing-shih lu, it seems clear that we
are dealing with a highly inbred bureaucracy.
63. There is a fairly full literature on the subject, including the studies
of Ikeda, Takeda and Twitchett mentioned earlier.
In addition, see Niida Noboru,
"Stein," and Mou Jun-sun, "Tun-huang."
64. The most important are Peking wet 79 and Stein 2052. Four fragments col
lectively numbered Stein 5861 and Pelliot 3191 may, according to Ikeda, be part
of a whole. Another Pelliot fragment, no. 3421, may be related.
I had intended
to discuss these documents in detail because I am reluctant to accept all of
Ikeda's conclusions, but Johnson, Ol-tgarohy^ pp. 64-87, has recently outlined
the relationship and filiation of the documents with great care.
1 am not sure,
however, that his view of the purpose of the lists is convincingly established.
65. Principally the T’ai--p'ing huan-yu ohi, a Sung geography by Yueh Shih,
the Kuang-yun rhyming dictionary, and the genealogical work Ku-ohin hsing-shih
shu pien-aheng. See Ikeda, "Todai," pp. 314-18.
66. Because the Tunhuang documents give only hsing and not ohia and are so
very fragmentary, comparison is difficult. Still, they list about five hsing
per prefecture, while the state lists of 638 and 659 average less than one, so
that even allowing for uneven distribution, the multiple of five seems reason
able.
67. To avoid a major inconsistency of Professor Ch'en Yin-k'o, I must specify
here that the term "national elite" henceforth includes the preeminent clans of
the Northeast. These were, 1 have suggested, well represented in the Hsing-shih
lu and increasingly accepted high posts in the central government from 659Analysis of the T'ang tsai-hsiang, or chief ministers, has recently be
come conventional among scholars despite the shortcomings of the group as a
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representative sample. Johnson, Oligco'ohyt Appendix I, pp. 204-206, outlines
some of the problems and advantages of using the sample and on p. 138 offers
the following breakdown in "chief ministerial man-years":

Period
618-626
627-649
650-659
660-683
684-704
705-711
712-735
736-755

(Kao-tsu)
(T'a1-tsung)
(Kao-tsung)
(Kao-tsung and Wu-hou)
(Wu-hou)
(Chung-tsung and Jui-tsung)
(Hsuan-tsung)
(regime of Li Lin-fu)

Great Clan (claimed)
91.8 (38.8)^
63.2 (15.9)
40.0 (8.0)
53.3 (1.8)
(0.4)
53.1
56.3 (1.0)
52.2 (4.4)
50.0 (38.6)

Non-Great Clan
8.2^
36.8
60.0
46.7
41.7
40.6
47.8
50.0

Although Professor Johnson seems to recognize the existence of unusual
situations in 618-626 and 736-755 which might distort his conclusions, he uses
these figures as his principal evidence in refuting Ch'en Yin-k'o's notion of
the rise of a new class during and after the regime of Empress Wu.
I do not
accept his view.
In the first place, the use of "man-years," even if combined with the
very different matter of individual appointment, can be extremely misleading
and is valid only when placed in the context of the evolution of tsai-hsiang
policy and the differing views of the institution held, for instance, by T'aitsung and the Empress Wu. T'ai-tsung's "usurpation" and Empress Wu's destruc
tion of the entire tsai-hsiang group who had opposed her rise were events that
were perhaps atypical but nonetheless distort the percentages of such a small
sample to an unacceptable degree.
Finally, and this is a more serious methodological objection, the pos
session of great-clan status did not prevent a man from being at the same time
an "examination bureaucrat." Appendix B of the present work shows how rapidly
even members of the greatest clans turned to examination as a qualification for
office in the later part of the seventh century.
Professor Johnson concludes on p. 139 that "the examination system had
very little effect on the social composition of the political elite in the T'ang
dynasty." This is true only in the narrowest sense. Equation of the tsai-hsiang
group with "political elite" is tendentious, to say the least and, moreover,
ignores the changes which the examination system began to occasion even in this
narrowly-defined political elite. The typical great-clan chief minister during
Kao-tsu's reign was very different from his counterpart during Hsuan-tsung's
reign. To obscure this fact does no service to our understanding.
It seems to
me that in dealing with the tsai-hsiang sample, questions of a different sort
might be asked and I attempt to do so in subsequent sections.
I deal with ar
istocratic domination of the Chancellery and the Board of Civil Office in Chapter
7.
68. See Chapters 5 and_9.
69- See Utsunomiya, "Todai kijin," pp. 81-95. The family codes, private
genealogies, and continued exclusivity of marriage were symptoms of the phen
omenon, and anecdota1 col 1ections offer many examples of the pride of clan tra
dition continuing^to flourish. See, for example, T'ang-kuo shih-pUj shang^ p.
20, for Li Chen
^ who refused to use his official titles, always signing
himself "Lung-hsi Li Chen." Several other interesting points are raised in the
excellent article by Takeda, "T5dai shizoku."
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70. In order to clarify somewhat the full extent of the tragedy of so many
great clans during the period of the Empress Wu, I provide below a list of those
exiled and executed for real or alleged crimes.
In most cases their immediate
families were exiled or enslaved and their property confiscated. Sources are
given only for those who do not appear in Appendix B.
(a) In 659> at the instigation of Hsu Ching-tsung, a final revenge was car
ried out on the former tsa-i-hsiang Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi, Ch'u Sui-liang, Han Yuan,
and Liu Shih.
In every case, their immediate families were enslaved, those of
sons and grandsons exiled to the far South, and several collateral relatives,
nephews and cousins, also executed (see CTS 183:3553:1 Ch'ang-sun Shang). When
the empress pardoned Ch'ang-sun in 67^, there remained only a single grandson
to carry on his ancestral sacrifices, and the others were pardoned only in 706,
in the last will of the empress {CTS 7:3078:1).
It may be noted that the Liu
family, for example, was in desperate straits economically when the pardon came,
and Liu Shih's grandnephew had to beg from Hsiian-tsung the money to bury properly
his ancestor.
In the same memorial, he pointed out that all five families pun
ished at the time [including, I think, that of Lai Chi, who suffered only exile]
were in a similar position. See CTS 77:333^:^.
In 66A, the adopted son of the deposed Empress Wang, who was degraded to
commoner when tied to the "treason" of Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi and the others, was
executed for complicity with Shang-kuan I {TTCLC 39, and CTS 4:3072:A).
(b) In 66A Shang-kuan I, who was a poet of renown as well as scion of an em
inent Shan-chou clan, was executed for his part in persuading Kao-tsung to de
pose the Empress Wu. His only son died with him and the rest of the family was
enslaved. Shang-kuan's son had married into the Cheng clan, and it was their
daughter Shang-kuan Wan-erh who, after rising from palace slave to private sec
retary to the Empress Wu, came to exercise such power in the reign of Chungtsung and was able then to rehabilitate her grandfather. She, of course,
perished in the coup against the Wei faction.
(c) In 681 a small rebellion in Ch'ang-chou led by Li Lung-tzu was snuffed
out and the leader executed {ETS 3:3640:2).
I am unable to establish his lin
eage.
From 659 until the rebellion of Li Ching-yeh, with the sole exception of
the Shang-kuan affair, the regime of the empress was singularly bloodless and
compares favorably with that of almost any other T'ang ruler.
It is difficult
not to notice that this was the period in which she sought, above all, consoli
dation and centralization, when she was wooing the elite of the Northeast to the
center.
(d) In the aftermath of Li Ching-yeh's rebellion of 684, the carnage was
great. The most prominent of the clans to fall were those of Li Chi whose own
tomb was desecrated, T'ang Chih-ch'i {CTS 85:3348:4), Lo Pin-wang {CTS 190 shang:
3581:3), and Tu Ch'iu-jen {HTS 106:3924:3). Only Lo Pin-wang was of undistin
guished lineage. Of capital officials the list is much greater; P'ei Yen and
the general Ch'eng Wu-t'ing were largely self-made men but at the height of their
influence, while Yang Shen-jang {CTS 190 shang:^) and Yuan Wan-ch'ing {CTS
190 s?zang':3581 :1) and Yuan Wan-Ch'ing {CTS 190
:3581 :4) were of old and
eminent families, the former a maternal relative of the empress. Several
of the other victims (Hsiieh Chung-chang, Wei Chao, Liu Ch'i-hsien) are without
biographies but bear surnames appearing in the clan lists and appear in the HTS
treatise as members of great clans.
The most interesting aspect of this incident is that, with the exception
of the Yang-chou ringleaders, officials above the fifth rank suffered the
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ultimate penalty, while those below that rank were either demoted or exiled with
their immediate family.
In Yang-chou itself, those below the sixth rank were
simply disenrolled {ah'u-ming). See CTS 190 shang:35^0:2, biography of Liu Yenyu.

There is no complete list of the victims of the long series of reprisals
which followed the suppression, since the evil officials in charge of the in
vestigations "forced every man indicted to implicate tens and hundreds of others.
The eminent families {-i-kuan) trembled in fear . . ." (CTS 186 shang :35(>5 •
•
The persecutions concerned with the uprising ended with the Act of Grace
of 690 when all but the ringleaders received a complete pardon {yuan-mien), and
it is interesting to note that by 8OI even Ching-yeh's descendants had flourished
and became prominent in the semi-foreign area to which they were exiled {CTS 8?:
3314:3).. The major reason for the higher recovery rate of the families involved
was the relatively short period before amnesty, and a legal precedent supported
by the Empress Wu on a personal plea from the celebrated censor Hsu Yu-kung {CTS
85:3349:1; and HTS 1 13:3939:3). By contending that the penalty of
which
entailed confiscation and registration of household members as oh'ien’
^ , "un
free," in the census registers could not be applied to the family of a man al
ready dead when the charge was brought, he saved over 300 families, reducing
their punishment to exile. See TT 169, pp. 8940 ff. and TFYK^ pp. 6l6-17> which
both contain several other examples of how Hsu Yu-kung successfully pleaded for
clemency before the empress and so set several legal precedents. Paradoxically,
the law seems to have become more lenient during the terror!
(e) The week-long Princes' Rebellion of 688 ended in the wholesale destruc
tion of the T'ang family. At least forty-four princes were executed and over
one hundred oh-ia destroyed, with many others barred from holding office {meikuan). The sources, with some exaggeration, claim that only a few children,
exiled in the remote South, survived. At the same time, the evil official Ch'iu
Shen-chi {CTS I86 s/zang-:3564:1) seized the opportunity to implicate in the ris
ing former exiles in Ling-nan and, as commissioner to the area, carried out a
brutal massacre, drowning over 1,000 families.
A complete list of casualties is impossible to draw, but we are told that
particularly in the two centers of the rebellion, Po-chou and Yu-chou, they were
great.
In the former over 1,000 families were killed, in the latter 6,700 per
sons were convicted of complicity which usually carried a sentence of exile, and
5,000 persons suffered the penalty of ohi-mo {CTS 89:3356:2, biography of Ti Jenchieh). Several capital officials, including the empress' own son-in-law, were
also executed. TT and TFYK^, loo. oit.^, show that the empress presided personally
over many of the trials at the time, and she appeared both competent and just.
(f) In 689 several of the highest capital officials, including the tsai-hsiang
Chang Kuang-fu, were executed for conspiracy with the brother of Li^ Ching-yeh
who had escaped his place of exile. Several more, including Wei Yuan-chung,
were sentenced to death and amnestied only on the day of execution. There are
a number of historiographical problems surrounding the event; see the k’ao-t notice
for TCTC 204, p. 6460.
After the declaration of the Chou dynasty and the elimination of the
T'ang family, there occurred a respite in the terror, and only in 697 was there
another large incident.
(g) In the first month of that year, a provincial prefect, Liu Ssu-1 1, con-^
spired to rebel and, when word leaked out, was executed with his closest associ
ates. At the time, Lai Chun-ch'en, seeking to regain his lost favor, managed
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to convince the empress that numerous high officials in the capital were in
volved, with the result that over thirty ahia were destroyed. CTS 57:3293:2
has a good account of the incident.
I count during this incident a total of thirteen high officials executed,
among then] members of such eminent clans as the T'ai-y’uan Wang, the Lung-hsi Li,
and the Yii-wen. The celebrated genealogist Lu Ching-ch'un also died.
In many
ways this event was a turning point in the dynasty.
Ssu-ma Kuang remarks that
so eminent were the victims that "the whole empire was angered," and the em
press, of course, destroyed the evil officials later in the same year and al
most immediately summoned Chung-tsung back to the capital.
The six incidents cited above account for most of the empress' victims,
though the list is by no means complete. The years 690 and 691 saw the execu
tion of eighteen other officials above the fifth rank, several of them tsaihsiang and many, members of great families. Most perished for opposing Wu
Ch'eng-ssu's ambition to be named crown prince—a most natural cause and a fine
example of the intensification of the tradition which initially had given the
elite members their status.
In almost every case the penalty of chi-mo was ap
plied to the victim's family, but in several Acts of Grace before her deposition
the empress specifically amnestied those who for complicity had been exiled or
enslaved {ch’ang-Z'iu chi yu-nu) .
I hope to complete soon a separate study on
the recovery of these families.
71. Appendix B, no. 59.
Interestingly, Li first became vice-president of the
Board of Civil Office in 669 when the first major reform of the period was under
taken. Just as Ch'en Shu-ta (Appendix B, no. 7) was earlier credited with bring
ing many southern shih to accept capital office, Li is credited with recruiting
numerous men from the Northeast.
In all, he served in the Board for eight years.
72. As, for instance, in the form of census registration. See the standard
study by Masumura, "K5hakuseki," and the studies cited in note 9 above.
73. ^YYH A62:9a and CTW 95:lAb. See also TCTC 203, p. 6435.
74. On the informers, see TCTC 203, pp. 6438-39, and on slaves and convicts,
TCTC 205, p. 6507 and THY 86, p. I569. The last measure inspired a strong pro
test from Ch'en Tzu-ang.
See Ch'en Tzu-ang chi^ pp. I78 ff.
75. See, for instance,
96:4b, 96:6a, and 96:11a.
76. TLSI 22:3, pp. 93 ff• The material is arranged in a very convenient
chart in T'ao Hsi-sheng, Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih, v. 3, pp. 249-51.
77* The most important recent work on the system has been done by Ikeda On.
See his fine summary, "Ritsury5" where on p. 289 he offers some cogent remarks
on the interaction between status and tu-ting systems. See also, in the same
volume, Ogata, "RySsensei," which offers a tabular presentation (p. 354) of the
shift in usage from shu to min.
78. TTCLC 100:3a, CTW 95:9b, and THY 67, p. II83. For instances of sumptuary
regulations directed at merchants and artisans, see THY 31, p. 572 and CTW 96:

19b.
79. TCTC 202, p. 6402.
80. For the former, see CTW 95:12a and TTCLC ll4:7b, an edict of 701, for
bidding the descendants of Yang Su to hold capital office, and CTShih 5, p. 57
where she speaks of the virtues of her own ancestors. The influence of geography
on character was a prevalent idea of the age as we have seen in Liu Fang's essay
and LoPin-wang's polemic. Pulleyblank, in Historians3 pp. 135-66, shows that
Liu Chih-chi expressed the view in his historical works. Empress Wu exhibited
the same feeling on several occasions as, for instance, in her decree executing
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Lai Chiin-ch'en, and sometimes when she honored other officials.
See CTW 95:11a
and HTS 109:3930:2.
This idea may help to account for the popularity of northeastern marriages
and the propensity of so many officials to claim native places with which they
had only the most remote connection.
8l. Explored in earlier notes, especially note 70 above.

Chapter 7
1. The uses and limitations of Tunhuang evidence are succinctly explored
by Twitchett, "Chinese social history." Saiiki hunha kerikyu contains several
excellent studies on the mechanics of provincial administration, fu-p-ing and tuhu-fu systems, etc., based on the manuscripts.
2. The problem was first brought to T'ai-tsung's attention by Ma Chou (Ap
pendix B, no. 29) in 66A and, because no action was taken, appeared again in
subsequent reigns. Chao I cites some examples in Kai-yu ts'img-k'ao 17, pp.
328-29, and its manifestations in the Chou are discussed in Chapter 9* The Em
press Wu once told a talented minister that she wished to keep him in the cap
ital because the provinces were of lesser importance. TCTC 206, p. 6517.
After t'ten-pao (7^2-756) the situation began to reverse itself, as sev
eral scholars have noted. Ch'en, Kuo-shih ehtu-wen, v. 2, pp. 13-15 cites the
most useful sources on the question.
3. See Chapter 9. On eunuchs in the T'ang, Rideout's "Rise of eunuchs" is
still useful and a more generalized view is presented by Mitamura, Chtnese Eu

nuchs .
4. Chapter 9. As we shall see, the empress used various clan members in mil
itary positions at the capital during crises, most notably following her usurpa
tion when four of them were given commands in the Yii-lin Guard and other capital
units. Considering, however, that seventeen members of the clan were given posts
and titles at the time and hence were available for military duty, the proportion
was small.
Furthermore, as Ching Hui was to comment in 705, the Wu princes were
usually posted outside the capital {CTS 183:3553:3) during the Chou, and it would
therefore be false to suggest that the empress needed to concentrate military
power in Wu hands to maintain her position. On several occasions she also gave
command of expeditionary armies to relatives or favorites, but only in the case
of the final expedition against Mo-ch'o's Turks does there seem to have been any
feeling on her part that the loyalty of the troops might have been in doubt.
Most striking of all, Wu postings in the Yu-1 in Guard were so infrequent in view
of this force's history and intimate connection with the T'ang that they amount
almost to bravado.
See Chapter 9*
6. See CTS 183:3553:2, HTS 131:4109:3, and Wan Ssu-t'ung's short essay in
Erh-shih-wu shih pu-pien 6, p. 7573 which suggests that the Wu relatives became
wealthy but had little political power.
I am, of course, speaking here of "fiefs of maintenance," a subject upon
which the fundamental study is Niida, "T5dai no hSshaku." Chao I, in Kai-yu
ts'ung-k'ao 77, pp. 336-9, was perhaps the first of modern scholars to charge
that "as a result of the desire of the Empress Wu to make great her clan, she
bestowed the title [and emoluments] of prince upon more than twenty [members of
her family], and this was the inception of the cheapening of the title. . . ."
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This theme is followed and amplified by Tonami, "Zui no bSetsu," pp. 165 ff.,
which is the best of recent studies and contains a most useful bibliography on
the subject.
While I agree with Professor Tonami about the magnitude of a problem which
was probably directing into private hands most of the revenues of the richest
areas of the country by the early eighth century, I cannot accept that the Em
press Wu was responsible for the development. My own research on the matter is
incomplete, but the following points may be made. There was a statutory limit
on the number of households assigned to each rank {IRSI, pp. 318-19 and TRY 90,
p. 1642) and, for present purposes, the important point is that a prince was
limited to 1,000 and a princess to 350. The T'ai-p'ing Princess, the favorite
of her parents, had early exceeded this limit, in the ch'ui-kung period (685“
9) receiving the revenues of 1,200 households, and in sheng-li- (698-7OO) of
3,000 {TCTC 204, p. 6466). Tonami believes that the awards of the Wu clan were
increased in proportion. There is, in fact, no evidence for this, and I believe
that the special role of the princess as the only family member taken fully into
the confidence of the Empress Wu, explains the excessive grant.
In 69O when
seventeen members of the clan received princely rank, only Ch'eng-ssu and Sanssu received the full 1,000 households, and the two figures mentioned for the
more junior members are 300 and 400.
I find no mention of an increase prior to
the restoration.
My reading of the biographies of the seventh century and of the rather mis
leading list in THY 90, pp. 1638-42, would indicate that awards beyond the limit
were made by Kao-tsu to favorite ministers, and that T'ai-tsung was an even worse
offender. See, for instance, CTS 55:3292:4 and 3293:3. The destruction of the
very extensive T'ang family and the confiscation of their property and revenues
in the late 680s also provided the empress with an enormous financial cushion.
Considering, for example, that almost all of Kao-tsu's twenty-two sons received
the full 1,000 households, these alone would cover the Wu awards, and it seems
perverse to criticize the empress on these grounds. The genuine abuse arose in
the next reign and should be attributed to Wu San-ssu and the Empress Wei. There
remains a good deal to be said on the matter.
7. See the biography of Yang Tsai-ssu, Appendix B, no. 111.
8. See Chapters 4 and 9 on these figures.
9. Nien-erh-shih oha-ahi 19, p- 258.
10. Chou Tao-chi's massive if diffuse study Han-T'ang has left little to say
on the subject. TT 20, pp. 119-21, gives a succinct evolution of the position
from earliest times. See also FonotionnaireSj v. 1, pp. 4-11 for a translation
with annotation of the HTS treatise.
11. HTS 46:3739:3. The claim seems first to have been made under Han Wu-ti.
See TT 20, p. 1I96.
12. Hslang-tao (HTS 106:3925:2) was a native of Wei-chou, the son of Lin-fu,
who had died in office in 629 after a successful career in which he served three
years as vice-president of the Board of Civil Office. With his Chancellery ap
pointment, Hsiang-tao was concurrently made vice-presieent of the Board of Civil
Office in charge of selection. He ended his career in honor, dying in 666 at
the age of 71.
The full memorial is found in CTW 162 and is abstracted in his biography,
in TCTC 200, p. 6308 and TT 17, p. 93a. The discussion in the text follows the
arrangement of the latter.

13.

See Appendix B,
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literary talent as well as an ambitious and ingratiating personality, had risen
rapidly in his official career until he offended Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi who used his
influence to have him demoted to the provinces. While attempting to block this
order, 1-fu discovered that Kao-tsung was seeking support in his campaign to
depose Empress Wang and made himself the first official to urge formally that
he do so.
Immediately upon the empress' elevation, he was rewarded with tsaihsiang status. Fitzgerald, Empress Nu, pp. 36 ff. outlines the remainder of his
career.
14. TT 17> p. 93a* Tu Yu's commentary here outlines the meaning of these
terms, and we might note that they were also referred to by such terms as tsajerij hsu-ti, or ah-ih-ohang-jen and sometimes meant officials "outside the cur
rent." It is difficult to know whether Liu is specifically contrasting these
men with examination graduates since he speaks of men "educated in the classics
and contemporary affairs." Because of the form of the examinations, I assume
that this is his meaning.
15. The term t'iu-ne'L referred to the nine ranks of career officials "within
the current" of promotion. By the eighth century there were approximately 2,500
in the central administration and another 16,500 pr so in the provinces.
In the
same period we find about 56,000 t-Lu-wai officials and another 300,000 minor or
part-time employees composed of clerks, guards, runners, etc. See Ikeda,
"RitsuryS," pp, 3OO-303.
16. On this examination, see des Rotours, Examens, pp. 31 and 128-30.
It
had been discontinued in 65I, largely because of its tremendous difficulty.
17. TCTC 200, p. 6308.
18. See Appendix B for the tsai-hstang sample and further discussions in this
chapter which suggest that bureaucratic recruitment by examination did not really
gain momentum until the 670s.
19. In addition to these, one could enter on the grounds of a father's or
grandfather's noble title or through a special act of imperial favor. The rel
ative importance of examination and yin is discussed by Wittfogel, "Public of
fice," pp. 23 ff., which gives also his calculations for the T'ang. See also
the lengthy discussions in Tsukiyama, Todai, pp. 139~63 and 195-224 which lists
a number of other relevant studies.
20. See Appendix B and later notes.
Literary evidence, some of which is cited
later in the chapter, suggests a rough figure of one-tenth, and a fairly careful
calculation made in the forthcoming Camhr-ldge History of China^ Volume 3, esti
mates that examination graduates accounted for fifteen percent at most of the
entire T'ang bureaucracy.
21. By this I mean to suggest not that examination was increasingly the sole
form of bureaucratic entry, but rather that it was increasingly used in tandem
with hereditary privilege. Examining only the small sample in Appendix B, it
is clear that many chief ministers could have entered the bureaucracy on the
basis of yin alone but used examination to better their chances of reaching one
of the "pure" posts. The combination of yin and examination gave a man a higher
initial rank at the beginning of his career and seems also to have facilitated
promotion. See TRSI, pp. 297"98, Examens^ pp. 146-51 and 227-29, and TTLT 2:19b.
This meant, of course, that the existing elite possessed a great institutional
advantage in the competition for office.
22. See note 16.
23. The only innovations explicitly credited to the empress are her founda
tion of the military examination and the ending of the principle of anonymity,
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a usage, incidentally, which she had herself initiated. RTS ^A:3737:2 glosses
over developments in the Chou by suggesting that "from the [time of the] dis
orders of Empress Wu, many of the old ways were upset but Chung-tsung set them
again in order."
24. The precise beginnings of the system in the T'ang are subject to some
dispute. The most detailed examination is Fukushima, Chugoku, pp. 53 ffI
follow his dating rather than the more usual 621.
25. Summarized in ExamenSj, pp. 26-36 and Liu T’ang-tai^ pp. 128-63.
26. A full study of the decree examinations, the first of which appeared in
658, would be most welcome. These examinations seem to have been held in the
palace, sometimes under imperial supervision, and were designed to produce a
particular type of official such as one who was "upright and correct" or "sage
and good," qualities listed in the examination title. Many sources offer lists
of these titles which numbered over seventy in the T'ang, and the Empress Wu
employed them often in her reign. Between 688 and 702 they were held nine times
and, although the usual practice was to respond with dissertations to a question
put by the emperor, some of these seem to have required poems or rhyme-prose.
A notice in WHTK 33, p. 311b suggests that the emperor tested the candidates
without knowing their identity, rewarded those who scored well with excellent
posts (mei-kuan), and gave the others positions appropriate to their basic rank.
The number who passed was usually small, though in 688 thirty candidates suc
ceeded .
See ExamenSj, pp. 205 ff- for the RTS description of these examinations and
note the fairly full listing in Yim-lu man-ch'ao, cKuan 6, pp. 82-86. Contem
porary anecdotes suggest that these examinations carried a good deal of prestige,
and some scholars like Li Chiung-hsiu (Appendix B, no. 128), Liu Ssu-li, Chang
Yueh and Chang Chiu-1ing sat for them several times.
27. On the hsuan, see Examens^ pp. 146-51 and 227-79, TRSI^ pp. 297-98, and
TTLT 2:19b. This provision meant that only the sons of princes {wang) were ex
empted from the hsuan.
28. Examens, p. 213 and TTLT 2:5a.
29. TTLT 2:5b, Examens^ p. 217, and TCTC 201, p. 6362.
30. TTLT 2:6a, and Eosamens^ p. 217. des Rotours distinguishes the tally from
the patent, but Ssu-ma Kuang, TCTC 200, p. 6293, considers them to be the same
thing.
It seems, incidentally, that the patent had to be rescinded before an
official and his family could be punished by the law. See also Niida, Roritsu
hunshOj pp. 793-806.
31. Examens, pp. 50 and 231 ff., TWI^, p. 288, TTLT 2:20b, and TRY 8I, pp.

1500-01.
32. TTLT 2:10a and FonctionnaireSi v. 1, pp. 59-71. The k'ao was basically
the responsibility of the lang-chung assisted by an auxiliary secretary {yuanwai tang) in the k'ao-kimg branch of the Board. They were supervised by two
higher officials from the Chancellery and from State Affairs.
33. Ti Jen-chieh (Appendix B, no. 93) was raised from B-plus to A-minus by
Liu Jen-kuei (no. 51) who was new at the task and seems to have required direc
tion. TRY 81, p. 1501. The second example, from 669, is found in TCTC 201, p.
6358. Lu Ch'eng-ch'ing (no. 46) had placed in the B-minus category an official
who had lost an entire cargo of grain being transported to the capital in stormy
weather.
Lu is said to have been a man who thought highly of his own generosity
and when the lower official appeared unaffected by his low rating, he raised him
to B. The man now requested an even higher grade and, remarking that he had
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shown himself unaffected by favor or insult, Lu again raised him to B-plus.
How typical these cases were is difficult to know. Ma Chou complained in
632 that no ratings higher than B-plus had yet been awarded {THY 81, p. 1500) so
that the impression was created that the dynasty lacked good men. A rating of
B in four k'ao was required for advancement, and for these reasons the evalua
tion tended to become more generous at least until an official reached the fifth
rank. To enter this charmed circle, a man needed a patent from the emperor,
who received a list of eligible persons from the Board of Civil Office. TTLT 2:
5b and 21a ff.
Evaluation was probably taken very seriously at this level, and
it is evident also that the Li-pu
and the tsai-hsiang could use this power
to block "undesirables." Yang, Cheng-ohth shih, pp. 173~7^, documents several
cases where men left the civil service after reaching this threshold of power.
By the Chou, it seems that advancement to the fifth rank had been greatly
accelerated by the empress' special promotions, and this was undoubtedly a source
of dissatisfaction in the upper bureaucracy.
In 695 she decreed that before an
official could apply for the fifth rank he must have undergone at least twelve
k'ao, have committed no crime, and have occupied one of the "pure" posts above
the seventh rank. Those who applied for third-rank posts should have undergone
twenty-five k’ao^ though exceptional talent could be exempted from these regula
tions. TFYK 629:20b.
3k. Examensy pp. 239-^0 and THY 75, p. 1355. HTS ^5:3738:3 points out that
prior to that time there were too few officials to fill the posts, and as a re
sult the central government simply sent out tallies to designate those who should
come to the capital for appointment. Once prospective officials had become more
numerous, it was decided to make the selection more careful, and the hsuan was
created at the suggestion of Liu Lin-fu, the father of Hsiang-tao. On conditions
early in the dynasty, see Fukushima, Chugoku, pp. 71 ff35. THY 26, p. 507. The five successful candidates were appointed to the
Hung-wen kuan to deal with imperial decrees and, in turn, to come to the palace
and draft them on alternate days. This was an unprecedented honor for inexper
ienced men. Hsu Ching-tsung, incidentally, had earlier been attached to the
same body for similar purposes, and it seems that this college, established in
626 with places for twenty students, had by now become an advisory body to the
throne.
It perhaps inspired the creation of the "North Gate scholars,"
36. On rang Lin see CTS 85:33^8:2 and HTS 113:3939:1 and on Hsiang-tao, note
12 above. T'ang Lin's native place is given as Ch'ang-an though the family was
originally from the North and had held office since the Chou. His uncle's ex
ecution by the Sui had deprived the clan of privileged status, and Lin was large
ly a self-made man rising through military ability.
Although the Liu clan claimed a native place in Ho-pei, Lin-fu had been
one of the earliest servants of the T'ang and T'ai-tsung's first vice-president
of the Li-pu, probably residing in the capital and certainly identified with the
Kuan-chung group. For contemporary evidence of capital residence by the great
clans, see TT 17, p. 96c.
37. These were Li Kang {CTS 62:3303:1 and HTS 99:3910:3), Yin K'ai-shan {CTS
58:3295:2 and HTS 90:3896:2), Yang Shih-tao (Appendix B, no. 24), Yang Kung-jen
(no. 8), and Feng Te-i (no, 9).
38. See note 34 above.
39. Appendix B, no. 29. He was married into the clan of Tai Chou (no. 22).
40. For their tenure in the Board of Civil Office, see Yen, T’ang p'u-shang^
pp. 81-90.
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Al. Those related by blood were Yang Shih-tao (Appendix B, no. 2k), Yang
Tsuan, and Yang Kungjen (no. 8); Tu Yen (no. 13) and Tu Ju-hui (no. 17); Liu
Lin-fu and Liu Hsiang-tao; T'ang Lin and T'ang Chiao.
Related by marriage were
Kao Chien (no. 15), Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi (no. lA), Liu Shih (no. 35), and Ch'u Sui1iang (no. 15).
Several more distant marriage relationships also existed.
Taking the group as a whole from 6l8 to 705, I find a total of seventyseven men, of whom I am unable to find information on eight. Of the remainder,
thirty-three were related in the same very close fashion described above, and
the high incidence of father-son, uncle-nephew relationships gives the Board
almost an hereditary cast for the entire century.
In the T'ang, seven direct
descendants of Liu Lin-fu held Ll-pu positions {CTS 81:33^2:1).
After 659 there seems to have been little dilution of the aristocratic
character of the body, but the regional balance improved rapidly and even before
the Chou, three of the "four surnames" of the Northeast were represented. Tsukiyama, Todai, pp. 7^-84, has some rather scattered remarks on the Li-pu at this
time.
k2. CTS 77:3333:2. Ma Chou is referred to as han-shih.
43. Chapter 6, note kk. Kao Chien was president of the Li-pu and Wei T'ing
had just been transferred to the Chancellery.
The tsai-hsiang connection became less pronounced after 659, but between
618 and 705 twenty-three were concurrently tsai-hsiang and six more had held the
status before their appointments to the Li-pu
.
It is also of note that
the majority were president or vice-president of tne Chancellery when awarded
tsai-hsiang status, and that evidence could be adduced to show a greater con
centration of aristocrats there than in the other two Departments until about the
end of Kao-tsung's reign. The role of the Chancellery in the hsuan was the most
important of the Departments. Examens^ p. 2l8 and Fonationnaires^ v. 1, pp. 137
ff. Acting with the Li-pu, it could genuinely control the awarding of posts.
kS. These were Yang Tsuan, Lai Chi (Appendix B, no. 38), and Tu Ju-hul (no.
17).
46. See CTS 82:3343:2.
Evidence for this is largely deductive.
From his bi
ography we learn not only that l-fu made appointments on a grand scale but also
that he was anxious to identify himself with the Chao-chun Li clan, one of the
greatest of the Northeast. As I suggest in Chapter 7, PP. 93-94, his appoint
ment as president of the Li-pu was designed primarily to weaken the control of
appointments by the northwestern aristocracy.
47. His fall is outlined in TCTC 201, pp. 6334-5- This category of punish
ment was exempted from the amnesty of 666 which followed the feng-shan sacrifice,
and Li is said to have been so disappointed that he took sick and died.
48. The two ssu-hsing representatives were Lu Ch'eng-ch'ing (Appendix B, no.
40) and Li An-ch'i (no. 56).
Chao Jen-pen (no. 53) was also from the Northeast.
The others, Hao Ch'u-chiin (no. 60) and Yang Hung-wu (no. 54) represented the
South and Northwest respectively.
49. Biographies in CTS 84:3347:2, NTS 108:3929:2, and Examens, p. 243.
In the
fourth month of 669, and as a result of P'ei's reform, a second vice-president
was added to the Li-pu, and P'ei himself took the post. TFYK 629:3a. He, there
fore, had no experience in the Board before drafting his reforms.
50. Feng-shih wen-ohien ohi 3, pp. 27-28.
51. NTS 45:3738:3- "At this time, candidates were very numerous, and [even]
ignorant and mediocre men applied. Some forged their tallies {fu-kao) and false
ly claimed to have been appointed while others used someone else's name to gain
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appointment. Some from far-off regions had no relatives but still found guar
antors. On the examination day, some found others to use their name [and take
the examination for them], and some cheated by using the answers of those near
them or by seeking help [from friends] outside the hall. Therefore, many [ap
pointees] had no real talent. . . ."
As early as 627 T'ai-tsung had complained that candidates were falsifying
their credentials. TCTC 192, p. 6031.
52. Appendix B, no. 5953. Examens, p. 2^3, CTS 84:33^7:3, NTS 108:3929:2, and THY 75, p. 134754. See ExamenSj p. 243. Ch'en Teng-y'uan, Kuo-shih ohiu-wen^ v. 2, p. 116,
connects it to a list of retiring officials.
55. See CTS 84:3347:3, TT 15, p. 84c, TFYK 629:l8b, and TCTC 101, p. 6362.
Both HTS 45:3738:3 and THY 75, p. 1347, use the shorter form, and Feng-shih wenchien ahi 3, p. 28, suggests that this was the conmon abbreviation. The notices
also reveal that the same year Chang Jen-wei composed a hs'Lng-t-i which des
Rotours calls a "catalogue des noms de famille," but this does not seem to give
the connotation of ti.
See Feng-shih wen-ohien chi 5, p. 53, on the tzu-li.
We know that in the first stage of the examinations a man had to submit docu
ments showing his ancestry and native place (Examens^ pp. 147 and 184) and this
was true also for the hsuan (note 51 above).
I believe that these were checked
against the hsing-ti to be certain of a candidate'e eligibility.
If so, the
hsing-li was a permanent list similar to the national status registers but con
cerned solely with official postings. Candidates for the hsuan were checked
against it and a "long list" of successful candidates with their clan's bur
eaucratic record was posted together with the number and nature of the expected
vacancies for the coming year. When the usage was discontinued because "every
one knew who would be appointed" (see next note), it must have been because fam
ily Influence was clear to see in the list. The paucity of specific information
about the list renders any interpretation speculative, but this view seems con
sistent with the class-conscious and exclusivistic character of the other
measures of 669. The list seems to have been designed to prevent the entry of
undesirables. See also Ts'ui Jung's memorial of 680 in THY 74, p. 1335.
56. Feng-shih wen-ohien chi 3, p. 28. The passage goes on to say that the
bias of the vice-president of the Li-pu who drew up the list resulted in such
lively protest that he was demoted to the provinces.
57. HTS 45:3738:2. See also ExamenSj p. 180.
58. That is to say, all those whose basic rank was above nine; listed in
ExamenSy pp. 227“8. On the universities, by which I mean the kuo-tzu hsueh,
the t'ai-hsueh and the ssu-men hsueh which were administered by the kuo-tzu
ohien and had a total of perhaps 350 students at this time, see Liu, T'ang-tai^
pp. 92-98. Only the ssu-men hsueh admitted commoners.
59. Examens,, p. 215 and TT 15, p. 84b.
60. TCTC, 201, p. 6362, TFYK 629:19a; and see TRSI^ p. 285 for other refer
ences .
61. The presidency was left vacant from 669 to 674 and 676 to 684 perhaps
since the vice-presidents had been given the whole task of selection in 67O.
Li Ching-hsuan was raised from vice-president to president in 674 and remained
there until raised to State Affairs in late 676. P'ei Hsing-chien remained as
vice-president until mid-679.
62. This was first noted in Liu Hsiang-tao's memorial of 657 (note 12 above)
and several other examples appear in later notes. See also the remarks of Ch'u
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Sui-liang in the biography of Wei Ssu-ch'ien (Appendix B, no. 79). This atti
tude was to be of importance in the dynamics of the Chou bureaucracy.
63. TFYK 629:19a. According to this decree, the ahu-se from the Boards of
Civil Office and War who had undergone the requisite number of k'ao, needed to
be examined only on one classic and one history before becoming eligible for
appointment "within the stream."
64. HTS 45:3738:2. The passage adds that there were sometimes ten persons
waiting for a single position.
65. See THY 58, pp. 1004 ff., TT 23, pp. 135 ff., and TFYK 629:3a ff. The
principal increases occurred in 669, 689, and 694.
66. On the ta-oh'eng^ see Examens^ p. 165 and on the restoration of the
schools, TFYK 550:4b and CTW 11:20b. Fukushima, Chugoku, pp. 129 ff., examines
the decline of the provincial schools showing a correlation with the numbers
who presented themselves for examination. For educational policy in the reign
of Kao-tsung, see Taga, Todai kyOiku, pp. 94 ff.
67. Note 26 above.
68. WHTK 29, pp. 276-80. The list is derived from the Teng-k'o lu of the
Sung scholar Yueh Shih and is exhaustively discussed by Fukushima, Chugoku, pp.
77 ff. Lin, Sui-T'ang shihj pp. 202-264, reprints the list with some annota
tion. The origins of this kind of compilation are discussed in Fukushima,
Chugoku, pp. 159 ff., and Yu-hai 115:19b ff. lists a number of indexes of grad
uates, usually compiled by a single clan. These began to outstrip genealogical
compilations in the later T'ang. See Fukushima, Chugoku, pp. 194-201.
69. Fukushima, Chugoku, p. 78.
70. No examinations were held in 669. The figures are as follows:
664 3
670 - 54
665 -all failed
67I - no examinations held
666 2
672 - no examinations held
667 5
673 - 79
668 - 26
674 - 57
These years seem to be the high point of success for ohin-sh-ih candidates
in the dynasty, and when fifty-five succeeded in 682, a reexamination, which
only fifteen passed, was held.
In the k'ai-yuan [713"742] period, an annual up
per limit of twenty-five was set, but it seems not to have been enforced since
by my calculation the average for Hsuan-tsung's reign was twenty-seven. The
numbers changed little after that, and Ma Tuan-1 in's remark that at its most
flourishing period the chin-sh-ih never produced more than fifty graduates {WHTK
29, p. 280) refers to this period.
Again working from ohin-shih figures in the Teng-k'o Z-u, discussed in note
68 above, the examination's development in the T'ang may be shown:

Graduates

Times Held

Average
per Time

5+
5
26
Kao-tsu
10+
T'ai-tsung
20
205
14Kao-tsung to 669
15
208
48Kao-tsung 670-684
9
430
21
Empress Wu
25+
532
71. TCTC 202, pp. 6374-75. The merrorial came from Liu Hsiao about whom no
further information exists.
72. TCTC 202, pp. 6386-87.
73. Biography in CTS 190 ohung: 35^7.: 2.
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7k. See ExamenSi pp. 166-67 for the numerous sources In which the memorial
is abstracted.
I follow des Rotours' translation.
75. NTS ^5:3738:3. I have found this passage nowhere else.
76. NTS ^5:3738:4. I find few other references to this problem prior to 705,
and it seems to have become serious only in the reign of Chung-tsung. See TCTC
209, pp. 6633 and 6635.
77- See their biographies cited earlier. Li's biography points out that
while his ability and carefulness were praised and while he could remember the
names of all his appointees, he brought "more than 10,000" men into the admin
istration In one year. This figure, of course. Is a conventional approximation.
He was dismissed in 676 because of Kao-tsung's displeasure with the manner in
which he built a large clientele in the upper bureaucracy through his appoint
ments and his three marriages into the preeminent northeastern clans. The T’angkuo shih-pUj shang, p. 20, tells how his marriages so confused the generation
order of the clans that grandfathers were grandsons and vice versa.
78. TCTC 252, p. 8167.
79. See, for instance, T'ang-kuo shih-pu, hsia, pp. 55~6, Feng-shih wen-ohien
chi 3, p. 22, and T’ang oh-Lh-yen 1, p. 3- Chao I gives other examples in Kaiyu ts’ung-k'ao 28, p. 583.
80. Examens, p. I63, TT 15, p. 83a, NUTK 29, p. 271b, and Yu-hai 115:11b.
The biography of Tu Cheng-lun {CTS 70:3319:4) tells us that fewer than twenty
men attained the degree in the Sui, and prior to 65I only another twenty-eight
were successful.
In the same period the ahin-shih sometimes produced seventeen
graduates in a single year! When the hsiu-tsai- was reestablished in 736, the
TT tells us it was considered less difficult than the oh-in-shth.
Ch'en, Kuoshih ohiu-wen, v. 2, pp. 117"20 and 125-27, introduces some useful sources on
the relative positions of the examinations.
81. Feng-shih wen-ohien ohi 3, PP- 24 ff., states that the ohin-shih was more
highly esteemed than decree examinations, but this reference, I think, is to the
situation in the eighth century. The HTS treatise {Examens^ p. 208) says that
those successful in the decree examinations received the most illustrious titles,
and I find it suggestive that those recorded to have taken both examinations in
the seventh century chose usually to take the decree examination first. The
ming-ohingy as we have seen, conferred a higher point of entry to the bureauc
racy than did the ohin-shih.
82. Taking as a sample the graduates among the tsai-hsiang from 664-705, I
find that fifteen had chosen the ohin-shih and thirteen the ming-ohing.
It is of interest to note that Japanese scholarship seems widely to accept
that the aristocracy long favored the ming-ohing over the ohin-shih.
See, for
instance, Tsukiyama, Todait pp. 69 and 139. This is reasonable in view of the
greater need for books, tutors, orthodoxy, tradition and discipline to prepare
the curriculum, and also in view of the form of the examination which from 737
and possibly from 68I included an oral interview with the aristocratic members
of the Li-pu.
It is difficult, however, to find statistical evidence.
In the later part of the T'ang few high officials seem to have entered
the bureaucracy via the ming-ohing.
83. See Pulleyblank, Baokground, pp. 194-204. Seven men had chosen the ohinshih while six passed all the other types.
84. WHTK 29, p. 271c and Yu-hai 115:15b. The T'ang ohih-yen^ 1, p. 4, comments
that "the' ohin-shih was founded in the Sui ta-yeh [era, 605-6I7] and flourished
in ohen-kuan [627-650] and yung-wei [650-656].
If a scholar-official reached the
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highest of state offices without passing the ohin-shihj he was in the end not
considered praiseworthy. The candidates before long often numbered no less
than eight or nine hundred men. . . . The difficulty [of the examination] was
expressed [by saying] thirty is old [to pass the] ming-ohing and fifty is young
[to pass the] ohin-shih."
Ts'en, Sui-T'ang shih^ v. 1, pp. 184 ff. gives four reasons for the rela
tive popularity of the ohin-shih.
85. Examens, p. 147.
86. See Chapter 2. We cannot be certain, of course, of the actual role of
the empress in the writings issued under her name, but there is ample evidence
of her fondness for literature, and most sources which comment on the form taken
by the dhi.n-sh-Lh attribute the literary emphasis to her interest.
In addition,
we find several other examples of this. See, for instance, TFYK 110:3b which
describes a poetry-composing party, and 840:l6a which tells how she awarded
high office to the author of a fine poem on the ming-t'ang. THY ~J1, p. 1405,
suggests how widespread was private scholarship and literature in her reign,
and we are told also that when she dispatched commissioners in 691 to inquire
about the state of the provinces, the whole court submitted poems to mark the
event. THY TJ, p. I4l4. The dynastic biographies of noted litterateurs and
poets like Sung Chih-wen and Shen Ch'uan-ch'i (,CTS 190 ohung:1S^^’h and HTS 202:
4100:4) suggest the importance of her patronage. Other examples are cited by
Lin, Sui-T'ang shih, pp. 199-200.
87. CTS 118:3414:1, the biography of Yang Yen. The occasion was a debate of
763 in which Yen protested the literary emphasis in the examinations, and his
opponent rebutted his arguments by suggesting that the Hsia dynasty was founded
upon sincerity, the Shang upon respect and the Chou on literature which governed
men's conduct quite as much as sincerity and respect.
88. TTLT 4:4b.
89. There is no evidence that the empress discriminated on the basis of a
man's degree, but her patronage of the ohin-shih created the climate which caused
high officials to have contempt for those of their colleagues without the degree.
See the examples cited earlier and the anecdotes in Yin-hua lu, 3, and T'ang-kuo
shih-pUj hsiOj pp. 55~56, which outline the honorific vocabulary which grew
around the degree.
90. See the chart in the text and note 87 above. Yang Yen also complained
that ohin-shih candidates knew neither the classics nor the histories. Other
evidence is cited in following notes.
91. TFYK 639:20a, THY 75, p. 1373, and see Chapter 9.
92. Appendix B, no. 70.
93. Chapter 3, n. 24.
^
.
94. I am not sure of the precise meaning of liu-li ( 7^\
) and oh'i-ohiao

(^
95. Discussed on pp. 103"105.
•

Wei might be referring here to the practice
whereby sons of honorific officials of the fifth rank or above and high regular
officials could enroll their sons as prefectural na-k'o p’in-tzu^ "sons of rank
ing officials paying a tax." At the age of eighteen, these were attached nom
inally to the Guards and after thirteen years took what seems to have been rather
an easy examination to enter the regular bureaucracy.
96. The memorial is found in full in CTW l68:2b and is abstracted in THY 74,
pp. 1336-7, ExamenSj p. 247, and TT 17, p. 94a. Fukushima, Chugoku, pp. 106-21,
analyzes it chiefly as a catalog of abuses growing out of Wei's conviction that
Confucian virtue received too little attention in selection and his belief that
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the Board of Civil Office had grown too powerful.
97. THY 74, p. 1337.
98. TT 15, p. 83a. See also THY 76, p. 1390, WHTK 29, p. 2720, and TFYK 639:
20a. The latter text uses only the term pi, "finish," not suggesting that the
candidates all failed.
99. The important steps in the process were the inauguration of decree exam
inations in 658 and the settlement of their basic form in 683 {THY 75, P- 1376),
the ceremony of 659, the creation of the ta-oh'eng in 675, the reforms of 68I
and, of course, the continuing process of raising more and more graduates to
the highest posts.
100. WHTK 29, p. 272a. The full text is found in CTW 281:10b, and it was sub
mitted by Hsueh Ch'ien-kuang whose biography is found in CTS 101:3383:2. See
also TT 17, p. 9^c.
101. Chapter 6.
102. ExamenSj pp. 2U7-8, TT 14, p. 85b, and f/HTK 37, p. 3^8c. The TT says
that the empress believed the Li-pu often failed to select the right men and so
decreed that examinations be written anonymously and that the same regulation
apply to the k’ao.
No source offers a dating for this event, but Yu-hai 115:25b suggests that
she ordered a decree examination in 689 to be administered anonymously. The
notice is rather puzzling because it goes on to say that Chang Yueh, after a re
examination, was placed first.
In other sources we are told that Chang Chienchih (Appendix B, no. 133) topped over 1,000 candidates, and the Yu-hai also
mentions this event (ll5:2^fab). The Teng-k'o chi-k'ao puts Chang Yueh's exam
ination in the preceding year and I am, therefore, suspicious of the first no
tice. Even if it is reliable, we cannot be sure that the principle was extended
to other examinations. However, since it is the earliest mention of the hu-ming,
we might assume that the practice began about this time.
103. Chapter 9, note 87.
lOif. Examens, pp. 209-212, TFYK 639:20b, THY 59, p. 1030, and TCTC 207, p.
6558. There was a corresponding hsuan. See ExamenSj p. 222, note 1.
105. Appendix B, no. 131. The full text is in CTW 236:3b and the memorial is
discussed in Chapter 9>
106. CTW 236:5a.
It was submitted in 709 and is abstracted in his biography
and in TCTC 209, p. 663^. The conditions described are for the reign of Chungtsung and are a good deal worse than those of the Chou.
107. These were Li Yuan-su (Appendix B, no. 101), Wei Chii-yuan (no. 105), Toulu Ch'in-wang (no. 107), and Wang Hsiao-chieh (no. IO9).
108. Japanese scholarship has demonstrated the existence of this division even
in the ohung-aheng system. See Miyazaki, Kuhon^ pp. 233“^3*
I pointed earlier
to several of its applications in the T'ang and might recall that the fifth rank
was the standard for inclusion in the Hsing-shih-tu and that for all her innova
tions in recruitment, the empress never changed the rule that entry into the
fifth rank was possible only by imperial decree. Fukushima, Chugoku, pp. 152
ff., collects other data on the division.
109. The term used by Ch'en Yin-k'o (see Chapter 6) and fairly standard in
Japanese scholarship.
110. Note 14 above.
111. See TT 40, pp. 229 ff•, TESI^ pp. Il4 ff., and CTS 42:3253:3 which pro
vides a full list of titles.
One of the greatest lacunae in T'ang studies prior to the rebellion of
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An Lu-shan lies in the study of the Ziu-wai officialdom. Since this group was
extremely important, especially in the provinces where it formed the closest
link between government and people, our perception of T'ang administration re
mains somewhat blurred. Tsukiyama, Toda-i, pp. 437 ff• , looks at the hsu-Z-i^
who were not strictly speaking Ziu-wai but often grouped with them, under the
five headings of function, entry "into the current," restrictions placed upon
them, provincial abuses, and the various attempts made to reduce their number.
His treatment is useful but not too coherent.
It is useful perhaps to have some concept of the size of the group, and
Ikeda's figures in "Ritsuryo," pp. 300-303, suggest for instance that in the
three Departments at the capital there were a total of 24l Ziu-nei. officials
and 1,498 Zi-u-wai- distributed as follows:
State Affairs
Chancellery
Secretariat

Ziu-nei,

Z-Lu-wai

159
40
42

1,135
1?6
187

On a wider level, TCTC 214, k'ai-yuan 21 (733) gives a total of 17,686 Ziu-nei
officials and 57,416 Ziu-wai in the whole administration. TT 40, p. 230b,
speaking of a slightly later period, gives a grand total of 368,668, so that
the hsu-Zi must have numbered almost 300,000. The figure is further divided
into 18,805 Ziu-nei and 349,863 Ziu-wai.
In addition to these, there was a
large number of minor employees recruited on a part-time basis.
As mentioned earlier, memorialists tended to group together all those
who were not Ziu-nei in their complaints.
112. TTLT 30:23a.
113. TTLT 2:31a and CTS 43:3245:1. This minor examination was held annually
and consisted of tests in writing, mathematics, and contemporary affairs though
the last was not important. Candidates underwent an annual k'ao and had to take
the minor examination after three k'ao in order to advance, although the con
stant complaints suggest that enforcement of the promotion rate was lax. See
also FonotionnaireSj v. 1, pp. 67 ff.
114. As Miyazaki, Kuhon makes clear, the distinction between "pure" and
"muddy" posts was a very old one, and in the T'ang the key capital appointments,
perhaps 500 or so, were reserved for men of good birth and scholarly attainment
usually demonstrated by examination. See TTLT 2:24a ff.
115. TT 35, p. 200c. The passage notes the establishment of 7,000 hsu-shih
chosen from the superior households.
116. THY 67, p. 1183. The full text is in TTCLC 100:3a and CTW 95:9b.
117. TTLT 2:31a and Tsukiyama, Todai, p. 443.
118. On the question of honorific rank, see FonotionnaireSi v. l,_pp. 50-59,
THY 81, pp. 1491-92, and the useful secondary study by Matsunaga, "Todai."
119. The sale of honorific ranks is mentioned in the Act of Grace of 684,
CTW 96:15a, and there is a good deal of Tunhuang evidence to show that the gov
ernment was concerned with fraudulent claims.
According to Tu Yu {TT 48, p. 773), the real cheapening of honorific
rank occurred in the k’ai-yuan period (713“742), but Professor Matsunaga's work
indicates that from the mid-670s and perhaps from the rationalization of the
system in 674 {THY 81, p. 1491), awards became increasingly free. Liu Jen-kuei
complained in 664 {TCTC 201, pp. 6340-41) that military rewards were not being
distributed, and in 688 we hear that honorific rank was being given for special
corvee duty, for instance, in the construction of the ming-t’ang.
See CTW 96:
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19a. Matsunaga ("Todai," p. 36) shows that land grants often accompanied these
awards so that the economic ramifications were quite serious.
120. Fukushima, Chugoku, p. 119121. Note 113 above. Liu-wai officials could advance only one grade every
three years, and once they entered the regular bureaucracy and became subject
to the k’ao system there, every four years. Since the bottom ranks contained
six grades, it would take twenty-four years to reach the seventh rank! Al
though liu-wat officials could expect their bureaucratic careers to be longer
than the twenty to thirty years which seems to have been average for high of
ficials, they could not expect to come anywhere near the fifth rank in the
normal course of events.
122. Chapters 5 and 9.
123. TCTC 201, p. 6346.
124. THY 81, pp. 1493-94.
125. Tonami,"Zui no bSetsu," pp. 172 ff. and Tsukiyama, Todai, pp. 444-52.
126. See, for instance, the remarks of Tsukiyama, Tbdaiy pp. 453“64.
127. TCTC 204, p. 6460. Kao-tsung, it seems, had planned to promote Chou
Hsing to a "pure" post until he found out that he was ineligible. Chou is said
to have gone frequently to the audience hall to await the announcement of his
appointment, and this embarrassing experience nray help to account for the re
venge he ultimately took on the "pure" officials.
128. Chapter 9* The most striking instance is their opposition to the Chang
brothers and the large faction which grew up around them. See also Tonami,
"Chusei," pp. 47 ff. on the forms of factionalism after Empress Wu.
129. This was Ti Jen-chieh, and the question is fully discussed in Chapter

9.

Chapter 8
1. See, for instance, Scott, Golden Age; Mahler, Westerners-, and Reischauer
Ennin's Travels.
2. CTW 96:11b, from the Act of Grace changing the reign title to kuang-ahai

3. See Chapter 9*
4. See Wright, "T'ai-tsung and Buddhism," in Ferspeotives^ pp. 250 ff. for
a discussion of what the author calls T'ai-tsung's "Han Wu-ti syndrome," and
Wechsler, Mirror^ pp. 101-105 with the sources cited there. Other indications
are found in TCTC 196, p. 6173, 198, p. 6226, and I98, p. 6247*
5. See CTS 194 shang:353(>’■ 2, 194 hsia: 3533-2, 196 shang:3503- h, and 199
shang:35\3'. \, and the succinct summary of T'ai-tsung's reign by Wechsler in the
forthcoming Cambridge History of China^ Volume 3*
6. TCTC 197, p. 6218, and 200, p. 6323 for his intention personally to at
tack Korea. Other indications are found in TFYK 124:8b and 543:7a. The latter
notice is an interesting memorial dissuading him from going to Korea.
7. TCTC 199, pp. 6269-70. CTS 196 shang: 350k-.2 points out that since the
warning was accompanied with precious objects for T'ai-tsung's tomb, Kao-tsung
was able to put a favorable interpretation on it, exchanging gifts and bestow
ing on the Tibetan ruler an additional title.
8. TCTC, loo. ait.
9. TCTC 199, p. 6273 and CTS 194 ?isia:3600:1. The best secondary accounts
are Ise, Chugoku, pp. I96 ff. and Ts'en, T’u-ohueh, pp. 269-74.
I am in agree
ment with Professor Ise that the rising was inspired not by any Chinese action.
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but by internecine strife among the Western Turks which can be traced back to
646 and to A-shih-na'Ho-lu's rapid success which led him to believe that Chi
nese arms were weakened by T'ai-tsung's death.
10. TCTC 199f p. 6274. HTS 215 ?zsia:4134:1 says there were only 20,000 Chi
nese troops while CTS and TT 199 are silent on the matter.
The troops were levied in the oKun-fu of Ch'in, Ch'eng, Ch'i and Yung,
all of which lie just west of Ch'ang-an and are cited in Ku, Fu-ping^ p. 155In Yung (Ching-chao) there were 131 ohun-fu with an average of about 1,000 men
each, so that I think the higher figure is the more likely one.
On the fu-ping system there have been few studies of note since Pulleyblank reviewed the literature in 1955 {Background, p. 140) aside from Ku's
excellent if tendentious work cited above.
Kikuchi Hideo has published some
fine articles, and his "Fuhei seido" is perhaps the best available Introduction
to the subject. See also his "lo sessho fu" which settles, I think several out
standing questions on the distribution of the units and their relationship to
earlier military systems.
Because of the necessity to contrast it with expeditions later in the
century, the form of Kao-tsung's first major army is worth a closer look. Gen
erally speaking, the emperor, on the advice of the Board of War chose one or more
generals who were designated as tsung-kuan for the area in which the expedition
ary army or hsi-ng-ohun was to engage. At the time they and their deputy com
manders were chosen, each was allotted a specific number of troops, called ohenghsing-c’en, who were usually chosen from fu-ping units in specified ohun-fu. The
troops, who provided their own clothing and equipment, etc., were told how long
the expedition was to last {TCTC 201, pp. 6340-1) and, as far as I can tell,
were to be replaced when their tour was complete, usually after one year. The
government had a pool of perhaps 500,000 troops to draw upon, less about 100,000
who acted in rotation as capital guards and another 50-100,000 stationed at the
borders. The establishment of these border garrisons remains something of a puz
zle. See Pulleyblank, Background, pp. 147-49. Empress Wu increased the fu-ping
just prior to her usurpation.
11. TCTC 199, p. 6277.
12. CTW 15:3b and TCTC 199, p. 6277- For reasons shortly to be spelled out,
it is difficult to know which of the states began the hostilities which inspired
Kao-tsung's rebuke.
I tend to believe the Si 11an acount that Paekche was em
boldened by T'ai-tsung's death to violate the Si 11an border and seize seven
fortresses, since it had been formally allied with Kogury'ii since 643 and both
had designs on Si 1 Ian territory. Si 11a, however, had retaliated even before
sending Kim Ch'un-ch'u, the future King Muyol, to China in 649.
A second embassy arrived in 65O bearing the plea for aid from the Si 11an
Queen Chindok, and Kao-tsung seems to have responded with a "mutual security"
treaty.
See Weems, HuVbert's History of Korea, v. 1, p. EDI05.
There are few satisfactory studies of Sino-Korean relations in this peri
od, and most of my remarks on the subject are drawn from Kim Pusik's Samguk Sagi
of 1145 supplemented, of course, by the Chinese sources. The best secondary
study is Ikeuchi, Man-Sen shi; another useful work is Nishijima, "Toa."
T'ai-tsung's will is found in TTCLC 11:2b and CTW 9:8b. On tsai-hsiang
opposition to the attack on Korea, see Wechsler, "Factionalism," in Perspec
tives, p. 95* Of Kao-tsung's tsai-hsiang only Li Chi had been in favor, and
Ch'u Sui-liang had been a most outspoken opponent.
13. TCTC 199, p. 6287.
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14. CTS 93:3366:2. After the recovery of the Four Garrisons in 692.
15. TCTC 202, p. 6385. Discussed on pp. 122-123.
16. TCTC 199, pp. 6287-8 and CTS 199 shang:3(>^S-2. See also Ikeuchi, ManSen shi, V. 1, pp. 308 ff. on the campaign. It might be noted that this first
campaign caused great hardship in the Northeast, a fact called to Kao-tsung's
attention in early 656 by Lai Chi (Appendix B, no. 38). See TCTC 200, pp. 6296-

97.

17. Discussed on pp. 112-117 passim.
18. TCTC 200, pp. 6295-96, which describes an attempt to set up rival khans
in order to detach A-shih-na Ho-lu's followers. See also TCTC 200, pp. 6301-2
and note the lengthy review of T'ang-Turkic relations in the k'ao-i notice.
19. Biographies in CTS 83:3344:3 and HTS 111:3934:2. Su's background was
typical of the northeastern hao-dhieh. The son of a man who never held office
but was able to lead thousands of men into the fray at the collapse of the Sui,
he gained early experience against the Turks under T'ai-tsung and thenceforth
pursued a career of uninterrupted military success. He won noble titles with
out ever holding significant civil offices and was praised at his death in 667
as the conqueror of three states. His biography gives an account of the ensu
ing campaign.
20. TCTC 200, p. 6305.
21. On the mu-ping^ see Pulleyblank, Background^ pp. 146-4722. The best short account is in TCTC 200, pp. 6306-8; see also CTS 194 hsia:
3600:2.
23. This practice of attaching a censor to expeditionary forces seems to have
been discontinued sometime before 687 when the empress was petitioned to re
instate it. She refused on the grounds that generals required freedom of action.
TBY 62, p. 1086 and TCTC 204, pp. 6446-7. On central control of the military,
see Kikuchi, "Fuhei seido," pp. 421 ff.
24. On these terms see note 21 above and Kikuchi, "Todai fubo." Under this
system, a central official called the ping-mu was sent to an area usually chosen
for its military reputation, large population or absence of fu-ping units, and
there chose a suitable number of troops from households with several sons.
Kikuchi shows that from the beginning the wealthy and influential managed to
avoid service and that troops of this sort tended to be used often as occupying
forces, not being demobilized so rapidly as the fu-ping. Liu Jen-kuel's mem
orial of 664, cited earlier {CTS 84:3346:3). is a good indication of this.
25. See note 10 above.
26. Note 24 above.
27. Note 24 above and subsequent discussion in the text.
28. Note 24 above.
29. The T'ang use of foreigners is well-known, and Chao I comments on it in
Kai-yu ts'ung-k’ao 17, p. 327, following his discussion of the amazing success
of T'ang arms.
30. On the early organization of the area, see Otani Shoshin's study of the
An-hsi protectorate in Ikeuchi Hiroshi, ed., Toyoshi ronso^ pp. 271“92. On Lu
Ch'eng-ch'ing, see Appendix B, no. 46.
Lu had made his reputation by compiling
for T'ai-tsung a complete census of China's population from earliest times but
was in mild disgrace at this time because of his close relationship to Ch'u Suiliang. He had much administrative ability and pursued a successful career in
the Board of Finance until his dismissal for erroneous estimates of expenditure.
31. TCTC 200, p. 6307 and CTS 81:3341:3-
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32. TCTC 200, pp. 6307 and 6317"18. See also Lin, Sui-T’ang shth, p. 366.
33. A recent and eloquent appreciation of the T'ang empire is Miyasaki, Dai
To teikokUi especially pp. 319 ff3^. Ise, Chugokuy p. 20h.
35. This was the sixth month of 658. The troops were mostly those of Ch'eng
Ming-chen {CTS 199 shang:3(>^5:2) , presumably raised in Liao-tung, though the
famed general Hsiieh Jen-kuei (CTS 83:33^5:1 and HTS 111:3934:4) was dispatched
as his deputy.
In the major battle of the campaign the Chinese were victorious
against a force estimated at 30,000, but the victory was facilitated by the re~
belli ion of the Koreans' Khitan allies.
36. TCTC 200, p. 6320. China later Justified this attack in the treaty she
forced Si 11a and Paekche to conclude in 665. SS 6, p. 68. Claiming that
Paekche had thrown off its allegiance to China, fomented discord with Si 11a and
formed alliances with Kogury'6 and Japan, the emperor had given the state a chance
to recant, attacking only when it "considered its position impregnable because
of the great distance and was contemptuous of Our Will.."
A caution about sources might be inserted here. Since the records of
Koguryo perished in the sack of Pyongyang in 668, the SS and Samguk Yusa offer
no more than an abridgment of the Chinese histories in writing about the state.
As a result, an unbiased view of peninsular strife in the period is almost im
possible.
37* HTS 220:4147:4.
See also CTS 61:3300:3, biography of Wen Yen-po (Ap
pendix B, no. 21). On China's early relations with the peninsula, rapid sum
maries are found in Hatada, History of Korea, pp. 3"24, and Henthorn, History
of Korea, pp. 18-54.
38. TCTC 190, p. 5976 and HTS 220:4194:1 and 3« The kings of the three
states received patents calling them oKun-wang and using the names of the Han
commanderies. They also received the Chinese titles of ahu-kuo or shang-ahukuo {CTS 1:3065:4), the highest in the system of honorific rank. Nishijima,
"T5a," p. 255, notes the ambiguous nature of these conferrals.
Mori, "Zui-To," summarizes a paradigm widely used in Japanese scholar
ship in which China's foreign relationships are divided into several types:
father-son, father-in-law-son-in-law, rulei—subject, patent and seal, direct
control, and enemy state, roughly in their order of chronological evolution.
The relationship with the Korean states was a highly advanced one.
39. CTS 199 shang :3(>] 5:2, TCTC 197, p. 6202, and SS 49, pp. 486 ff. for his
biography. The latter source tells us that after murdering over a hundred high
officials at a banquet, he killed the king and installed a puppet ruler from a
cadet branch of the royal house. He was himself the real ruler and one of great
cruelty and severity. "No one dared [even] to look upon his face and when he
mounted or dismounted from his horse, nobles and generals prostrated themselves
on the earth. . . ."
40. CTS 199 shang:3(>] 5:2.
41. TCTC 201, p. 6355* See also THY 43, p- 766. The occasion was the sight
ing of a comet which Hsu Ching-tsung interpreted as an omen of Koguryo's fall.
Kao-tsung disagreed.
42. SS 4, pp. 56 ff. Although the process had been going on for some time,
it became wholly conscious in 649 when Si 11a changed its calendar to that of
the T'ang and began to use Chinese era names. See also Nishijima, "Toa," pp.
258 ff.
43. Text in CTS 199 shang:3(>\7
and SS 5, p. 57It is of the five-word
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line style and combines praise for the T'ang with an appeal for aid.
kk. The Hwabaek was the ancient Si 1 Ian Council of State and continued to
exist above the Sinicized administration, deciding the most important state
matters. The Hwarang-to which might be translated as “Company of Knights of
the Flower," was inaugurated in the middle of the sixth century and aimed to
develop carefully chosen young men into military and societal leaders.
It rap
idly built a tradition of patriotism and loyalty, high culture and leadership,
and under Kim Yu-sin, the Hwarang became the flower of the Sillan army. The
only English treatment of the subject is Rutt's “Flower boys of Si 11a.“
ks. SS 5, pp. 58. Muyol (r. 65^-661) was a nephew of Queen Chincf6k, not,
as the CTS suggests, her brother.
46. His son Munmu was to make the claim in the document quoted extensively
in the text.
47. SS 28, pp.
from the annals of Paekche is probably the best account
of the events and agrees in general outline with the Sillan record, SS 5» PP59-63.
It was apparently Kim Yu-sin‘s victory which prevented Paekche from
fortifying the mouth of the Paekang and so blocking the passage of the Chinese
fleet. The Chinese accounts, for instance TCTC 200, p. 6321, make no mention
of the Sillan contribution.
48. SS 28, p. 111. When King Uija and the crown prince fled, the king's
second son declared himself ruler and Invested the capital. His nephew, son of
the crown prince, judged this to be usurpation and surrendered to Su Ting-fang
with most of the capital residents. On the fall of the city, Uija gave himself
up and died of illness shortly thereafter.
49. CTS 199 shang-.Z(>\f>-.2 and SS 28, p. 211. Overall authority was vested,
however, in a Chinese tu-tu, a post soon given to Liu Jen-yuan.
50. CTS 199 shang:3S]S:2 and SS 28, p. 27751. SS 28, p. 211 specifies that those exiled consisted of “eighty-eight per
sons of the royal family, great generals and ministers, and 12,807 of the peo
ple." We know very little of this resettlement, but the much greater movement
of people at the fall of Koguryo has been studied in detail by Hi no, “Sh5 kokuri
koku." Hino points out that as early as 643, T'ai-tsung had settled inside the
Wall about 3,500 of Korea's best soldiers in order to weaken resistance in the
state, providing a precedent for the deportation.
Later it was hoped that by
removing the leaders of society movements of national liberation could be fore
stalled.
In all likelihood, the same motive was present in 66O and suggests
that the Chinese planned to incorporate the peninsula into their empire.
Professor Hatada {Korea, p. 25) is convinced that the Paekcheans were en
slaved, but I find no evidence of this. The Koreans, we are told, were later
settled in underpopulated areas of the Northwest so that the need for labor was
a motive in their placement, but we are also told that they took with them their
chariots, horses and cattle, and this seems to suggest quite the opposite of en
slavement. Professor Hino makes no suggestion.
52. TCTC 200, pp. 6322-23.
In the three areas mentioned there existed nine
teen prefectures which had fu-ptng units and, according to the figures of Ku
Chi-kuang and Kikuchi, these yielded on paper about 130,000 troops. The fact
that only a third of this total was produced by what seems to have been a full
levy, and that at least a portion of these were probably conscripts and volun
teers, would seem to indicate that the effective strength of the system had been
substantially reduced by 66O.
53- With the exception of Ch'i-pi Ho-li, the other three commanders were all
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prominent members of the northeastern hao-ohteh.
Coupled with the fact that the
expedition was launched from Loyang, this suggests a special effort to persuade
the Northeast.
5^. TCTC 200, p. 632l». The year 660 was that of Kao-tsung's first serious
illness. Fitzgerald, Empress Wu^ p. 59, speculates on the empress' reasons for
opposing her husband's participation, and see also THY 95, P- 1708, for other
opposition.
55- SS 28, pp. 278-9 and TCTC 200, pp. 6323"^. Poksin set up as ruler a son
of the former king who had been a hostage in Japan. These two, aided by a Bud
dhist monk called Tochim, managed to rally the people and put the garrison of
Li Jen-yuan {HTS 220:4llt8:4) under severe pressure.
56. SS 5, p. 62 and 28, p. 278 both record engagements in which Si 11a was
bested and this may be the real reason it retired. The Si 1 Ian king Muyol, who
was to die in mid-66l, seems to have left state affairs in the hands of his son
Munmu and, as
will be suggested later, he was playing a double game at the time.
Liu Jen-kuei,
given the task of relieving the garrison, is said to have remarked
that he wanted to pacify once and for all {sao-p'ing) the Eastern "barbarians"—
a remark hardly calculated to defuse the situation. TCTC 200, p. 632^.
57. TCTC 200, pp. 6325-27. Su, in fact, was already at the walls of Pyong
yang by the seventh month of 66I. On Ch'i-pi, see CTS 109:3^00:2 and HTS 110:
3932:2.
58. On the Uighur rebellion, which in three months had also gained the sup
port of 100,000 Mulguls, see TCTC 200, pp. 6326-29.
Five generals were sent
against them and, though the heroism of Hs’ueh Jen-kuei resolved the incident
with relatively little bloodshed, 13,000 Chinese were lost in a fruitless pursuity of the Uighurs.
In early 663 two new protectorates were set up in the
area.
On Kao-tsung's illness, see TCTC 200, p. 6329, and on the cancellation
of the sacrifice, TCTC 201, p. 6332.
59- TCTC 201, pp. 6336 ff. The full text of these instructions is found in
CTW 14:3a.
60. SS 6, p. 67. Munmu had been Si 1 Ian ambassador to China in 65O.
61. SS 28, p. 279* Jen-kuei was able to do this when the restoration lead
ers killed each other, leaving Prince P'ung in command. See also Jen-kuei's
biography in CTS 84:3346:1 and HTS 108:3928:3, and for the troops, all levied
in Ho-pei, TCTC 200, p. 6330.
62. TCTC 201, p. 6337, dates the decree found in CTW 12:10a in the eighth
month of 663.
63. TCTC 201, pp.
i SS 28,
p. 278 and 6, p. 67. The Si 1 Ian source
claims that the state had twenty-eight generals in the field and that they were
responsible for taking the capital. The only Chinese source to acknowledge Sillan aid is CTS 199 shang:3(>^(>-3Ikeuchi, Man-Sen shi^ v. 2, pp.
offers
the fullest account of the campaign.
The remnants of the Japanese are said to have surrendered, and SS 42, p.
436 preserves a severe reprimand delivered to them by King Munmu.
64. TCTC 201, pp. 6340-42, and a fuller version in CTS 84:3346:3.
65. TCTC 201, p. 6342 and CTS 84:3346:4. Liu had powerful enemies at court
of whom Li Ching-hsuan was the most notable. See note 107 below.
66. See SS 6, p. 68, and CTS 199 s/iang':3616:3 for the text. The pact, which
is discussed later in the text, was sealed with the slaughter of a white horse,
a ritual seemingly sufficient to guarantee its sacredness.
In it Si 11a is
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praised as a model of "barbarian" submission, and the claim is made that Si 11a
requested the treaty. Munmu was later to claim that it was imposed on him.
67. Munmu's position was that of ta-tu-tu, a post he considered superior to
that of Jen-kuei. Hino, "Sho kokuri koku," Shien 61 (1957), p. 32, suggests
that it was the practice to have a Chinese tu-tu supervise native rulers even
if their ranks were superior. Munmu was also disgruntled because Ijija's son
had been given the same rank as he. SS 28, p. 279.
68. Liu returned, ostensibly to participate in the feng-shan sacrifices and
seems never to have returned to the peninsula.
In 668 he was appointed general
against KoguryS but almost immediately removed for "loitering" in the prosecu
tion of the attack. TCTC 201, p. 6355.
69. TCTC 201, p. 63^7.
In the fifth month of 666 YMn'gae Somun's heir re
quested aid against a challenge from his younger brothers. The final campaign
is described by Ikeuchi, v. 2, pp, 276-AI8.
70. TCTC 201, p. 6351.
71. SS 6, pp. 70-71, TCTC 201, pp. 6352 ff., and TFYK 986:9a ff. The biogra
phies of the various commanders also offer details.
TCTC 201, p. 635^ preserves a very interesting conversation between Kaotsung and Chia Yen-chung, a censor who had been attached to the army and was
able to explain why this campaign would succeed where the others had failed.
72. TCTC 201, p. 6356 estimates the population at 697,000 households and
Hino, pointing out that this is probably a low figure, puts the population at
about four million.
73. The siege lasted only two months and the city was betrayed by a monk so
that the capital was taken with little bloodshed. The burning seems, therefore,
to have been less a reprisal than an expression of Chinese ambition to pacify
the country permanently.
It should be seen in the context of the exiling of
150,000 Koreans.
74. CTS 199 shang:3(>](>:]. Nishijima, "Toa," pp. 263-4, suggests some of the
implications of the organization, and we might note especially the appointment
of King Pojang to the presidency of the Board of Works. Appended to his title
was the term yuan-wat t'ung-aheng which Hu San-hsing {TCTC 201, p. 6356) ex
plains as an auxiliary appointment with all the emoluments of the regular holder
of the post. This was essentially a sinecure, awarded only once before and for
a much lower post in 654.
It was to become increasingly frequent and, as one
of the empress' irregular forms of appointment, was to contribute to the serious
economic problems of the end of her reign.
75. CTS 199 shang^.^(>^(>:\.
76. The major accounts, CTS 199
3616:1 and RTS 220:4148:4 make no
mention of Si 1 Ian participation. The Si 1 Ian account suggests that their troops
engaged the KogurySns once, in the seventh month of 668, and reached Pytingyang
two months later. This was almost twenty months after the campaign was initi
ated and a few days before the city fell. Munmu on two occasions refused to
meet either Li Chi or Hsueh Jen-kuei, each time sending a subordinate to repre
sent him.
The attitude of the Chinese in these circumstances seems understandable,
and we might note here a remark in CTS 199 shang-.^(>\l
"In the fifth year of
hsien-oh’ing [66O] . . . [Paekche was extinguished]. From this time Silla grad
ually seized the territory of Kogury?^ and Paekche and greatly expanded her bor
ders, in the West even to the sea." Curiously, the other sources have no
parallel passage and, if it represents more than the historian's hindsight, it
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could explain, for instance, why Muntnu was demoted to tu-tu in 663 and why China
determined to incorporate the peninsula.
77* SS 5, pp. 77“81. There exist many lacunae in the early part of the ac
count and a number of errors in the text so that the background is not altogeth
er clear.
It seems, however, that in the sixth month of 671 Si 11a had badly
defeated a combined Chinese and Paekchean force, inflicting over 5,000 casual
ties. The next month it received a severe reprimand from Hs'ueh Jen-kuei which
gave Munmu two days to decide whether he would repent for his recent "crimes"
or face attack by two Chinese armies.
78. There is no Chinese record of any such promise.
79. An event unmentioned in Chinese sources but attested in SS 28, p. 278
and 5, p. 62, the annals both of Paekche and Si 11a. Neither mentions Munmu's
leadership.
80. Unmentioned in any text.
81. SS 5, p. 62 verifies the Sillan defeat which occurred in the fourth
month. During the first part of the year. Si 11a was also meeting an invasion
of Kogury6ns and Mulguls and was unable to repel them until mid-year. SS h2,
p. A34, the biography of Kim Yu-sin, gives details.
I find no other mention of
an epidemic, but if Munmu's statement is true, Silla was indeed hard-pressed at
the time.
82. The name Te-min, found in Kim Yu-sin's biography, seems to have been a
reference to Jen-kuei though it is not mentioned in his biography.
83. The text refers to Jen-yuan as tsung-kuan rather than tu-tu which was
his actual rank while heading the garrison.
84. No information is available on Sun.
85. I have not been able to pinpoint the exact location of Ungnyong.
If, as
seems likely, it was near Ungjin and Ungch'on, Silla did quite well in the set
tlement.
See map.
86. SS 6, p. 70, relates that at this time, the tenth month of 667, Li Chi
was two hundred 1% north of Pyongyang. The king sent him a message by fast
Khitan cavalry and was told to advance. He had scarcely done so when he heard
that Li Chi had retreated, so he also withdrew.
Chinese sources offer little enlightenment on the matter except to sug
gest that Li was busy reprovisioning the fleet which had lost its supplies be
fore effecting a junction with his troops. This, combined with the severe
winter, may have prevented him from moving. The next engagement recorded took
place in the second month of 668.
It is interesting to note that no sooner had
Munmu withdrawn than he received an imperial command, transmitted by Liu Jenyuan, that he "aid in the subjection of Koguryli." Receiving orders from two
sources must have caused confusion.
87.
I cannot identify the site mentioned.
88. SS 6, p. 71
records a Sillan victory in the seventh month and this is
probably the one to which Munmu refers.
Coming two months before the fall of
Py'lingyang, it is difficult to say what effect it had. The Sillan annals, inci
dentally, make no mention of their cavalry leading the assault on the city, and
I suspect exaggeration here.
89. The Chinese sources make no mention of reward to the Slllans, and the
Sillan annals detail only the rewards bestowed by their own state. SS 42, p.
433 records that in 66O Su Ting-fang offered Kim Yu-sin and some other generals
fiefdoms to be carved from the conquered territory. Kim Yu-sin refused on the
grounds that China had rescued his country from peril, but the refusal has a
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ring of insincerity and the text continues, "the T'ang troops had extinguished
Paekche . . . and secretly plotted to invade Si 11a. Our king knew of this and
asked his ministers and generals what should be done . . . [preparations were
made and] the spies of the Chinese learned we were ready . . • [and the attack
was aborted]." There is no confirmation in other sources, but as an explana
tion for the strained relations which followed, it seems plausible.
SS 1*3, p. ^38 records that in 668 gold and silk were bestowed by the
Chinese upon those who had assisted in the campaign and an imperial commendation
awarded to Kim Yu-sin.
In view of Munmu's claim and in view of the fact that
Kim Yu-sin is recorded to have been absent at Pyongyang,this report seems con
tradictory. The Chinese, furthermore, had never before rewarded the Si 11ans in
this fashion, and I am inclined to reject the report.
90. There is no record elsewhere that Paekche reinitiated hostilities, and
the Sillan annals mention no fighting until early 670.
91. The reference here is to the episode of An Sung, discussed on p. 121 in
the text. See SS 6, p. 73* Munmu's version seems reliable since the Si 1 Ians
had repulsed a large Koguryon invasion only two months earlier and so considered
Koguryli^ the greater threat.

92. I am not sure of Munmu's meaning here.
93. SS 7, PP. 77-82.
9^. SS 6, p. 67. The text says ta-tu-tu-fu.
95- TCTC 201, pp. 6356“57. An-tung consisted technically only of the nine
tu-tu-fu and forty-two chou into which Koguryo had been divided. Both Paekche
and Si 11a were presumably subordinate to the protector-general.
96. Ikeuchi, Man-Sen shi, v. 1, pp. 84-87 provides in tabular form a summa
tion of

relations among

the

peninsular

states,

and

the annals of Paekche and

Si 11a, while often contradictory, at least present a chronicle of aggression and
reprisal from which Silla emerges no better than its neighbors.
97. Kim Yu-sin's biography makes no mention of his illness, but SS 6, p. 71
remarks that when Munmu was summoned to Join Li Chi in the sixth month he "re
mained in the capital because of Yu-sin's illness." Munmu arrived in the ninth
ironth and without Kim Yu-sin. The latter's biography says simply, "Our great
king Munmu and the Duke of Ying-kuo [Li Chi] defeated Py'tSngyang." SS 43, p. 438.
98. For instance, Hatada, History of Korea, p. 24 sees the beginning of Sillan
ambition only with the fall of Kogury^i. Han Woo-keun, History of Korea, pp. 75”
89 offers an interpretation of events very similar to my own though far less
detailed.
99- TCTC 201, p. 6359* Every other source gives the figure 28,000. See, for
instance, TFYK 486:12a.
100. See note 51. The deportation of so many Koreans is an indication of the
ferocious anti-T'ang feeling which must have been present among the Koreans.
Their exile in underpopulated sectors of Northwest China was probably designed
to separate them as completely as possible from their homeland since as a group,
they were not really farmers and since depopulation was equally serious in the
Northeast. Hino, "Sh5 Kokuri koku," Shien 6l (1957), P* 25 points out that the
settlers were taken from every part of the defeated state, and their removal thus
caused widespread disturbance.
This measure was perhaps the single most important factor in Silla's later
unification of the peninsula. The exiled clans were precisely those who had con
stituted the greatest opposition to it in previous years, and their removal left
Kogury'b substantially weakened and her people so angered they either turned on
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China or fled to Si 11a.
101. SS 6, pp. 73“7^ and TCTC 201, pp. 6363"6^ where the rebel is incorrectly
called An Shun. The uprising was not, in fact, initiated by An Sung who appears
as rather an unsuitable leader, killing his colleague and fleeing to Silla at the
appearance of the Chinese troops. Munmu provided the rebels with supplies early
in the rising and in the eighth month of 670 bestowed upon An Selling a patent mak
ing him king of Koguryo. The patent, itself a usurpation of imperial prerogative,
contained some inflammatory phrases, among them the statement that Koguryo must
not be extinguished, its royal line cut off, and its people left leaderless.
After their flight. An Sung and his followers were given Si 1 Ian bone rank and
settled in territory seized from Paekche.
102. SS 7, p. 76.
103. Weems, Eulbert's History of Korea, v. 1, pp. 114 ff. contains an account
of Si 1 la's aggrandizement in the period. On Munmu's apology, see SS 7, p. 84.
104. SS 7, pp. 82-83.
105. SS 7, pp. 84-85.
In 675 Silla claimed eighteen successive victories
"large and small" and in an amphibious engagement of 676 claimed to have killed
more than 4,000 of Hsueh's troops.
In the second month of 676 Hsueh was forced
to move the seat of the protectorate back to the old city of Liao-tunq {.THY 73,
p. 1318 and TCTC 202, p. 6378). The k'ao-i notice, in TCTC 202, p. 6378, re
produces a shih-tu notice saying the move was made in 670, but Ssu-ma Kuang re
jects this, following the Hui-yao.
106. TCTC 202, p.
A second feng-shan sacrifice in the same reign would
have been an unprecedented event.
107. See TCTC 202, p. 6385 and the biography of Li Ching-hsiian, Appendix B,
no. 59. The affair reflects badly on Liu Jen-kuei who knew that Li had long
been his enemy at court and, knowing also that he had no military ability, rec
ommended him to put down the Tibetans.
Li's protests were to no avail since
Liu's prestige was so great. The Western Turks were flirting with the Tibetans,
and a brief alliance did occur in mid-676. TCTC 202, pp. 6390-91.
108. CTS 199 shang:3(>\(>:\ , HTS 220:4149:1, TCTC 202, pp. 6382-83, TFYK 710:6a.
Hino, "Sh5 Kokuri koku," Shien 6l (1957), PP. 28 ff. gives a good secondary ac
count .
Sillan successes in the 670s and the demonstrated unreliability of the
Mulguls probably account for the king's return, though the immediate cause was
another rising in Kogury'Ji in 676 which showed that even the highly praised ad
ministration of Hsueh Jen-kuei could not pacify the area. The hope of the court
was that the return of the exiled Koreans would bolster Pojang's authority and
perhaps constitute a barrier to further Sillan expansion. The king's betrayal
aborted the project, and it seems that most of the Koreans remained in the Liao
tung area.
109. Anong the several sources cited in the preceding note are a number of
contradictions. TCTC is alone in using Wang instead of ohun-wang, and in the
matter of the tu-tu position, CTS 199 shang-.'i(>\i>:\, HTS 220:4149:1, and THY 95,
p. 1709 give Liao-tung, TFYK gives Liao-chou, and TCTC gives Liao-tung chou.
All term Paekche, Hsiung-chin. The use of Ch'ao-hsien and Tai-fang with its
overtones of the Han colonial venture strikes me as rather inept and perhaps
reflects the unwillingness of the court to admit the failure of so costly a con
quest.
110. The return of Pojang had been accompanied by the movement of the protec
torate forward from Liao-tung to Hsin-ch'eng. The latter was an admirable
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defensive position, and when the venture failed the Chinese remained there.
It
is interesting to note that in 676 when the protectorate had been moved back to
the Liao, the Chinese had relied principally on Korean officials {TCTC 202, p.
6379), and the same procedure was probably followed at this time. The Chinese
awareness of the need for self-government was slow in coming.
After Pojang's death, his position was inherited by his son under whom
most of the area between Hsin-ch'eng and the Taedong River became virtually in
dependent and is often termed Lesser Koguryo.
In 698 the empress ended the
fiction of Chinese rule there by creating a much smaller An-tung protectorate.
THY 73, p. 1318 points out that most of the Koreans joined the Turks or Mulguls
and the royal line died out.
111. 55 7, p. 86.
112. The relations are outlined in 55 8, pp. 89-IOO and 9, pp, 101-109, and
THY 95, pp. 1712-13- See also Ikeuchi, Man-Sen shi, v. 1, pp. 325-87.
113. See Pulleyblank. Background^ pp. 75-81, and Ku, Fu-ping^ pp. 261-70,
which emphasizes the strains placed on the system by the Korean wars and the Antung administration. He suggests that the important change there was the meld
ing of conscript and garrison forces.
I am in sympathy with this view but would date the development rather
earlier than Professor Ku, possibly from 663 when Kao-tsung lowered to fiftyeight the age when service was ended {TT 6, p. 33).
I have tried to point out
the initial inadequacy of the northeastern units for the prosecution of the
Korean wars and the gradually decreasing reliance of the court upon them. Chap
ter 9 will attempt to show their inability to cope with the Khitan and Turkish
invasions. The argument against this interpretation would point to new units
established by the Empress Wu in 69O, but my view is precisely that their lo
cation was largely a recognition that in Ho-pei the system was no longer viable.
Kikuchi, "Todai fuhei seido" shows that most of the new units were placed in
Ho-nan near the new capital, and the only two Ho-pei locations were Wei-chou
and Huai-chou. The first was on the Ho-nan border, and the second adjacent to
what was to be the northern capital.
It seems fair to assume that had the em
press deemed it practicable, she would have taken this opportunity to correct
the imbalance between the Northeast and the Northwest which had existed since
the inauguration of the system and, particularly with her capital at Loyang,
set up units to protect it from the North instead of restricting herself mostly
to Ho-nan. The following chapter will point out that the new military dispo
sitions she eventually made in Ho-pei were a pointed denial of the continuing
validity of the fu-ping system.
11^. TCTC 201, p. 6385. On Chang, see Appendix B, no. 57*
115. T'ang relations with the Tibetans are conveniently summarized in THY
97; CTS 196 shang; HTS 216 shang; and TFYK 970. The best secondary treatment
of the years under discussion is Ise, Chugoku, pp. 315 ff.
Their first recorded tribute mission to the T'ang arrived in 63^, and
by 638 they could send an army estimated at 200,000 to press upon T'ai-tsung
their demand for a marriage.
In 641 the Wen-ch'eng princess, who may have been
an inmate of the harem rather than a daughter of the emperor {HTS 83:3883 and
3884), was married to the Tibetan ruler. She seems to have hastened the process
of Sinification in the area and to have played an important role in fostering
the harmonious "in-law" relationship of the next decade.
The death of the ruler in 65O and the seizure of power by Lu Tung-tsan
brought about a change. Lu and his five sons succeeded not only in strengthening
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the internal power of their people, but also in bringing under their sway many
of the surrounding tribes. The most notable of these were the T'u-yii-hun whose
300-year history of independence ended when they became Tibetan vassals in 663.
See CTS 198:3612:3. Tribute to China, often in the form of Buddhist statues
and other golden artifacts, continued until 665, but after 667 when many Western
Turks joined them, the Tibetans took up a hostile stance and in the summer of
670, they burst into eighteen prefectures in the Western Regions and seized the
Four Garrisons {TCTC 201, p. 6363). Henceforth their raids became an annual
threat.
116. TCTC 202, pp. 6385“88. The force sent against the Tibetans, whose power
was not at its height, was perhaps the largest of the century.
In the spring of
677 an army under twelve commanders was levied from large western prefectures
like Feng and Hsing, some of which had no fu-ping units whatsoever. The force
must, therefore, have been composed largely of conscripts and volunteers, and
two of Kao-tsung's sons were given nominal command.
In the twelfth month a
statewide call for more troops went out {TCTC 202, p. 6384), and in addition to
calling up troops in Shan-nan and Chien-nan where there had never been many /up-ing units, commissioners were sent through Ho-nan and Ho-pei to "recruit brave
soldiers without inquiring into their background and official position." See
also CTW 14:5a.
It seems fairly clear from the constitution of this force that the avail
able pool of fu-pi-ng troops was largely exhausted and if Ku Chi-kuang is correct
in suggesting that exemption from expeditions was granted to all those slated
for garrison duty in a given year and that this left a pool of only 100,000 {Fuping, p. 174), this is understandable. The recruitment of the lower classes sug
gests a certain desperation on the part of the court, and it seems incredible
that an attack on Si 11a could be considered at the same time.
The Tibetan force must have been formidable since it could draw on the
resources of an empire which the CTS describes as contiguous to China in the
East, touching upon northern India in the South, encompassing the Four Garrisons,
and reaching in the North to the territory of the Turks. CTS I96 shang :3(>0h:2.
117. TCTC 202, p. 6396.
118. TCTC 202, p. 6386.
119. Gn Wei, see Appendix B, no. 121. The memorial is abstracted in TCTC 202,
p. 6387.
120. See Ku, Fu-ping^ pp. 165“97» and Fonationnairesj v. 2, pp. 763-69.
I
simplify greatly here because Ku's treatment is so thorough and because the
mechanics of the fu-ping are beyond the scope of this discussion.
It is neces
sary to note, however, the connection between the fu-ping and the lure of empire.
The fu-ping made T'ang imperialism possible, but only at the cost of the destruc
tion of the institution itself and ultimately of the centralization it had early
promoted so successfully.
121. Chapters 5 and 9*
122. Ku, Fu-ping3 pp. 192-97.
123. See earlier notes and Chapter 9*
124. TCTC 202, p. 6390. On the resurgence of the Western Turks under the
khan of the Shih-hsing tribe, see Chavannes, DoaumentSi pp. 74 ff.
125. The vagaries of the foundation and control of the Four Garrisons of Kucha
(Kuei-tzu) , Kashgar (Shu-lo), Tokmak (Sui-yeh) and Khotan (Yii-t'ien) are studied
in detail by Ise, Chugoku, pp. 190 ff. Chavannes, Documents, pp. 114-28, trans
lates the CTS notice on each.
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126. The Chinese sources refer to the clan as Lun. This is somewhat
puzzling since the sounds bear no resemblance to each other, and I am indebted
to Professor Henry G. Schwarz for the suggestion that the Tibetan surname nGar
is derived from mgar ba
JJ' "smith" or "wheelwright." The Chinese
version should therefore be'^i^
"wheel," but the sources write the character
with an incorrect radical.
127. P'el was vice-president of the Board of Civil Office at the time but,
as noted earlier, had had a good deal of experience on the western frontiers.
His discussion centered on the recent defeats by the Tibetans and recommended
that since the king of Persia has recently died and his son was a hostage at
Ch'ang-an, an embassy should be sent to install him on the throne and, while
crossing the territory of the Turks, take the opportunity to detach them from
their Tibetan alliance. P'ei was given charge of the affair, and his biography
recounts a brave saga of near-starvation on the desert before an ingenious strat
agem enabled him to take the khans prisoner and bring them back to the capital,
thereby defusing a dangerous situation.
The subsequent administration of the area is best outlined in the bi
ography of Wang Fang-i in CTS l85 shang:35^^and NTS 111:393^:1•
128. TCTC 202, pp. 6392-93, CTS 5:307^:3, and THY Sk, pp. I69O-9I. Ts'en,
T'u-ohueh, pp. 289-92 examines the full range of sources. The Turks and their
allies advanced to the area of modern Peking before retreating to the Northwest
as P'ei's armies advanced. The decisive battle took place at Hei-shan, north
of Feng-chou, where the combined Chinese forces are estimated by CTS at ^50,000.
129. This is not to say that there was no follow-up to the victory. The
great Korean general Hukch'i Sangch i made viable the defenses of the entire Hoyuan area {TCTC 202, p. 6395 and CTS 109:3^00:3), and by mid-682 Wang Fang-i
could report the final pacification of the Western Turks {TCTC 203, P* 6409).
The same year Hsueh Jen-kuei, recalled from his second disgrace over the Korean
debacle, administered another defeat to the restive Turks, taking over 200,000
captives. TCTC 203, p. 6412.
At Kao-tsung's death the Tibetans were recuperating from eight succes
sive defeats at the hands of Lou Shih-te (Appendix B, no. 104), and there were
troops in the field pursuing recent Turkish invaders. These returned two months
after his burial. The Tibetan campaign was not renewed until 687.

Chapter 9
1. The question of ritual abdication is discussed by Carl Leban in a paper
titled "The accession of Ssu-man Yen, A.D. 265: Legitimation by ritual replica
tion" (Asilomar, 1975)In the case of the Chou, it is important to note that
the annals of the empress in both T'ang histories state simply that she "raised
her title" to emperor, and Ssu-ma Kuang records that "the empress-dowager ac
cepted {k’o) the request of the emperor and the ministerial body . . . and ele
vated her title to sheng-shen huang-ti." TCTC 204, p. 6467. Jui-tsung does not
seem to have signed the petition which requested the foundation of the Chou, but
rather to have asked simply that his surname be changed from Li to Wu. TCTC,
loo oit.
In 705 the CTS^ HTS^ and TCTC use the term oh'nan-weij "transmit the
throne" for Chung-tsung's reassumption of the position of emperor.
2. CTS 6:3076:1, HTS 4:3641:3, and TCTC 204, p. 6467- Jui-tsung's heir
was at the same time made huang-sun.
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3. Notes 12^ and 139 below.

h. Some of these relationships are outlined in Ch'en, "Hun-yin chi-t'uan,"
and Fitzgerald, Empress Nu, p. 147. See also TCTC 204, pp. 6466-67 for T'aip'ing's marriage to the empress' nephew and the conferral of the Wu surname on
the Ch'ien-chin princess in 69O just prior to the usurpation.
5. TCTC 206, p. 6540.
6. NTS 4:3641:1 and TCTC 204, p. 6470.
7. Professor Hok-lam Chan has recently pointed out to me that the T'ang did
not formally adopt the earth power until 750. Since this is the case, we might
assume that the empress had no need to formally choose an element for her dynas
ty. On the other hand, the tradition of doing so had become well-established
in the period of division, and in the early T'ang there were extensive debates
on the matter in which Wang Po (648-75) proposed the scheme which was eventually
adopted. See Lu Ssu-mien, Ltang-Chtn, pp. 1469-72.
8. NTS 76:3869:2.
9. See, for instance, Kuo Mo-jo, Wu Tse-t'ien, pp. 135"37 and 154-55 which
outline the findings of an academic expedition to the old Li-chou area which
discovered epigraphical evidence of her popularity and also the existence of an
agricultural festival said to be held in commemoration of her birthday. See
also TCTC 208, p. 6587, for Ts'ui Chiao's secret memorial to Chung-tsung point
ing out that the hearts of the people still adhered to the empress.
10. For a recent and succinct discussion of the importance of role in legiti
mation, see J. D. Langlois Jr., "Ritual and law in the legitimation of the Ming
dynasty" (Asilomar, 1975)11. TCTC 204, pp. 6467-68. Arthur Wright, in his paper on the formal proce
dures by which Sui Wen-ti sought legitimation, emphasized the importance of the
foundation of ancestral temples. For examples of the substitution of "Wu" for
"T'ang" in place names, see THY 70, p. 1257 and 71» P- 1261.
12. Chapter 4, n. 92, and Chapter 6; see also Twitchett's remarks in Financial
Administration, pp. 84 ff. A northern capital was founded in 692, TCTC 205> p.
6487.
13. TCTC 204, p. 6473, TFYK 486:336, THY 84, p. 1553, and CTS 6:3076:1. This
occurred in the seventh month of 69I with the households from such chou as Yung,
T'ung, and Ch'in where the concentration of fu-ping units was high. There are
some source contradictions, with CTS and TCTC saying that those resettled were
drawn exclusively from Kuan-nei while the others say Kuan-wai. TCTC limits the
number transported to 100,000, and CTS goes on to say that Yung-chou was divided
immediately into four parts.
The basic motives, it seems, were to provide a larger base of support for
the new capital and the official class concentrated there, and to weaken the old
Ch'ang-an area.
14. TCTC 204, p. 6473. Wu Yu-i, in fact, became liu-shou prior to the move
ment of the households.
15. TCTC 205, pp. 6478-79. Li Chao-te (Appendix B, no. 99) was placed in charge
of the project.
16. TCTC 205, pp. 6496 and 6502-3Jao's excellent study, "Tsung-chiao hsinyang" convincingly connects the t'ien-shu with Manicheanism.
17. TCTC 205, p. 6496. Note also Ssu-ma Kuang's comments on p. 6498 suggest
ing that the treasuries were emptied to pay for the construction of th&Tningt 'ang comp lex.
18. TCTC 205, p. 6493, which describes these treasures, and also Chapter 4.
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19. THY 35, p. 637.
20. TCTC 20A, p. 6471. The petitions appeared in early 691, and the one sug
gesting the feng-shan sacrifice included 2,800 names.
21. TCTC 205, p. 6503. See also CTS 6:3076:2 and Jao, "Tsung-chiao hsinyang," pp. 402-405. On the forms and purposes of the suburban sacrifice, THY 9
shang^ pp. l4l ff.
22. TCTC 204, p. 6473. The sons of the former Crown Prince Hsien were given
the Wu surname and imprisoned with Jui-tsung's family.
23. TCTC 204, pp. 6473 and 6489.
24. TCTC 204, p. 6472 and CTS I86 sfezng';3564:4.
25. CTSj loo. oit. See also TCTC 205, p. 6485 for Ssu-ma Kuang's estimate
of the toll taken by the so-called evil officials.
26. TCTC 205, p. 6485.
27. On Hsu, see Chapter 5, n. 88. His early refusal of office is found in
TCTC 204, pp. 6469-70.
28. For examples of the activities of these, see TCTC 205, PP. 6485-86.
It
is of interest to note that in mid-692 Chu acknowledged in a memorial that "the
minds of the people are already made up" {ohung-h.s'in i-ting) , presumably in
favor of the Chou.
29. TCTC 205, p. 6486.
30. Details are found in TCTC 205, PP. 6479 ff. and Fitzgerald, Empress Wu,
pp. 138-40.
31. CTS 183:3553:2 and TCTC 204, pp. 6474-75. See also CTS 87:3352:4.
32. On Li, see Appendix B, no. 99. He is depicted as a courageous official
opposing, for instance, the attempt of Lai Chun-ch'en and his cohorts to marry
into the T'ai-yiian Wang and Chao-chun Li clans {CTS 87:3352:4), and once having
one of the most powerful of the "evil officials" flogged to death, ostensibly
for a violation of the sumptuary regulations {TCTC 205, p. 6491).
In the matter
of the succession, he rapidly showed his position by having Ch'eng-ssu's spokes
man beaten to death. TCTC 204, p. 6475.
33. TCTC 204, p. 6476.
34. TCTC 205, pp. 6483“4. Three others, Ts'ui Shen-chi (Appendix B, no. 97),
Yao Shou (no. lOO) and Li Yuan-su (no. 101), were all raised to tsai-hsiang sta
tus with Chao-te on this occasion and so might be identified as his adherents.
All were eventually disgraced or executed.
35. On the posts held by the Wu clan, see CTS 183:3553:1. After 695, with
the fall of Hsijeh Huai-i, the use of family and favorites in military posts was
very rare, the only exceptions being Wu l-tsung and Wu Yu-i. This is discussed
passim in the text. I do not suggest, however, that members of the Wu clan be
came a negligible factor in the political equation. The empress used them on
subsequent occasions to further her political aims so that, for instance, Ch'eng
ssu and San-ssu assisted her in the New Year's ceremony of 693 from which Juitsung was barred.
{TCTC 205, p. 6488 and ETS 76:3867:4). We may surmise that
her aim was to confuse the advocates of a T'ang restoration.
36. See note 32 above.
37. TCTC 205, p. 6496.
38. TCTC 206, p. 6519.
39. Note 35 above.
40. TCTC 205, p. 6488. Hsiian-tsung's mother, the Virtuous Concubine, was the
great-granddaughter of Tou K'ang (Appendix B, no. 6).
41. CTS 186 shang:3S(>h:3 and TCTC 205, PP. 6489 and 6490. Ssu-ma Kuang re

marks that "from that time none of the nobles or ministers were able to see him.
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42.
43.
44.
45.

TCTC 205, p. 6490.

See Chapter 5, n. 7 and 8.
Chapter 5, n. 79.
See Pulleyblank, Baokgroundj pp. 48 ff., and more particularly, Chou,
Han-T'angj, pp. 373 ff.
46. By my calculations, ten men held tsai-hstang rank in 645* The totals
vary according to source and, although my own are different, i am here follow
ing the figures given in TEY 1, pp. 3-4. Those for the reign of Kao-tsung,
divided to correspond with the expansion of Empress Wu's power, are as follows:

Period
650-659 (4th month)
659-664 (12th month)
664-684
Total

Appointments
14
4

Tenicre

4.5 years
2.2 years
25
5.5 years
3.1 years
43
47. See Appendix B, no. 104, and note TCTC 206, p. 6541), which comments on
his remarkable longevity in spite of the terror and the confused politics of the
time.
48. While I have made no exact count, I have found that virtually every kind
of irregular appointment occurred within the tsai-hsiang group in the Chou. The
terms used to designate this type of position are several: chien-ohiao "acting,"
"probationary," shou "temporary," and she "provisional." We find also a
large number of concurrent (ohien
appointments, supervisory duties {p'an)
and those appointed to one post but designated to fill the function {ohih
)
of another. This led not only to uncertainty of tenure among the tsai-hsiang
but severely restricted their freedom of action and created an atmosphere of
distrust in the highest ranks of officialdom.
49. My calculation. See Appendix B.
50. TCTC 205, p. 6501.
51. On these appointments see, for instance, TCTC 206, p. 6533 and 205, pp.
6496-95 and 6499-6500.
52. See Chapter 1, n. 42, and CTS 6:3077:1.
53. For instance, TCTC 205, p. 6484 and p. 6478, respectively.
54. See the biography of Chi Hsiu in Appendix B, no. 120 and TCTC 206, p.
6544.
55. On the question of the succession as a "household matter," see TCTC 206,
p. 6526. Criticism of the Changs brought death in 701 to the son and daughter
of Chung-tsung and the son of Wu Ch'eng-ssu. TCTC 207, pp. 6556-57 and CTS 86:
3350:4. Other examples of both are cited in the text.
56. Chou, Ean-T'ang^ pp. 506 ff.
57. TCTC 202, p. 6376. Judging by the dates of the literary works for which
they were responsible, and by a notice in TFYK 550:2b, the group seems to have
existed prior to 674, perhaps as early as 667. Most of those whose names are
preserved, Liu Wei-chih (Appendix B, no. 72), Fan Li-ping (no. 85), Yuan Wanch'ing {CTS I90 ahung:35S\:k), Miao Shen-k'o (CT5^ loo. ait.) and Hu Ch'u-pin
{CTS 190 ahung:3582:]) received their first capital appointment at about this
time. TCTC 204, p. 6447, a notice of 688, is the last mention of the group.
58. TCTC 203, p. 6417.
59. TCTC 204, p. 6466. On Wan-erh, see CTS 51:3279:4.
60. TCTC 206, p. 6526.
61. TCTC 205, pp. 6477-78. See also TEY 67, pp. II8O-8I, which says that 132
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appointments were made at this time. The highest posts, acting grand secretar
ies of the Secretariat, were of the fifth rank, first grade, and the lowest were
clerks of the ninth rank, third grade.
62. See TCTC 205, pp. 6500-01 and THI kO, pp. 728-29.
63. See Chapter 7. The bureaucratic expansion in the early Chou seems to
have equaled that in the period just prior to the usurpation. Although we are
offered no estimates so specific as Wei Yuan-t'ung's statement of 685 that over
1,000 ohu-se entered the "current" each year {THY Ik, p. 1336), we are told,
for instance in 692, that vast numbers had their selection rescinded. THY Ik,
p. 1345 snd T ’ at-p' trig kuang-oht l85:5a.
It is possible that some of the excess
was absorbed in the expansion of military administration: eighty-six new fuping units were created in 690 {WYYH 46^:1b), and later new positions were set
up in existing units {Yu-hat 138:4a). As we shall see, the empress had to re
spond to pressures for bureaucratic reduction toward the end of the Chou.^
64. Taking once again our tsai-hsiang sample from the Chou, and excluding
those who rose as family or favorites of the empress, we find that of fifty-nine
chief ministers, at least thirty-three came from clans which were either aristo
cratic in background or had a tradition of office holding. Of these, however,
only fourteen were from clans specifically regarded as preeminent. This means
that less than a quarter of the Chou tsai-hsiang came from_the great clans.
65. Pulleyblank, Background, pp. 47-60, and Tonami, "Chusei," pp. 9 ff.
66. TCTC 205, p. 6478.
67. See, for instance, the case of Tsung Ch'u-k'o {CTS 92:3365=4 and HTS 109=
3930:4) who had not only a marriage connection with the empress, but whose broth
er had been one of her firmest supporters in the usurpation and is said to have
invented her new characters. The Tsungs' first demotion occurred in the tenth^
month of 690. TCTC ZOk, p. 6468. A relative of Lai Chiin-ch'en lost his position
in the Yu-1 in Guard in late 692. TCTC 205, p. 6487.
68. THY 85, p. 1555 and TFYK 486:12a.
69. On the decree examinations, see Lin, Sui-T'ang shih, pp. 210-211, and on
the Board increases, THY 58, p. IOO6, and 59, p. IO3O.
70. TCTC 205, p. 6485, from a memorial of 692.
71. TCTC 205, p. 6489, THY 63, P- H04, and Yu-hai 48:32a.
72. See, for instance, the list of tributary missions in TFYK 970:17a ff.,
and the investiture of the Sillan king in TFYK 964:10a.
73. My own calculation. When the Shih-hsing sought refuge in China in 690,
it was after five years of constant attack by the Eastern Turks. Their leader,
the Hu-se-lo Khan, was made a general [TCTC 20k, p. 6469). THY 98, p. 1756
remarks on the settlement of the Ch'iang, and TCTC 205, P* 6494, that of the
74. On Wang, see CTS 93=3366:2 and HTS 111:3935=3, and on T'ang, CTS 93=3366:
3 and HTS 111:3935:4. Wang had been captured by the Tibetans Hsiieh Jen-kuei s
defeat at Ta-fei-ch'uan in 67O and, after living among them for a decade, re
turned to become China's greatest expert on the Western Regions. T'ang came
from a family whose military tradition went back to the Northern Chou, but which
had chosen the wrong side at the time of the T'ang foundation so that to estab
lish himself, Shou-ching had taken the ming-ohing degree. His early experience
was against the Turks.
^
75. CTS 93:3366:2. The campaign is outlined in the biographies above and dis
cussed in some detail in Ise, Chugoku:, pp. 197 ff- See also Fitzgerald, Empress

Wti^76
pp*
. TCTC 205, p. 6493.

On Mo-ch'o, see CTS 184:3598:1, HTS 140:4132:1, and
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THY Sk, pp. 1691 ff.
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Ts'en, T’u-ohueh, pp. 324 ff. outlines Mo-ch'o's raids
from 689, even before he became khan.
In Western languages, see Giraud, Turos
celestes, pp. 49 ff., and Grousset, L’empire, pp. 155 ff. Mo-ch'o was the broth
er or half-brother of the Khan Ku-ch'u-1u, usurped the leadership on his death
in late 693, and immediately invaded Ling-chou.
77. TCTC 205, p. 6503. The request to submit may have been in response to
the fact that Wang Hsiao-chieh had just been sent against him with a large force.
78. Note 63 above and TFYK 532:14a.
It is interesting to note also a decree
of 694 {thy 78, p. 1438) whereby each of the major provincial officials, gov
ernors, prefects and garrison commanders were required to leave one son in the
capital guard.
It seems unlikely that any new posts were created for this but
rather that a hostage system was being established.
79. TCTC 205, pp. 6495-96.
80. TCTC 205, p. 6496.
It is of interest to note that no protest is recorded.
81. On Li Chiao, see Appendix B, no. 123, and on his memorial. Chapter 5, n.
37 and THY 85, pp. 1560-61. The memorial, along with others relating to the
problem, is translated by Balazs in "Beitrage."
82. CTS 94:3368:2.
83. See Tonami, "To no ritsuryS," and Pulleyblank, Background^ pp. 27 ff. On
the Tunhuang evidence, see T'ang Ch'ang-ju, "Fo-t'ao-hu."
84. Most notably, the construction of the nine tripods {TCTC 205, p. 6499) on
whose Confucian associations, see Tz'u-yuan, p. 58a.
85. TCTC 205, p. 6500 and THY 11, pp. 278-79.
86. On
the reconstruction, see THY 11, pp. 279“80, TFYK 564:7a, and TCTC 205,
p. 6505.
The new building was called the T'ung-f'len fang and was smaller in
all dimensions than the original. On the death of Huai-i, see TCTC 205, p. 6502,
CTS 183:3554:4, and note the contradictions pointed out in the k'ao-i. notice.
The nun who ran a house of ill repute was enslaved with all her followers. TCTC
205, pp. 6499-6500.
87. The hu-ming principle was abolished in the tenth month of 695. THY 75,
p. 1358.
The full decree is found in CTW 96:6a but offers little enlightenment
on the reason for ending the practice. The empress acknowledges that she initi
ated the principle of anonymity so that her officials could be chosen from as
many sources as possible, but then goes on to characterize the practice as con
trary to principle and calls for its end in the name of efficiency and good
government. The reason I suggest for the change is conjectural.
88. TCTC 205, p. 6503.
89. The best account of this campaign is found in the biography of Lou {CTS
93:3366:2, HTS 108:3929:4).
See also TFYK 443:5a and TCTC 205, PP. 6504-5. The
empress was extremely angry, demoting Wang to commoner's status and Lou to a low
provincial post.
90. On the history of Sino-Tibetan relations, see Chapter 8, n. 115.
91. See CTS 199 ?zsia:36l8:3 and TCTC I98, 6252-3. The details of early Khitan
history are extremely sketchy, and since the Si 1 Ian annals in the SS make fairly
frequent reference to them, the lost annals of Kogury'6 would probably have been
our best source. TCTC 205, p. 6505, k^ao-t, gives a brief administrative history
of Ying-chou.
92. TCTC 205, p. 6505. The rebel leaders descended from tribal chieftains,
and one had won the imperial surname for dynastic service. They were related
by marriage and held the positions of governor {tu-tu) and prefect at the time
of the rising.
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93. TCTC 205, pp. 6506-7, CTS 199
3618:4, and HTS 219:4145:4.
94. TCTC 205, p. 6507.
95* The only full description of the empress' actions are contained in a mem
orial from Ch'en Tzu-ang, abstracted in TCTC, too. oit., and found in full in
Ch’en Tzu-ang chi, pp. 178-82.
Ch'en's basic purpose in the memorial was to protest the levy, regarding
it as unnecessary, dangerous, and an affront to the national dignity. He took
the opportunity, however, to raise a number of other matters, both general and
specific. Pointing out that the Khitan ambush was unfortunate and had created a
very serious problem, he begged the empress to remain calm and to keep in mind
that the Tibetans and Mo-ch‘o‘s Turks posed a more serious threat than the Khitans.
To send troops from the northern and western frontiers to meet the lat
ter was folly. Ch'en was critical of the standard of ministerial advice which
the empress received, particularly that which permitted the "barbarization" of
the armies, and he urged her to seek out the many competent men who had been
neglected in appointment to high office. He spoke of self-seeking and timid
ministers and conflicts between civil and military officers which the empress
should no longer tolerate.
Turning to the situation at hand, he asked that the troops levied from
Shan-nan and Huai-nan be given a more reasonable length of time to reach the
frontier and not be threatened with the death penalty for tardiness. The diver
sion of grain to the front, he believed, would not only cause enormous hardship
and resentment among the carriers for whom no special reward seems to have been
arranged, but would cause a great price rise in the Northeast and general con
fusion. The actual situation at the front, he pointed out, was not even known!
Finally, and perhaps with some regional jealousy, Ch'en pointed out that
because the Northeast supplied the armies, its people were not conscripted. He
had recently heard that in their arrogance and rudeness, they had claimed that
the government could not compel them to serve, and this was being discussed
everywhere. Furthermore, the area had recently found itself plagued by a grow
ing number of bands composed of the lawless and unemployed. Central officials
should be sent out immediately to conscript them into the forces, thus augment
ing the national strength and ensuring that their relatives remain loyal to the
state. He ended with a plea that the court be more generous with incentives and
rewards for military service lest the task of recruitment become impossible. The
common people of the Northeast were exhausted.
From this memorial, submitted less than a month after the defeat, it would
seem that the neglect of the military had reached serious proportions. Ho-pei
had suffered only two minor invasions since 679, the Turkish raids of 683 and
687 (TCTC 203, p. 6413, and 204, p. 6443), and when Ch'en mentioned the "magnates
and roving warriors who have become bandits, the Jobless drifters, the wealthy
families and strong clans," he was commenting also on the military potential of
the area which we noted earlier. This seems to confirm my finding that the fuping declined earliest there, and it might be reasonable to suggest that the
dissident elements were deserters or men who might otherwise have found niches
within the system.
Two additional facts support this view.
In 696 the empress set up in the
frontier areas of the Northeast special units called wu-oh'i t ’ uan-ping, and the
next year these were extended throughout Ho-nan and Ho-pei to defend against Moch'o.
In these units 150 households provided fifteen soldiers and one horse among
them. THY 78, p. 1438 and TCTC 205, p. 6507. See also Hamaguchi, "Fuhei," pp.
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1A66 ff. These units were almost certainly the prototypes of the later t'uanchleh, and their creation seems to reflect a concession to regional feeling and
an alternative to fu-ping service. Moreover, in Chang Yueh's report on Wu Itsung's Ho-pei campaign of 697 {WIYE 647:8a) we find the names of those "men
tioned in dispatch." Twenty-two men are mentioned, and the origin of their units
may be tabulated as follows:
Ho-pei
Ho-tung
Kuan-nei
Lung-yu

7
5
4
3

Chiang-nan
Chien-nan
Ho-nan

7
1
]

The table suggests that the fu-ping in Ho-pei was weak, especially in
view of the fact that of the northeastern units mentioned, only one was among
the 86 established in 690 when the empress augmented the forces there.
It is
difficult to escape the conclusion that these new units were not viable from the
start.
We need not, however, read too much into these facts for they seem to say
little about the oft-mentioned "separatism" of the area. They suggest more, I
think, that because the Northeast had borne the brunt of the T'ang's early im
perialism, the inappropriateness of the fu-ping was revealed there first. The
response of the area to alternative service and its refusal to respond to Khitan
and Turkish calls to dethrone the empress support this view.
96. TCTC 205, pp. 6507-9.
97. On Ch'en's background, see Chapter 5, and on Kuo, CTS 31:1113:2 and NTS
122:3957:1. The latter, a dhin-shih graduate of undistinguished lineage, had
just returned from personal negotiations with Lun Ch'in-ling and seems to have
been familiar with the situation among the Tibetans since it was he who conceived
the plan adopted by the empress.
98. TCTC 205, pp. 6508-9. The k'ao-i reproduces a notice from the Yu-shiht’ai ohi outlining subsequent events.
99. TCTC 205, pp. 6509-10.
100. TCTC, loo. oit.
101. The Khitan call for Chung-tsung's restoration seems to have been made in
early 697, and judging from the k*ao-i notices in TCTC 206, pp. 6526-28, the
source of the report is the Ch'ao-yeh oh'ien-tsai.
Corroboration is lacking, but
in view of the harmony of Khitan relations with T'ai-tsung and Kao-tsung, it seems
perfectly reasonable.
There seems to have been a certain amount of collaboration with the enemy
in the area, since we are told that Wu l-tsung executed several guilty persons
{.TCTC 206, p. 6522) before Ti Jen-chieh's pleas for clemency were heeded. Ti's
statement {CTS 89:3356:4) ment ions both those who were coerced and those who
joined the Khitans wi11ingly, but points out that the area suffered from eco
nomic depression and the unreasonable demands of harsh officials, so that under
the circumstances it had been highly loyal. See also TCTC 206, pp. 6535-36.
His remarks were made in late 698 after Mo-ch'o had withdrawn and refer both to
Turkish and Khitan invasions.
102. On this affair, see TCTC 206, pp. 6512-13, Fitzgerald, Empress Wu, pp.
152-3, and Chapter 6, n. 70(g).
103. Lai had gone so far as to accuse Chi Hsu, the man who had brought the con
spiracy to his notice, of being implicated in it. After Chi had cleared himself
he, of course, hated Lai, and the empress used their hatred once again to balance
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her appointments. On Chi Hsu, see Appendix B, no. 120.
104. TCTC 106, p. 6517. These two figures, about whom we would like to know
a good deal more, have biographies in CTS 78:3337:1 and HTS 104:3921:4; and for
their ancestry, see Appendix B, no. 34. Fitzgerald, Empress Wu^ pp. 163 ff*>
outlines their careers in some detail.
105. See, for instance, Fitzgerald, Empress Wu^ p. I63 for his suggestion
that the terminology of HTS and TCTC is such as to indicate that both became the
empress' lovers.
For contemporary evidence, see note 159 to this chapter.
106. TCTC 205, p. 6487. A notice of the ninth month of 692 when the empress
grew some new teeth and changed the era name to oh’ang-shouj "long life."
107. TCTC 206, p. 6546 and CTS 78:3337:2.
It was for this reason probably
that the literary institute, founded in 699 {TCTC 206, p. 6538) to provide a
sinecure for the Changs, was called Office of the Crane (K'ung-hao fu). Wang
Tzu-ch'in (6th century B.C.), also known as Wang Ch'iao, ascended to the im
mortals on the back of a white crane and so became a symbol of longevity. See
also the remark of Yang Tsai-ssu in TCTC 207, p. 6572, suggesting that Chang
Ch'ang-tsung had made an elixir of immortality {shen-tan) for the empress.
108. See preceding note; also TCTC 206, p. 6517 for the account of a man who
won lavish rewards from the empress for claiming that he dreamt she would live
forever. Jao, "Tsung-chiao hsin-yang," pp. 402-5 discusses the question in some
detai1.
109. TCTC 206, p. 6514 and CTS 78:3337:2.
no. TCTC, loo. oit. See also the biography of Yao Shou (Appendix B, no. lOO)
who dissuaded the empress from the project. The verses said to be written by
the empress for the erection of the tripods are found in CTShih 5:1a. These
tripods, incidentally, are said to have been cast from 8OO tons of bronze.
111. TCTC, loo. oit.
112. CTS 185 s?zan^:3560:l and TCTC 206, pp. 6515-16.
In the early 670s, many
of the Western Turks and the Tu-yii-hun had submitted to China {TCTC 201, p. 6363,
and 202, pp. 6371-72) and had been settled in the six prefectures of Feng, Sheng,
Ling, Hsia, Shuo, and Tai. To send these back to Mo-ch'o would weaken the entire
North. Ts'en, T'u-ohueh, pp. 333-39 offers a good examination of the events of
this year.
113. On Li Chiao, see Appendix B, no. 123 and on T‘ien Kuei-tao, CTS I85 shang:
3560:1 and HTS 197:4088:3. Their position was that the Turks were covetous and
lacking in good faith and that granting their demands was an invitation to inva
sion. Their opponents were Yang Tsai-ssu (no. Ill) and Yao Shou (no. lOO).
114. TCTC 206, p. 6416 and THY 94, p. I69I. The latter remarks "from this
Mo-ch'o grew even stronger."
115. On l-tsung, see CTS 183:3554:1 and HTS 206:4110:1.
116. TCTC 206, pp. 6520-22.
117. On Lai's activities at this time and his fall, see CTS I86 s^zan^';3564:3
and TCTC 206, pp. 6518-I9.
118. See CTW 95:8b for the edict of punishment, and TCTC 206, p. 6520.
119. TCTC 206, p. 6523.
120. On Ti, see Appendix B, no. 93, and TCTC 207, PP* 6550-1. T1 was the
most famous and perhaps the greatest of the empress' ministers and is the subject
of a large secondary literature. A man of uncompromising integrity and infinite
subtlety, he won the empress' complete trust and, "although he was fond of argu
ing with her [in court], she accepted it and followed his advice." She is said
to have called him the "old man of the state" {kuo-tao) and in one incident.
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recounted in TCTCj loo. ott., is said to have valued his safety more than that
of the crown prince. She was disconsolate on his death in 700.
It must be acknowledged, however, that Ti's power was never total, partly
because Wu San-ssu usually occupied a parallel position in the hierarchy and
partly because the empress seems to have insisted on the invulnerability of the
Changs.
Probably because of their relative harmlessness, Ti never sought a con
frontation with them. His biography suggests a different reason for this, point
ing out that he recommended "several tens" of T'ang loyalists for high posts, so
that these were in a position to carry on his work when he died. Most notable
among them were three leaders of the restoration coup, Chang Chien-chih, Huan
Yen-fan and Ching Hui. See also TCTC 207, pp. 6551-52. THY 75, p. 1357, says
he recommended all five leaders of the coup.
121. TCTC 206, p. 6526.
122. TCTCy loo ott.
"From this [remonstrance] the empress-dowager had no in
tention of establishing Ch'eng-ssu or San-ssu."
123. TCTC 206, pp. 6526-27.
]2h. TCTC 206, p. 6537, and see the lengthy examination of the event in the
k'ao-i. notice.
125. TCTC 206, p. 6532.
126. TCTC 206, p. 6525. As pointed out earlier, it was Li Chiao who first
requested the reduction of yuan-wai officialdom in the next reign.
127. See Chapter 7. See also TFYK 629:20b-21a for a decree of 696 which rec
ognized that advancement "within the current" had been much too rapid.
128. The full text is in CTW l69:2b, and the memorial is abstracted in THY
73, pp. 1326-27 and TCTC 206, pp. 6524-25.
129. For Ti's reference here, see TCTC 195, p. 6l48.
130. I cannot identify this figure.
131. TCTC 206, p. 6525.
132. Ch'en Tzu-ang ohi^ pp. 173~78.
In general Ch'en approved of the demobil
ization but warned the empress that the self-seeking officials in the prefectures
of Sung and Mao, deprived of the profit they reaped from the supply of the mil
itary, might falsely stir up trouble with the Ch'iang in order to restore their
fortunes. He spoke also of 30,000 vagrant households who had fled to the West
from the Szechwan region, attributing their migration to the harshness of of
ficials there and requested administrative reform there. Finally, since he saw
the necessity for keeping the T'ung-kuei Army stationed in Sung-chou active, he
recommended a much less costly and onerous means of keeping them supplied.
Perhaps because he was a westerner, Ch'en was more conscious than most
of the Tibetan threat. The fact that even he advocated a relatively passive
stance toward the foreign neighbors suggests that the attitude was becoming wide
spread in officialdom.
133. See the preceding note and TCTC 206, p. 6530. Lou Shih-te was appointed
commissioner to assess the garrisons in the area.
134. TCTC 206, pp. 6530-31 and CTS 183:3553:4. Yen-hsiu, the second son of
Ch'eng-ssu, reached his destination in the eighth month of 698. He did not re
turn until 704, and in 708 married Princess An-lo.
135. See Appendix B, no. 133 and TCTC 206, p. 6530.
136. TCTC 206, pp. 6530-32, CTS 194 shang:3S3^-.2, TFYK 964:10b and 998:8b.
137. TCTC 206, p. 6533; see also Ts'en, T'u-ohueh, pp. 339~50 which offers a
full examination of the events of this year, introducing two inscriptions which
contradict the standard account. We have no details on the constitution of the
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force, but since the three commanders were designated as tsimg-kuan of the east
ern, western, and central provinces, it seems likely that the troops were raised
throughout the empire.
138. TCTC 206, p. 653^.
It is difficult to know whether or not this is true.
The dynastic histories reproduce the story only in Ti's biography and there as
his claim rather than as fact.
It is found also in Ta-T'ang hsin-yu 1:11a.
I
am prepared to believe that Chung-tsung's appointment increased the levies, but
the story still seems too contrived to be fully credible.
139- TCTC, loo. oit.
It is important to note that the new volunteers came
from Ho-pei since it is a strong indication that the area was not "separatist"
or disloyal to the T'ang. The other possibility, of course, is that Ho-pei had
been alienated by Wu l-tsung's cruel swoop through the province in 697 to punish
those suspected of collaboration with the Khitans. He acted so harshly then
that the inhabitants composed a bitter proverb about him. TCTC 206, p. 6522.
Undoubtedly the empress' popularity suffered.
1^0. TCTC, loo. oi,t.
It is interesting to note that while Ti Jen-chieh led
the new army against Mo-ch'o, the empress placed command of the remaining troops
{t’un-ping) at the capital in the hands of Wu l-tsung and Wu Yu-kuei, the first
sign that she was concerned about her security. TCTC 206, p. 6535.
141. CTS 194 shang:353^•2. Ssu-ma Kuang uses the conventional term "over
10,000" but adds that casualties in the region from Mo-ch'o's five invasions
were countless.
142. TCTC 206, p. 6535.
See also Grousset, L'empire, pp. 150 ff.
143. TCTC, loo. oit.
144. TCTC 206, pp. 6539-40 and CTS 196 shang:3(>0h:2.
145. CTS 93:3366:3 and TCTC 207, p. 6549.
146. On Kuo, see CTS 97:3373:2, NTS 122:3957:1, and TCTC 207, PP. 6557“58.
147. CTS 196 shang:3(>0k:2 and TCTC 207, p. 6562.
148. See TCTC 207, p. 6558 and 206, p. 6539; also note 95 above.
149. TCTC 207, p. 6562.
150. TCTC 207, p. 6568. CTS 194 shang:3S3^‘2 says that the empress brought
two of her grandsons, Ch'ung-chun and Ch'ung-ming, into the audience hall to show
them as prospective bridegrooms to the Turkish envoy. Ch'ung-chlin was shortly
to be active at court, and no other source mentions that Chung-tsung had a son
called Ch'ung-ming. Perhaps Mo-ch'o's new son-in-law was not a prince at all.
151. See TCTC 207, PP- 6562-63. This incident, in fact, involved only the
Western Turks but, according to CTS 194 hsia:3(>00:3, the An-pei protectorate was
set up at this time at T'ing-chou.
152. CTS 194 shang:35SQ'2 and Grousset, L'empire, pp. 157"58.
153. TCTC 206, p. 6539.
154. TCTC 206, p. 6546. The elixir was a costly one and had taken three years
to synthesize.
155. TCTC, loo. oit. and CTS 6:3076:4.
In celebration of the event she
changed the era name to ohiu-shih, "everlasting youth," from the phrase oh’angsheng ohiu-shih in the Tao-te ohing.
156. TCTC 207, p. 6551.
157. TCTC 206, p. 6538 and CTS 78:3337:2. Among the best-known scholars ap
pointed to the institute were Li Chiung-hsiu (Appendix B, no. 128), Chi Hsu (no.
120), T'ien Kuei-tao and Yuan Pan-ch'ien. The latter, disgusted at the unprec
edented nature of the office and the quality of its incumbents, immediately re
signed and was demoted for his presumption. See CTS I90 ohung;3582:2.
158. THY 36, p. 657 and TCTC 206, p. 6546. This was the San-ohiao ohu-ying
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and probably marks the first time Buddhism was officially classified as a teach
ing equal to Confucianism and Taoism.
159. CTS 78:3337:2. Fitzgerald, Empress Wu, p. 167 seems to put a different
interpretation on the matter. The memorial is abstracted in TCTC 206, p. 65^6.
160. TCTC 206, p. 65A7.
161. TCTC 206, p. 65^6 and CTS 78:3337:2.
162. It is difficult to get a complete picture of the Chang clan, but since
the principals were referred to as "fifth and sixth master," they must have had
several brothers. Two elder and one younger are mentioned in the histories, all
of them involved in corruption. On the case of bribery in the hsiian, see TCTC
206, p. 65A7.
163. TCTC 207, p. 6572. Both Li Chiung-hsiu (Appendix B, no. 128) and Chang
Hsi (no. I2A), who were otherwise reputable officials, seem to have fallen into
the same ways.
164. See, for instance, TCTC 207, p. 6563.
165. CTS 78:3337:2.
166. TCTC 207, p. 6556.
167. TCTC 207, pp. 6556-57, and CTS 78:3337:2. Chung-tsung‘s crown prince
was of necessity his son by a concubine, and Empress Wei is said to have been so
unhappy with this situation that she sought to have her daughter An-lo replace
him. Her actions goaded the Crown Prince Ch'ung-ch’un into an attempted coup in
the summer of 707, initiating a period of unremitting palace intrigue which
ceased only with Hsuan-tsung's accession.
168. On Wu San-ssu, see Appendix B, no. II8. He is said at this time to have
formed a liaison with Empress Wei in preparation for her husband's succession.
169. TCTC 207, p. 6559. The empress refused, awarding instead dukedoms with
revenues of 300 households to both brothers. The TCTC notice is somewhat mis
leading here since the titles were a reward for literary compilation. CTS 78:
3337:2.
170. On Wei, see Appendix B, no. 121.
171. TCTC 207, pp. 6563-66.
172. See Fitzgerald, Empress Wu^ pp. 173~77, which follows closely the TCTC
account.
173. TCTC 207, p. 6565.
174. TCTC 207, pp. 6565-66.
175. TFIK 604:4a, TCTC 206, p. 6542, and the full text in CTW 236:3b. On Wei,
see Appendix B, no. 131.
176. TCTC^ loo. ait.
177. CTW 236:3b ff.
178. See, for instance, TCTC 207, p. 6557, on selection. The problem of pro
vincial administration is discussed on p. 151 in the text.
179. See Chapter 7.
180. Jao, "Tsung-chiao hsin-yang," pp. 403~405.
181. See TCTC 207, PP. 6549~50, and my remarks in Chapter 4.
182. Chapter 4. On the clerical tax, see TCTC 207, p. 6571.
183. TCTC 207, p. 6554 and see the k'ao-i notice.
184. CTS 6:3076:4 and TCTC 207, p. 6557.
It may be significant that Jul-tsung
was given command of the Yu-1 in Guard immediately before the empress' departure.
185. TCTC 207, p. 6556. Su memorialized again on the same subject the next
year. See TCTC 207, p. 6559, also TFYK 544:6b.
186. Chapter 7. See Examens^ pp. 36 and 209-212.
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187. TCTC 207, pp. 6560-61.
It was not until 70^, however, that complete re
habilitation occurred and the road to office was reopened to those whose rela
tives had been found guilty of crime. TCTC 207, p. 657^.
188. On the appointments of Li and Wei to tsai-hsiang rank, see TCTC 207, p.
6571. Wei An-shih (Appendix B, no. 125) was already well-known as an opponent
of the Changs. Wei Ssu-li (no. I3I) held his position in the university until
the twelfth month of 70^ and, in view of his concern with education, was probably
a successful administrator. On the new censors, see THY 60, p. 1053 snd TFYK
512:6a.
189. TFYK 55^:17a and THY 63, p. 109^.
190. TCTC 207, p. 6567.
191. The concern perhaps arose from a disturbance in the far South in the
eleventh month of 703. TCTC 207, PP. 6568-69.
I have been unable to find a def
inition of the "six categories" of the Han.
192. TCTC 207, p. 6570 and THY 68, pp. 1198t99. Some of the best-known offi
cials assigned to the task were Wei Ssu-li, Hsueh Ch'ien-kuang and Yang Tsai-ssu.
In some cases, at least, the officials retained their current posts and became
only acting prefects so that the experiment was perhaps not a wholehearted one.
193. TCTC 207, p. 6571.
19^. Note 9 above.
195. THY 66, p. 1157 and Yu-hai 59:38b.
196. TCTC 207, p. 6578.
197. TFYK 629:22a and THY 75, p. 1359.
198. THY 60, p. 1053 and TFYK 512:6a.
199. TCTC 207, p. 6571*.
200. See, for instance, on the palaces, THY 30, p. 557 and TCTC 207, p. 6569.
201. TCTC 207, p. 6575 points out that for several months the empress saw only
the Changs, receiving neither chief ministers nor her own sons. The many demo
tions at the restoration give some idea of the size of the Chang faction.
202. CTS 78:3337:2, TFYK 515:9a, and TCTC 207, pp. 6572-73. Fitzgerald, Em
press NUi p. 182 construes "meritorious service" as a possible double entendre.
203. TCTC 207, p. 6576.
20k. On Huan, see CTS 91:3360:1» and HTS 120:3951:3. He was the scion of an
official clan from Huai-nan obtaining his first post through the yin privilege.
Much admired by Ti Jen-chieh, he rose to high positions in the Censorate where
he was responsible for the restoration of the political rights of the victims of
Lai Chun-ch'en and Chou Hsing. At Ch'ang-tsung's treason trial, his was the
strongest call for punishment, and his biography contains the fullest account of
the coup.
205. On Chang, see Appendix B, no. 133.
206. TCTC 207, pp. 6571* ff. Fitzgerald's account is found in Empress WUj pp.
184-88.
207. The "tame" judges were Wei Ch'eng-ch'Ing (Appendix B, no. 135) and Ts'ui
Shen-ch'ing {CTS 77:3335:3 and HTS 109:3930:3).
208. On Sung, see CTS 96:3372:1 and HTS 124:3960:1.
209. See Appendix B, no. 132. Ts'ui was in many ways typical of the north
eastern ssu-hsing. After passing the ming-ahing^ his mother, who was a member
of the eminent Lu clan, instructed him on the integrity necessary to an official
calling, and it was his incorruptibility while charged with the examination system
which brought him to the personal notice of the empress. His biography shows that
he was one of the empress' most sincere supporters, never suggesting abdication.

290

Notes to Chapter 9

It was the complete lack of alternatives which finally brought him into the
conspiracy.
210. See TCTC 207, p. 6579.
211. CTS 91:3361:3 and UTS 120:3952:2. Ching was one of the "new" officials
prominent in the Chou, a member of a family with no tradition of office, a
mi-ng-oh'Lng graduate and a man whose reputation had been made in the provinces.
His opposition to the Wu interests, carried into the next reign, precipitated
the destruction of himself and his four co-conspirators by Wu San-ssu.
212. CTS 91:3362:3 and UTS 120:3951:3. Yuan was another of the "new" type
of official. A northeasterner, his early career is nowhere documented, and we
know only of his capital appointments. He may have had some military experience
since during the actual coup, he was in charge of the Southern Guard whose task
was to deal with unforeseen resistance.
213. TCTC 207, pp. 6578-79* Li found himself on the losing side in 707 when
he joined the crown prince in an attempted coup against Empress Wei.
21it. TCTC 207, p. 6579.
215. CTS 78:3337:2. These included Li Chiao, Ts'ui Shen-ch'ing, Ts'ui Jung,
Sung Chih-wen, Shen Ch'iian-ch'i and several others who not only held high posts
but were among the best-known figures of their time. Their connection with the
Changs shows how influential the faction had become.
216. CTS 193:3553:^. Wu Yen-hsiu had returned to the capital in 70^ and,
although he was not married to Princess An-lo until later, their relationship
seems to have existed from this time.
217. TCTC 207, p. 6580. He was persuaded by Li Chan, the son of Li l-fu.
218. TCTC 207, pp. 6580-81. The empress had special scorn for Chung-tsung
whom she thought perhaps to intimidate, for Li Chan whose father had been her
earliest supporter, and for Ts'ui Hsuan-wei who had been her personal and in
dependent choice for high office. Ts'ui, perhaps with some sadness, could at
tribute his presence only to "Your Majesty's great virtue."
219. CTS 6:3077:1 and TCTC 207, p. 658I.
220. See, for instance, TCTC 208, p. 6587, and 207, p. 6582 for T'ien Kueitao's refusal to cooperate with the conspirators.
221. TCTC 208, p. 6596.
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A-shih-na Ho-lu

If'l’

. , ,

^

A-shih-na Hu-se-lo (Hu-se-lo Khan) P-J
m^
A-shih-na Ni-shu-fu
.1^
A-shih-te Wen-fu
Act of Grace SEE ta-she
^
^ >a ^ a ^
Amitayus Sutra (Wu-tiang^shou ohi-ng)
An-hsi
^
An-1 o, P r i ncess^i^
i
An Lu-shan
An-pei ^
An Shun

^

An Stfng Ip
An-tung
An-yeh ^^
OH.
Avatamsaka (Hua-yen)
Azumi no Hirabu no Muraj I

„

vsr +

bhadanta (ta-te)
Bodhiruci ^4A,^Aj'
bodhisattva (p'u-sa) t
Buddhapila 'i%
cakravartTn
candrapribha

I^y'ueh-kuang wang) pjin yu
^-

If ^

Chai I
Ch'an
ch‘an-wei
ch' an-yli
Chang
Chang Ch'ang-tsung
--- ^
Chang Chao ^
chang chiao
Chang Chlen-chih
Chang Ch i u-IJ^ng 5:^
chang-fu
/ij
Chang Hsing-ch'eng

5A. S
X »

Chang l-chih 3i,§_£V
Chang Jen-wei 5A.i^^r
Chang-ku
Chang M i ng-shan 5i^
Chang T'ing-kuei
Chang Wen-kuan
Chang Y'ueh
ch'ang o©
Ch'ang-chou Ip '^ li
«
ch'ang-liu chi yu-nu

W

.

l>

,
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ch'ang-ming hsing-li pan^ ^ %>
ch'ang-sheng chiu-shih
ch'ang-sheng yuan
ch'ang-shih
ch'ang-shou
Ch ‘ ang-sun Shun-Te

Ch'ang-sun
Chao-chou
^’*'1
Chao-chun
0f
Chao-i
Chao Wan-1 i /EflCh'ao-hsien
chen ^

^

"1^ 4’tj'

^
-IL
^

Chen-iaian oheng-yao
chen-kuan c^ih chih
chen-kuei iX ^
Chen Ti-erh 'M
chen-yuan chiang-chun
ch ‘ en 2.
i
Ch'en Ku-yuan

^ ^
2^ "Uv

Ch'en Shih-i ohi p^4^ig^4fc

r^-f s

Ch‘ en ”
Tju-ang
Cheng
cheng
cheng hs i ng-jen
cheng-ming at, ^
Cheng-ming ehing '%^% 9^
Cheng-shih fang
cheng-t'ung j£-V,p>
<Tu
Ch
Ch eng-ku hsien
ch eng-kuang
j
sb. * ^
Ch eng Ming-chen
ch eng p'i-yang chih ch' ungiL
Ch eng Wu-t'ing
j.
Ch en yang, Princess jr^ fi|)
chi
Chi Hfu v3 y?-!
chi-jih
0
chi-nx3
sha-men ^
vu-ying pai-su teng-shih
Chi-su
Ch' i »iiA.
Ch' i -chou ^ ')l'\ ,
ch' i-chu she-jen

^ '^A-

ch'i-pao SEE sapta ratna
Ch'i-pi Ho-li
chia-k'ou chi-mo
ff ?][
chia-men y fn
Chia Pi
^
Chi a Yen-chung ^
Chiang-nan >X.

i

^ y
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Glossary
Ch iang-tso ,
^
Chiang Ya_^J^
Ch'iang ^
chiao-hsmg
chiao-i
ch'iao-hsing
chi eh
chieh-kung
chieh-tu gp ^
chien-ch'a
^
Chien-chen
chien-chiao/J^ ^

chien-jen tu-fu chih heng ^
Chien-nan
chien-te
chien y"u shang erh chih^yu hs ia
Ch'ien-chin, Princess
ch'ien-feng
Ch'ien-yiian tien '^£1
chih-chang-jen ^'^A_
.
chih-cheng-shih che san-p' in
if>Ly ^
chih-chij
Chih-hsUn^^»
Chih-i W ^
^
chih-ming-chu
Chih-sheng ^ ^
Chih-yen

^

^ T s»

’■ o ■ jt,
^ 51

Chin-k 'o t 'i-pa so-yin ^ ^’J /d.
Chin-1ing

^

Chin-shang shih-tu '^JL^ 3^
chin-shen 4®
chin-shih jlf ^ •jr

Chin-shih lu ^ ^
Chin-shih-tzu ohang
chin-tai chiji ch'uah-tao
Chin-yang
Ch'in
Ch'in Shih-huang-ti
Chindok, Queen^^^,-^i
Ching-ai ssu,
^
Ching-chao
Ching-chou tu-tu ^'J 'M|
’fe*
Ching-hsi
^ j. ^
Ching-hna-yuan 4^ -jtj
Ching Hui
ching-lun
Ching Po
Ching T'ang

^

i

Chih-yuan k'ao-ting fung-ahien kang-mu
ch' ih-i
tf
Chin #
chin chung-yii

h

^Tu"^
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^ H

Ch' ing-ho

^ ^
y*J rii

Ch'ing-ho Ts'ui
ch'ing-hsien

^

ChHng hsu t'a-i-sneng oh’ang-kuan ohu-ohien shu-li ohuang
Chiu-hsing

Aj

Ch' iu Shen-chi
Chou
jl]
Chou Chii
Chou Hsing jlj

Chou-li
Chu Ching-ming
Chu Chi ng-ts^ ^
Chu HsI

Chu-hsing lueh

0^
ft'J
^

\

IB^

4

chu-kuo
± ID
chu-mei feng-yao ■^-^/SOSS
chu-se
^
chu-shih
chu-sh^

chjj

-tF

4

Chu-ch'ang ^ t..
^
_
chij-jen wei^ mi-chU
Ch'u-chi
- -hf ^
ch'u-chiu chih^ying-mo ^}i fl
Ch'u Jen-huo
ch'u-ming
^
ch' u-shen ill ^
Ch'u Sui-lianq
^
ch'uan-chih ^ ^'J
ch'uan-wei
Ch'wi-kung (mi .f
Chiin-chou ^
chun-fu
^
chUn-hsing
chlin-kung
chun-kuo ta-shih ^
chun-tzu
^ -J'
chlin-wang ^ i
4, j.
Chung, Crown Prince /'J A-f
chung-cheng
^ JE.
.
chung-hsin i-ting

Chung-kuo hun-yin shih
Chung-kuo tsa-ahih
Chung-kuo wen-hsueh shih 'f
chung-nei ch'ing-wai
chung-nu
^
chung-shu tu-shih
Chung-tsung
Ch'ung-chun ^
4
Ch'ung-hsien kuan
Ch' ung-hsuaji sl^ ^
ch'ung-i
"U
Ch'ung-ming
^

^
^

/ j.

if

f

^

M ^t\X
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Ck 'ung-wen tsung-mu ahih-shih lu
Churyo
®

Dai hariwa jiten

"1^ if

Dharmaraksa
Divikara Q
en-tu
Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-pien
Fa-hsiang

^

Fa-min
Fa-ming
80
Fa-tsang
^
fa-tzu
^ t +A i
L
Fa-yuan chu-iin ytk
fan-chieh chih en
fS'i-Sfan-hu
Fan Tzu-kai
Fan-yang lu

-f-

Fang-chou ^ 911
Fang Hsiao-ju
Fang Hsuan-ling
fang-pi en
^
fei-ch'ang ts'ai-Y.ung
fei ju-shih
Fen-chin
y'^
feng-ch'en fu
Feng-chou ^ 9‘H
Feng Hao
feng-ko
feng-ku Mu
feng-nei
feng-po
feng-shan 5^4^
Fo-kuang wang

^
^
^^ If)
^

)^i

S.

..

fu-cheng

fu-jui
fu-kao
Fu Kung-shl^h
fu-lu /|£
_
Fu-ma ..^14"
fu-ping
Jl
fu-t' ien yO ming-o' i
Fu Yu-i i!-^
J

“ia

mGa r jy H) *•'
han-chun
^ ffl§.
Han Hsien-tsung
Han Hsiu

^
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1^,
Han Kao-ti
Han-1 in Academy
han-shih
^ dr
Han Ta-min
Han Wu-ti
Han Yuan
Hansbng
hao-chieh
Hao-chou
^ u
Hao Ch'u-chiin^, yfff j)u:^ 1^
Hao Hsi
^ ^
Hao-1ing ^hu ^
hao-tsu
hei-ho
hei - i
'K.
Hei-shan
lIj
hei-shui
^
Heng-ch i ng
^
Ho-hs i
\g7
Ho-Ian Kuo-ch'u
Ho Ian Min^chih
Ho ■nan
Ho-pei
Ho-p i Pa l ace

%%%^

>5

'S'

Eo-t'u
Ho-yiian

Eou Ean-shu

t- ^

Hou Ssi^-ch i h ■in. ®'jtHs i
^
Hsi-chou
Hsi-ho chun \B -/tl ;SP
Hsi-kun
w
@
Hs a
•;i|
Hs a-chou
hs
hs
Hs
Hs ang-li Chin
hs ang-Ung
Ha 30 ^
■Hl

__

Esi,ao-chvng
hs
hs
hs
Hs
Hs
hs

ao-ch‘uan
ao-hsuan -J ’
,
ao-jen
Aao Liang-ti
ao Wen-ti
^'r,eh-san-pao

Es ieh Yao-huan
Hs
hs
hs
hs

en, Prince
en-ch'ing
en-feng
en-heng

5^3

^

^

fi,
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hsien-ho
Hsien-hsiang
hsien-kung
'4
hsien-1iang fang-cheng
Hsien-pi
hsien-shou ^ "S'
hsien-t'ien t'ai^ou
hsien-tz'u
^
Hsien-yang 0/
hsin ff
Hsin-ch'eng
Hsin-chou 'f/f Jll

I* t ^

#f'/t li-1

Hsin-feng ch'ing Mountain
hs i ng
Hsing-chou
'J ((
hsing-chun
-n
hsing-chiin ssu-k'ai^-^T ^ 'd
Using-hsi tun
^ ”1^
hsing-li
-^Ijt _
Using-shih lu
,

ix

Using-tsu-hsi lu
hsiu-ts'ai
^
hs i ung
Hsiung-chin SEE Paekche
^
Hsu Ching;;tsung
hsu-1i
Hsij-mi Mountain (Mt, Sumeru)
Hsii P'eng-(^iao
hsu-shih ^ i"
Hsu Sung
hsu-fu
Hsu Yen-pai
HsU Yu-kung
hsLian
hsuan-chieh
Hsuan-tsang
Hsiian-tsung
Hsuan-t'ung shih-chi Sr
_
Hsuan-wu Gate ■£^F5
Hsueh
H

m

hsiieh
Hsueh
Hsueh
Hsiieh
Hsiieh

ifl 6f ie-

H

.

Ch'i^n-kujng P
Huai-i
Jen-kuei
^^\zY^n-ch'ao i\ ^ Mi
^
.
. .14

Usun-ohih chai-ahi
hsiin-fu-sMh
'j
hsun-kuan‘"
‘|*
hu
Hu Chen-hsiang

Usun-ko

lU

'Cl'

jl

.^iFT
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Hu Ch'u-pin

^

hu-ming
^
Hu-pei
;Ib
Hu-se-lo Khan SEE ^-shih-na Hu-se-lo
hua-ch'eng
■jkLi
hua-fo tsung-k'ung lai mo-ting wei shou chi
Hua-yen SEE Avatamsaka

tZj

Hua-yen ohing_^h’uan-oh'i
Huai-chou
>>i| |
Huai-nan
Huai-shuo
Huan Yen-fap
^Z>
huang-ssu f
huang-sun
%
huang t'ai-sun ^
huang-ti p'u-sa
Hui
7C^
hui
I2 )
Hui-an
,
Hui-ching
7^
Hui-hsin yuan
Hui-neng
ft

-t r

fi

hui-yao
Hukch'i SaMch' i
hun-chu
i
Hung, Crown Prirjce

Bung-fan
Hung-lu ssu >j| ^
Hung Mai
Hung-nung Yang ^
Hung-wen kuan ^ yC.
Hwabaek
%
Hwarang-^o ^
-^AHyoso ^ 0£

i-cheng

I-ohiao ohir
I-ahing
l-ching
i-kuan

I-kuan p'u ^ ^ -5^
i-nien-1^ kung-jen i-ling fang-ch'u
i-t'u
M

ffl

I-t*ung-shih ohi

't 1^ hf sij

I-yuan & 7^
11 i River ^\f ^ '/•d

JambudvTpa
jen

f.

Ju-i-oKun ohuan

y9 %

ju-lai SEE tathagata
jui-shih
;S’

^
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■^^P7 ***
Jui-tsung y
Jung-ohH hsu-pi ^
j

Jung-kuo fu-jen
Jung-yang Cheng

%

^ mk^

%

m M

k'a i-fu-i-t'un
ung
fi san-ssu
k'ai-huang
J.
7tJ
k'a i-yuan
Kan-chou
Kan-yeh
4 h
K'ang Yu-wei
Kao-ch'ang
Kao Chien \-63
Kao Chun-ya
kao-hua
^ ^
Kao Li-shih ^ tj
kao-liang
kao-shen
Kao Shih-lien
Kao-tsung ^
kao-yanq iS
k'ao
^
k'ao-kung
sfy
Kashgar (Shu-lo)
Khotan (Yu-t'ien)
Kim Ch'un-ch' i.u- ^
^ M1t
Kim Yu-sin
ko
k'o
k'o-chun ^ ^
k'o-ping
-4h
K'ou Ch'ien-cbjh
Kogury^
Kokonor (Ch'ing-hai) ±
i\UK.unur

v^fi

iiiy-iicii/

f^Ki

iJi’

Ku-dhin hsing-shih sT^ plen-oheng «
Ku-chin ping-yao £
Ku-oh-in tien-gjao

^

,

w fsf 5 ^

Ku-ch'u-l.u
%
ku-t ‘o
k'u
kuan g
Kuan-chunq
kuan-hu 'g ^
kuan-mien chih chia
Kuan-nei {|jjy
Kuan-wai
M ^|'
Kuan-wang
kuang-chai
^
kuang-chai ssu-t'ien-hsia pa-piao i-shih-chih
kuang-lu ta-fu TU
il go ^ A
kuang-ming sheng huang-ti ytj ®^J x ^ *i
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Kuang-ming ssu
^
Kuang-wu ming
Kuonn-uVjyi.
KiMxng-yun
k'uang-fu
^
Kucha (Kuei^zi^
%%
kuei-ch'i
^
'a''
Kuei-kuo, D^e^of II
kuei-men
kuei-tsu
''
Kuel-ya^
f%
K'uei
k'uei-chi
^
k'uei-yu
__
Kijm River
kun-lung ^ |1
K'un-1 ing^
K'un-lun g ^
>
kung-pu shang-shu i
K'ung-hao fu
^
^
K'ung-tzu oh’an
kuo-chia chih chou ® '^Z.'hlj
Kuo-fen ssu
Kuo Hsiao-chen jf-:$
kuo-1ao 1^ ^
kuo-shih 1^ ^
"V7 -a?kuo-tzu chien
kuo-tzu hsUeh \J3
Kuo Yuan-chen %f tj
Kyerim
Lai Chi
Lai Chiin-ch'en
S
lan-kuan
lang-chung
lao
lao-chun
^
Lei-li
j^j
L Chan ^
L Chang ^
L Ch'ang ^^
L Chao-te ^

fr t

1 -cheng^_^ jl.
\i]
L Chi
Li-ohi
tL,

4

Li Chiao
^
Chih rfl. ^
Li Chih ts ’ang-sjiu
L Chin-chung 4l ^ /S'
Ching 'P
Li-ohing
ftS
it
Ching-ch'en
Ching-hsuan

Glossary

L Ching-yeh
L -Chou :f'J 'Ml
'Jm /'-I-/'Jf /f
L -chou chianq-t'an tso
Chuan
fW
L
i '•/%. jiL
L Ch'un-feng
Ch'ung t
^
L
Ch'unqjjun ^
yj%^
Li Fei
Fei M
^ Jift'
i
i-f*
Li-hsiang-kuo tvn-shi'h-<^ ^ 'v'B
&W
Li Hsiao-ch'a^ng
^

“ . *An
3

'-Shan
^
Ju-chen^
Kang 4^
Lung-lzu. $ tl4MI
S
Ping ^
^
Shan-kan
-shih ti chen-shih yu i-shu ti chen-shih
Li-tai fa-pao ohi ^ ''iX ^ ^
To-tso
A -ijE
-ts' un 'f. 4^
Yung
^ ^
ang ^
ang Ch'i-ch'ao^
..ang-chia ^
Liang-Chin Nan-pei oh'ao shih
'ang-chou ,
‘J'l'j
ang-jen
ang-kuo, Duke of
ang Wu-ti
ao River
ao-tung
ieh-chuan
Lieh-nii chuan

s^ihih^g^»

f.j

1in-ch'ao ch'eng
lin-pao
lin-te^

1 i ng
Ling
^
Ling of Wei. Empress Dowager
Ling-chou ^ 'j-l’l
Ling-hu Te-fen
Ling-nan
1ing-shih ^ ^
1 iu
'/iL
.
^ «
Liu Ch'i-hsien
^ ^

^ia
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u
u
uu

Ch ' ung ^ 'I
Fang iiiP -¥
Hslang-^o
Hsiao IJ .1

u
u
u
u

Hsu
Hung-chi
Jen-jui ^<\
Jen-kuei

.

5^
^
i— ^

u Jen-yuan
j—
u Liang-pin
u Mien
u Mu ^f>
u-nei -/Xi i’*3
u Shih
^
^
u-shou shu-tso ® *1^
u-shou ssu-ping ^
u ssu-n
u-t'iao
7^
u Tsung-yuan
7ii
u Tz' u
Jitfc
u-wai
u Wei-chih
^
u Wu-chou J‘J ^
u Yen-yu
u Yun-chi
^ 7^
Lo-chih
M 1^'
1o-hs 1 ng
Lo Kuan-chung
^ 'f’
Lo Pin-wang
jE.
Lou Shih-te
-

Lo-shu
Lu Ch'eng-chjing
7^ j§^
Lu Chih f# ^
^
Lu Ching-ch'un

Lu-hsuan-kung oh'iuxn-^hi
Lu-Iing,

of ^

lu-shih_
Lu Tung-tsan

Lu-chou S ’-I'M
Lij Hsia-ch' ing

^1

Iji-liog

Lu Ts 'ai ^
^
luan-t'ai
Lun Ch'in-ling
Lung

^

Lung-oh 'eng lu
Lung-hsi
Lung-men MfT
lung-shuo

Lung-t'u t’u

^JL

-7_t
fit

^

313

Glossary

Lung-yu
Ma Chou

1^

Ma Tsai
Mahivi bhasaj-sastra
mai-hun
Maitreya (Mi-lo) _ ,
Maki ta. Ta i ryo
Man
^

,
'?u

man-fen-chij^
Mao-chou
>)-l'|
mao-hsmg
/^'-ki.
Mara
Mei
mei-kuan ^ ^
mei-niang
men-hu
Meng-ch'i pi-t'an ■fMeng-ch' ih^
-ycii
meng-ya 00 Jmi-chlj p
Mi-lo SEE Maitreya
miao
Miao Shen-k'o ^^}
min
^
ming-ching
ming-chu
9^ i
Ming Ch'Lian 9-^
ming-fa-wang

^

.
i

Ming-sha

Ming-shih

.

ming-fang 8^’^
Mo-ch'o (Qapagan)
mo-fa
^ yi,
mu
Mu Ni ng
mu-ping
mu-shih
Mulgul

^

$Jj^r
, ^ "t
^

Munmu
Muyol
na-k'o
na-yen

p

1n-tzu

mt ,

Nait5 Torajir5
Namg^n ^
Nan-shih
nei-ch'ung A
nei-fu 1-^ T*
nei-shih-1ing
nei-tao-ch'ang
nien-hao
fjt
Nien-i-shih ssu-p 'u

i'i)
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Nii Kua ^
nu-kuan ^ ’g’

nij-tzu yu hs iao-jen

^4^1 -J'A-

Oda Teizo
Otani Shoshin
Pa-chou £ •) l |
pa-piao
Paekang
>X
Paekche §
pal
14
pai-hsm| § 4:^

P’an-tung~t'ai-

pei

■!■£

PancaveramanT (Wu-hsing-fa) 3pao

^

Pao-k'o ts'urig-pien

Pao Ssu-wei

^

g

Pao-t 'u ‘0’ ®
Pao-yu ahvng ^
parahita
;^'J fe
Parhae -}fk. ^
pei-men hsLieh-shih

Pei-shih
Pei-fing tu-hu^u
P'ei Chien
P'ei Hs ing-chien
P'ei Yen ^ x

ik >g.:|f tg/f#
.
"ij 7^?.

^

pen-ch i
pen-kuan -4 jS
pen-se ^ ^
pen-wang
P'eng-lai ^ JL
pi-hsia Pj? T
P i -we i
p‘ i
77
p' i-chao
'
i
-yang
ch
i
h
ch' ung
p'iin-k‘o '% W
p' in-ts 'a i
^4
Ping-chou
ping-mu A ^
Po-chou t-f
Po-1ing Ts'ui
Po-shan tiei^
Pojang '0 ^

L%<’

Poksin
4a
pu-ch'tieh 4^
pu-k'o i chiang
pu-shun

P'u

^

if

p'u-sa

SEE bodhisattva

f-§ L
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p ■ u-sa t • 1 en-tzu
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^

p'u-she
p'u-t'
i§ i$:
P'ung -f
Puyorung
Raksasa ^ i-'J ^ ^
Saito Aik^ ^ ^ it f
samadhi — 9
.
Samguk Yusa ^
it f
^
san-ch'i ch'ang-shih
San-ohiao ohu-ying
san-ch'uan
san-huang X. %.
san-i —
san-kuan
san-kung X
San-kuo ohih x-iD
san-lei
san-wei X
saiigha (san-kang) X ^filS)
sao-p'ing
-f
sapta ratna (ch'i-pao) iG

«ri

r

*
if

Seng-ch'ang 'fg-^
Seng-ni nieh-hal
^
Seng-shih lueh ig ^ ^
Sha-po-lo khan
>f
shan -5Shan-chou
>)i l
Shan-nan
iL
Shan-tung^
Shan-yu ^ ^
shang Jl
shang-chu-kuo JH ^2 iS
shang-hu Jl
Shang-kuan I JL
^
Shang-kuan Wan-^rh _L
shang-pien
5hang-shu
shang-shu tu-shih
shang-t' ien Jl
Shang-yang Palace J±
Shang-yuan Ji ^
__
Shao Tzu-wu of P'ing, Prince
she-chih kuo-cheng
shen
^
Shen Chi-ch'i
Shen Ch'iian-ch'i y%
shen-hsien 4^ iUi
Shen-hsiu
Shen-huang wang 4+ii
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Shen Kua
shen-lung
-'k 'A'l^ t
Shen1 Ping-chen i-'X
F
1-sheng huang-ti
J
shen-j
shenTtan
shen-tu
"^P
sheng ^ ^
sheng-chiao
sheng-ch'ing
Sheng-chou
sheng-li ^
sheng-men ^
sheng-mu lin-jen yung-ch'ang ti-yeh
sheng-mu shen-huang ^ •;©
^
sheng-shen huang-ti ^
sheng-sh ih ^ t\
sheng-wang
^ i

Shih-oheng chi
Shih-ohi ^ f 2j
Shih-ah 'i-shih shang-ahiao "t" b
Shih-ching

.

^

shih-chou ming-chia it
Shih-hsing
Shih-jang “±"5^
Shih-kuo SEE Tashkent
Shih-leng ± ^
shih-1ing
shih-1 iu-wai
shih-lu

Shih lun-ahi
shih-min

it ^
It ^
li? -t
shih-shih feng
shih-ta-fu ^ kk.

Shih-pen

Shih-tsu ohih iK
shou
Shou-yang kung ^ f|
Shu ^

Shu-ohtng
shu-jen
shu-p'an4#J

±yx0a4-A.^&t
Snu-pen fen-men ku-ehrn tei-shih £j x ^ H ^ ^
*
Shuo-chou
Siksananda

4

Si
11a
Sinmun 4^ k
^^’

S6ngd6k f #.

Ssu-chen fu
ssu-hai t'ung-wang
ssu-hs i ng '3^ Jit

^
vn?

j^L ^
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^

ssu-k'ai ts'an-ch'un
ssu-k'unq
'fj 'S
ssu-ma
Ssu-ma Ch'ien
ssu-men hs'ueh
ssu-ta
'3Z7
SSU-t'u

Is
'XP

-J/J:
'f]
—
j/fT_

Su An-henq
Su-chou ^

ii'l

su-kuan
%
Su Mien ^
^
Su Ting-fang
'/iSu-tsung
^
Sui-chou
•><■(

.

5u-z: T'on^ 2/en-i ^ ff /f
Sui Wen-t i
Sun Jen-shih 4|l
Sun Wanj^j ung
Sung
Sung-chou
‘)l'|
Sung Chih-wen
^

Sung-shih
ta-ch^en X. li
ta-ch'eng
ta-chiang-chUn fu-k'a i-ts'ao

aj-(jb
^ /f?" j-S. 'a_^

Ta Chou k’an-t-ing ohung-ching nru-lu A.1^
Ta Chou wu-shanq hsiao-minq kao huanq-hou pei-ming
Ta-chuang-yen Temple
ta-chung-cheng ssu-t'u
Ta-fei-ch'uan
I'l
ta-i
ta-kuei
ta-ni
ta-pao
A. y
ta-she (Act of Grace)
Ta-sheng hsuan-ohi A ^
ta-te SEE bhadanta
ta-tu-tu
ta-yeh
Ta-yun dhing A
Ta-y'un mi-tsang ;A ^

^

3^

^

Taedong River
yX
T'ae-p'yong song
Ta i -chou
Tai-fang
^
Tai Li cl^g-yeh t'ao Wu-shih hsi
Tai-pej
t'ai
t‘ai-ch'u
T'ai-hang

.

.

A'^3'

>

+t
"5^ ^
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t 'a
t'a
t'a
t'a

Glossary
■ho
■hou A. t'a
■hsueh
■huang ^ ^

T’ai-p 'ing ahing

,

t'ai-shang hsuan-yuan huang-ti
t 'a i-shih ^
t'ai-ssu ^ ^
t'ai-sun ^-llfl
T'a -tsu hsiao-mng kao huang-ti
T'a -tsung X
t'a -tzu ^
t'a -tzu san-shih
t'a -we i ^ M'j
T'a -yuan AM
T'a -yuan, Prince ^ V /^J ^ i
-A—
T'a -yuan chun-kung
ng Ayf,
T'ai—yuan sh-Lh-ohif
T'an-kang ^ 1^‘J
tang hao-hsi chih li-shu
T'ang Chiao
T'ang Chih-ch'i $ A %
T'ang-hsing hsien
T'ang Hsiu-ching
4A

_ .

T'ang-jen pa-ohia sMh j%
T'ang Lin
,
T'ang p'u-shang ch'eng-lang piao /¥

T'ang-shih lun-tuan ^
T 'ang-shu chVh-pi.
%M^
T'ang-t'ang ]%
T'ang Te-tsung

T'ang fung-ahi
^
T
^
T 'ang-wen
'ang-wen hsu-sh-ih
shih-i /% y|K fc
^
T'ang Yin
Tao-an
^
Tao-ch'eng ^'iV

is
Tao-seng
tao-shih ko
ij_
Tao-hsuan

^

^_

Tao-te oh-iiw
Tao-tsun
Tashkent (Shih-kuo) To
tathagata (ju-lai)
te-hsing
'',f
te-mien ^,ttj
.
te-ta tzu-tsai i-f A €1 ^
Te-tsung
te-yun I
.
Teng-ch'eng^^ M

Teng-hsia chi

T^

)'^ :Br

A
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Teng-k’o ohi-k’ao
Teng-k ’o lu ^ ^
teng-ti ^ ^

ti

^

ti-chu
Ti Jen-chieh

t lao
t' i eh l})t
tien-shih
tien-yeh ^
t en-hou ^
t en-huang
T

<■,

3

.a

en Kuei-tao Ifl
en-ming wei-kai
«f ^ ^X.
en-n’u ^-jt
__
^
en-nii shou-chi ;X
en-pao
^ .

t
t
t
t
t en-she-nu
t' en-shou
T Hen-shou shevg-t 'u ^
t' ien-shu ^
T'ien-t'ai /
t'len-t'ang ^
T'ien Te-p'ing
t'ien-ts'e wan-sui .
t' ien-t^ng-tzu
’/iTing
Ting-chou
'ki j

t'ing-ch'ang
T'ing-chou

•

m

,

1

’

Todai no koyomi
Tokchim
Tokmak (Sui-yeh)
Tou ^

/j

^^
^

^

tsa-hu'

tsa-se-jen
Atsa-wen ^5 A
tsai-ch'u
tsai-hsiang A A0
ts'ai ^
ts'ai-jen^ A
tsan-che
btsan-po
^
ts'an-chun ^
^
ts'an-tso shih-p'in ^

4b

«

Ts'ao '©
Tse-t'ien shun-sheng huang-hou ^’J
Tse-t'ien ta-sheng huang-ti
Ts'en Wen-pen

tsou-ch'u chin-chih ^
tsu 4JL

, ^
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tsu-fu
tsu-tzu
tsu-wang
^
tsu-yung-tiao iB-M
ts‘u-yu wen-li ^ ^ K JS.
tsui
^
Ts' u I Chih-yuan
^
Ts' ui Hao %
Ts' ui Hsuan-wei ^05
Ts' ui l-hsuan 4 ^
.
Ts'ui Min-kan ^ ^
^
Ts'ui Shen-ch* ing ^
Ts'ui Tzu-ylian /5t
Ts'ui Yung ^
tsung-chang
Tsung Ch' in-k'o ^ ^ %
tsung-kuan
'g^
Tu Cheng-lun
Tu Ching-chien
Tu Ch'iu-Jen

tu-hu-fu^Pt?/ft
at
Tu-ku
Tu-ling 4itu-shih
y
tu-tu-fu ^
tu-tu-fu ch'ang-shih

Tu t 'u:

-ahien lun

ii

K

t'u 4
T'u-chiieh
t'u-chung
fu-te
T'u-yu-hun
tuan
t'uan-chieh

r 'ui-pei t 'u

,,

/a

"»wp
2^

„

^

tun-chiao
t 'un-ping
T'ung-ch'ang chun
t ung-cheng-chun )s]
T'ung-ch'eng Ifj

T'ung-Gh-ten ohi-shih pen-mo
T 'ung-ahzh
T 'ung-ohih erh-shih ViieTn
t'ung chung-shu men-hsia san-p'in
T'ung-kuei Army
^
T'ung-t'ien.t‘ang
t'ung-yao
tzu-ch' i u ,
Tz' u-en
Tz'u Hsi
"^4tz' u-pu 4f] "pf
tz'u-shih W 'C\

V

TOU

Glossary

Tz 'u-yuan

-/j^,

.j

L) i ja
Ungch' >n
i fc )•!
Ungjin /fe
Ungnyong a? ^

wai-ch'i ^j*/^
wan-kuo chih chu ,
wan-sui t'ung-t'ien
wang-ch'i 51 ^
Wang Ch'iao 5.
Wang Ch'iu-1i 5 Z
Wang Fang- i Jt 15
Wang Fu-chih 3- ^
Wang Fu-sheng i “fX
Wang Hsiao-chieh 3Wang Hung 51 5^
Wang Kuei 5.
Wang Mang 5- ^
wang-ming X ^
Wang Mingj;;^s^ng
Wang Po -±~
Wang Tzu-chin^ ^
Wang Wei 5.^,
We An-shih
5We , Prince of
Chao
J
We
We Chi %
Wei-ahih

'j'/
Wei -chou
we -chuan
We Hs i n-tzu
We -hs m
^ ^ ^
«
We Hs'uan-chen jf.
Hsuan-t'
ung
1^
We
-kuo
fu-jen
iC
We
/^. jf'
We Ssu-1 i
We Ssu-werv
/iHX
We T' ing
.
we -tsao
We Wen-ti
7L>'SWe Yuan-chung
wen
Wen ■ch'eng, Princess 5C^ 4iwen-1 ij
wen-ming
9/J
Wen of Chou, Prince M1
Wen-shui
^
-
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Wu Ch'eng-ssu ^
wu-ch'i t'uan-ping
Wu Ch' ia
^

1^)-^

Wu-ohiao oh'ana 3.
Wu Chien ^ -1^
Wu-chih-lei i f ^
Wu Ching ^
Wu Chu-ch'ang
M
Wu-ch'uan ^ )'\
Wu Chung-kuei
Wu Han
Wu-hen-t 'ien

Wu-hou chih Jen

^ ("s

wu-hsiang ^
wu-hsing ^
Wu-hsing-fa SEE PancavjsramanT
Wu-hsing hsiejn
wu-hsuan
Wu Hua ^ ^
Wu Huai-yun ^
Wu l-tsung
Wu K'o-chi
Wu-liang-shou ohing SEE Amitayus Sutra
Wu Mei-niang
Wu of Chou, Duke
^
Wu San-ssu
Wu Shih-huo
±
wu-te ^ 4^.
Wu Tse-t^ien
|ij ^
wu-tzu
wu-wang
X
Wu Wei-1 iang ^ f/f| t
Wu Yen-hsiu ffV
#
Wu Yu-chl
Wu Yu- i
-i'k. 'M
Wu Yu-kuei ^-j'jL
Wu Yu-ning ^
Wu YUan-ch'Ing ^ %j
Wu Ylian-shuang ^
^
Yang-chou
Yang Hs i ung
Yang Hsuan-kan
Yang Ju-shih
Yang-kuan
Yang Liang
Yang Ling-chieh
Yang Shen-jang
Yang
Yang
Yang
Yang

|

±
_

^

Shih-tao
Shou-chueh
'f'
Ssu-cheng ^
Ssu-chien
M/®

^

Glossary
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Yang Ssu-hsuan
/Vj
Yang
Yang Ta
^ i|_,
yang-tao fl j|_
Yang-ti
f
Yang Tsai-ssu ^
Yang Tsuan M %
Yang Yen
^

HX

Yang Yun-ju
m^
Yao Ch'ung
Yao YUan-ch'ung

70

Yeh-hou^ahia ahuan
yen
=
Yen-chi ^ ^
Yen-hs i u ji^ ^

If

-ff

Yen Li-pen
Yen Shan-ssjj
^
yen-sheng
Yen-tsung ^
Yin
yin
Yin-chou ssu-ma -k9i O-' l
yin erh pu-1 uan
iT^'J-I^L,

Yin-hua lu

)SI

Yin K'ai-shan
Yin-tsung
yin-yang ^ PA

^ Jj

Ying-chou V -Mi
ying-chii
Ying-kuo, Duke of
Yon' gae Sotnun

I. !f

yu
'
J7
yu-hsiang su-wei
M^
yu-hsing
yu-su-cheng yu-shih-t'ai ^ ^

Yii
Yu-ah’i sheng shih aJnen-ahu t:
YU Chih-nit^

Yu-chou

■f" dr
/Cj'

y-/q

Yu Hsien-chang /O' ^iLi '|L
Yu-hua Palace
t- ^
VU-lin chUn
Yu Pao-chia

Yu-shih-t *ai oh\
Yu-wen Hua-chi
Yu-wen T'ai ^ 5t.^
yuan-mien
^
Yuan of Lu-chiang, Prince
Yuan Pan-ch'ien ^
Yuan Shu
Yuan Shu-chi
L»
yuan-shuai tc, ^*p

^
^ Ij
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YUan-sung ah'an ytj
Yuan T'ien-kang
yuan-tso
^
ylian-wai g
yuan-wai-lang
-^1'
yuan-wai t'ung-cheng ^ J'l'
Yuan Wan-ch'ing f(_j ^
yiieh-kuang wang SEE candraprabha
yueh-wang ch'ang-shih
i
Yung ^
^
yung-ch'ang
Yung-chou ^ »j-f|
yung-hui
yung-lung^
yung-shih
Yung-t'ai, Pr i ncess

5

INDEX

A-shih-na Ho-lu, 109“111
A-shih-na Hu-se-lo, l45
A-shih-na Ni-shu-fu, 124
A-shih-te Wen-fu, 124
Act of Grace (ta-she) of 684, 54-55
Acts of Grace, annual, 135
end of, 152
Administrative reforms, 55, 56, 63, 87"106, 132-136, 152
An-hsi protectorate, 112, 136
An-lo Princess, viii
An Sung, 12
An-tung protectorate, 117
Aristocratic clans of early T'ang, 61, 70-86, 93, 238-240.
Azumi no Hirabu no Muraji, 116

See also shih.

Base class (Qhien)^ 71, 240
Book of Rites (Li-o'hi)^ 35, 45
Buddhism, xi, 27, 31-49, 66-68, 129, 138, 150, 157Bureaucratic reform.
See Administrative reforms.

See also Great Cloud Sutra.

Ch'an Buddhism, 48
Chang brothers, 31, 88, 128, 134, 142, 144, 147~150, 151, 152, 153, 154
Chang Ch'ang-tsung, 142, 147, 148, 152, 153* See also Chang brothers.
Chang Chien-chih, l45, 152, 153, 198, 286n120
Chang Ch'un, 18
Chang Hsi, 195
Chang Hsing-ch'eng, 142, 175
Chang l-chih, 142, 147, 152. See also Chang brothers.
Chang Kuang-fu, 186
Chang Liang, 173
Chang Ta-an, 182
Chang Wen-kuan, 122, l80
Chang Yueh, 29
Ch'ang-sun Shun-te, 11
Ch'ang-sun Wu-chi, 17, 88, 170, 213
Chao I, 201
Chao Jen-pen, 179
Ch'en Shu-ta, 168
Ch'en Tzu-ang, 56, 60-6l, 101, l4l, 145, 236n92, 283
Ch'en Yin-k'o, 6, 18, 70, 71, 209, 238-239
Ch'eng Wu-t'ing, 59
Chi HsU, 142, 143, 194
Ch'i-pi Ho-1i, 115, 116
Chiang K'o, 179
Chten (base class), 71, 240
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Ch'ien-chin, Princess, 36
Ch'ien Wei-tao, I85
Chih-hsien, 48
Chih-sheng, 45
Chih-yen, 48
Ching-hua yuan (FtoDens dn the Mirror)j 158, 199
Ching Hui, 153, 286nl20
Chiu T'ang Shuj see Old T'ang History
Chou Chu, 130
Chou, dynasty founded by Empress Wu, 2, 126-154
stages leading up to, 54, 62, 64-65
rationale for its founding, 156-157
founding of, 66, 68
and Buddhism, 46-47
and examination system, IOI-IO6
rituals and state ideology of, 35, 49
stages of, 128
Chou Hslng, 60, 88, 104-105, 130, 151
Chou Yun-yuan, 193
Chu Ching-tse, 130, 197
Chu Hsi, 3
Ch'u Sui-liang, 17, 18, 174, 233
Ch' uan T'ang-wen, 3 3
Chung-tsung, Emperor, viii, 2, 24, 51"52, 55, 65, 80, 101, 126, 132, l4l, l43,
144, 145-146, 148, 153, 154
Ch'ung-hsien kuan, 28
Comprehensive Mirror For And in Government, 3, 5, 8, 20, 52, 61, 62, 63, 66,
121, 130, 145, 149. See also Ssu-ma Kuang.
Confucianism as legitimizing ideology, 28-30, 53, 127, 129-130, 138, 144, 149-

150
Cosmic hall, see Ming-t’ang
Discussion of Surnames and Lineages (Hsing-hsi lun), 71“74
Divikara, 48
Economic affairs, 64, 98, 137“138, 158-159
Education, 28, 90, 95, 149-150.
See also Examination system.
Examination system, xi, 28, 66, 70, 81, 89“103, 132-136, I38, 149-150, 151, 158
Fa-hsiang school, 47, 48
Fa-ming, 36
Fa-tsang, 48
Fan Li-ping, I87
Fang Hsiao-ju, 5
Fang Hsuan-ling, 170-171
Fang Jung, 198
Female rulers in Chinese history, vii, 3“4, 50, 54, 87, 199
Feminism, vii, viii, 3“4, 5, 50, 61, 63-64, 67, 144, 149, 155, 157, 199, 201n36.
See also Legitimation.
Feng-shan ceremony, 2, 20-21, 25, 28-29, 53, 104, 105, 116, 121, 129
Feng Te-i, 169
Fiefs of maintenance (shih-shih feng), 88, 253-254

Index
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Fiscal problems, 64, 137-138. See also Economic affairs.
Flouevs in the Mirror (Ching-hua-yuan)^ 158, 199
Foreign policy, 107-125, 136-137, 138-144, 145-147
Fu Kung-shih, 15
Fu-ping (militia), x, 25, 55, 56, 70, 109,
122, 123-124, 125, 129, 137,
232-233, 266nl0, 276nll6, 283-284
Fu Yu-i, 187-188
Great Cloud Sutra (Maiicmegha), xi, 36, 37-46, 66-68, 129, 157, 158
Han Yuan, 18, 162, 175, 213
Hao-ohieh (magnate clans), 71, 76, 240. See also Aristocratic clans, Shih.
Hao Ch'u-chun, 23, I8I
Heng-ching, 48
Hereditary privilege (yin), 91
Ho-Ian Kuo-ch'u, 21
Ho-lan Min-chih, 21, 34
Hou Chun-chi, 172
Hsiao Liang-ti, 17, I8, 23, 28
Hsiao Yu, I67
Hsien, Crown Prince, 23"24, 41, 44, 54, 58
Hsin Mao-chiang, 177
Hsin T'ang Shu^ see New T'ang History
Hsing-hsi tun (Discussion of Surnames and Lineages)3 71-74
Hsing-shih lu^ 77-79, 80, 81, 93, 103, HO
Hs ing Wen-wei,187
Hsu Ching-tsung, 9-10, I8, 89, 163-164, 177, 212
Hsij Sung, 95
Hsii Yu-kung, 62, 130, 136
Hsu Yii-shih, 177
Hs'uan-tsang, 19, 35, 47, 48
Hsuan-tsung, Emperor, 57, 88, 132, 133, 137
Hsueh Huai-i, 35“36, 46, 62-63, 66, 88, I38, 147
Hsueh Jen-kuei, II6, 117-120, 121
Hsueh Yuan-ch'ao, I8I
Hu San-hsing, 98
Hua-yen sect, 48, 49
Huan Yen-fan, 152, 153, 286nl20
Hui-neng, 48
Hung, Crown Prince, 23
Hung Mai, 202
Hyoso, King of Si 11a, 122
I-cheng (volunteers). 111
l-ching, 48
Ideology, state, development of, 26-50
during Han, 26
Empress Wu and, 49“50, 126-127, 129
Japan, II6
Jen Chih-ku, I88
Jen Ya-hsiang, 177
Jui-tsung, Emperor, 2, 40, 52, 63, 68, 101, 126, 130, 131, 132, 143, 145, 146,
148, 153
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Kao Chi-fu, 174
Kao Chien, 170
Kao Chih-chou, 182
Kao Ch"un-ya, 11-12
Kao-tsu, Emperor, 11, 14, 15, 74, 93, 112
Kao-tsung, Emperor
accomplishments of, 19, 84, 105, 155
foreign policy of, 109, 112
and great clans, 77, 79, 80
and obeisance controversy, 32-34, 220
relationship with Empress Wu, 16, 17, 19-20, 22, 24-25
Khitan rebellion, I38, 142
Kim Yu-sin, 114, 117, 120-121, 273n89
Ko Fu-yuan, I88
Kogury8, 19, 110, 112-122, 145
Korea, wars with, 55, 79, 105, 109, 110, 112-122.
See also Kogury^, Paekche, Si 11a.
Ku Ts'ung, I96
Kuang-chai Temple, 35
Kuang-ming sheng Emperor's rebellion, 35
Kuo Cheng- i, 183
Kuo-fen temples, 34
Kuo Mo-jo, 6, 159, 210
Kuo Yuan-chen, 141, 146
Lai Chi, 162, I76, 213
Lai Chun-ch'en, 60, 61, 88, I30, 131, 141-142, 143, 151
Lai Heng, 182
Lao Tzu, 22, 30, 66.
See also Taoism.
Legal system of T'ang, 6, 85, 126
Legitimation, political issue of, x, 1, 2, 3, 24, 26-50, 52-53, 66-67, 68-69,
104, 126, 128, 144, 149, 200n5,6,7
Li An-ch'i, I80
Li Chan, 154
Li Ch'ang, 44
Li Chao-te, 131, 133, 136, 143, I89-I90
Li Chen, 65, 66
Li-ahi. (Book of Rites)3 35, 45
Li Chi, 18, 57, 107, 116, 119, 123, 173, 213
Li Chiang, 201
Li Chiao, 12, 55, 137, 144, I5I, 195, 205-206, 236n96
Li Chih, 202
Li Chin-chung, I38, l4l
Li Ching, I7I
Li Ching-ch'en, 184
Li Ching-hsuan, 84, 94, 96, I8I
Li Ching-yeh, 57~59, 64, 65, 156, 250-251
Li Ch'iung-hsiu, 196
Li Chuan, 65-66
Li Ch'ung, 65
Li clan, 42, 44, 66, 74, 126, 132, 154, 157

Index

Li Hsiao-ch'ang, 15
Li Hsien, 32
Li Huai-yuan, 196
Li l-fu, 18, 89, 90, 93, 9A, 176
Li I-yen, 182
Li Lin-fu, 88
Li Mi, lA
Li Shu-t'ung, 211-212
Li Tao-kuang, 193
Li Yu-tao, 189
Li Yuan-chi, 169-170
Li Yuan-su, 190
Liang Wu-ti, ^6, 67
Ling-hu Te-fen, 33
Liu Chih-chi, 8-9, 10, 104, 133, 135
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